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1.  SECTION  I 
GENERALITIES  ON  THE  ACTIVITIES  OF  THE  MINES  SAFETY 
AND  HEALTH  COMMISSION 
1.1.  INTRODUCTION 
1.1.1.  The  year  1975,  covered by this report,  is the third year of the enlarged 
Community  including the United Kingdom,  Ireland and  Denmark;  the terms 
'Community  of Nine'  and  'Community  of Six'  or  'Eur.  9'  and  'Eur. 6'  will, 
however,  still be used. 
1.1.2.  Coal  mining activities 
As  in the three previous reports,  a  number  of statistics on activities 
in the coal mining sector are given below.  These  are based on the 
records of the Statistical Office of the European Communities,  the 
statistical telegram of  21  Januar,y  1976  and figures  supplied by the 
national mines  inspectorates  (see table below). 
Coal  production in 1975  was  5.9%  up  on that of the previous year, 
increasing from  242.6  to  256.8  million tonnes.  But  this apparent 
increase is largely explained by a  production loss in 1974  of approximately 
16  million tonnes,  resulting from  the miners'  strike early in that year. 
In the Federal  Republic of Germany,  the  stab~lization of production that 
was  becoming apparent  towards the  end  of the previous year did not 
materialize fully because of the downturn in industrial consumption of 
electricity. 
In France,  the  14%  and  11%  decreases in production in previous years 
were  arrested,  and  for this year the loss in productive capacity was  ~. 
In Belgium,  however,  the decline of 7 to  8%  recorded in previous years 
continued. -2-
-
'Eur.  9  D  F  I  B  U~KQ 
Production  (million t) 1973  270,2  103,6  25,7  o,oo5  8,8  130,2 
"  "  1974  242,6  101,5  22,9  0,004  4,1  109,2 
"  "  1975  256,8  99,1  22~4  0,004  7,5  127' 7 
~ change 1974/1973  ·- 10,2  -·  211  - 10,9  -- 20  - 8,3  -·  16,1 
%  change 1975/1974  +  5,9  - 2,3  - 2,1  - - 7,5  +  17 ,o 
-
Output  per manshift  Kg/Shift 
Underground - 1974  3572  4196  2799  - 2597  3350 
1975  3567  4o6l  2761  - 24-24  3493 
%  change 1975/1974  --0,1  - 3,2  ·- 1,4  - - 6,7  +  4,3 
- -
Underground workers  on  books  (1000) 
Average  1974  341,0  113,7  42,0  0,2  18,6  169,2 
Average  1975  ,..  342,0  109,3  4o,5  0,2  15,8  172,5 
%  change 1973/1972  - 8,5  - 9,3  - 12("{  - -12,3  -·  11'  2  %  change 1974/1973  - 5, 7  - 3,9  - 10,1  - - 6,0  - 6,6 
%  change 1975/1974  +  0,3  + 0,5  - 1,4  - + 1,1  +  2,0 
- Number  of working mines at the  end 
of 1974  344  47  31  1  15  250 
of 1975  336  46  29  - 14  242 
Capacity abandoned  in 1975  1,4  o,B  0  - o, 1  0,4 
(million t)  ·- .. --·---
,......_ 
Pithead coal  stocks at the  end 
of 1973  23,9  9,0  3,4  0  0,2  10~9 
of 1974  11,9  2,4  3,2  0  0,2  6,0 
of 1975  26,2  9,2  5,5  0  o,B  10,7 
%  change 1975/1974  + 121  +  288  +  69  - +  230  +  79 
-
Stocks of hard coke at  coling plants 
at the end of 1974  (million t)  4  1,7  0,3  0,7  0,3  0,1 
of 1975  12,8  7,9  1,1  1,3  o,1  2,4 
%  change 1975/1974  +  223  +371  + 67  - 51  + 146 
Percentage of output  produced by 
mechanized means  in 1973  95,6  95,5  86,9  - 86,7  98,1 
in 1974  96,6  96,9  89,2  - 91,3  98,3 
in 1975  97,3  97,9  89,9  - 95,9  98,3 
Percentage of powered support:  1973  71,5  55,5  40,0  - 48,1  92,4 
1974  ao,o  75,7  40,6  - 54,8  94,4 
1975·  83,8  82,1 
l 
41,2  - 53,2  94,5  - ---3-
Eight collieries were  closed in 1975  (23  in 1974  and  52  in 1975),  resulting 
in a  reduction in production capacity equivalent  to  1.4 million tonnes, 
f.e.  o.~ of the toal  amount  mined  (11  million tonnes in 1974  and  18 
million in 1973). 
The  number  of registered underground workers  did not  decrease further; 
it rose slightly in the United Kingdom,  the Federal Republic of Germany 
and  Belgium,  and decreased slightly in France.  In previous years the 
decline was  in the region of  10  to  1~. 
The  average underground output  per manshift  changed  only slightly in the 
Community  as a  whole,  from  3572  kg in 1974  to 3567  kg in 1975.  The  sharp 
drop recorded in Belgium  and the Federal Republic of Germ~  may  be 
explained by the large number  of shifts provisionally assigned to 
development  work,  with a  view to stabilizing production levels. -4-
1.1_.3.  Overall accident  figures  (accidents occuring underground only). 
These  figures  could not  be  shown  on  the same  basis for both the 
Six and the United Kingdom,  where  a  different  system of accident 
classification from  the "Six" is used.  Harmonisation of the 
system of classifying accidents in the Community  of 9 is one  of 
the projects which  cannot  be pursued as a  result of shortage 
of staff. 
1.1.3.1.  For the Community  of Six. 
1.1.3.1.1.  Accidents resulting in an absence  from  work  of 4 to 20  days were 
33  985  for a  total of 318,6  million man-hours,  i.e. a  rate of 
106,67  accidents per million man-hours  (mio/h)  compared with a 
rate of 110,97  in 1974  (out of a  total of 34  797  accidents). 
1.1.3.1.2.  Accidents resulting in an  absence  from  work  of 21  -56 days 
were  15  454,  i.e. a  rate of 48,50  per mio/h  compared with 50,62 
in 1974  (out  of a  total of 15  875  accidents). 
1.1.3.1.3.  Accidents resulting in an absence  from  work  of more  than 56  days 
were  4 795,  i.e. a  rate of 15,05  per mio/h  compared with 16,12 
in 1974  (out  of a  total of 5 054  accidents). 
1.1.3.1.4.  There were  110  fatal  accidents  (  0  collective accident),  i.e. 
a  rate of 0,345  per mio/h  compared with 0,456  in 1974,  when  there 
were  143  fatalities,  47  of them  in two  collective accidents. 
1.1.3.1.5.  The  total number  of personnes injured (including casualties 
requiring at least 4  deys'  absence  from  work  and fatalities) 
was  54  344,  i.e. a  rate of 170,57  per mio/h  compared with 
55  869  casual  ties and a  rate of 178,16  per mio/h in 197 4• 
1.1.3.2.  For the United King4om. 
The  number  of persons fatally injured in 1975  was  55,  i.e. a 
rate of 0,181  per mio/h  compared with 37  fatalities and a  rate 
of 0,138  per mio/h in 1974. 
1.1.3.3.  Details and  comments  on  these statistics are given in section IV. -5-
1.2.  GENERAL  ACTIVITIES  OF  THE  MINES  SAFETY  AND  HEALTH  COMMISSION 
1.2.1.  Staffing of Secretariat- Meetings held 
One  post for a  principal administrator which  had been vacant  since  1971 
was  filled on  15  August  1974;  the occupant  of the post  resigned on 
31  October  1975,  bringing the number  of qualified engineers acting as 
secretaries for the working parties down  to three. 
The  Mines  Safety and Health Commission held three meetings,  on 20 
March,  11  July and  2  December;  the Restricted Committees  held pre-
liminar,y discussions on the day before each of these meetings and also 
met  on  10  Januar,y  1975. 
The  working parties and their committees of experts met  33  times on a 
total of 42  days  and there were  in addition 23  restricted pPeparator.y 
meetings.  The  total number  of meetings held,  including  special 
conferences rose to 65,  on  a  total of 75  days. 
Because of the shortage of typing and office staff in the Secretariat, 
made  even more  serious by long periods of sick leave,  it has again 
been :impossible  to keep  pace with all the work  arising from  the tasks 
given to the working parties by the Mines  Safety and  Health Commission, 
and  only preparatory work  could be undertaken to extend the work  of the 
Mines  Safety and Health Commission  to all mineral  extractive industires. 
1.2.2.  Group  accidents 
One  group accident  (accidents resulting in the death or incapacity for 
a  period of at least  eight  weeks  of not  less than five victims) 
occurred in 1975  and  was  immediatley reported to the Secretariat of the 
Mines  Safety and Health Commission.  This was  an explosion at Houghton 
Main  Colliery in the United Kingdom,  in which  five persons were  killed 
and a  sixth was  seriously injured,  on  12th June. 1975. 
Also,  six persons were  killed when  part of a  disused spoil heap  (waste 
tip)  collapsed on  26th August  1975,  at No.  6.  Pit, at Marles in 
Cal onne-Ri  couart  •  ( x) -6-
The  Mines  Safety and Health Commission  studied these accidents at its 
meetings  on  11  July and  2  December.  In the course of its three meetings, 
it also studied the accident  which  occurred at  Lens-Lievin  (Nord  et 
Pas-de-Calais, France)  on 27  December  1974,  when  a  firedamp  and  coal-
dust  explosion killed 42  persons. 
On  11  July it gave the following mandates to the Working  Party on 
Ventilation and Firedamp and the Working  Party on Flammable  Dusts: 
- Working  Party on Ventilation and Firedamp  (x) 
The  Mines  Safety and Health Commission  asks the Working  Party on 
Ventilation and Firedamp to  study all aspects of the accident at  Lens-
Lievin which might  help to prevent  firedamp  explosions,  and  from  this 
to draw up  proposals on preventive measures to be taken to control 
firedamp  emission from  old workings,  whether or not they are being 
salvaged,  and  from  oul-de-sacs  (blind headings,  drifts or development 
drivages) 
- Working  Party on Flammable  Dusts 
The  Mines  Safety and Health Commission  asks the Working  Party on 
Flammable  Dusts to continue its examination of the circumstances and 
causes of the accident at  Lens-Lievin on  27  December  1974.  Great 
importance is attached to any conclusions which might  be  reached, 
especially if standardized measures for the most  effective reduction 
in the risk of dust  explosion in coal mines  can be proposed. 
Reports  on these three group accidents are given in Section III. 
(x)  The  mandate  of the Working Party was  further extended on 6.5.76. -7-
1.2.3.  Decisions of the Mines  Safety and Health Commission 
1.2.3.1.  The  Mines  Safety and Health Commission  either approved findings or took 
decisions on the reports of its working parties in the fields of wincl.ing 
ropes  and  shaft guides;  winding engines and winches;  light alloys; 
electricity;  and  the extension of its responsibilities to cover the 
other extractive industries as followss 
1.2.3.1.1. The  Mines  Safety and  Health Commission  approved three reports on  20 
March  1975  and  requested that abstracts of them  be  included in the  12th 
Report  so  that they would  be brought to the attention of interested 
parties more  swiftly (see  12th Report,  2.2.4.) 
The  three information reports were: 
(a)  A  summary  of current  techniques in shaft winding and  rope haulage 
with special reference to the design of winding engines,  by Mr.  H. 
Arnold,  Head  of the Seilprttfstelle in Bochum  (Doc.  No  2883/74);  (x) 
(b)  The  safety requirements for brakes on winding engines  a.nd  winches 
in the shaft winding plant on the  German mining industry,  by Mr. 
G.  Hauesler,  Ing. dipl. of the Seilprttfstelle in Bochum  (  Doc.  No 
3254/74);  (x) 
(c)  Shaft winding and safety,  by Dr Hoischen,  Oberhausen-Sterkrade 
(Doc.  No  4046/74).  (x) 
1.2.3.1.2.  In the same  field,  the following reports were  approved on 2  December 
1975: 
(d)  A proposal to national governments  on  'Minimum  safety requirements 
for winding and balance  rope  suspension gear,  for shaft winding 
and  sinking installations'. 
It is reproduced in Annex  VII  of this Report;  it was  presented to 
the governments  as a  proposition aimed  at  improving safety in 
accordance with Article  1  of the Mines  Safety and Health Commission's 
terms of reference. 
(x)  These  documents  are available on application to the Secretariat  ~f the Mines 
Safety and Health Commission,  DG  V,  Commission  of th European  Communit~es, 
The  Jean MONNET  Building,  The Kirchberg,  Lu:x:embourg,Tel.  No.  Lux.  43011. -8-
(e)  An  'Information report  on new  aspects of the testing of ropes in 
winding installations subject to high and maximum  stress', which is 
given in Annex  VIII. 
1.2.3.1.3. In connection with its work  on  light alloys,  the Mines  Safety and Health 
Commission took a  decision at its meeting on  11  July 1975  on  a  question 
from  Cenelec  on the use of light alloys for enclosures of electrical 
equipment  in gassy mines;  this was  without  prejudice to ~  opinion 
which the Mines  Safety and Health Commission might  give on the use of 
light alloys for mining equipment  in general.  This matter is discussed 
in paragraph 2.3. on the Working  Party on Electricity,  and the question 
and  answer are reproduced in Annex  IX  of this report. 
1.2.3.2.4. In connection with its work  on electricity, the Mines  Safety and Health 
Commission  approved on 2  December  1975  a  draft directive to be presented 
to the Council  b,y  the Commission  on the approximation of legislation 
in the Member  States regarding electrical equipment  liable to be used in 
an explosive atmosphere in gassy mines.  This procedure  was  an exceptional 
one  for the Mines  Safety and Health Commission  and is described in para-
graph 2.3. 
Extension of the Mines  Safety and  Health Commission's  responsibilities 
In the course of its three meetings the Mines  Safety and Health Commission 
studied the implementation of the Council Decision of 27  June  1974  on 
the extension of its responsibilities,  bearing in mind  the shortage of 
staff in the Secretariat and taking into account  the preparatory work 
done  by the Restricted Committee  on  10  Januar.y.  As  a  result,  on  11 
July it was  decided to set up  an Ad  hoc  Committee  to compensate for the 
fact that the Rules of Procedure of the Mines  Safety and Health Commission 
were  not  amended  by the Council  Decision extending the field of activity 
to all extractive industries.  (The  number  of members  of the MSHC  is 
thereby limited to 36). -9-
This  temporary  committeJ~s to include representatives of the three 
sectors, viz. coal,  oil and gas and other minerals extracted by drilling, 
and all other minerals whether won  in underground mines  or by opencast 
methods.  Its task is to advise the Mines  Safety and Health Commission  on 
the organization of working parties,  taking account  of the priorities 
and the number of staff in the Secretariat,  and to give opinions  on: 
(a)  priority topics in the extractive industries other than coal mining, 
which  could be discussed in existing working parties or 
which  would  call for new  working parties; 
and 
(b)  the possibility of merging  existing working parties and  putting 
other less urgent  problems  'on ice'. 
The  Mines  Safety and Health Commission also decided,  on  11  July 1975,  to 
set up  a  Working  Party on  petroleum,  gas and other material  extracted by 
drilling,  with the following terms  of reference: 
'  1)  to collect  any information available on  safety and  health hazards and 
on the causes of accidents during prospecting,  boring and  extracting to 
obtain petroleum,  gas and other materials in the Community  countries; 
2)  to pinpoint the fields in which  new  Community  work  might  play a 
useful part; 
and 
3)  to be  aware  of work  being carried out  at international level b,y  both 
the working parties set up  at the London  Conference of 1972  and  the 
European Diving Technology Committee  so  as to keep the Mines  Safety and 
Health Commission  informed of progress'• 
The  composition of these two  Working  Parties (i.e. the Ad  hoc  Committee 
on Petrol and  Gas)  was  fixed at the Mines  Safety and Health Commission 
meeting on  2  December  1975;  in the early stages,  both will be limited 
to one  or two  government  representatives per countr.y. 
(x)  This  'Ad  hoc'  group met  on  18  Februar.y 1976. -10-
In the same  connection,  the Mines  Safety and Health Commission  examined 
the activities of all the working parties:on 2 December  to work  out 
priorities for work  which  might  be necessar,y in view of the staff situation 
in the Secretariat and the extension of its responsibilities. 
Meanwhile  the Secretariat has maintained its close contact with the 
European Diving Technology  Committee. 
Experts  from  iron ore mines  attended several working party meetings  on 
matters  concerning them. 
The  name  "The  Mines  Safety and Health Commission"  would be maintained,  but 
would be  completed by "(including the Petrol & Gas  and other extraction 
industries)". 
1.2.5.  Dissemination of information- Conference for engineers from  Mines 
Inspectorates in the Member  States in Bochum  on 9,  10  and  11  December 
1m 
This was  organized by the German  members  of the Mines  Safety and  Health 
Commission,  the Westf!lische Berggwerkschaftskasse,  and the Secretariat 
of the Mines  Safety and Health Commission,  for 70  engineers from  mines 
inspectorates,  most  of whom  were  not  members  of Mines  Safety and  Health 
Commission  Working  Parties. 
Papers  were  presented on the general situation of the  German  mining 
industr,y and  on shield support  systems.  These  were  followed by reports 
on the activities of most  of the working parties,  especially current 
work  to be done  in the near future;  visits to mines  and  mining estab-
lishments were  organized.  A brief report  on this conference is given 
in 2.7. 
1.  2.6 •  Community  safety campaigns 
These  were  conducted as described in 2.7. 2.1.2. 
2.1.3. 
-11-
2.  SECTION  II 
ACTIVITIES  OF  THE  WORKING  PARTIES 
Chapter A - Rescue  arrangements,  mine  fires and underground combustion 
This  Working  Party held four plenary meetings  on  30  January,  25  February 
and  14  November  1975  in Luxembourg,  and  on  25  and  26  June in Yorkshire 
(United Kingdom).  Meetings  of the Committees  of Experts were  held as 
follows: 
- Conveyor belts: four meetings,  of which three were  plenary; 
- Fire-resitant hydraulic fluids:  five meetings,  of which three were 
plenary and  two  were  for medical  experts only; 
- Stabilization of ventilation:  eight meetings,  of which  two  were  plenary; 
- self-rescuers  (anti-CO masks):  four meetings 
making  a  toal of 25  meetings,  of which  16  were  plenary. 
The  Working  Party and its Committees  of Experts continued the work 
described in the  12th Report;  they studied an instance of fire neutral-
ization by means  of nitrogen in the Federal Republic  of Germany,  reached 
agreement  on the initial series of harmonized tests on self-rescuers,  and 
made  further progress in the harmonization at Community  level of tests on 
fire-resistant hydraulic fluids and  conveyor belts. 
Furthermore,  two  reports were  drawn up by independant  experts on the 
stabilization of ventilation in the event  of fire. 
Activities of the Working  Party within the framework of its general 
terms of reference. 
At  its four plenar.y meetings,  the Working  Party continued the exchange of 
information on various topics,  in accordance  with its general terms of 
reference  (Annex  III): 
2.1.3.1.  Itsiudied reports of the rescue operations following the explosions at 
Lens-Lievin  (27  December  1974)  and Houghton-Main Colliery  (12  June  1975); 
the rescue workers had managed  to  evacuate the injured and dead rapidly 
and without  incident,  and to minimize material  damage  - at Houghton-
Main  Collier.y this had involved sealing off the affected area. -12-
2.1.3.2.  The  Working  Party examined  a  British document  on  'Fires in Coal Mines-
Prevention and  Control'  by P.  Thorp  of the National  Coal  Board,  which  was 
presented at a  conference in Montreal  in April  1975.  The  document  had 
already been examined  in 1974  in connection with work  on  the stabilization 
of ventilation,  by members  of the relevant  Committee  of Experts  (12th 
Report  2.1.5.).  Mr.  Thorp's report  provided a  means  of comparing the 
methods  used and  objectives in the United Kingdom  and the Community  of 
Six in the prevention and  control of open fires and  spontaneous  combustion. 
In the report  a  distinction is made  between fire fighting techniques for 
small fires and  severe ones.  It is available from  the Secretariat of the 
Mines  Safety and Health Commission in English,  French and  German. 
In spite of the fact that timber is being increasingly dispensed with 
underground,  since the disaster at Marcinelle,  its utilization is still 
unavoidable in certain cases and  attention is still being given to fire-
proofing treatment for wood.  In the course of its visit to the United 
Kingdom  on  25  and  26  June,  the Working  Party had an opportunity to study 
the British method  of increasing the fire resistance of wood  by  impreg-
nating it under pressure with magnesium  and  calcium salts.  The  method  is 
currently used for lagging wood  and is to be  extended to other types  of 
mine  timber.  Impregnation is monitored by reduced scale tests,  and  a 
full-scale experimental gallery has been constructed on  the surface at 
the NCB's  Yorkshire Regional  Laboratory in  Wath-on-Dearn.  Harmonization 
at Community  level of the conditions for 1/1 -scale tests is envisaged. 
Experiments have  been continued in the Tremonia  experimental gallery for 
the same  purpose,  with financial aid from  the Commission,  as mentioned 
in the  12th Report  in 2.1.7.2.,  but  the timber being impregnated with  Ca  C1 2 
and Mg  c1 2  salts.  Backing of smoke  and the length of fire-breaking 
zones  are also studied in these tests,  which  are described in an interim 
report  produced at the beginning of  1976  (Doc.  No  719/76,  available in 
English, French and  German) • 
The  Working  Party studied a  method  for neutralizing a  district on fire 
with inert gases that was  used in the Osterfeld Colliery at the beginning 
of December  1974.  At  the suggestion of the Head  of the Essen Mine 
Rescue Station,  nitrogen was  injected into a  district where  there was  a 
risk of explosion so that it could be  sealed off.  The  gas  was  brought -13-
to the mine  in tanker lorries of  13  tonnes capacity,  evaporated in 
surface plant  and  introduced into the relevant area  through the existing 
air and water pipelines,  at a  rate of 30  and  then 60  m 3  per minute. 
154  000  m 3  of nitrogen were  used. 
This  successful  operation was  described in an article in the mining 
magazine  'Gluckauf',  which may  be obtained from  the Secretariat of the 
Mines  Safety and  Health Commission,  in English, French and  German  (Doc. 
No  2036/75). 
A recapitula~o~  report giving details of a  number  of applications will 
be  submitted to the Working  Party in 1976. 
The  Working  Party took note of an instruction circular from  the 
Landesoberbergamt  of North Rhine-Westphalia in Dortmund,  dated  13 
September  1974,  on the use of polyurethane,  for injection into strata. 
The  Mines  Safety and Health Commission has already expressed an opinion 
on the use of foamed  urethanefor surface coating purposes,  in view of 
the inflammability of the product,  and  advised that it be used only in 
special cases under strict supervision. 
(7th Report  of the Mines  Safety and  Health Commission,  Annex  VI). 
The  Landesoberbergamt  recommendations  and the instructions for use 
accompanying them  concern the use and approval  of polyurethane-based 
resins underground for stabilizing strata,  when  introduced into the rock 
through drill holes,  by injection or using cartridges. 
The  instruction circular may  be obtained from  the Secretariat in English, 
French and  German  (Doc.  No  700/75). 
The  Working  Party,  together with the Working  Party on Roof  Control,  is 
continuing its search for mortars and sealing products that have the 
same  high adhesion properties as the above-mentioned products but are 
completely fireproof. -14-
2.1.3.7. A general  outline was  obtained of the use of hand-held instruments for 
measuring the oxygen content,  total explosibility,  and  carbon monoxide 
content of gas  and fumes.  The  replies to a  questionnaire gave the 
dimensions,  weights,  operating principle and  stage of development  of these 
instruments for each countr.y.  Copies  of this data may  be  obtained from 
the Secretariat of the Mines  Safety and Health CommissioJ;) The  United 
Kingdom  also has  a  data bank on this subject for major mining countries 
throughout the world,  located at the Safety in Mines  Research Establishment, 
Harpur Hill,  Buxton,  England;  requests for access to this information should 
be made  to the Secretariat of the Mines  Safety and Health  Commission. 
2.1.3.8. On  31  December  1975  the information on  rescue techniques using drill holes 
was  updated and  is given in Annex VI. 
Conv!Yor belts 
As  stated in the  12th Report,  in 2.1.3.,  the Mines  Safety and  Health 
Commission  adopted the  'First report  on tests and criteria of flammability 
of conveyor belts with fabric  core used in coal mines  in the European 
Community'  on  15  November  1974  (Annex  VI  to the  12th Report). 
This report was  forwarded to national governments  at the beginning of 
1975  as a  proposal  aimed  at  improving safety in mines. 
The  German,  Belgian and United Kingdom  mining authorities adopted the 
two  tests recommended,  viz. the propane burner and drum  friction tests. 
In France the manufacturers were  aware  of the existence of these tests 
and in Belgium the conveyor belts currently produced for the coal mining 
industr.y comply with these norms. 
Additional tests are stipulated in Germany  (DIN  22118  - Tremonia model 
experimental galler,y test)  and  in the United Kingdom  (Barthel burner 
test). 
Descriptions of these tests may  be obtained from  the Secretariat of the 
Mines  Safety and Health Commission in English,  French and  German.(xx)  As 
requested by the Mines  Safety and  Health Commission  (12th Report,  2.1.3.), 
the various testing centres- INIEX  (Belgium),  Cerchar  (France), 
Versuchsgnebengesellschaft  (F.R.Germany)  and  NCB  Harrow/Bretby 
Doc.  No.  3065/7) 
Doc.  No.  709/3/74  and 4047/74 -15-
(United Kingdom)  - continued their comparative  test~ on belts 
manufactured in these countries, using five types of test:  the two  tests 
recommended  in the first report,  the DIN  22118  and Barthel burner tests 
and  a  critical oxygen test.  A quality control test has  proved to be 
necessary and a  suitable method is being sought.  The  first report has 
been brought  up  to date,  defining more  exactiy certain details,  especially 
those relating to the burner diaphragm,  and to rejection and acceptance 
criteria (Doc.  3425/75,  available from  the Secretariat of the Mines 
Safety and  Health Commission  in English, French and  German). 
The  Committee. of Experts  examined  a  method used in France for the laboratory 
testing metal  carcass belts,  and the possibility of adapting the propane burner 
test for use on this type of belt.  No  decision has been reached;  in the 
Federal Republic if Germany,  these belts are tested in the Tremonia fUll-
scale galler.y,  but the test is costly and not  suitable for frequent use, 
and further research is necessa.ry to find a  small scale test for metal  carcass 
belts. 
Fire-resistant hydraulic fluids 
Following the publication of the 5th Report  listing the specifications 
and testing conditions from  the 4th Report  which were  applicable in the 
former Community  of Six on the one  hand and adding the specifications for 
the United Kingdom  on the other,  the Committee  continued its harmonization 
work,  especially with regard to tests of fire-resistance and toxicity. 
A new  flammability test is under study at the SMRE  (Great Britain)  which 
can measure the flame persistance or heat output;  the results are 
analyzed statistically.  This method  was  used to test fluids fulfilling 
the requirements for the British test as well  as fluids fulfilling the 
requirements given in the 4th Report.  The  Committee  of Experts met  in 
the United Kingdom  on  11  and  12  October 1975  to study this apparatus and 
the other testing methods  used in that countr.y. 
As  for health hazards,  the Committee  of Medical Experts continued its 
tests on chlorinated diphenyls  and compared the British and continental 
po:ints of view on the basis of the tests described in the 5th Report. -16-
A statistical survey was  conducted on the consumption of the various 
types of hydraulic fluid.  At  the end  of the year,  the Committee 
requested that its terms of reference be  extended to include lubricants, 
as oils and greases had  pl~ed a  part in an appreciable number  of fires, 
or combustions  reported to the Inspeotorates,  especially in the United 
Kingdom. 
2.1.6.  Filter self-rescuers 
As  mentioned in the  12th Report,  a  Committee  of Experts  was  set up  at the 
end  of 1974  and  drew up  a  list of universal minimum  criteria for the 
design and testing of the filter self-rescuers in use in Community  mines. 
The  first part of this report  was  completed in the course of the year 
and  submitted to the Mines  Safety and  Health Commission  on 6 May  1976; 
it was  then forwarded to national governments  as a  proposal  aimed  at 
improving safety in coal mines.  These  minimum  requirements may  even 
be too  low for certain countries where  regulations in this field are 
already more  stringent.  The  report  does not,  however,  state that it is 
necessary to use these types of filter. 
Although this first part  was  only approved by the Mines  Safety and 
Health Commission  in 1976,  it is reproduced in Annex  X of the  13th Report 
to bring it to the attention of interested parties as quickly as possible 
The  second part of the report  will be  concerned with the maintenance of 
self-rescuers and training in the use of the equipment  in the sort of 
conditions in which  they would  be used,  i.e. hampered  by darkness,  dust, 
fumes  and heat;  the need for this type of training has been referred to 
in the Report  of the Chief Inspector on the disaster at Houghton Main 
Colli~ (12th June  1975). 
2.1.7.  Stabilization of ventilation in the event  of fire 
The  Committee  of Experts met  twice to continue its examination of a· 
. document  entitled  'Summar.y  of the measures  taken to stabilize ventilation 
in the event of fires in underground workings  (other than shafts)'. 
This report consists of a  concise  (7 page)  summar.y  of the results of 
various work  collated by two  independent  experts,  an important  document -17-
that is currently being translated into French and  German.  The  work  was 
subsidized by the Commission  of the European Communities  and the results 
will be distributed under the names  of the authors,  whereas the summary 
will be  examined by the M.s.H.c. 
2.2.  Chapter B  Winding  ropes  and shaft guides,  winding engines  and winches 
(x) 
The  Working  Party met  in Bochum  on  14  and  15  April  and  in Luxembourg  on 
12  September. 
In Bochum  the Working  Party visited the Rope  Testing Centre,  and in 
Sterkrade the winding engine works  of the Gutehoffnungshtitte  (  CIHH) 
Sterkrade Aktiengesellschaft,  where it saw  an illustration of the 
techniques described in the information reports  (summarized  in the  12th 
Report,  and  approved by the Mines  Safety and Health Commission  on  20 
March  1975  (see 1.2.3.1.1. above);  see also information report  mentioned 
in this chapter and  reproduced in Annex  VIII of this Report).  These 
techniques are essentially designed for modern  conditions,  with high 
payloads and  speeds,  for both vertical and  horizontal applications  (e.g. 
shaft winches  and  monorails).  The  reports cover braking systems for 
winding engines  (a braking system was  responsible for the Markham 
accident)  and  the study of dynamic-stress fatigue in ropes  and  components 
of captive rail horizontal transport  systems,  monorails or floor-mounted 
rail track haulage. 
On  12  September the Working  Party completed work  on its draft safety 
proposals for winding and  balance rope  suspension gear,  mentioned in 
1.2.2.1.2. above,  for submission to the Mines  Safety and Health Commission 
on  2  December  1975~x)These are minimum  requirements  which could be incor-
porated in national regulations.  The  Working  Party nominated experts on 
winding engines to form  a  sub-committee which  would  keep  in touch with the 
British committee  set up  after the Markham  accident  (30 July 1973), 
especially with the study group  examining braking systems.  The  experts 
met  in Great  Britain on  19  and  20  November  1975  to  study ongoing research 
in this field,  which it should be possible to incorporate,  without 
duplication of effort,  into the research project  receiving financial aid 
from  the Commission  mentioned in the  12th Report  in paragraph 2.2.5. 
Adopted by the Mines  Safety and Health  Commission  on  2 December  1975 
(see Annex VII  of this Report). -18-
Lastly the Working  Party began work  on  a  study for the harmonization of 
regulations on  ropes,  taking account  of the regulations in force in 
Community  countries and the standards set by the International Standards 
Organization.  It began by studying ways  of calculating the breaking load 
for winding ropes. -19-
2.3.  Chapter C - Electricity 
2.3.1.  The  Working  Party held plenary meetings  on  5  a.nd  6 February,  4  and  5 March, 
29  and  30  April;  26  and  27  June,  2  and  3  September and  6 October,  and held 
three preparatory meetings  on  4 June,  15  September and  16  October,  making 
a  total of  14  days  of meetings. 
2.3.2.  Continuing the harmonization studies begun in 1974  and mentioned in 2.3. 
of the  12th Report,  the Working  Party drew up  and finalized a  Draft 
Directive to be  submitted to the Council  of Ministers on the approximation 
of the laws  of the Member  States concerning electrical equipment  for use 
in potentially explosive atmospheres in gassy mines.  (Doc.  No  1411/8/75, 
·available from  the Secretariat of the Mines  Safety and Health Commission in 
English, French and  German)  and an explanatory memorandum  giving the grounds 
for this directive  (Doc.  No  2032/5/75). 
2.3.2.1. It submitted the Draft  Directive to the Mines  Safety and Health Commission 
together with a  report  (Doc.  No  1807/4/75)  which  explains that this draft 
is an adaptation to gassy mines  of a  directive produced b.y  Directorate-
General  XI,  in connection with the removal  of barriers to free circulation, 
on the design of electrical equipment  for use in potentially explosive 
atmospheres  (which  excluded equipment  designed for work underground in 
mines  susceptible to firedamp),  adopted by the Council of Ministers on  18 
December  1975  (OJ  No  L 24,  30.1.197~,  P•  '(). 
2.3.2.2. This directive would  be  accompanied by harmonized  standards based on 
European standards produced by the European Committee  for Eleotrotechnical 
Standardization (CENELEC)  which  would  also be  examined  by the Working  Party 
to adapt  them  to gassy mines,  and presented to the Mines  Safety and Health 
Commission  for adoption as harmonized  standards.  This  work  was  begun in 
1974;  more  recently the Mines  Safety and Health Commission  was  able to 
offer a  solution to three questions asked by CENELEC  (see  12th Report, 
S.3.,  and Annex  VIII);  the fourth question,  on the use of light alloys 
for the construction of enclosures for electrical equipment,  was  also 
settled by the Mines  Safety and Health Commission  in 1975  (see  1.2.3.1.3. 
and Annex  IX). -20-
2.3.2.3.  The  Mines  Safety and Health Commission  adopted this draft directive 
on  2  December  1975,  taking into account that the harmonization referred to 
was  optional;  i.e. a  date was  not  specified by which all national  standards 
would  have to be  rescinded.  It is therefore permissible at the moment  for 
the national  standards and harmonized  standards to exist concurrently. 
The  Working  Party also started work  on part of the third phase of their 
mandate  on acceptance procedures. -21-
2.4.  Chapter D - Flammable  dusts 
2.4.1.  The  Working  Party met  on  10  June  and  10  November  1975  and a  Committee  of 
Experts met  on  4  December  1975. 
2.4.2.  The  meeting on  10  June  was  devoted to  examining all the aspects of the 
part played by flammable  dusts in the Lievin disaster on  27  December  1974• 
The  Working  Party decided to  draft  recommendations  on methods  for 
neutralizing coal dust  with hygroscopic  saltJf)and on water barriers, 
especially wide-action water barriers.  These  subjects were  discussed in 
information reports approved by the Mines  Safety and Health Commission  on 
22  Januar.y  1974  and  annexed to the  11th Report  (Annexes  VI  and VII).  The 
reports are to be updated and presented in an appropriate form,  following 
discussions of the advantages  and  drawbacks  of these methods.  Their 
place in the range of measures  already in existence, will be  indicated. 
The  Mines  Safety and Health Commission  ratified  the Working  Party's approach 
on  11  July and  instructed it 'to continue its examination of the circum-
stances and  causes of the Lens-Lievin accident  (27 December  1974).  Great 
importance is attached to any conclusions which  might  be  reached, 
especially if standardized measures for the most  effective control of dust 
explosions in coal mines  oan be proposed'• 
2.4.3.  On  10  November  1975  the Working  Party continued its examination of the 
circumstances and  causes of the accident at Lievin on  the basis of the 
information given in the standard questionnaire.  'Memorandum  on  information 
necessary for the examination of coal-dust  explosions or ignitions of 
firedamp  in mines',  (completed by personnel of the Mines  Inspectorate 
carrying out the enquir.y)  which is based on a  recommendation by the Mines 
Safety and Health Commission  adopted on 6 February 1973  (Annex VII to the 
10th Report).  It took note of a  programme  instituted by Charbonnages  de 
France to minimize  the danger of firedamp  and  coal-dust explosions in mines 
classified as at risk by:' 
(a)  improving neutralization by permanent  wetting,  new  efficient methods 
of stone dusting,  and dust  binding using hygroscopic  salts; 
(x)  adopted by the M.s.H.c.  on  3.9.76.  (Doc.  No.  735/3/76.) -22-
(b)  new  methods  for preventing coal-dust  explosions using water barriers 
of the wide-action or concentrated type,  depending on the location. 
The  Working  Party drew up its own  programme  consisting,  initially, of 
work  on the following:  neutralization with hygroscopic  salts,  water 
barriers,  sampling and use of water  (including water infusion).  It 
appointed a  group of experts which  met  on 4 December  1975  to examine  a 
draft  recommendation on hygroscopic salts. -23-
2.5.  Chapter E - Joint  accident statistics 
2.5.1.  The  expert's study mentioned in the  11th and  12th Reports in 2.5. was  up-
dated for  1973  and  1974.  It is contained in a  document  entitled  'Trends in 
very serious and  fatal  accidents in the United Kingdom  and in the Community 
of Six in 1958-74'  (Doc.  No  932/76).  The  Working  Party was  unable to 
examine  this document  in 1975. This work will be  continued in 1976 if the 
Secretariat has sufficient means  at its disposal. 
2.6.  Chapter F  - Health 
2.6.1.  The  Working  Party met  once,  on  29  Januar.y. 
2.6.2.  It continued its study of the replies to a  questionnaire on the analysis of 
mine  airs with regard to concentrations of respirable dusts  (Doc.  No 
1771/74). 
In a  general  summar.y  (Doc.  No  3079/74),  the replies to the questionnaire 
are compared;  for each countr.y,  they show  the arrangements made  to measure 
respirable dusts,  the apparatus  and  sampling methods  used,  the staff 
responsible for obtaining samples,  the evaluation  of the results, the 
positioning of samplers and the duration and  frequency of sampling depending 
on the working areas  concerned. 
Finally,  the maximum  concentrations of dust  normally allowed in each 
countr,y are  shown,  with the criteria originally used for defining these 
limits,  the action to be taken if the permissible limits are exceeded and 
the criteria justifying this action,  as well  as the intervals between and 
arrangements for X-ray examinations of the thorax. 
Analysis of this information resulted in the following conclusion: 
2.6.2.2.1. Document  3079/74  (amended)  could be distributed for information. 
2.6.2.2.2.  In connection with the comparison of maximum  coneentrations with a  view to 
their standardization: 
(a)  maximum  dust  concentration levels were  fixed,  on  the basis of medical 
studies,  to minimize the number  of workers  affected; -24-
(b)  these limits are dependent  on both the point of sampling and the 
apparatus used; 
(c)  the limits were  chosen to take account  of the fact  that different 
types of dust  have different effects on health; 
(d)  a  programme  of comparative measurements  with different measuring 
equipment  is being conducted,  with financial aid from  the Commission, 
in the United Kingdom,  Belgium,  Federal Republic of Germany  and France, 
in ten workings using all the measuring instruments  simultaneously, 
positioned as stipulated in the regulations; 
(e)  only when  the results of these comparative tests are available will 
it be possible to continue the comparison of maximum  admissible con-
centrations with a  view to standardization. 
The  Working  Party took note of a  document  of basic scientific information 
on noise and lighting.  It considered that available knowledge  and 
findings  about  noise  should be  pooled to see what  technical  studies were 
still necessar,y and  should be  encouraged,  and  to·pe~it it to 
compare  regulations or draft regulations.  Little data was  available with 
regard to lighting in the mining environment. 
This work  has been temporarily suspended as  a  result of the resignation 
of the Working  Party's seoretar,y  • 
Further work  should give priority to the following: 
(a)  the control of dust  from  powered  support  systems  and  face  crushers; 
(b)  noise control  (technical and  legal aspects); 
(c)  heat control. 
The  work  on  comparison of regulations relative to measurements  of respirable 
dust  concentrations and the determination of maximum  admissible  concentrations 
should be restarted as  soon as the results of the comparative tests now 
in progress are lmown. -25-
2.7.  Chapter G- Sociological  and  psychological factors affecting safety 
- Dissemination of information and safety campaigns. 
The  Working  Party met  on 23  May  and  17  November  1975,  mainly in order to 
examine  the results of the safety campaigns.  The  following reports were 
considered: 
2.7.1.1.  Campine  coalfield- 1973- 'Accidents due  to falls of heavy rook, during 
the drivage of roadweys  and stables,  (Doc.  No  4169/73). 
The  campaign was  divided into four stages: 
. (a)  a  programme  of information for supervisory staff; 
(b)  analysis of the hazards in different  situations; 
(c)  establishment of instructions based on the reports drawn up  by the 
'organizers'; 
(d)  personal  contacts. 
As  a  result of this campaign,  lists of hazards  and  of measures to be taken 
during operations were  drawn up. 
2.7.1.2.  Campine  coalfield- 1974- 'Accidents during drivage of roadways  and 
stables'  (Doc.  No  3917/74). 
This was  carried out  along the same  lines as the previous campaign but 
covered all drivage operations,  i.e. all hazards. 
The  results of the two  safety campaigns at Campine  are difficult to 
quantify,  but the workers'  safety sense and the quality of work  have 
improved. 
2.7.1.3.  Saar Coalfield- 1973- 'Continuous  conveyors'  (Doc.  No  713/74) 
This campaign was  in five  stages: 
(a)  programme  of information for administrative staff and the press; 
(b)  programme  of information for management  staff,  supervisory staff a.nd 
workers'  representavies; 
agreement  on the content of the campaign; -26-
distribution of check lists; 
(c)  planning and  implementation of measures to maximize  safety in work 
with continuous conveyors; 
(d)  training of specialized staff; 
(e)  programme  of information for all staff. 
Comparison of the figures  showing accidents six months  qefore and six 
months  after the campaign have  shown  that total accidents caused by 
continuous  conveyors,  for which the figure was  0.900 per  10  000  shifts 
before the campaign,  dropped to 0.696  per  10  000  shifts after the campaign; 
there had therefore been a  22.7%  drop in accidents. 
2.7.1.4.  Ruhr coalfield- Ruhrkohle  AG  campaigns- 1973  and  1974  (Doc.  No  1391/75) 
and the  'Gewerkschaft Auguste Victoria'  mining company  - 1973  (Doc.  No 
1392/75)  on  "continuous  conveyors". 
These  campaigns  were  carried out  along the same  lines as those in the 
Saar area.  In one  of the Ruhrkohle  AG  groups of mines  (Bergbau  AG  -
Dortmund),  the campaign also  included an exhibition of all the safety 
devices  concerned. 
2.7.1.5.  Charbonnages  de France- 1973 a·nd  1974- 'Prevention of accidents linked 
with mechanized handling operations'  (Doc.  No  3993/75) 
This  campaign invo  1  ved: 
1)  training and raising  safety~awareness of staff and workers at all levels, 
2)  major back-up by audiovisual media; 
3)  studies aimed  at  improving or adapting equipment. 
2.7.1.6.  All coalfields in the Federal Republic  of Germany- 1975  and  1976-
'Accidents caused by falls of ground'  (Doc.  No  3993/75) 
This campaign was  begun in autumn  1975•  It comprises the same  stages as 
the campaign on  'continuous conveyors',  but the production of check 
lists has been abandoned. -27-
2.7.1.7.  All  mines  in the Federal Republic  of Germany- 1974  and  1975- 'Noise' 
(Doc.  No  3994/75) 
The  aims  of this campaign were: 
1)  to  reduce the harmful  effects of noise by methods  that  could be put 
into practice in the short  and medium  term; 
2)  elimination of extreme noise levels  (above  100  dBa  at the workplace); 
3)  to  encourage  'noise-awareness'  among  workers; 
4)  to  eliminate potential accident hazards due  to noise. 
Financial assistance from  the Commisssion of the European Communities 
could not  be granted for this campaign. 
In  1975  the following financial  assistance was  awarded  by the Commission 
of the European Communities: 
Campine:  FB  500  000  (Safety campaign on the prevention of accidents 
linked with handling of equipment) 
Saar:  FB  500  000  (Safety campaign on  'Accidents caused by falls of 
ground'). 
Conference for engineers  from  Mines  Inspectorates in Bochum  (FR  Germany) 
on 9,  10  and  11  December  1975. 
A summary  is given below of the proceedings of this conference,  which 
was  mentioned in 1.2.5. above  and  which  was  attended by  70  engineers 
from Mines  Inspectorates in the Member  States. 
2.7.3.1._  Papers  presented on the first day. 
2.7.3.1.1.  The  participants were  welcomed  by Mr  Schnase,  Ministerialrat in the 
Federal Ministry for Economic  Affairs in Bonn  and  a  member  of the Mines 
Safety and  Health Commission,  by Mr  Hurck,  member  of the managing board 
of the Westfalische Berggewerkschaftkasse in Bochum  and Mr  Shanks, 
Director-General for Social Affairs at the Commission of the European 
Communities  in Brussels. 
The  following papers  were  presented: -28-
2.7.3.1.2.Survey of the coal  mining industr.y in the Federal Republic  of Germany, 
by Mr  Jakob,  chief executive secretary of the  General  Association of the 
German  Coal  Mining  Industr.y,  Essen  (Doc.  No  3736/75,  available in English, 
French  ,  German  and  Italian. 
Mr  Jakob listed the coal deposits,  their location and characteristics, 
and the main  reserves of coal  (24 000 million tonnes  of workable coal), 
and  went  on to describe the conditions and main features  of mining 
operations,  stressing the  economic  importance of the  German  coal  mining 
industr.y which  supplied that  countr,y's  iron and steel  industr.y with coke 
and  accounted for a  major part of electricity production.  He  analysed 
the effects of the  economic  recession on the energy policy agreed on in 
1973,  one  of whose  aims  had been to stabilize coal  production. 
2.7.3.1.3.The extraction of minerals  (except  hard coal)  in the Federal Republic  of 
Germany,  by Mr  Reiche,  President  of the  Geologisches  Landesamt  (Geo-
logical  Office)  for North Rhine-Westphalia,  Krefeld  (Doc.  No  3744/75, 
available in English,  French,  German  and  Italian). 
Mr  Reiche  also listed the various non-hard-coal  deposits,  with their 
location and  estimated reserves;  in the case of lignite,  there were 
35  000 million tonnes  or  11  000  million t.c.e. of reserves that  were 
workable  and profitable under the present  conditions  (126  million tonnes 
were  produced in 1974); 
oil- 74  million tonnes  of known  and probable reserves  (6.2 million tonnes 
were  produced in 1974); 
natural gas - 315  000  million m 3  of known  reserves  and  probable  reserves, 
20  000 million m3  production in 1974; 
salts and  potash - production more  than covered  German  requirements; 
iron,  zinc and lead ores - production covered  7%,  25%  and  10%  of German 
needs  respectively. 
The  value of all the minerals  extracted,  including basalt,  sand,  gravel 
and other materials,  is estimated at  40-42 000 million DM  at  1974  prices. 
2.7.3.1.4.0ccupational safety in mines  in the Federal Republic  of Germany,  a  joint 
task for mines  inspectorates,  companies,  trade associations and technical 
services,  by Mr  Coenders,  President  of the  Landesoberbergamt  for North 
Rhine-Westphalia in Dortmund,  and  member  of the Mines  Safety and Health -29-
Commission  (Doc.  No  3826/75,  available in English,  French,  German  and 
Italian). 
It was  pointed out  that in the Federal Republic  of Germany  mining plans 
were  subject to an official approval  procedure.  They  were  drawn up  by 
mining operators,  approved or otherwise by the Mines  Inspectorate,  and if 
contested were  examined  by experts from  the trade associations and tech-
nical services.  The  provisions of the plan were  binding once it had 
been approved. 
Similar collaboration was  necessary before new  regulations could be 
published. 
Each mine  had its own  safety and  occupational medicine service. 
In 1975  North Rhine-Westphalia had  spent  9 million DM  on studies to improve 
safety and health in mines,  not  including the financial  assistance given 
to the Versuchsgrubenesellsohaft in Dortmund. 
2.7.3.1.5. Use  of powered  shield support  systems in hard coal mines  in the Federal 
Republic  of Germany,  by Mr  Grotowsky,  Mining Director of the Hugo  Kine 
of Ruhrkohle  AG  (Doc.  No  3735/75,  available in English,  French,  German 
and  Italian). 
The  paper illustrated the technical theme  chosen for the conference because of 
its topicality.The development  of powered  support  systems  since  1969  was 
outlined;  thanks to the use of shields,  such  systems had been adapted to 
difficult conditions,  e.g. fragile roof conditions,  larg seam  thicknesses 
and  steep gradients. 
In July 1975,  75  faces had been equipped with this type of support,  with 
seam  thicknesses between 1.6. and 3.3. metres  and angles of dip from  18 
degrees to as much  as  36  degrees.  Safety at the face had been improved 
the frequency of accidents due  to falls of ground was  halved when  indivi-
dual steel supports were  replaced by conventional  powered  supports,  and 
was  reduced to one  sixth when  shield support  systems  were  introduced. 
Mr  Ritter of the Landesoberbergamt  in Dortmund  enlarged upon this report 
by describing the administrative provisions affecting this type of support, 
especially with regard to resistance to roof lowering and directives 
governing approval  of types of powered  supports  (Doc.  No  3945/75,  avail-
able in English,  French,  German  and  Italian). -30-
2.7.3.1.6.  These papers  on the situation of the mining industr,y in Germany  and the 
technical,  economic  and legal aspects affecting health and  safety in 
mines  were  followed bt  a  paper by Mr  Leclercq,  the Secretary of the 
Mines  Safety and  Health Commission,  who  outlined the histor,y of the Mines 
Safety and Health Commission,  beginning with the Bois  de  Cazier disaster 
in Marcinelle in 1956,  and describing the way  in which the MSHC  took 
action,  under its mandate  from  the Council  to make  proposals to governments, 
its working methods  with its eleven working parties,  its achievements,  its 
current  work  and its prospects for the future,  especially in view of the 
extension of its responsibilities to cover all extractive industries 
(Doc.  No  1600/75,  available in English,  French,  German  and  Italian). 
2.7.3.2.  On  the second day,  the Chairmen of the working parties described the 
activities of their Working  Parties. 
2.7.3.3.  Finally,  on the third day,  the participants visited workings  with shield 
support  systems,  or alternatively,  lignite mines  owned  by the Rheinische 
Braunkohlenwerke Aktiengesellschaft  in Cologne  or mining establishments 
in the Ruhr area. -31-
2.8.  Chapter H - Ventilation and Firedamp 
2.8.1. 
2.8.2. 
The  Working  Party met  in Luxembourg  on 7 May  and  11  November  1975.  A 
preparatory meeting was  held in Bochum  on 6 June. 
On  1 May  the Working  Party examined  an interim report  on the disaster at 
Lens-Lievin on  27  December  1974.  It continued this work  on  11  November 
and also studied the report on the accident  at Houghton Main colliery 
(12  June  1975).  These  two  accidents will be  examined further,  on the 
basis of the report  following the official public inquiry chaired by HM  Chief 
Inspector of Mines  and  ~arries, for the Houghton Main Oolliery explosion and 
the replies to the MSHC  standard questionnaire  (Memorandum  on  information 
necess~ry for the  examination of coal-dust  explosions or ignitions of 
firedamp  in mines)  for Lens-Lievin.  The  Mines  Safety and  Health 
Commission's  mandate for the latter accident is,  we  repeat,  worded  as 
follows:  'The Mines  Safety and  Health Commission  asks the Working  Party 
on Ventilation and Firedamp to  study all aspects of the accident  at  Lens-
Lievin which might  help to prevent firedamp  explosions,  and  from  this to 
draw up  proposals  on preventive measures to be taken to control firedamp 
emission from  old workings,  whether or not  they are being salvaged,  and 
from  dead ends'.  (x) 
In this connection,  the Working  Party took note of a  British document 
entitled  'The Control  of Methane  emitting from  sealed-off areas using 
pressure chamber techniques',  summarized  in six pages  in Doc.  No  3965/75 
(available in English, French and  German). 
2.8.3.  In addition,  the Working  Party continued the work  already mentioned in 
the  12th Report  in 2.8.3. 
2.8.3.1.  In connection with its work  on methanometers,  the Working  Party collected 
data on the criteria and  specifications for hand-held methanometers; 
Doc.  Nos  (Germany)  2996/74,  (France)3003/74,  (Belgium)2349/75,  (United 
Kingdom)  2227/74,  available in English,  French and  German.  These  data 
were  collated in a  document  entitled  'Summary  of the specifications 
and testing regulations for hand-held methanometers  in Community  countries' 
and will be discussed by a  committee  of experts in 1976  with a  view to 
standardization. 
(x)  This mandate  was  further modified on 6.5.76. -32-
No  further progress has been made  in the study of the effect of firedamp 
on the explosibility of coal dust,  pending the results of tests being 
carried out in the Federal Republic  of Germany  by the Westfalische 
Berggewerkschaftskasse  (Doc.  No  1836/76,  currently available in English, 
French and  German). 
Danger of firedamp  ignition underneath armoured  conveyors. 
The  findings of a  series of systematic measurements  of methane  concen-
trations underneath this  equipment,  requested by the Mines  Safety and 
Health Commission  on  15  November  1974  (see  12th Report,  2.8.3.3.)  have 
been collated for Belgium,  France,  and the Federal Republic 
of Germ~.  A general report  has  been drawn up by one  of the 
experts.concerned and will  serve as the basis for a  further report,  to 
be  dr~d  by a  restricted committee of experts,  on measures  recommended 
to combat  this danger. 
Use  of Diesel engines in mines:  problem of exhaust  gases  and  of protec-
tion against  explosion and fire.  An  independent  expert  had been charged 
with this study for which financial  assi~e  has been granted by the 
Commission of the European Communities.  It will be available in June  1976 
and will be discussed by the Working  Party. 
Finally,  the Working  Party has gathered together a  series of documents 
on  firedamp  ignitions caused by power  loader and heading machines that 
have  occurred in the past ten years in the United Kingdom,  in the past 
five years in the Federal Republic  of Germany,  and this year in Belgium, 
and  on tests and  research conducted in the United Kingdom  in this field. 
The  following documents  are available from  the Secretariat of the Mines 
Safety and Health Commission in English,  French and  German. -33-
National Coal  Board Report  on  'Frictional ignitions'  (Doc.  No  578/75) 
Ignition of firedamp by friction during rock cutting - SMRE  Report 
(Doc.  No  2228/75) 
Ignitions of firedamp by power  loaders and  heading machines  - List of 
accidents occurring between 1 Januar.y  1970  and  30  June  1975  in the 
districts of the Landesobergamt  (Mines  Inspectorate)  for North Rhine-
Westphali~ and the Oberbergamt  for the Saarland and Rhineland Pfalz 
(Doc.  No  3072/75) 
Report  on ignitions of firedamp  by power  loaders in the Campine  coal-
field - Incidents occurring on  16  and  24  April  1975  (Doc.  No  3073/75) 
Third  ~eiim Report  of the Joint NCB/HSE/CUMM  Co-ordinating Committee 
on frictional ignitions  (Doc.  No  3738/75 
The  ignition of methane-air by machine  picks autting into  rock by 
F.  Powell,  K.  Billinge and  D.P.  Cutler of the SMRE  (Doc.  No  3075/75) -34-
Chapter  I  - Mechanization 
The  Working  Party met  in Luxembourg  on  19  September  1975  and in Rossing-
ton and Doncaster in the United Kingdom  on 24  and  25  November  1975.  In 
addition,  a  drafting committee met  on 7 October,  22  October and 3 
December  1975. 
On  19  September  1975  the Working  Party examined the reports on specific 
subjects requested from  each of the delegations at the  end of 1974. 
The  topics were:  shearers,  ploughs,  armoured  conveyors  and haulage 
chains,  and  each of the reports  shows  the lessons learnt  from  accidents, 
the measures taken to avoid repetitions,  an analysis of available·data 
on the subject,  conclusions that  can be put  into practice and prospective 
trends.  The  reports are: 
(a)  Serious accidents associated with shearer loaders,  by Mr  Bourne of 
the British delegation (Doc.  No  2215/75) 
(b)  Recommended  safety measures for stripping coal winning with plough 
and  scraper chain conveyor in the coal mining industr.y,  by Mr 
Schonw~lder of the German  delegation  (Doc.  No  1619/75) 
(c)  Study of accidents and proposals for preventive measures,  by Mr 
Deckers,  for the Belgian and Netherlands delegations  (Doc.  No  2380/75) 
Following the  examination of these reports,  the first general report  on 
safety techniques . in winning areas was  drawn up  at the end of the year. 
The  Working  Party also visited a  face  in the United Kingdom  where 
shearer haulage  was  by a  'Rack-a-track'  system,  which  eliminates  haulage 
chain,  breakage or whipping  which,  in Great Britain,  cause between  30 
and  4o%  of the accidents associated with machines.  At  the end  of 1975 
39  of these and other chainless shearer haulage  systems  were  in use in 
Great Britain,  com~ared with 27  in the previous year.  They  were  studied 




Chapter J  - Strata Control 
The  Working  Party  met  in Luxembourg  on 8  January,  2  July and  13 
November  1975,  and  in Ashby,  Leicestershire in the United Kingdom  on 
24  and  25  April  1975. 
It continued work  on the topics already mentioned in the  12th Report  in 
2.10.2. 
The  document  mentioned there,  Doc.  No  2751/74,  describes methods  for 
developing the ends of long wall  faces  so  that they can be mechanized 
and the risk of accidents can be reduced.  One  of these methods  involves 
a  technique  employed  on advancing faces in the NCB's  South Midlands area 
by which the roadway is formed  'in line'  with the face  and the roof is 
normally cut by the shearer,  so  that the area of roof  exposed is reduced 
to a  minimum,  and there is no  break in the support  system,  which is also 
of the powered type,  at the roadhead.  The  Working  Party saw this method 
in use during its visit to the Midlands  on  24  and  25  April  and noted its 
advantages,  not  only for reducing accidents at the roadhead and  end  of 
the coal face,  but  also for roadway stability outbye. 
2.10.2.2.  The  Working  Party also continued work  on ways  of protecting roadways  by 
means  of gateside packs made  with hydraulic binders,  especially by the 
use of natural anhydrite,  as  employed  for several years  now  in the 
Federal Republic of Germany  (Doc.  No  3775/74,  available in English, 
French and  German);  in Great Britain pumped  packing systems have  been 
used,  taking coal  from  the conveyor together with water,  bentonite and 
cement  (Doc.  No  2090/75,  available in English,  French and  German). 
2.10.2.3.  A number  of papers were  received on improving the stability of roadways 
by rock bolting and the injection of adhesive products  (polyurethane, 
resins,  etc.);  some  of these were  'Experience with roof bolting in coal 
and  other mines  in Germany  (Doc.  No  3774/74),  'long-term effectiveness 
of bolting in France'  (Doc.  No  2095/75),  'Strata reinforcement  in NCB 
mines'  (Doc.  No  345/75)  and  'Strata consolidation by injection in France' 
(Doc.  No  2089/75). 
An  information report  summarizing all these papers is being prepared by 
a  restricted committee  of experts. -36-
2.10.2.4.  Injection of adhesive products was  discussed in two  other memoranda 
describing the precautions to be taken during injection of certain of 
these products. 
2.10.6. 
The  Working  Party continued its examination of the lessons to be learnt 
from  the accident  which  occurred at Seafield mine  in Scotland on  10  May 
1973,  in which  five men  were  killed by an extensive fall of roof in an 
inclined seam,  where  powered  supports were  employed at the face. 
The  British National Committee  responsible· for .examining all the 
aspects of this type of working forwarded its report  entitled 'First 
report  of the National  Committee  on Steep seam  working in British coal 
mines'  (Doc.  No  1408/75,  available in English,  French and  German),  and 
the Working Party took note of the report at the end  of the year. 
Examination of this matter will be continued in 1976;  special  powered 
supports have been designed for gradients of more  than 18°,  so  that 
the use of powered  supports is now  possible in steep seams;  in 
workings equipped with powered supports,  the line of face  should always 
be at right angles to the roadways. 
The  work  on rock bursts begun in 1973  by a  restricted group of experts on 
rock mechanics  could not,  unfortunately,  be resumed owing to the limited 
resources of the Secretariat,  but it is necessar,y to continue with this; 
the subject might  be suitable for a  research contract to enable a  report to 
be presented in 1977. 
The  Working Party examined  a  statistical report  on the effect of powered 
support  systems  on the frequency of serious and fatal  accidents in the 
United Kingdom,  where  94%  of coal production is currently mined  on  faces 
equipped with powered  supports.  The  marked  advantages  of using this 
type of support  indicate that the possibility should be studied of 
extending it to all types of faces,  in thick,  thin and  steep seams  as 
well  as to  roa.dheads.  The  Working  Party intends to draw up  similar stat-
istics for the other countries. 
The  Working  Party discussed the problems arising from  the extension of 
the Mines  Safety and Health Commission's  responsibilities to the other 
extractive industries.  It considered itself competent  to deal  with these 
other industries and  from  1975  onwards  has called on the non-coal  industries, -37-
mainly from  French and  Swedish  (observer)  iron ore mines,. where  roof 
bolting and guniting techniques are highly developed,  to assist in its 
work.  It has been found  that  some  techniques could be applied- in coal 
mines,  such as automatic insertion of rock bolts and  mechanized cleaning 
of roofs,  followed by guniting.  Conversely,  information on  long wall 
mining and powered  support  systems is likely to be of interest for 




3.  SECTION  III 
STUDY  OF  GROUP  ACCIDENTS 
These  accidents  are  mentioned  in  1.2.2. 
Accident  at Lens-Lievin 
The  circumstances  and  causes  of  this  accident  were 
studied  by  the  Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission  at 
its meetings  of  20  March,  11  July  and  2  December  1975, 
with  the  help  of  the  French  Government  delegation,  and 
an  interim written  note  from  this  delegation  dated 
15  January  1975,  as  well  as  the  replies  to  the  memo-
randum  on  information  necessary  for  the  examination  of 
coal-dust  explosions  or  ignition of  firedamp  in  mines 
(10th  Report  of  the  Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission, 
Annex  VII)  addressed  to  the  Mines  Safety  and  Health 
Commission  by  the  French  Government  delegation  on  3 
November  1975  (Doc.  3424/75,  available  from  the 
Secretariat in  German,  French  and  English). 
The  administrative  inquiry  is  complete,  and  a  judicial 
inquiry  is  being  carried out  at  the  time  of writing. 
On  27  December  1974  an  explosion  killed  42  men  and 
injured  7  in pit  3  of  mine  19  of  the  Lens  production 
unit  (mines  18  and  7-19-4).  This  pit,  forming  part of 
pit 4,  produces  729  tons  per  day  of  a  type  of  coking 
coal  with  23  %  VM. 
The  inquiry  showed  that  the  accident  was  caused  by  a 
firedamp  explosion  which  was  transformed  into  a  light 
coal-dust  explosion.  This  explosion  occurred  in  the 
'Six Sillons'  area  at  a  depth  of  710  metres  and  trav-
elled  through  a  newly  developed  face  90  m  in  length 
and  2  500  m  of  roadways.  The  face,  1  to  1.2  m  ~iqh 3 • 1 • 3 • 
-39-
was  equipped  with power~d supports  and  had  been advan-
ced  only  1112  metres  before  the  5-day  Christmas  break, 
in  readiness  for  the  permanent  installation of  these 
supports. 
The  accident  occurred  at about  6.15  a.m.,  shortly after 
the  arrival of  the  shift.  The  victims  were  quickly 
taken  to  the  surface:  the  deaths  and  injuries  were 
caused  by  mechanical  effects,  by  burning  or  by  asphyxia. 
The  following  information  is  taken  from  the  above-
mentioned  memorandum: 
3.1.3.1.  The  workings  are  generally  classified as  gassy  and 
dusty. 
The  "Six  Sillons"  seam  has  the  following  character-
istics: 
- volatile matter  content: 
- the  firedamp  emission  is 
emission  per  tonne  varies 
- ash  content:  8% 
23% 
5  m3/t aqd  the  specific 
from  11-33  m3/t 
- seam  thickness:  1.1  - 1.2  m  with  70  em  of  coal  and 
20  em  of  middlings.  The  coefficient of  cleanness 
net  =  50%  gross 
- the  dip  is  from  5-27°.  The  seam  profile  is  irreg-
ular  with  undulations  in  the  roof  and  floor,  in 
particular,  the  top  end  of  the  face  is broken  up  by 
a  series  of  rolls  and  faulting. 
40  m  and  100  m  respectively  above  the  "Six  Sillons" 
seam  are  the  Marthe  and  Jeanne  seams.  67  m  below  is 
the  Victor  seam. -40-
3.1.3.2.  Operating  conditions  in  the  explosion  zone 
The  only  drivage  or  winning  operations  taking place 
at the  time  of  the  disaster were  those  in  Vm  33. 
Drivage  was  begun  on  9  December  1974;  on  21  December 
it measured  47.6  m,  with  a  rise of  12°  and  a  total 
width  of  1.25  m  (seam  thickness). 
VC  72  was  driven  in  October  and  November  1974,  work 
stopped  on  7  December  1974  at  190  m;  ventilation  was 
stopped  on  20  December  and  the  area  closed. 
VM  31  is  a  new  face  in  which  machinery  was  being 
installed:  it was  due  to  be  brought  into operation  at 
the  beginning  of  1975. 
Explosives  were  not  used  in  the  district. 
In  normal  operating  conditions  the  procedure  was  as 
follows: 
the  products  of  seam  31  are  conveyed  via  VC  11, 
which  leads  into  VC  4, 
- VC  4  leads  into  cross-cut  306  which  terminates  at 
mine-car  loading-point  031. 
Material  would  be  transported  to  the  seam  via  VC  4  -
vc  5  - vc  54  - 70  - 71. 
3.1.3.3.  Ventilation conditions  in  the  explosion  zone 
3.1.3.3.1.  See  diagram  for  the  flow  of  the  air current. 
The  volumes  of air in  the  various  workings  are  as 
follows  (m3/s): 
VC  5  :  8m3 ;  VC  7  5.Sm3 ;  VM  31  9m3 ;  VC  71  :  2m3 ; 
VC  7  :  3m3 ;  VC  11  :  4.Sm3 ;  in  each  direction;  VC  4  : 
3  9.5m  • -41-
3.1.3.3.2.  Measurements  revealed  a  firedamp  content  which  never 
exceeded  0.2  - 0.3% 1  and  no  abnormal  outbursts  were 
recorded. 
3.1.3.3.3.  In  VC  72  there  was  an  accumulation  of  firedamp  as  a 
result of  the  shutdown  of  the  auxiliary ventilation. 
By  examining  the  flow  of  the  firedamp  at  the  entrance 
to  the  working it was  established: 
(a)the  firedamp  was  flowing  to  the  entrance  of  this 
heading  at  a  rate  of  1.5  1/s. 
(b)tests  have  shown  that  the  firedamp  leaving  VC  72 
could  not  back  up  VC  70  against  the  airflow. 
(c)this  firedamp  could  only  increase  the  average  fire-
damp  content of  the  air current circulating  in  VM 
31  and  VC  71  by  0.1  - 0.2%. 
(d)the  flow  of  this  firedamp  could  intermittently  take 
the  form  of  a  "roof  layer"  with  an  explosive  content, 
situated in  the  crown  of  the  roadway  in  the  lagging: 
this  layer  was  between  10  em  and  20  em  thick at 
the  entrance  to  VC  72. 
3.1.3.3.4.  In  rise heading  VM  33,  the  ventilation  ventube  was 
crushed  for  some  hours  before  the  disaster;  ventilation 
of  this  heading  was  therefore  disruptedduring  this 
time.  The  re-placing  of  the  supports  when  the  new 
shift arrived  may  have  caused  a  bleed.  The  tests  have 
shown  that it could  not  have  an  explosive  content, 
however. 
3.1.3.3.5.  A  strong  barometric  depression  was  recorded  between 
22  hours  on  26  December  and  8  hours  on  27  December; 
by  morning  the  barometric  pressure  had  fallen  from 
762  to  752  mm,  i.e.  10  mm  in  10  hours  with  a  peak  rate 
of  2  mm/h  between  0  and  6  hours. -42-
Examination  of  the  remote  methanometry  recordings  made 
during  this period  in  the  adjoining districts  does  not 
show  any  unusual  chang.e  of  the  con tent  curves,  and it 
may  be  inferred  that,  in  general,  this  depression  did 
not  have  a  typical  effect  on  the  emission  of  gas  from 
the  old  workings. 
3.1.3.3.6.Flow of  firedamp  from  the  old  workings:  there  is  a 
constant  flow  of  air  from  VC  2  on  stoppage  days  as  a 
result of  a  natural  air  flow. 
3.1.3.4. 
It has  been  shown  by  measurement  that this  flow  of air 
is  weak  (less  than  10  1/s);  most  of  the  time  it is  not 
very  gassy,  since its maximum  firedamp  content  has 
rarely  exceeded  20%.  With  a  100%  firedamp  content, 
this  flow  would  only  have  had  a  negligible  effect 
(less  than  0.5  of  one  thousandth)  on  the  average  fire-
damp  content  of  the  air current  of  21.Sm3/s  circulating 
in  VN  1. 
Coal-dust  in  the  working  zone  and  the  dust-suppression 
measures 
3.1.3.4.1.The quantity  of  dust  deposited  in  the  district was  low 
since  the  seam  was  not  in  normal  operation. 
3.1.3.4.2.An  average  humidity  was  maintained  in  the  district 
before  the  disaster. 
The  dust-suppression  methods  used  in  winning  work 
involved  spraying. 
In  the  roadways  there  are  spraying  and  fine-spraying 
ramps  at  the  delivery  ends  of  and  along  the  conveyors. 
This  method  is primarily  intended  to  suppress  noxious 
dusts. -43-
3.1.3.4.3.Flammable  dusts  were  suppressed  by  neutralization 
with  stonedust. 
The  neutralization ratio measured  in  the  roadways 
before  the  disaster was  around  90%;  the  recorded 
interval between  two  checks  was  less  than  three  months. 
Sampling  is  carried  out  by  sweeping  a  20  em  wide  band 
of  dust  from  a  thin  layer  on  the  periphery  of  the 
roadway.  Samples  are  taken  every  50  m. 
After  the  disaster it was  established that  no  samples 
were  taken  at  floor  level  in  damp  roadways  and  that 
the  neutralization ratio  was  only  measured  on  the 
walls  and  roof.  In  normal  operating  conditions  this 
state of  affairs  appeared  satisfactory,  but after  a 
stoppage  of  several  days  the  floor  became  dry  and 
there  was  a  distinct difference between  the  total 
neutralization ratio  and  the  measured  ratio.  The 
decrease  is  around  40%  after  a  stoppage  of  4  - 5  days. 
3.1.3.4.4.State of  the  explosion barriers 
The  explosion barriers  in question  contained  400  kg 
2  of  stonedust  per  m  of  roadway  cross-section.  They 
consist  of  shelves  60  em  wide  resting  directly  on 
pipes  between  10  and  12  em  diameter.  The  number  of 
barriers  is variable  and  depends  on  their  length  and 
load,  which  is  usually  about  100  kg,  but  sometimes 
120  kg  or  200  kg. 
These  explosion barriers  are  checked  every  month. 
The  layout  of  the  explosion barriers  is  given  in  the 
attached  diagram. 
were  as  follows: 
After  the  explosion  their conditions 3.1.3.5. 
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Cross-cut  2003:  both  explosion barriers  intact~ 
VN  1  :  three  shelves  worked. 
Cross-cut  306:  ten  shelves  upset  and  eight  remained 
in position. 
Cross-cut  102:  three  shelves  worked.  No  other effects. 
Cross-cut  1007:  the  explosion barrier  functioned  with 
50%  efficiency.  No  other  effects. 
Mechanical  and  thermal  effects  and  condition  of  the 
injured 
3.1.3.5.1.These effects  are  described  in detail  in  the  memorandum. 
To  sum  up,  the  dynamic  effects  were  on  the  whole 
slight,  with  more  violent effects  in  certain areas, 
such  as  VC  4  (between  VC  1  and  VC  5)  where  the  conveyor 
was  uprooted  and  hurled  some  distance,  VC  5  where  the 
arches  were  tilted first  one  way  and  then· the  other, 
and  vc  54  where  the  arches  were  tilted and  the  mono~ 
rail shifted. 
3.1.3.5.2.Thermal  effects  were  apparent  in  VC  71  where  wooden 
boards  were  burnt,  and  the  monorail  chains  and  cable 
sheaves  were  thickly  encrusted with  coke  in  VC  7, 
between  VC  70  and  VM  32,  and  at the  entrance  to  VM  33. 
A  plan  of  the  flame  effects  has  been  drawn  up  giving 
the  percentage  of  cenospheres  of  coke  and  semi-coke 
and  the  percentage  of  melted  coal. 
3.1.3.5.3.0f  the  49  persons  who  were  in  the  district: 
- one  has  no  injuries  (Cliquet) 
- one  has  injuries but  no  burns  (earlier) 
- five  have  injuries  and  burns  (Hanot,  Veret,  Delille, 
Nazar  and  Sczepanski) 
- 38  have  died  as  a  result of  injuries  and  burns 
- two  were  poisoned  and  had  slight burns  (Delplanque 
and  Kubiak) -45-
- two  were  poisoned and had burns to the face  and hands 
(  Obert  and Lhermitte  )  • 
3.1.3.6.  Causes  of the explosion 
The  theory proposed after erlensi  ve investigation is that  a.n 
ignition of firedamp  occurred at the intersection of VC  70  and 
VC  71  where,  as pointed out  above,  there was  a  l~er of firedamp 
at the roof and above  the supports. The  cause of ignition of this 
firedamp  cannot  be stated with a  great  deal of certainty;  however, 
it is thought that a  leak from  a  compressed air hose with a 
diameter of 100  mm  was  the most  probable  cause,  by charging 
electrostatically a  fibre.  A hole of about  8  mm  in diameter was 
found in the air hose  some  2 hours before the disaster  :  the 
leakage may  well have  contained particles of rust. This was  the 
only thing in front  of the leakage which  could have been well 
insulated and become  sufficiently charged (see Doc.  No.  3435/75). 
The  firedamp ignition caused an ignition of dusts: 
this was  quite possible since,  as stated above,  the neutralization 
ratio after the five-day Christmas break was  inadequate. 
3.2.  Accident  at Houghton Main Mine,  occurring on  12th June  1975,  which 
resulted in the death of 5 miners,  and the serious injury of another 
This  accident was  the subject of a  public inquiry held by 
H.M.  Chief Inspector of Mines  and Quarries,  which  started on 
26  August  1975  and lasted 9  da\Ys.  Preliminary information on 
this explosion was  dicussed by the Mines  Safety and Health 
Commission  during its meetings of 11  July and  2 December  1975• 
The  Official Report  of the explosion was  received by the 
Secretariat of the MSHC  during 1976  and has been translated in 
extenso into French and German.  Copies  of the original document 
and the translations are available from  the Secretariat. 3.2.2. 
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The  following  is  a  summary  of  the  causes  of  the 
accident  prepared  from  the  Official  Report,  but  for 
a  full  explanation,  see  the  original  report.  The 
Recommendations  of  H.M.  Chief  Inspector  are  re-
produced  in  full. 
3.2.2.1.  In  a  nearly  level  seam,  1.5  metres  thick,  a  360m  long 
arched  development  heading  had  been  driven  taking  the 
seam  and  some  of  the  roof  beds.  The  heading  had  been 
temporarily  stopped.  Normally  it was  ventilated  by 
an  exhausting  fan of a  bifurcated design,  (driven by an 
electric motor),  with a  wet  dust filter attached,  but  due  to a 
mechanical  failure which  caused frictional  sparking the fan had 
been stopped for 9  ~s  before the explosion. 
3.2.2.2.  At  the  end  of  the  afternoon  shift on  12  June  1975, 
two  electricians  and  a  deputy  are  thought  to  have 
attempted  to  restart the  fan  and  shortly  afterwards, 
a  violent  explosion  took  place  which  travelled at 
least  700  metres  down  the  intake  or  conveyor  road-
way,  resulting  in  the  death  of  four  persons  immediat-
ely.  A  fifth  miner  died whilst  trying  to  escape  in 
the  return  air;  he  was  wearing  a  self-rescuer around 
his  neck  but  the  mouthpiece  was  not  in his  mouth. 
H.M.  Chief Inspector's recommendations were  sent to the Mines 
Safety and Health Commission  at the end of 1975,  so that they 
could be  studied by Members  in 1976.  They  are fully reproduced 
below so as to give them  as rapid diffusion as possible. 
REOOMMENDATIONS 
129  I  recommend  that: 
(1)  There should be  amendments  to the following statutor.y 
provisions: 
(a)  The  Mines  and Quarries Act  1954:  Section 10:  the person 
appointed to read reports on behalf of the manager  should be 
the holder of a  first or second class certificate of competency. -47-
(b)  The  Coal  and  Other  Mines  (Managers  and  Officials) 
Regulations  1956: 
(i)  The  provisions  of  Regulation  6A  relating  to 
the  appointment  of  a  competent  person  to 
read  reports  on  behalf  of  an  under-manager 
should  be  revoked. 
(ii)  A  statutory shift report  should  be  introduced 
for  officials  superior  to  deputies  but  sub-
ordinate  to  undermanagers. 
(c)  The  Coal  and  Other  Mines  {Surveyors  and  Plans) 
Regulations  1956: 
The  manager  should  ensure  that  any  information 
that is  necessary  to  be  supplied  to  the  surveyor 
for  recording  on  the  plans  and  sections  which  are 
required  to  be  kept  at  the  mine  is  accurate  and 
should  certify this  by  counter-signing all  such 
plans  and  sections  prepared  by  or  under  the 
supervision  of  the  appointed  surveyor  for  the  mine. 
(d)  The  Coal  Mines  (Precautions  Against  Inflammable 
Dust)  Regulations  1956: 
Regulation  10A  should  be  amended  to  include  the 
recording  on  a  plan  the  position  of all  the  stone 
dust barriers  specified  in  the  manager's  scheme 
by  virtue  of  this  Regulation. 
(e)  The  Coal  and  Other  Mines  (Ventilation)  Regulations 
1956 
These  Regulations  should  be  amended  to  include 
the  following  provisions: -48-
(i)  Rules  should  be  made  for  the  installation  and 
operation of  auxiliary  fans. 
(ii)  Narrow  drivages  which  require  at  any  time  to 
be  ventilated by  auxiliary  means  are,  there-
after,  constantly ventilated by  positive  means. 
(iii)  The  manager  should  specify  the  construction of 
any  fence  erected  to prevent  access  to  an  un-
ventilated part of  a  mine  and  should  ensure 
that it is  maintained  constantly  in  an  effect-
ive  condition. 
(f) (i)  The  Coal  and  Other  Mines  (Fire  and  Rescue) 
Regulations  1956: 
Regulation  27  should  prescribe  standards  for 
the  size,  equipment  and  facilities  of  rescue 
rooms.  The  room  should  be  maintained  solely 
for  rescue  work. 
(ii)  Regulations  should  be  made  to  cover  the  appro-
val,  carrying  and  training  in  the  use  of 
self-rescuers. 
(2)  The  National  Coal  Board  should  implement  as  they 
arise  any  interim  findings  of  the  National 
Committee  referred  to  in para  124. 
(3)  The  National  Coal  Board  Committee  studying  the 
design  of  self-rescuers  should  be  reconvened  as 
soon  as  possible.  The  membership  and  terms  of 
reference  should  be  reviewed. -49-
(4)  The  National  Coal  Board  should  ensure  that wherever 
possible  its specifications  for  auxiliary  and  booster 
fans  are  completed  during  the  time  this  new  equip-
ment  is  in  the  prototype  stage.  Such  prototype 
equipment  should  be  used  only  in  closely  controlled 
conditions.  The  test  and  assessment  requirements 
for  new  equipment  of  this  type  should  include 
standards  or  construction,  perfomance  and  ease  of 
maintenance  underground. 
(5)  When  a  plan  for  the  ventilation of  a  development  in 
a  mine  has  been  prepared  and  signed  no  change  should 
be  made  in  the  proposed  system  of  ventilation without 
the  agreement  of all signatories  of  the  said  plan. 
(6)  Any  change  made  in  a  ventilation circuit should  be 
recorded  forthwith  on  the  rescue  and  ventilation 
plans.  Furthermore,  a  joint working  party  should  be 
set  up  to  review  the  frequency  of  up-dating  all 
statutory  plans  and  the  available  methods  of  plan 
reproduction  so  as  to  reduce  the  time  between  survey 
and  issue. 
(7)  The  equipment  to  enable  deputies  to  detect  flammable 
gas  in  extensive  roof  cavities  should  be  readily 
available  where  needed.  Such  cavities  should  be 
positively ventilated or  filled. 
(8)  At  large  collieries  consideration  should  be  given  to 
the  appointment  of  a  chief  engineer  to  coordinate  the 
activities of  the  electrical  and  mechanical  engineering 
departments.  Where  there  is  no  chief  engineer 
arrangements  should  be  made  to  ensure  that  in  respect 
of matters  likely  to  affect  safety,  there  is  a 
daily  exchange  of  information  between  the  mechanical 
and  electrical engineers  for  the  mine. -50-
(9)  The  National  Coal  Board  should  provide  effective 
means  for  the  immobilization  of  apparatus  which  may 
be  dangerous  by  reason  of  some  mechanical  or  elec-
trical defect  or  abnormality. 
(10)  The  National  Coal  Board  should  review  the  appoint-
ment  of  deputy  managers  and  safety  engineers  at 
collieries.  The  provisions  of  Section  1  of  the 
Mines  Management  Act  1971  should  be  more  widely 
applied  in  this  respect. 
(11)  The  duties  of  safety officers,  ventilation officers, 
roadway  dust  samplers,  and  stone  dust barrier super-
visors  should  be  specified  in writing  by  the  colliery 
manager. 
(12)  The  format  of  M  &  Q  Forms  No.  231  qnd  No.  232  re-
lating  to  deputies  inspections  should  be  reviewed  to 
take  account  of  current  mining  practice. 
3.3.1. 
3 • 3 • 2 • 
Tip accident at No  6 Mine,  Marles at  Calonne-Ricouart 
(Pas-de-Calais)  26.8.75•  - 6 persons killed. 
This  accident  was  examined  by  the  Mines  Safety  and 
Health  Commission  at its meeting  on  2  December  1975 
on  the  report of  the  discussion  by  the  French  Government. 
A  tip  which  had  not  been  used  for  15  years  had  burned, 
and  the  red  shale  was  being  used  by  a  contractor  as  road-
base  material.  A  sudden  slip occurred  during  the  night 
of  26  August  1975,  when  there  was  no  one  on  the  tip. 
Large  lumps  were  found  up  to  150  m,  and  fine  dust  up  to 
350m  away.  A  house  in  a  workers'  estate  was  destroyed 
and  six  people  killeJ~) There  had  apparently  not  been  an 
explosion,  as  had  originally been  thought,  but  rather  a 
collapse  of  the  face,  which  at  the  time  of  the  accident 
was  70  m  high,  almost  vertical  and  being  worked  from  the 
bottom.  This  collapse  presumably  caused  hot  dust  to  be 
transported  by  air pressure. 
(x)  These fatal accidents are not  included in the statistics for 1975. 
(See  paragraph 1.1.3.  and 1.2.2.,  P•  3- P•  4). 3 . 3 • 3 • 
3.3.4. 
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The  discussion  of  this  incident  recalled earlier 
accidents  resulting  from  slippage  of  materials,  some 
of  which  had  been  made  transportable  by  water,  or  from 
gas  explosions.  Various  members  expressed  concern  with 
regard  to  the  stability of  tips,  many  of  which  were 
being  worked.  The  topic  would  be  taken  up  at  the  next 
meeting,  when  the  enquiry  would  be  finished. 
This  subject will  be  considered  in  greater detail  in 
1976,  in  view  of  the  general  interest in  the  stability 
of  tips,  many  of  which  are  currently  being  exploited 
for  burnt  shale,  on the basis of a  report to be  submitted by 
the French delegation. -52-
4, SECTIOlf  IV • 
JOINT  ACCIDENT  STATISTICS 
4,1,  Annex  I  contains tables la)  and lb), which give absolute figures 
and frequency rates  (per million hours)  for fatalities  and  injuries 
for 1974 according to the 13  technical causes and  4  accident lo-
cations, Tables  2a)  a.nd  2b),  which  give a  similar information 
concerning fatalities and  injuries in accordance with the severity 
and locality of the injuries, These tables cover Belgium, 
Italy,  the Federal Republic of Germany  with separate 
tables for each coal field {in CJerma.ny  and France), A summary  has 
been made  for these countries for tables la)  and  lb), but  not for 
2a)  and  2b)  as it was  not  possible for Belgium to provide the 
neoessar.y details, 
For the United Kingdom,  tables la)  and lb),  2a)  and  2b)  have been 
drawn up  but  only for fatalities and "serious injuries". 
(see paragraph 4.2.1.). 
4,2.  The  results for the united Kingdom  and the Community  of Six can 
only be partially compared  with reservations for the following 
reasons  : 
4,2.1,  united Kingdom  injur.y figures  cannot be incorporated in their 
present form  in the tables by the Mines  Safety and Health 
Commission,  Records  are kept for all accidents giving rise to more 
than three days'  incapaoi  ty whereas for the Community  of Six,  the 
records  are for at least 4 days of incapacity and  under different 
head.i~so -53-
4.2.2. Different criteria are used to define the term "serious" aocide:b.itsa 
in the United Kingdom  it means  those which  result in serious frac-
tures or amputations and  other injuries which might  endanger life 
or lead to permanent  incapacity,  while in the Community  of Six, it 
means  accidents causing- temporary incapacity of aore thaa 5o  flays. 
These  accident rates are not  comparable in their present form. !he 
study mentionet in 2.5.1.  will attempt to deal with this matter. 
4e2e3e Fatal accidents mean  those resulting in death within 52  weeks  after 
the accident in the United Kingdom,  and  within 56  calendar dS\YS  in 
the Community  of Six. In spite of this difference,  rates for these 
accidents are generally comparable. 
4e3e  As  in earlier days,  the tagles in this chapter include a  chronolo-
gical comparison of serious an4 fatal accidents since 1958 for the 
Community  of Six. These  figures are given in tables A,  11  a.n.i  C 
(collective accidents)  and  D,  which  summarizes  the important 
factors. The  lower section of the latter table gives the corres-
ponding figures for the united Kingdom  in 1974  and 1975• 
A summary  of the frequency rates of all accidents in 1975  in the 
Community  of Six is also given with these tables  { lb},2b)  }  and 
tables lb)  and  2b)  for the United Kingdom,  but for fatalities 
and "serious injuries" only. 
4e4e  As  has been mentionned,  the  on~ comparison which can properly 
be made  without :further investigation is that of f'atal  aociients. 
In 1975  there were  55  fatalities in the United Kingdom,  represen-
ting a  rate of 0.181  per million man-hours,  and  110 fatalities 
(a rate of 0.345  per mio/h)  in the Community  of Six. For the 
purposes  of statistical oomparison,it is preferable to deduct 
fatalities resulting from  collective accidents  (5  in the united 
Kingdom  and  0 in the Community  of Six), at•er which  the rates are 
0.165  and  0.345  respectively. Here  too the rate for the united 
Kingdom  is considerably and significantly lower than the Community 
rate. -54-
4e5e  Returning to the chronological analysis of serious  and fatal acci-
dents in the Community  of Six, the same  reservations app.ly  as in 
earlier yeps. The  rates cannot be compared  as  such and  a  certain 
margin or confidence interval should be allowed. This confidence 
has been chosen here with a  probability of 84  %.  The  difference 
between the two  rates is significant at more  than 95 %  when  these 
intervals do  not  touch. 
Summarizing the tendencies which  can be observed from  fable D. 
The  number  of fatalities for the Community  of Six,  per million man-
hours,  fele from  0.456  to 0.345,  a  decrease of 24  %.  Disregarding 
collective accidents,  these rates are  0~307 and 0.345  respectively, 
which  represents an increase of 12 %,  which however is not a 
statistically significant variation at 95  %  confidence. 
For the united Kingdom  the fatality rate rose from  0~138 at  0~181 
per million man-hours,  an increase of 31  %.  Disregarding the 
collective accident from  1975  (5 fatalities), these rates are 
0.138  and 0,165  per mio/h respectively,  an increase of 19,5 %, 
increase not a  statistically significant variation. 
For the Community  of Nine  there were  165  fatalities for 622  mio/h 
in 1975,  a  rate of 0,265,  whilst in 1974  there were  180  fatalities 
(with the accident of Lievin) for 581  mio/h,  a  rate of  0~310. 
Disregarding collective accidents, there were  16o  fatalities 
in 1975,  representing a  rate of 0  •. 258,  whilst  in 
1974  there were  133  fatalities,  a  rate of 0,299,  an increase in the 
rate of 0,029  or 12,6 %  which  is a  statistically "non  significant" 
variation. 
The  incidence of serious injuries in the Community  of Six fell  from 
16.12 in 1974  to 15.05  in 1975,  a  statistically signi~icant decrease 
of 6.7 %  • -55-
The  decrease in serious injuries,  since 1973,  was  marked  as regards 
accidents involving falls of ground  (  I  ) ,  haulage and transport 
and fall of the victim  (  II and III ), and at last the machinery 
and falling objets  (  IV  and V ), as may  be seen in Table A below. 
For the united Kingdom,  the incidence of serious injuries rose from 
1.555 in 1974  (417 injuries) to 1.722 in 1975  ('22 injuries),  an 
increase of 10.7% which is not  statistically significant at the 9~  level, 
since the higher level of the confidence interval in 1974 was  le67 
and the lower level for 1975  was  le46e 
4.6. As  previously stated,  a  chronological  analysis of other accidents 
can only be made  for the former  Community  of Six and  only for a 
period of four  years,  which is too short  a  time to yield a 
statistically valid interpretation of the changes  observed. 
Repeating these reservations,  and by w~  of illustration (see 
Tables la)  and  lb)  ), it should be mentionned that: 
- the number  of casualties resulting in an absence from  work  of 
21  - 56  days  (15  875  in 1974)  fell to 15  474,  representing a 
statistically significant fall of 4.2 %  in the rate,  from  50.62 
to 48.50  per mio/h. 
- the number  of casualties resulting in an absence from  work  of 
4  - 20  days  (34  797  in 1974)  fell to  33  985,  representing a 
statistically significant fall of 3.9 %  in the rate,  from  110.97 
to 106.67 per mio/h  • 
It should be remembered,  however,  as regards this category of 
accidents,  that the Working  Party believes that the change in 
these accident figures do  not  provide a  reliable reflection of 
changes  in safety standards. -56-
4•1•  In the same  way  as last year,  Table la) gives a  breakdown of 
accidents in the first five categories of "technical causes" for 
the Community  of Six and the united Kingdom.  For the United Kingdom, 




However,  headings  I  - V account  for almost all injuries and sizeable 
variations were  not  noted as  compared with 1974  in each of these 
headings,  regarding collective accidents. 
1975  Co11muni ty  (Six)  United  Ki  ngd01n 
4 to  20  21  to  56  >56  Fat a- Fat a-
days  days  days  1  i ties  Total  Serious  1  i ties  Total 
%  %  %  %  % 
Falls of  ground  31.0  24.8  24.1  29.0  27.2  26.2  14.5  25. 1 
Hau 1  age  and  transoort  5.4  8.1  15.4  31.8  7.1  33.4  36.4  33.6 
Falls by  acci dent  22.6  27.4  22.4  13.6  23.9  13. 6  1.8  12.5 
victim 
IV  Machinery.too1s  etc.  17.2  16.5  15.3  13.6  16.6  12.4  16.3  12.5 
V Falling  objects  20.6  20.4  18.4  10.9  20.7  8.4  7.3  8.3 
Total  I  to  V  95.8  97.2  95.6  98.9  95.5  94.0  86.3  92.1 
4•8•  'l'o  sum  up, it is apparent that within the former Community  of Six 
the rate of injuries has decreased in all categories of injuries. 
The  fatality rate also fell as in 1974 there was  the 1974  collective 
accident at Lievin,  but  disregarding this, the fatality rate has still 
increased but not  b,y  a  statistically significant amount. 
On  the other hand,  in the UDited Kingdom,  however,  the fatality 
rate has  increased ,  but not  significantly,  and  is still considera-
bly lower than the rate for the Community  of Six;  the serious injury 
rate has also increased, but not  statistically significantly. GERMANY  1958  1959 
1)  Falls  of  ground  4,843  4,779 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  2,550  2,569 
3)  Movement  of  personnel  2,497  2,463 
4)  Machinery,  handling  of  tools  and 
supports  o,  767  0,914 
5)  Falling objects  2,537  2, 719 
6)  Explosives  0,015  0,011 
7)  Explosions  of  firedamp  or 
coal  dust  0,011  0,016 
8)  Sudden  outbursts  of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural  gases  - -
9)  Underground  combustion  and  fires  - -
10)  Inrushes  of  water  0,004  -
11)  Electricity  0,010  0,014 
12)  Other  causes  0,487  0,522 
TOTAL  13,721  14,007 
BELGIUM  1958  1959 
l) Falls  of  ground  5,911  4,294 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  4,132  2, 979 
3)  Movement  of  personnel  1,354  0,998 
4)  Machinery,  handling  of  tools  and 
supports  2,804  2,085 
5)  Falling objects  0,414  0,371 
6)  Explosives  0,027  0,007 
7)  Explosions  of  firedamp  or 
coal  dust  - -
8)  Sudden  outbursts  of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural  gases  0,011  -
9)  Underground  combustion  and  fires  - -
10)  Inrushes  of  water  - -
11)  Electricity  0,011  -
12)  Other  causes  0,260  0,255 
TOTAL  14,924  10,989 
A.  Comparative  Table  of numbers  of  persons  incapacitated 
by  underground  accidents  for  eight weeks  or  longer 
years  1958-1975 per  '000,000 man-hours  (frequency) 
1960  1961  1962  1963  1964  1965  1966  1967  1968 
4,886  4, 797  4,682  4,663  4,894  4,732  4, 7 21  4,524  4,618 
2,445  2.458  2,501  2,433  2,385  2,411  2,067  1,913  1,994 
2,348  2,512  2, 608  2,646  2, 744  3,032  2,852  2, 974  3,300 
0,920  o, 867  1,046  1,213  1,242  1,234  1,244  1,124  1,396 
2,738  2,945  3,077  3,038  3,242  3,344  3' 272  3, 642  3,773 
0,010  0,009  0,008  0,006  0,006  0,005  0,005  0,017  0,011 
- 0,002  o, 123  0,010  - 0,014  0 ,013_  - 0,004 
- - - - - 0,005  - 0,003  -
0,003  0,002  - - - - - - 0,004 
- - - 0,004  - - - - -
0,012  0,014  0,006  0,012  0,009  0,002  0,010  0,006  0,011 
0,457  0,503  0,488  0,473  0,477  0,354  0,414  0,396  0,429 
13,819  14, 109  14,539  14,499  14,999  15,133  14,598  14,599  15,540 
1960  1961  1962  1963  1964  1965  1966  1967  1968 
4,324  4,071  4,439  4,432  4,417  3' 574  3,568  3,850  3, 676 
2,709  2,770  3,331  3,565  3,419  2,866  3,269  2,960  3,220 
1,008  1,062  1' 136  1,066  0,961  0,771  0,936  0,903  1,122 
2,386  2,097  2,461  2,414  2,310  2,126  2,146  2,265  1,903 
0,354  0,301  0,445  0,547  0,397  0,292  o, 349  0,459  0,358 
0,032  0,018  - 0,019  0,018  - 0,013  0,056  0,049 
- - - - 0,009  o ,o31 I  - - -
I  ! 
- - - - - - 0,013  - -
- - - - - 0,021  - - -
- - 0,010  - - - - - -
0,016  0,018  0,010  0,009  - 0,010  0,015  - 0,016 
0,260  0,301  0,351  0,198  0,268  0,333  0,362  o, 278  0,228 
11,089  10,638  12,161  12,250  11,7 99  10,024  10,669  10'  7  71  10' 572 
1969  1970  1971  197 2  1973  1974  1975  1976  1977 
4, 736  4,321  4,354  4,20  4,30  4,08  3, 69 
2,195  2,007  1 '7 24  1,81  1,80  1,68  2,16 
3,399  3,370  3,246  3,48  3,98  4,15  3,37 
1,291  1,382  1, 597  1,38  1,61  1'  58  2,16 
4,036  4,166  3,313  3,49  3,49  3,37  2,97 
0,007  0,008  - - - o,o1  -
0,004  - 0,012  - - - -
- - - - - - -
- - - - - - -
- - - - - - -
0,026  0,012  0,008  0,01  0,005  - 0,009 
0,402  o, 532  0,632  0,96  0,99  0,52  0,32 
16,096  15,7 98  14,886  15,31  16,19  15,40  14,69 
1969  1970  1971  1972  1973  1974  197 5  1976  1977 
5,07 5  4, 673  3,989  4,6  4,02  3,99  2,79 
3,169  3,018  3,365  2,8  3,33  2,43  2,39 
1,186  1,144  1,496  1,3  1'  41  1,70  1,29 
2,353  1,801  2,469  1,7  2,58  2,18  1,66 
1,244  1,242  1,870  1,5  1,44  1,84  1,46 
- - 0,025  0,03  - - -
0,019  - - - - - -
- - - - - - -
- - - - - - -
- - 0,025  - - - -
0,019  - - - 0,03  0,03  0,03 
o, 17 5  0,195  0,324  0,2  0,36  0,41  0,06 
13,240  12,097  13' 563  12,13  13,16  12,61  9,71 ,., 
FRANCE.  1958  1959 
1)  Falls  of  ground  5,027  4,665 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  1,980  1,695 
3)  Movement  of  personnel  1,505  1,118 
4)  Machinery,  handling  of  tools and 
supports  0,914  1,022 
5)  Falling objects  1,890  2,187 
6)  Explosives  0,043  0,051 
7)  Explosions  of  firedamp  or 
coal  dust  0,047  0,088 
8)  Sudden  outbursts  of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural  gases  0,004  -
9)  Underground  combustion  and  fires  - -
10)  Inrushes  of water  - -
11)  Electricity  0,014  -
12)  Other  causes  2,956  2,  768 
TOTAL  14'  380  13,594 
ITALY  1958  1959 
1)  Falls  of  ground  1,355  1,378 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  1,335  0,984 
3)  Movement  of  personnel  0,668  0,394 
4)  Machinery,  handling  of  tools  and 
supports  1,169  0,984 
5)  Falling objects  1,169  1,698 
6)  Explosives  o, 167  -
7)  Explosions  of  firedamp  or 
coal  dust  - -
8)  Sudden outburst of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural  gases  - -
9)  Underground  combustion  and  fires  - -
10)  Inrushes  of water  - -
11)  Electricity  - -
12)  Other  causes  0,334  0,591 
TOTAL  6,197  6,299 
*  Including  Provence  as  from  1970. 
A.  Comparative  Table  of  numbers  of  persons  incapacitated 
by  underground  accidents  for  eight weeks  or  longer 
years  1958-1975 per  '000,000 man-hours  (frequency) 
1960  1961  1962  1963  1964  1965  1966  1967  1968 
4,  744  4,416  4,222  4,177  4,308  3,941  3,927  3,634  4,162 
1,920  2,106  2,196  2,364  2,278  2,153  1,858  1,918  1,946 
2,873  2,334  2,458  2,"368  2,383  2,087  2,239  2,174  2,815 
1,621  2,523  2,991  3,096  3,042  2, 272  2,639  2, 773  3,016 
1,893  2,292  2,073  2' 278  2,074  1,839  1,  785  2,114  2,386 
0,031  0,017  0,051  0,009  0,013  0,037  0,010  0,011  -
- - 0,004  - - - 0,029  - -
- - - - - - - 0,005  -
- - - - - - - - -
- - - - 0,018  - 0,005  - 0,006 
0,004  0,029  0,004  0,014  0,009  0,01~  - 0,005  0,006 
o,  793  0,362  0,240  0,354  0,227  o, 174  0,200  0,185  0,233 
13,909  14,079  14' 239  14,660  14,347  12,517  12,692  12,819  14,570 
1960  1961  1962  1963  1964  1965  1966  1967  1968 
1,808  - o, 792  0,366  0,893  5'  57 2  6,360  5,s-8o  0,182 
1,205  o, 676  1,847  1,465  1,  7  87  - 0, 707  o,  797  0,812 
1,005  1' 578  1,056  0,732  1, 7  87  - 0,707  1,594  0,812 
o, 603  0,902  1,584  1,465  3,127  7,164  7,067  13,552  7,304 
1,808  2,029  2,37 5  3,296  3,574  0, 796  - 6, 377  6,493 
- 0,225  - 0,366  - - - - -
- - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - -
0,603  0,451  - - - 1,592  3,360  3,189  0,812 
7,032  5,861  7,654  7 '690  11,168  15,124  18,201  31,089  17,043 
1969  1970  1971  1972  1973  1974  1975  1976  1977 
4,044  3 '761  3,721  3  J 79  4,38  4,52  3,75 
1,556  1,666  1,959  1,89  2,37  2,36  2,63 
3,226  3,372  3,667  4,51  4,79  4,11  4,29 
3,070  3,332  2,373  2,63  2,84  2,98  2,94 
2,537  2,515  4,566  4,96  5,00  5,12  4,11 
0,050  0,016  - 0,02  - - 0,03 
- 0,087  - - - 0,08  -
- - - - - - 0,01 
- - - - 0,01  0,03  0,01 
- 0,032  - 0,01  0,04  - -
0,014  0,024  0,009  0,01  - 9,01  0,03 
0,291  0,294  0,314  0,43  0,67  0,63  0,64 
14,788  15,099  16,609  18,24  20,09  19,85  18,44 
• 
1969  1970  1971  1972  1973  1974  1975  1976  1977 
3, 656  - 5,958  2,20  - - -
- - 3,404  - - - -
1,462  - 1,702  - 3,25  - -
8,043  6,896  2,553  - - - 4,00 
3,656  - 1,702  - - 1,64  -
- - - - - - -
- - - - - - -
- - - - - - -
- - - - - - -
- - - - - - -
- - - - - - -
- 5,172  0,851  - - - -
16, 817  12,068  16,170  2,20  3,25  1,64  4,00 NETHERLANDS  1958  1959 
1) Falls of  ground  1,326  1,464 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  1,511  1,562 
3)  Movement  of  t>ersonnel  0,324  0,386 
4)  Machinery,  handling  of  tools  and 
supports  o, 617  0,402 
5)  Falling objects  0,401  0,515 
6)  Explosives  - -
7)  Explosions  of  firedamp  or 
coal  dust  - -
8)  Sudden  outbursts  of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural  gases  - -
9)  Underground  combustion  and  fires  - -
10)  Inrushes  of water  - -
11)  Electricity  - -
12)  Other  causes  0,262  0,161 
TOfAL  4,441  4,490 
COMMUNITY  (IV)  1958  1959 
1)  Falls  of  ground  4,846  4,490 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  2,602  2,347 
3)  Movement  of  personnel  2,003  1,823 
4)  Machinery,  handling  of  tools  and 
supports  1,098  1,064 
5)  Falling objects  1,962  2,161 
6)  Explosives  0,023  0,020 
7)  Explosions  of  firedamp  or 
coal  dust  0,017  0,030 
8)  Sudden  outbursts  of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural  gases  0,002  -
9)  Underground  combustion  and  fires  - -
10)  Inrushes  of water  0,002  -
11)  Electricity  0,010  0,008 
12)  Other  causes  0,985  1,012 
TOTAL  13,551  12,954 
A.  Comparative  Table  of  numbers  of  persons  incapacitated 
by  underground  accidents  for eight  weeks  or  longer 
years  1958-i975  per  '000,000 man-hours  (frequency) 
1960  1961  1962  1963  1964  1965  1966  1967  1968 
1,3b5  1,829  2,238  1,  742  2,017  1,923  1,688  2,466  2,450 
1,898  1,924  2,590  1,826  1,952  2,808  2,621  1,866  2,407 
o, 187  0,514  0,580  0,630  0,472  o,  774  o, 605  o,  766  1,160 
0,  780  0,915  1,015  1,050  1,094  1,282  2,066  0,833  1,031 
0,492  0,819  0,642  o, 630  0,923  0,862  0,958  0,866  1,590 
- - - - 0,021  - - - -
- - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - -
- - 0,021  - 0,021  - - - -
0,390  0,210  0,497  0,147  0,129  0,088  0,353  o, 700  0,301 
5,051  6,212  7,583  6,025  6,629  7,737  8,291  7,497  8,939 
1960  1961  1962  1963  1964  1965  1966  1967  1968 
4, 571  4,434  4,387  4,337  4,509  4,215  4,186  4,060  4,261 
2,310  2,371  2,521  2,520  2,346  2,416  2' 173  2,037  2,139 
2,185  2,185  2,282  2,261  2,326  2,364  2,320  2,354  2, 795 
1,264  1,423  1'  712  1,818  1,848  1 '77 3  1,815  1'  790  1,945 
2,105  2,353  2, 37 5  2,406  2,442  2,415  2,362  2' 638  2,858 
0,017  0,012  0,018  0,010  0,011  0,013  0,007  0,019  0,015 
0,010  0,001  0,071  0,006  0,001  0,011  0,016  - 0,002 
- - - - - 0,002  0,001  0,003  -
0,002  0,001  - - - 0,002  - - 0,002 
- - 0,001  0,002  0,003  - 0,001  - 0,002 
0,010  0,018  0,007  0,012  0,008  0,006  0,007  0,005  0,010 
0,513  0,428  0,404  0_,390  0,364  0,289  0,354  0,337  0,341 
12,986  13' 227  13,7  81  13 '7  81  13,861  13,506[13,242  13,246 14,370 
1969  1970  1971  1972  1973  1974  1975  1976  1977 
2, 737  2,634  2,528  2,06  4,219  1,041  -
2,562  2,634  1,820  2,19  2,443  2,603  -
1,165  0,905  0,404  1,03  0,888  0,521  -
1,689  1,894  3,033  1,81  1,554  4,686  -
1,106  0,659  1,213  1,55  0,888  1,562  -
- - - - - - -
- - - - - - -
- - - - - - -
- - - - - - -
- - - - - - -
- - - - - - -
0,116  0,165  0,202  0,52  0,666  - -
9,375  8,891  9,201  9,15  10,659  10,413 
1969  1970  1971  1972  1973  1974  197 5  1976  1977 
4,492  4,135  4,109  4,08  4,29  4,15  3,61 
2,118  2,016  1,953  1,93  2,11  1,91  2,28 
3,023  3,084  3'  117  3,47  3,88  3,89  3,38 
1,865  2,011  1, 876  1 '7 5  2,01  1,98  2,29 
3,185  3,308  3,506  3,62  3,63  3,62  3,08 
0,019  0,011  0,002  0,008  - o,o1  o,ooE 
0,004  0,025  0,007  - - 0,02  -
- - - - - - o,oo: 
- - - - 0,003  o,o1  o,oo: 
- 0,009  0,002  0,003  0,009  - -
0,021  0,014  0,007  0,008  0,006  o,o1  O, Olt 
0,333  0,434  0,509  o,  73  0,84  0,53  0,37 
15,160  15,047  15,088  15,60  16,77  16,12  15,05 GERMANY  1958  1959 
1)  Falls  of  ground  0,268  0,290 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  o, 179  o, 169 
3)  Movement  of  personnel  0,094  0,097 
4)  Machinery,  handling  of  tools  and 
supports  0,010  0,027 
5)  Falling objects  0,065  0,041 
6)  Explosives  0,009  0,003 
7)  Explosions  of  firedamp  or 
coal  dust  0,011  0,012 
8)  Sudden  outbursts  of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural  gases  0,005  0,003 
9)  Underground  combustion  and  fires  - 0,003 
10)  Inrushes  of water  - 0,003 
11)  Electricity  0,022  0,008 
12)  Other  causes  0,025  0,025 
TOTAL  0,687  0,680 
BELGIUM  1958  1959 
1)  Falls  of  ground  0,223  0,213 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  o, 101  0,124 
3)  Movement  of  personnel  0,011  0,027 
4)  Machinery,  handling  of  tools and 
supports  0,005  0,014 
5)  Falling objects  0,016  -
6)  Explosives  0,011  0,014 
7)  Explosions  of  firedamp  or 
coal  dust  - -
8)  Sudden  outbursts  of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural  gases  0,016  0,014 
9)  Underground  combustion  and  fires  - 0,007 
10)  Inrushes  of  water  0,011  -
11)  Electricity  0,021  -
12) Other  causes  0,005  -
TOTAL  0,420  0,413 
B.  Underground  accidents  resulting  in death within eight weeks 
years  1958-1975 
per  '000 ,000  man-hours  {frequency) 
1960  1961  1962  1963  1964  1965  1966  1967  1968  1969 
o, 263  0,216  0,280  0,260  0,200  o, 184  0,197  0,206  0,148  0,192 
0,182  0,196  0,149  o, 178  0,300  0,191  o, 17 5  o, 150  0,126  0,143 
0,070  0,086  0,059  0 ;089  0,071  0,070  0,094  0,076  0,079  0,056 
0,012  0,027  0,037  0,019  0,028  0,025  0,030  0,020  0,014  0,034 
0,039  0,065  0,072  0,072  0,054  0,058  0,048  0,063  0,051  0,049 
0,003  - 0,004  - 0,002  - - - 0,004  -
- - o, 660  0,002  0,002  0,019  Q,056  - 0,061  -
0,002  0,004  0,002  - - 0,002  0,002  0,007  - 0,004 
- 0,002  - 0,006  0,009  0,005  - - - -
0,002  - - 0,004  - - - - - -
0,002  0,005  0,010  0,002  0,004  0,005  - 0,003  0,004  0,004 
0,036  0,049  0,049  0,025  0,017  0,023  0,027  0,017  0,022  0,022 
0,611  0,651  1,344  0,657  0,587  0,582  0,629  0,542  0,509  0,504 
1960  1961  1962  1963  1964  1965  1966  1967  1968  1969 
o, 299  0,266  0, 246  o, 264  0,222  0,239  0,324  o, 264  o, 179  0,214 
o, 157  0,168  0,142  0,245  0,166  0,166  0,187  0,180  0,114  0,097 
0,008  0,035  0,010  0,057  0,028  0,011  0,025  - 0,033  -
0,016  0,027  0,047  - 0,018  0,052  0,025  0,028  0,065  -
0,008  - 0,010  0,019  0,018  - - - 0,016  -
- - - - - - - - 0,016  -
0,016  - - - - 0,011  - - - -
- - 0,047  - - 0,041  0,013  - - -
- - - - - 0,011  - - - -
- 0,044  0,047  0,019  - - - - - -
0,024  - - 0,009  0,009  0,011  - 0,014  0,033  0,019 
0,008  0,009  0,019  0,028  0,009  - 0,013  0,042  - -
0,536  0,549  0,568  o, 641  0,471  0,542  0,587  0,528  0,456  0,330 
1970  1971  1972  1973  1974  197 5  1976  1977 
0,113  o, 147  0,10  0,08  0,12  0,12 
0,128  0,103  0,16  0'  13  0,07  0,12 
0,058  0,032  0,06  0,06  0,06  0,06 
0,031  0,032  0,03  0,02  0,02  0,05 
0,035  0,047  0,06  0,02  0,04  0,05 
- - - - - -
- 0,008  - - - -
- 0,008  0,004  0,005  - -
- - - - - -
0,012  - - - - -
0,004  - 0,004  0,005  - -
0,027  0,083  0,04  0,09  0,03  0,005 
0,408  0,460  0,46  0,420  0,34  0,41 
1970  1971  1972  1973  1974  197 5  1976  1977 
0,268  o, 100  0,08  0,21  0,06  0,03 
o, 170  0,125  o, 18  0,21  o,o6  0,16 
- 0,049  0,03  - 0,03  -
- 0,025  - 0,03  - 0,09 
- - 0,03  - 0,03  -
- - - - - -
- - - - - -
- 0,025  0,18  0,06  - -
- - - - - -
- - - - - -
0,024  - - - - -
- - 0,03  0,03  - -
0,462  0,324  0,53  0,54  0,20  0,29 FRANCE  *  J.958  1959 
1)  Falls of  ground  0,235  0,192 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  0,115  0,085 
3)  Movement  of  personnel  0,007  0,018 
4)  Machinery,  handling  of  tools  and 
supports  0,018  0,040 
5)  Falling objects  0,025  0,007 
6)  Explosives  - 0,026 
7)  Explosions  of  firedamp  or 
coal  dust  0,115  0,121 
8)  Sudden  outbursts  of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural  gases  0,043  0,026 
9)  Underground  combustion  and  fires  - -
10)  Inrushes  of  water  - -
11)  Electricity  - 0,011 
12)  Other  causes  0,036  0,029 
TOTAL  0,594  0,555 
ITALY  1958  1959 
1)  Falls  of  ground  o, 167  -
2)  Haulage  and  transport  - 0,197 
3)  Movement  of  personnel  - -
4)  Machinery,  handling  of  tools  and 
supports  - -
5)  Falling objects  - o, 197 
6)  Explosives  0,501  -
7)  Explosions  of  firedamp  or 
coal dust  - -
8)  Sudden  outbursts  of  firedamp, 
suffocation by natural  gases  o, 167  -
9)  Underground  combustion  and  fires  - -
10)  Inrushes  of  water  - -
11)  Electricity  - -
12)  Other  causes  - -
TOTAL  0,835  0,394 
*  Including  Provence  as  from  1970. 
B.  Underground  accidents resulting  in death within eight weeks 
years  1958-a.975 
per  '000,000 man-hours  c~requency) 
1960  1961  1962  1963  1964  1965  1966  1967  1968  1969 
o,i86  0,219  o, 167  o, 120  o, 127  0,164  0,214  0,159  o, 177  0,149 
0,082  0,122  0,077  0,121  o, 141  0,052  0,126  0,088  o, 101  0,186 
0,027  0,008  0,043  0,009  0,009  0,042  0,024  0,016  0,025  0,014 
0,016  0,008  0,030  0,009  0,036  0,009  0,015  0,016  0,006  -
0,004  0,017  0,030  0,009  0,018  0,019  0,015  0,011  0,031  0,014 
- - - 0,005  0,005  0,009  0,005  0,005  0,006  -
- - 0,004  - - 0,155  - - 0,038  -
0,019  0,004  - 0,019  0,009  - 0,005  0,027  0,019  0,007 
- - - - - - - - - -
- 0,004  - - - 0,005  - 0,005  - -
0,012  - 0,009  0,024  - - 0,010  - - 0,007 
0,008  - 0,009  0,014  0,014  - 0,005  0,005  - 0,007 
0,354  0,382  0,369  0,330  0,359  0,455  0,419  0,332  0,403  0,384 
1960  1961  1962  1963  1964  1965  1966  1967  1968  1969 
0,201  0,225  - 0,366  - - - - - -
- - - - - - - o,  797  - -
- - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - 0'  797  - -
- - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - -
0,201  0,226  - 0,366  - - - 1,594  - -
1970  1971  1972  1973  1974  1975  1976  1977 
0,143  o, 117  0,07  o, 20  0,11  0,06 
0,127  o, 108  0,08  0,07  0,12  0,07 
0,016  0,072  0,01  0,01  o,o1  0,03 
0,032  0,027  - 0,02  0,03  -
0,016  0,045  - 0,04  0,03  0,03 
0,108  0,018  - - - -
o, 127  - - - o, 58  -
- 0,072  - 0,01  - -
- - 0,01  - o,o1  -
0,016  - 0,01  - - -
- - - - - -
- 0,009  0,03  - - -
0,484  0,468  0,21  0,37  0,09  0,18 
1970  1971  1972  1973  1974  1975  1976  1977 
- - 2, 20  - - -
- - - - - -
- - - - - -
- - - - - -
- - - - - -
- - - - - -
- - - - - -
- - - - - -
- - - - - -
- - - - - -
- - - - - -
- - - - - -
- - 2,20  - - -NETHERLANDS  1958  1959 
1) Falls  of  ground  0,262  0,064 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  0,077  o, 145 
3)  Movement  of  personnel  - -
4)  Machinery,  handling  of  tools  and 
supports  0,015  0,016 
5)  Falling objects  - 0,016 
6)  Explosives  - -
7)  Explosions  of  firedamp  or 
coal dust  - -
8)  Sudden  outbursts  of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural  gases  - -
9)  Underground  combustion and  fires  - -
10)  Inrushes  of water  - -
11)  Electricity  - -
12)  Other  causes  - -
TOTAL  0,355  0,241 
COMMUNITY  1958  1959 
1)  Falls  of  ground  0,253  0,242 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  o, 147  o, 141 
3)  Movement  of  personnel  0,057  0,063 
4)  Machinery,  handling  of  tools  and-
supports  0,011  0,028 
5) Falling objects  0,04S  0,02.1-
6)  Explosives  0,009  0,010 
7)  Explosions  of  firedamp  or 
coal  dust  0,032  0,036 
8)  Sudden  outbursts  of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural  gases  0,016  0,010 
9)  Underground  combustion  and  fires  - 0,003 
10)  Inrushes  of water  0,002  0,002 
11)  Electricity  0,016  0,007 
12)  Other  causes  0,023  0,021 
TOTAL  0,610  0,590 
B.  Underground  accidents resulting in  death within eight weeks 
years  1958-1975 
per  '000,000 man-hours(frequency) 
1960  1961  1962  1963  1964  1965  1966  1967  1968  1969 
0,034  0,114  0,062  0,084  0,043  0,044  0,050  o, 100  o, 172  0,058 
0,067  0,095  0,062  o, 105  o, 172  0,177  0,126  - 0,086  -
- - - - - - - - - 0,058 
- - 0,041  - - 0,022  - 0,067  - o, 117 
- - - - 0,043  - - - 0,043  -
- - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - -
- 0,019  - - - - - - - -
0,017  - - - - - - - - -
o, 119  0,229  0,166  0,189  0,258  0,243  0,176  o, 167  0,301  0,233 
1960  1961  1962  1963  1964  1965  1966  1967  1968  1969 
0,235  o, 217  0,234  o, 217  o, 17 5  o, 17 7  0,208  0,192  o, 160  o, 176 
o, 146  o, 168  0,124  o, 167  o, 178  o, 149  o, 160  0,128  o, 115  o, 145 
0,047  0,056  0,045  0,060  0,045  0,051  0,060  0,044  0,054  0,038 
-o.o12  0,021  0,037  0,013  0,030  0,024  0,023  0,024  0,017  0,023 
0 ,0.2~  0,041  0,-062  Q,Q~~  Q,OJ7  0,037  O,OJO  0,036  0,040  0,031 
0,002  - 0,002  0,001  0,002  0,002  0,001  0,002  0,006  -
0,002  - 0,375  0,001  0,001  0,053  0,030  - 0,044  -
0,006  0,003  0,007  0,005  0,002  0,006  0,004  0,012  0,006  0,004 
- 0,001  - 0,003  0,005  0,005  - - - -
0,001  0,006  0,005  0,005  - 0,001  - 0,002  - -
0,007  0,004  0,008  0,008  0,003  0,004  0,003  0,004  0,006  0,006 
0,024  0,029  0,032  0,021  0,014  0,013  0,017  0,015  0,012  0,015 
0,507  0,546  0,932  o, 547  0,492  0,522  0,536  0,457  0,460  0,438 
1970  1971  1972  1973  1974  1975  1976  1977 
0,082  0,101  - - - -
0,165  - 0,26  - - -
- - - - - -
- - - - - -
- - - - 0,521  -
- - - - - -
- - - - - -
- - - - - -
- - - - - -
- - - - - -
- - - - - -
- - - - - -
0,247  0,101  0,26  - 01521 
1970  1971  1972  1973  1974  1975  1976  1977 
o, 135  o, 133  0,092  o, 13  0,11  o, 10 
o, 132  o, 104  o, 141  0,12  o,os  0,11 
0,039  0,043  0,043  0,04  0,05  0,047 
0,027  0,029  0,019  0,02  0,02  0,047 
0,025  0,041  0,038  0,02  0,04  0,038 
0,002  0,005  - - - -
0,037  0,005  - - 0,13  -
- 0,027  0,022  0,012  - -
- - 0,003  - - -
0,011  - 0,003  0,003  - -
0,004  - 0,003  0,003  - -
0,016  0,053  0,035  0,06  0,02  0,003 
0,429  0,440  0,399  0,413  0,456  0,35 C.  Comparative Table of underground group  accidents  (see  (1)  below) 
years 1960-1975 
c AU s  E  s  1960  1961  1962  1963  1964  1965  1966 
N  a  b  N  a  b  N  a  b  N  a  b  N  a  b  N  a  b  N  a  b 
1)  Falls of ground  2  2  10  1  - 7  3  3 18  - - - - - - - - - -
2)  Haulage  and transport  - - - - - - - - - - - - 2  5 14  - - - -
3)  Movement  of personnel  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
4)  Machinery,  handing of tools  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - and supports 
5) Falling objects  -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
6)  Explosives  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
7)  Explosions of firedamp or 
~38  coal dust  - - - - - - 3 p2  - - - - - - 3  4 41  3 
8)  Sudden  outbu~ts of firedamp, 
suffocation by natural gases  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
9)  Underground  com~tion and  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1res 
~0) Inrushes of water  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
~1) Electricity  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
~2) Ohter causes  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
TOTAL  2  2  10  1  - 7  6 :>5  35€ - - - 2  5  14  3  4  41  3 
(1~  Accidents  involving more  than five casualties of type  (a). 
(N  NUmber  of groups  accidents. 
(a  Casualties were  unable. to resume  work  below ground for at  least  eight  weeks. 
(b  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
REPARTITION  : 
Germany 
N  a  b  N 
1960  2  2  10  -
1961  - - - -
1962  4  63  344  1 














1967  1968  1969  1970 
N  a  b  N  a  b  N  a  b  N  a  b 
- - - - - - 1  - 6  - -~ 
- - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - 1  - 5  - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - 1- - -
- - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - 1  - 17 - - - 1  11 ~6 
- - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - -








N  a  b 


















1965  1  4  8  2  - 33 
1966  2  5  21  1  6  -
1968  1  - 17  - - -
1969  - - - - - -
1970  - - - - - -
1971  2  - 12  - - -
1973  2  - 9  - - -
1974  1  1  5  - - -
1972  1973  1974  1975  1976  1977  1978  1979 
N  a  b  N  a  b  Na  b  N  a  b  N  a  b  N  a  b  N  a  b  N  a  b 
- - - 2  - 9  1 1  5  - - -
- - - - - - -- - - - -
- - - - - - -- - - - -
- - - - - - -- - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - -- - - - -
- - - - - - 1 5  42  - - -
- - - - - - -- - - - -
- - - - - - -- - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - -- - - - -
- - - - - - -- - - - -
- - - 2  - 9  2  6  47  - - -
France 
N  a  b 
- - -
1  - 7 





2  - 11 
1  11  16 
1  - 8 
- - -
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1958  252  278  1 634  1 260  770  17  074  3,052  67,68  0,610  13,551 
1959  240  602  1 788  1 122  622  14  539  2,585  60,43  0,590  12,950 
1960  239  967  1 958  1 037  526  13  459  2,192  56,09  0,507  12,986 
1961  235  848  2 100  962  527  12  720  2,235  53,93  0,548  13,227 
1962  233  233  2 229  901 
;:~  ~~~ 
12  4lts  3, 602  ~.~~  53,24  o, ~32 t3<  13,7tsl 
2,320  4  o, 600  4) 
1963  229  769  2 331  849  465  11  686  2,024  50,86  0,547  13,761 
1964  235  007  2 395  841  411  11  726  1,749  49,89  0,493  13,860 
1965  224  249  2 461  784  410  10  595  1, 828  47,25  0,522  13,506 
1966  210  189  2 611  698  374  9 247  1,779  43,99  0,536  13,242 
1967  189  484  2  824'  587  269  7 781  1,420  41,06  0,457  13,246 
1968  181  016  3 065  522  240  1  501  1,326  41,44  0,460  14,370 
1969  176  749  3 265  476  209  7 222  1,181  40,82  0,438  15,160 
1970  170  355  3 442  438  188  6 591  1,104  38,69  0,429  15,047 
1971  164  910  3 514  414  182  6 249  1,104  37,89  0,440  15,088 
1972  151  809  3  659  369  147  5 763  1,033  26,34  0,399  15,60 
1973  139  700  3 755  332  137  5 560  0,981  39,80  0,413  16,77 
1974  133  300  3 742  313  143  5 054  1,073  37,91  0,456  16,12 





Net  extraction,  slurr,y and  dust. 
Incl.  Luisenthal  explosion. 
m 
Excl.  Luisenthal  explosion. 
Casualties were  unable to resume  work  for at least eight weeks. 
UNITED  KINGDOM 
1973  130  200  3 598  306  74  490  0,568  3,76  0,242  1,60 
1974  109  200  3 260  268  37  417  0,339  3, 82  0,138  1,555 




Note  :  It is only possible to compare  the figgers  m  1 able  l  ~  ( ommun1. ty ot·  'the  Bl.XJ 
with those in table 2,  by  refering to the explanator,y notes in Section IV, 
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COMMON  STATISTICAL  ~J~~RY OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  M11~S IN  1975 MINES SAFETY AND HEALTH 
COMMISSION 
DETAILED BREAKDOWN OF ACCIDENT VICTIMS ACCORDING TO CAUSE AND SITE 
OF ACCIDENT AND PERIOD OF INCAPACITY 
Common Statistics on voctoms 
of accodents underground in coal monas 
COUNTRY 
COAL-FIELD 
Federal  Republic of Germany 




shafts and staple-pits 
1  2 
~ 
4to  21  to  4to  21  to  Fatal 
20  56  >56  20  56  >56  acco- total  CAUSES OF ACCIDENTS  ty 
days  days  days  dents  days  days  days 
(3)  (3)  (3)  (')  (')  (3) 
I. FALLS OF GROUNDS AND ROCKS  12604 1  414  423  9  4  450  1  47•  665  218 
II. TRANSPORT, TOTAL  207  229  131  5  572  1L  58  46 
a) Continuous Transport  89  110  63  2  264  2(  14  16 
b) Discontonuous Transport 
118  110  hP.  "l,  'l.Clfl  'i4  L1..lt  'l.O 
Ill. FALLS AND MOVEMENT OF THE VICTIM, 
TOTAL  739  1  044  284  A- 3  071  1  Q6c  613  138 
a) while movong about the mine  - - - - - - -
b) in the course of other activitoes 
739  1  04.4  284  4  3  071  1  Q6C  613  138 
IV. MACHINES, TOOLS AND SUPPORTS 
TOTAL  202  753  262  4  2  221  55  307  93 
.. 
a) Machones  191  131  80  1  40  1~  76  32 
b) Tools  __M7  17<  41  - 56<  274  lo6  30 
c) Supports 
66/J.  A<;{  1A1  111  2'if.  178  12'5  31 
V. FALLS OF OBJECTS  11  821  11  111  'l.AR  'il' 28'  730  294  104 
VI. EXPLOSIVES 
1  - - - - - -
VII. IGNITIONS OR EXPLOSIONS 
OF FIREDAMP AND COAL DUST  - - - - - - - -
VIII. OUTBURSTS OF GAS, DE-OXYGENATION, 
SUFFOCATION OR POISONING BY NATU-
1  2  RAL GASES (CO., CH•, CO, H2S),  1  - - - - -
TOTAL 
a) Outbursts of Gas  - - - - - -
b) De-oxygenation and Poisoning 
by natural Gases  1  - - 2  - - -
IX. HEATING$ OR FIRES  - - - - - - - -
X  INRUSHES  - - - - - -
XI  ELECTRICITY 
~  II  1  -
XII. OTHER CAUSES  99  37  9  - 14'  57  18  4 
TOTAL  7  676  4  59  1457  27  1375- 3955 1  95~  603 
(1) Number of hours worked by pit staff and employees of contractor ftrms who belong to a mtners' soctaltnsurance scheme 
tJI) Ac:cidenlstnvotving more than five caaualti• (I.e  who ,.ther dted or were unable to reaume work underground for at least etght weeks). 

























Shafts and staple-pots  Other places 
3  4 
4to  21  to 
Fatal 
4to  21  to  Fatal 
20  56  >56  20  56  >56  total  total  acci- total  8CCI-
days  days  days  dents  days  days  days  dents  (3)  (')  ('I  (31  ('l  ('l 
2368  15  3  'i  23  300  1'i'i  41  1  11.97 
179  91  81  7'i  9  2'i6  271  293  166  7  737 
51  7  4  4  l  16  17  18  ~'i  o;n 
128  RA  77  11  8  240  254  27'i  151  7  687 
1821  238  18;  65  31  491  tt  280  783  207  5  2  275 
- 4  - - 6  - - - - -
1821  234  183  65  3  485  1  280  783  207  ')  2  27" 
957  56  26  4  - 86  397  201  43  3  644 
213  15  5  .,  - .,.,  01  ""  "" 
1  ,  7~ 
410  34  18  2  - 54  216  94  12  - 322 
334  1  3  - 10  90  '52  6  2  l'iC 
1128  122  89  30  241  6l'i  "l,22  117  <;ll  oc;c; 
l  - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - 1  - - - 1 
- - - - - - - - - -
- - - 1  - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - .  -
- - - - - - - - -
1  1  - - - 1  4  3  2  - 4 
79  12  6  3  - 21  89  28  8  1  121 
6  5.3<1  535  390  182  12 1119  2  957  1  78~  5§4  22  5  34t 
Tabla  1a 
YEAR  1  9  7 5 
MAN-HOURS WORKED (1)  197  052  115 
Total of  Group 
accidents underground  accidents (•) 
5  6 
4to  21to  I  Fatal  20  56  >56  56  Fatal  acci- total 
days  days  days  days  acci- total 
dents 
(')  (')  (')  (')  dents 
/J.  ~91  2  2~7  687  23  7  338  - - -
643  661  418  22  1  744  - - -
1'l.'l.  lilh  oR  /J.  "1.81  - -
'i10  51"  320  18  1  363  - - -
4  326  2  625  694  13  7658  - - -
4  ~  - - 6  - - -
4  322  2623  694  13  7  6')2  - - -
2  207  1  287  402  12  3908  - - -
~07  ?t:.?  1 'l.O  7  810  - - -
871  39C  85  - 1  346  - - -
939  63(  178  5  1  752  - - -
~  ::>R8  1  816  <;99  10  'i  7U  - - -
- 1  - - 1  ...;  - -
- - - - - - -
2  - - 3  - - -
- - - - - - -
2  1  - - 3  - - -
- - - - - - - -
- _I  - - - - - -
9  7  ,  - 1P.  - - -
2'57  89  24  1  311  - - -
15123  8724  2  826  81  126  754  - - -MINES SAFETY AND HEALTH 
COMMISSION 
DETAILED BRE-AKDOWN OF ACCIDENT VICTIMS ACCORDING TO CAUSE AND SITE 
OF ACCIDENT AND PERIOD OF INCAPACITY 
Common Statostocs on victims 
of accodents underground on  coal mines 
~"''"'"'"'"' 
CAUSES OF ACCIDENTS  y  ~ 
I  FALLS OF GROUNDS AND ROCKS 
II. TRANSPORT, TOTAL 
a) Continuous Transport 
b) Discontinuous Transport 
111. FALLS AND MOVEMENT OF THE VICTIM, 
TOTAL 
a) while moving about the mine 
b) in the course of other activities 





V. FALLS OF OBJECTS 
VI. EXPLOSIVES 
VII. IGNITIONS OR EXPLOSIONS 
OF FIREDAMP AND COAL DUST 
VIII. OUTBURSTS OF GAS, DE-OXYGENATION. 
SUFFOCATION OR POISONING BY NATU-
RAL GASES (COs, CH•. CO. HsS), 
TOTAL 
a) Outbursts ol Gas 
b) De-oxygenation and Poosoning 
by natural Gases 
IX. HEATINGSOR FIRES 
X. INRUSHES 
XI. ELECTRICITY 
XII. OTHER CAUSES 
TOTAL 
COUNTRY  :  Federal Republic of  Germany 
COAL-FIELD  N  R  W 
Headings excluding  Production faces 
shafts and staple-pits 
1  2 
4to  21 to  4to  21 to 
20  56  >56  Fatal  20  56  >56 
Fatal 
acci- total  acci-
days  days  days 
dents 
days  days  days  dents  (3)  (3)  (3)  (3)  (3)  (3) 
n  .. 21  7.18 12.1')  O.O"i  122 .. '19 17.47  3  .• 37  1.11  0.07 
1.0'  1.16 lo  .. 66  0.0':\  2.90 0.37  0.29  0.23  0  01 
0.  A'  0  .. '\6 lo.':\2  0.01  1.  ':I.A  0.10  0.07 lo.oa  0  .. 01 
0.60  0.60 lo.1o:;  0.02  1.'\6 10 .. 27  0.22 I0.1"i 
iA.A':\  <;.':\0 11  .M  0.0~ 11c;,c;A  c;  .  .d?  ~  "11 10.70  0.01 
- - - - - - - - -
IA.A':I.  <;_':\0 11  .AA  0.0? ilc;_c;A 
I  <;.A?  ':\.11 10.70  b.Ol 
6,10  3,81 1,33  o,o2 ll,27 2,80  1,56 0,47  p,o3 
0.97  0.66  0.41  0  01  2  0')  0,')1  0,39  0.16  b.03 
1.  7(,  0.87 10 .. 21  - ?.8.11 11  . ':\9  __Q.._54 Lo..J.s  -
3.17  2.28 10.72  0.02  6.38  10.90  0  63  0.16  -
9.24  5.64 1.77  0.03 16.67  13.70  1.49 0,53  -
- - - - - 0,01  - -
- - - - - - - - -
o,01  o,01  - - o,o1  - - - -
- - - - - - - - -
o,01  o,o1  - - o,01  - - - -
- - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - -
0.0?  0.0?  - - _QH04 I  0 .  .111  - - -
0,50  0,19  0,05  - 0,74 0,29  0,09  o,o2  -
8,96  23,31 7,40  0,14 69,80 20,()(  9,92 3,06 p,12 
(')Number of hours worked by pltstatl and employ.-of contractor lirms who belong to a miners' soc1alonsurance scheme 
(
1
) Accidents involvong more than five casualties (o.e. who e1ther died or were unable to resume work underground for at least eight weeks) 
(') Calendar days 
(frequency rates) 
Shafts and staple-pots  Other places 
3  4 
4to  21 to  4to  21  to  Fatal 
20  56  >56  Fatal  20  56  >56 
total  aCCI·  total 
days  days  days 
acci- total 
days  days  days  dents  dents 
(3)  (3)  (3)  (3)  (3)  (3) 
12 02 008  0  02  0  0~  - 0.12 1.'52  o.  79  b  21  0  01  2.'12 
0.91 0.46  0.41  0.38  0  O"i  1.10 L':\8  1.49 lo  84  0.04.  3.74 
0.26 I  n.n.t  0.0:>  lo.o:::>  0.01  o.oB  i  o.no  O.OCI  lcu1R  - 0  .. 2'l 
o_l\c; lo.A':\  o.  ':\~  0.':\6  O.Od.  1  22  1.29  1.40 lo. 77  0.04.  3.49 
q  ~A 11  .?1  O.Q.Il lo.':\':\  0.02 I  2.119 16 .. '\0  .1.97  b..O"i  lo.m 111,5'5 
- o.o2  0,01  - - 0.03  - - - - -
9  ?A I  1 _  1 q  O.Q~ lo.':\':1  0.02  ? •  .116 l6.'l0  .1.97 11.0')  lo.o3 In.  '5'5 
4,85 0,28  0,13 o,o2  - 0,43  2,01  1,02 0,22  o,o2  3,26 
1.08 0.08  0,03  o.01  - 0,11  0,46  0,28  0,13  o,o1  o,87 
2  08  0  17  0  0~ 0  01  - 0  27  1.10  0.48 o.o6  - 1,63 
1  69  0.04  0.02  - - O,O'i  0.46  0,26 0  03  0.01  0,76 
5.72 0.62  0.45 0.15  - 1,22 3,12  1,63 0,59  0,03  5,37 
0,01  - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - o,01  - - - o,01 
- - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - o,01  - - - 0,01 
- - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - -
10.01  lo.m  - - - 0  .. 01  0.02  0 .. 02 lo .. 01  - lo.oo:; 
0,04  o,06  OrJ3  o,o2  - o,n 0,45  0,14 0,04  o,o1  o,64 
33,16  2,  72  1,93  0,92  o,o6  5,68 15,01  9,06  2,96  o,n 27,14 
T•ble 1b 
YEAR  1  9  7  5 
MAN-HOURS WORKED (1)  197  052  115 
Total of  Group 
accidents underground  accidents (21 
5  6 
4to  21  to 
Fatal 
20  56  >56  total  56  Fatal 
days  days  days  aCCI·  days  acci- total 
(3)  (3)  (3)  dents  (I)  dents  - _,__ 
~~-~A 11  . ').<;  ':\ .  .19  _0..12  ':\7  '2Jl  - - -
':\.27  ':\.':\"i  2  .. 12  0.11  8.8"i  - - -
0.67  0.711  0.. 'lO  0. 02  L.ll  - - -
2.')9  2  61  1.62  0.09  __6...92_  - - -
21.9'5  1 ':1.. ':\?  ~.'l2  0.07  18.86  - - -
1'"1  1'"1?  1'"1.1'"11  n.o':l.  -
21.93 13.31  3.'52  0.07  38  83  - - -
11,20  6,53  2,04  o,06  19,83  - - - - 2,01  1,35  0,71  0,04  4,ll  - - -
.......... 
N 
4.42  1,98  0,43  - 6,83  - - -
A.Tl  ':\.:'0  ()  oo  0.0?  8.89  - - -
16  6C  q  22  3.04  Q._Q5_  28_._2.2  - - -
- 0  01  - - 0,01  - - -
- - - - - - - -
o,o1  0,01  - - o,o2  - - -
- - - - - - - -
o,o1  o,o1  - - o,o2  - - -
- - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - -
0.0'  0,04.  0.01  - 0,09  - - -
1  ':\(  0.45  0.12  0,01  1,88  - - -
76, 7<  44,30 14,34  0,41  135,77  - - -MINI!I AFI!TY AND HEALTH 
COMMISSION 
Common Statiatocs on voctims 
of accodents underground on  coal mones  DETAILED BREAKDOWN OF VICTIMS ACCORDING -TO  LOCATION 
AND NATURE OF INJURY AND PERIOD OF INCAPACITY 
COUNTRY  FEDERAL  REPUBLIC  OF  GERMANY  (absolute figures) 
COAL-FIELD  N.R.W. 
Open wounds  Burns and 
Amputatoons  Fractures  Luxations,  Concussoon  contusoon  harmful effects  Poosomng  NATURE OF THE INJURY  and  woth or wothout  twostand  and onter- and muscular  olelectrocoty  and 
enucleatoons·  dislocatoon  spraons  nal InJury  abrastons  and radoatoon  sullocation 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
>56  Fatal  >56  Fatal  >56  Fatal  >56  Fatal  >56  Fatal  >56  Fatal  >56  Fatal 
PERIOD OF INCAPACITY  days  ICCI·  total  days  acci- total  days  acci- total  days  BCCI·  total  days  acci- total  days  acco- total  days  ace•- total 
(')  dents  (')  dents  I')  dents  (')  dents  1'1  dents  (5)  dents  (5)  dents 
LOCATION OF THE INJURY 
l:i::::::::r::  ·~  )  1:)\::-:::  1 Head and neck  - - - 55  20  241  2  - 20  18  2  168  66  4  258  - - !5 ;:.:.;.:::; .. ·  1:::::.  ::::: 
:-..  :::·> 1::/if:/::. 










i>:·  IL\!:/:t 
1  - 3  1\<>Y 
1  - 9  42  1::-.:··//  1:<<<-:  ·.:· . 
:::-
. .':·:···  ::- ·>: 
:·>. 
/( 
Ill  Trunk  - 1  1  140  2l  487  5  - . 71  3  5  20  6&  2 1673  3  - 25  p:y_;:::;:; nu/.t 
·.< :-.-:  :  .  .:::-:: 
I 
!:<:i:=: .. ·.:  ; 
~{:::: :-·:  ·  ...  ·  1<:-::::./· 
IV  Upper limbs  4  196  328  18  131  9  -2769  5  - 37  ~;;;j I 
(excluding the hands)  3  - - -
U.:Gi 
l'l 
28  I:/ 
~·············· 
::-:::::::-
I  t  t:::·l)tl)}' !i.t:.:·_:-:::· 
ll 
V  Hands 
15!  - ~ 67'  28  180  IW  25L  1 ~026  2  - 32  ::=:::::- 76  - 599  -
UL± Lt 
I 
[::/>{ I·>  -::_:;> 
I•• 
v::::-:=:::: [:}.:\<  VI  Lower limbs  4  - 4  358  1  453  81  - 371  176 
t·>:·:-·;::: r·-:-=:.-:  .·.  (excludong feet) r•1 
:.;.  -:=- :-:=::: ':;:·  ·>::  - 2787  1  - 26 
··::::::::::  -=:·.·.-: 
c····:·  /:::::.-: 
:;!)').'/ 
i  ~··············· 
l )  !  1:::{·:::::: 
VII  Feet 
lui 
- 1822  1  - 10  :<:::r_::  8  - 12  348  - 94  35  - 678  If\::  ...  :: 
107 
1:··:).:::::, 1:)}/f  1:'·  .::: 
:·:::::::::-···· 
i>>.  -:':'. v_:::-:-.::::  1:':'. 
VIII  Mu ltople locatoons  1  1  13  12  35  1  - 2  1  4  7  9  2  169  - - 8t::·  :.:-:  1:::/r:=:-::  -
n:::  ·. 
1.>::: 









-:--:-:·::  :.::·:··.·:: ..  .1_::·::  .:-=·:  .·. 
:  :::-:=: 1·:::·:(.::<  :;::::·:>: 
:;.: 
:-::····/·;:: 
::::: ::>·  :·:::  ·> ..  ::  IX  Not specofoed 
:···:.;;::::/  :=:::)< 
.-:  - - - - - J  E:::.;:  ·:·  }\:  ..  ·  .. 
(\:-::-·:::= 
t··  _:-
U/:d-1/f<:::.:=:  <<  .. ·.  :::: 
!···  :(  (/\\  ~>>:>:·  :::. ::::-::··:·0:·.  :::::-.''·:·  ,._.-:=) .  .;.:  ;.·:.  ·-:·. 
TOTAL 
9·  2  18(  170  57  517<  170  - 1453  23  11  204  813  9  ~946~  15  - 231  - - 3 
-·  11  J Number of houre wortted by pit 111ft and employ  ...  of contractor firma who belong to a mine. 1 10clallnaurance  1cheme. 
,  .. , tnclud•ng comphcatlona 
~~ 1  Tne snoulders and the wnata are tncluded under, upper hmbs 
1'1 The hlpo and the onkleo ore included under .. Lower limbo 
4") Calender days 
T1ble 21 
YEAR  1  9  7  5 
MAN-HOURS WORKED (1)  197  052  115 
Multople onjuries 
ol those not  TOTAL 
specified 1 21 
8  9 
>56  Fatal  4to  21 to  >56  Fatal 
20  56  days  acci- total  days  days  days  ace I- total 
(5)  dents 
.  I'L  ,l!L.. 
(I)  dents 
-~--~ 
1  - 2  227.5  .598  142  26  3041 
1  - 23  620  71  48  - 739 
- 1  7  1282  750  219  33  2284 
- - 4  2246  714  313  - 327.3 
- - 2  5008  4104  959  1  10072. 
1  - 4  186&  1159  621  1  3645 
1  - 3  1722  1252  500  - 3474 
- 1  1  104  75  24  20  223 
- - - 2  1  - - J 
4  2  46  15123  8724  2826  81  26754 MINU APITY AND HIIAL  TH 
COMMISSION 
Common Statistics on victims 
of accidents underground In coal minas  DETAILED BREAKDOWN OF VICTIMS ACCORDING TO LOCATION 
AND NATURE OF INJURY AND PERIOD OF INCAPACITY 
NATURE OF THE INJURY 
PERIOD OF INCAPACITY 
LOCATION OF THE INJURY 
I.  Head and neck 
II. Eyes 
Ill. Trunk 
IV  Upper limbs 
(excluding the hands) 
(•) 
V  Hands 
VI. Lower limbs 
(excluding feat) c•) 
VII  Feat 
VIII. Multiple locations 




FEDERAI,  REPUBLIC  OF  GERMANY 
NRW 
Amputations  Fractures  Luxatlons, 
and  with or without  twist and 
enucleations  diSlocation  sprains 
1  2  3 
>58  Fatal  >58  Fatal  >58  Fatal 
days  ace I- total  days  &CCI- total  days  accl- total 
(')  dents  (')  dents  (')  dents 
- - - p,28  0,10  ,22  o,o1  - p,10 
.·  .··  :··:-· 
·::·:  :  :·· 
p,01  o,o2  ·:·  t··· 
" ..  ::  - ::>).L 
.  :.: 
:-::::-:<  ::::'. 
·.·:  t:-:::.:::  ::,:_:, 
- p,Ol  0,01  0,70 0,12  2,47  p,o3  - 0,36 
o,o2  - o,o2  0,99  - 1,66  0,09  - 0,66 
0,40  - o,  78  3,04  - 13,64 0,14  - 0,90 
o,o2  - ~,02  1,82  o,o1  2,30 0,41  - 1,88 
~.04  - 0,06  1,77  - 4,82 0,18  - 3,44 
- 0,01  o,o1  o,o6  0,06  0,18  o,o1  - p,o1 
••••••••••••• 
·<.  ,,.·.·.  :,:  .  .  ··:  ..  -: 
k:•··  ..  ::: 
·:·  .::  .. :: 
l::u:·_.:; k 
.: 
".'  :  .···  j=.> 
V:  :::  1:.:;  :·:·. 
·. 
·<·  :··· 
0,48 p,o1  0,92  8,66  o,28  26,29  o,86  - 7,35 
1
11  Number of houra wor-by pllataff and emp~  of contractor firma who belong to • mtMr aaoctat lnaurMCS ocheme. 
I'  I Including compllcallona  · 
rsJ The ahouldefl and the wrleta are Included under .. upper limba" 
(Frequency rates) 
YEAR  1  9  7  5 
MAN-HOURS WORKED (1) 
Open wounds  Burns and 
ConCUSSIOn  contusion  harmfu  I effects  Poisoning  Multlpialnjurle~ 
and Inter- and muacular  of electricity  and  olthoaenot 
nal injury  abrasions  and radiation  suffocation  specified (') 
4  5  6  7  e 
>58  Fatal  >58  Fatal  >58  Fatal  >58  Fatal  >58  Fatal  4to 
20  days  accl- total  days  accl- total  days  acci- total  days  accl- total  days  accl- total  days 
(')  dents  (')  dents  (5)  dents  (5)  dents  (5)  dents  <'> 
:··:  .··.  ::  ':-
::  :::· 
0,09  p,01  ~,85  0,33  p,o2  13,12  - - 0,13  : ·,::.  o,o1  p,01  11,55  ..  :.  .::  .  -
.':-:-.-:-: 
·>·:  .. : 
0,01  o,os  o,2o  3,22 0,02  0,34  ,  ..  : ··:·· 
.·.  - p,12  3,15  - - - ::·1·>  0,01 
1·> ..  .:.:: 
·:·  ',  ... 
-:, 
o,o2  0,03  o,1o 0,34  o,01  8,48  o,o2  - ~,13  - o,o1  0,04  6,51  -:: J.  ·:  ~- :-
1<·:···:--:··:: 
~::rc:.::i 
::·::::> ..  ..  ..  :: 
··.·  ::,_ ..  :.::  ... ·  ·:· 
:  .. ·:  •:>·.  ·::::::  .. 0,46  - 4,05 o,o3  - p,19  ·.·  .:::1.:>  - - o,o2  1,40 
:/.  ·. :-.:  ": 
·.  ..  ·.·  1.:: 
::::  t-· 
::.::·.  .:··  k  1·: 
.  :-1)  f:· . 
1,29  o,o1  35,6..;  0,01  0,16 k::: 
~5,38  - - - 0,02  : :  ':'  ·J>  ·: 





o,89  - 14,14 o,01  - 0,13 p  ·~,01  - 0,03  9,46 
:··· ..  c.::. 
.-:'  t-::··. 
-::.  ·>  .;: 
···.:· 
1.::  ·:·  0,54  - 9,24  o,o1  - 0,05  ....  :::p,Ol  - 0,02  8,74  .  :- ·>  .·<t:: 
·<·  :::.:: 
0,01  o,o2 10,03  o,os  0,01  o,85  - - 0,04  .:::·.:  o,o1  o,o1  0,53  -
•  0,02  - - - - - - - - o,01 
. 
0,13  o,06  1,03  4,10 o,os  ~8,73 0,08  - ~,17  - - 0,02  0,04  o,01  o,26  76,72 
k  ' 
( )  The hlp11nd th• an  IN are Included uncle  .Lo-rUmba" 
(1) Cllender da~. 
197  052  115 
TOTAL 
9 
21to  >58  Fatal  58 
days  days  accl- total 
(I)  (I)  dante 
3,03  0,72  jo,13  15,43 
0,36  0,24  -
3,75 
3,81  1,11  0,17  11,59 
3,62  1,59  - 16,61 
20,85  4,88  0,01  51,11 
5,88  3,15  o,o1  18,50 
6,35  2,.54  - 17,63 
0,38  0,12  0,10  1,13 
0,01  - - o,o2 
44,30  14,34  0,41  135,77 MINES SAFETY AND HEALTH 
COMMISSION 
DETAILED BREAKDOWN OF ACCIDENT VICTIMS ACCORDING TO CAUSE AND SITE 
OF ACCIDENT AND PERIOD OF INCAPACITY 
Common StatistiCS on victims 
of accidents underground 1n coal mmes 
COUNTRY  :  Federal Republic  of Gennany 
COAL-FIELD  Saar 
~TIHCC'D'Ofl 
Production faces  Headings excluding 
shafts and staple-pits 
1  2 
~ 
4to  21  to  Fatal  4to  21  to 
20  56  >56 
a  CCI- total  20  56  >56 
days  days  days  days  days  days 
CAUSES OF ACCIDENTS 
dents 
(')  1 3)  I')  (a)  (3)  <'> 
I. FALLS OF GROUNDS AND ROCKS  231  145  83  2  461  47  28  19 
II. TRANSPORT, TOTAL  10  10  15  - 35  6  10  7 
a) Continuous Transport  6  8  12  - 26  2  5  2 
b) Discontinuous Transport  4  2  3  - 9  4  5  5 
Ill. FALLS AND MOVEMENT OF THE VICTIM, 
45  TOTAL  31  15  - 91  ?5  21  5 
a) while moving about the mine  22  15  7  - 44  10  10.  2 
b) 1n the course of other activities  23  16  8  - 47  15  11  3 
IV. MACHINES, TOOLS AND SUPPORTS 
TOTAL  171  111  40  - m  49  19  11 
a) Machines  12  20  6  - 38  6  5  3 
b) Tools  25  ?0  4  - 49  32  9  4 
c) Supports  134  71  30  - 235  11  5  4 
V. FALLS OF OBJECTS  76  35  13  - 124  35  17  11 
VI. EXPLOSIVES  - - - - - - - -
VII. IGNITIONS OR EXPLOSION& 
OF FIREDAMP AND COAL DUST  - - - - - - - -
VIII. OUTBURSTS OF GAS, DE-OXYGENATION, 
SUFFOCATION OR POISONING BY NATU- - - - - - - - -
RAL GASES (COs, CH., CO, HoS), 
TOTAL 
a) Outbursts of Gas  - - - - - - - -
b) De-oxygenation and Poisoning 
by natural Gases  - - - - - - - -
IX. HEATING$ OR FIRES  - - - - - - - -
X. INRUSHES  - - - - - - - -
XI. ELECTRICITY  - - - - - - - -
XII. OTHER CAUSES  50  30  13  - 93  31  20  9 
TOTAL  583  362  179  2  1126  193  115  62 
(1) Numbel' of hours -rked  by pit eta!! and employ-of contractor !Irma who belong to a miners aoclallnsurancescheme. 
(1) Accldenll Involving more than live c•ualtlea (I  e. who either died or_,.  unable to ruume  work underground tor at leut eight weeks) 



























Shafts and staple-p1ts  Other places 
3  4 
4to  21  to  Fatal  4to  21  to  Fatal 
total  20  56  >56 
8CCI- total  20  56  >56  acci- days  days  days  days  days  days  dents  dents 
(')  <'>  I')  ('J  (')  (3) 
96  - - - - - 25  19  9  -
24  5  5  2  - 12  37  35  25  2 
9  - - - - - 1  1  - -
15  5  5  2  - 12  36  34  25  2 
51  2  6  - - I  a  50  61  15  -
22  2  3  - - 5  20  15  8  -
29  - 3  - - 3  30  46  7  -
79  1  2  - - 3  43  24  15  -
14  - - - - - 3  3  3  -
45  1  2  - - 3  28  13  7  -
20  - - - - - 12  8  5  -
63  4  1  3  - 8  61  46  17  -
- - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - -
60  2  12  3  - 17  71  53  21  -
373  14  26  8  - 48  288  238  102  2 
Table 1e 
YEAR  1  9 7  5 
MAN-HOURS WORKED (1)  19  285  592 
Total of  Group 
accidents underground  accidents (1) 
5  6 
4to  21  to 
Fatal 
total  20  56  >56 
aCCI·  total  56  Fatal 
days  days  days  days  acci- total 
dents 
(')  (')  (')  (')  dents 
54  304  192  111  4  611  - - -
99  58  60  49  3  170  - - -
2  9  ].!.  14  - 37  - - -
97  49  46  35  3  133  - - -
126  122  119  35  - 276  - - -
43  54  43  17  - 114  - - -
83  68  76  18  - 162  - - -
82  2M  156  66  - 486  - - -
9  21  28  12  - 61  - - -
48  86  44  15  - 145  - - -
25  m  84  39  - 280  - - -
124  176  99  44  - 319  - - -
- - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - -.  -
- - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - -
145  154  115  46  - 315  - - -
630  1078  741  351  7  2177  - - -MINES SAFETY AND HEALTH 
COMMISSION 
DETAILED BREAKDOWN OF ACCIDENT VICTIMS ACCORDING TO CAUSE AND SITE 
OF ACCIDENT AND PERIOD OF INCAPACITY 
Common Statistics on victims 
of accidents underground in coal mines 
COUNTRY  :  Federal Republic of Germany 




shafts and staple-pots 
1  2 
~ 
4to  21to  Fatal 
4to  21to 
20  56  >56  total 
20  56  >56 
days  days  days  ace•- days  days  days  CAUSES OF ACCIDENTS 
(3)  (3)  (3)  dents  (3)  (3)  (3) 
I. FALLS OF GROUNDS AND ROCKS  11.98  7.52  J,, 30  0,10  23.90  2.H  l.J,5  0.99 
II. TRANSPORT, TOTAL  0,52  0,52  o. 78  - 1,81  0,31  0.52  0.36 
a) Contmuous Transport  0,31  0.41  0.62  - 1,35  0,10  0, 26  0,10 
b) Discontinuous Transport  0,21  o. 10  0,16  - 0,47  0,21  0, 26  0,26 
Ill. FALLS AND MOVEMENT OF THE VICTIM, 
TOTAL  2. 33  1,61  o. 78  - 4. 72  1,30  1.09  0, 26 
a) while moving about the mine  1,1J,  o. 78  0,36  - 2.28  0,52  0,52  0,10 
b) in the course of other activities  1,19  0.83  0,41  - 2,J,J,  o. 78  0,57  0,16 
IV  MACHINES, TOOLS AND SUPPORTS 
TOTAL  8,87  5, 76  2,07  - 16.70  2.54  0,99  0.57 
a) Machones  0,62  1,04  0,31  - 1.97  0,31  0, 26  0,16 
b) Tools  1.30  1,04  0,21  - 2,54  1,66  0,47  o. 21 
c) Supports  6,95  3,68  1,55  - 12.19  0,57  0, 26  0,21 
V. FALLS OF OBJECTS  3,94  1,81  0,67  - 6, 43  1,81  0.98  0,57 
VI. EXPLOSIVES  - - - - - - - -
VII. IGNITIONS OR EXPLOSIONS 
OF FIREDAMP AND COAL DUST  - - - - - - - -
VIII. OUTBURSTS OF GAS, DE-OXYGENATION, 
SUFFOCATION OR POISONING BY NATU- - - - - - - - -
RAL GASES (COo, CH., CO, H1S), 
TOTAL 
a) Outbursts of Gas  - - - - - - - -
b) De-oxygenation and Poisoning 
by natural Gases  - - - - - - - -
IX. HEATINGS OR FIRES  - - - - - - - -
X. INRUSHES  - - - - - - - -
XI. ELECTRICITY  - - - - - - -
XII. OTHER CAUSES  ?.59  1,56  0,67  - 4.8?  1,  61  1.04  a. 47 
TOTAL  30.23  18,77  9.ZS  0,10  58.39  10,01  5,96  3, 21 
1 ) Number of houro worked by pot staN and employ-of contractor firms who belong to a moners  soc  tal msurance scheme 
f1) Acclder1ts involving more than f•ve casualties  (1.e. who etther died or were unable to resume work underground for at least ••ght weeks) 



























Shafts and staple-pots  Other places 
3  4 
410  21  to 
Fatal  4to  21  to  Fatal 
total 
20  56  >56  acci- total 
20  56  >56  acci-
days  days  days  days  days  days 
(3)  (3)  (3) 
dents  (3)  (3)  (3)  dents 
4.98  - - - - - 1,35  0,99  0,47  -
1, 24  0,26  o. 26  o. 26  - 0,62  1,92  1,81  1,30  0,10 
0,47  - - - - - 0,05  0,05  - -
0, 78  0, 26  0,26  0,10  - 0.62  1,87  1, 76  1,30  0,10 
2.64  0,10  0,31  - - I  0,41  2.59  3,16  0, 78  -
1,14  o. 10  o. 16  - - 0.26  1.04  o. 78  0,41  -
1.50  - o. 16  - - 0,16  1,56  2.39  0,36  -
4.10  0,05  0,10  - - 0,16  2. 23  1, 24  0, 78  -
o. 73  - - - - - 0,16  0,15  o. 16  -
2. 33  0,05  o. 10  - - 0.16  ], 45  0,67  0,36  -
1,04  - - - - - 0,62  0.41  0,26  -
3, 27  0,21  0,05  0,16  - 0,41  3,16  2.39  0,88  -
- - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - -
3,11  0,10  0.62  0,15  - O,BS  3.68  2. 75  1.09  -
19,34  o. 73  1. 35  0.81  - ?.49  14,93  12.34  5, ?9  0,10 
YEAR  1  9 7  5 
MAN-HOURS WORKED (1)  19  285  592 
Total of  Group 
accidents underground  accidents (1) 
5  6 
4to  21  to 
Fatal 
total 
20  56  >56 
acci- total  56  Fatal 
days  days  days  days  acci- total 
(3)  (3)  (3)  dents  (")  dents 
2,80  15,76  9.96  5, 76  o. 21  31.68  - - -
5,13  3,01  3,11  2,5J,  0,16  8,81  - - -
0,20  0,47  0, 73  0, 73  - 1.92  - - -
5,03  2.54  2.39  1,81  0,16  6.90  - - -
6,53  6, 33  6.11  1.81  - 14,31  - - -
2.23  2,80  2.23  0,88  - 5,91  - - -
4.30  3,53  3,9J,  0,93  - 8,J,O  - - -
4, 25  13.69  8,09  3,J,2  - 25.20  - - -
O,J,7  1,09  1,J,S  0,62  - 3,16  - - -
2. 49  4,46  2. 28  0, 78  - 7.52  - - -
], 30  B, 14  J,, 36  2.02  - 1J,.S2  - - -
6,U  9.13  5,13  2. 28  - 16.54  - - -
- - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - -
7.52  7.99  5.96  2. ~9  - 16,33  - - -
32.67  55.90  38.42  18.20  0,36  112.88  - - -MINI!S AFI!TY AND HI!AL  TH 
COMMISSION 
Common Statistocs on vocllms 
of accodents underground on  coal monas  DETAILED BREAKDOWN OF VICTIMS ACCORDING TO LOCATION 
AND NATURE OF INJURY AND PERIOD OF INCAPACITY 
COUNTRY  FEDERAL  REPUBLIC  OF  GERMANY 
COAL FIELD  SAAR 
Amputations  Fractures  Luxations. 
NATURE OF THE INJURY  and  woth or without  twostand 
enucleat1ons  doslocation  sprains 
1  2  3 
>56  Fatal  >56  Fatal  >56  Fatal 
PERIOD OF INCAPACITY  days  &CCI- total  days  ace•- total  days  acci- total  ,.,  dents  ,.,  dents  I')  dents 
LOCATION OF THE INJURY 
I  Head and neck  - - - ~  ~  9  3  - 8 
·:  1·:  ·-
[::  .:>_,  :>. 
I··  :·:: ':: .. :.  :·- .. ::·  :-·· 
II. Eyes  - - -
~::-.::it::  [::  ::::: ..  k::::.:::\  :-:::::-:).  ::::;:::  ·_:·  -.  :··· 
Ill  Trunk  - - - 2  1  10  2  - 50 
IV  Upper limbs 
(excluding the hands)  - - - 7  - 7  9  - 4{) 
I') 
V  Hands  10  - 44  20  - 79  1  ~  - 95 
VI  Lower limbs 
1  - 1  21  (exclud•ng feat) ''I  - ?2  27  - 108 
VII  Feet  - - 2  12  - 29  30  - 127 
VIII  Multiple locatoons  - 1  1  ~  1  5  16  - 61 
1  r I i  I 
•••••••••••••••• 
I 
~:::·<:  .· .. ::::::::?> 1:::::.::::·:::. 
:::c:-·): 
IX  Not specohed 
!:!}3!:.: 1\H\:  )::UU:.  ~::::::::-:::::: 
:;:::::: :::::: 
TOTAL  11  1  48  70  6  161  101  - 489 
f 
1 J Number of hours worked by pit 1t1tf 1nd employ  ...  ot contractor firma who belong to a miner IIOclallnluranee tehama 
r111 tnctudtng complications 






>56  Fatal  >56 
days  8CCI- total  days  ,.,  dents  I') 
1  - 1  7 
- - - 2 
- - 1  9 
p·><:· 1/:>::  ·:  ·.::::··:·> 




1·:  :> 
·:  51 
:-..  -·-:' 
;:.::  _.-,.;.  ·. 





<:- -:  :-
27 
",' 
. _:>  .. :::::>·-.-:  :-
- - - 23 
·  ..  :- ..  :-.-: 
. __ . 
iL:·>> 




1  - 2  153 
Open wounds  Burns and 
contusoon  harmful effects  Poisomng 
and muscular  of electncity  and 
abras1ons  and rad1at1on  suffocation 
5  6  7 
Fatal  >56  Fatal  >56  Fatal 
ace•- Iota  I  days  8CCI~  total  days  acci- total 
dents  (5)  dents  (5)  dents 
-, 
_I:··  ·:·:·  1'·:·  :·::: 
- 196  - - -
- -· 
··:  ·:-·  ... : 
·:·  .- _ .  .; 
-.'  - 129  - - - 1·-·  1'::  ·> 
.:-
1·>.  .·-·  -: 
- 60  - - - - ·-::1::;:·.  <  .. _:  .-::.  -· 
I:·> 
_-.-.  .  :'  -:· 
- 136  - - -
·:·  •.:: 
·.-.  :.;  ·:-·:  ·:· 
- 524  - - - :::  1::::·  ::: 
·.·. 
:,_:;_:::. I'L  .. ·  ·-:·: 
r·:- 1·>.;  ..  ::. 
", 
- 129  - - - 1:'  :·-
:··.'  .:  ··:::·· 
", 
·  ..  ":::· ..  ·.  ::: 
··-:·:- '_:·  ,-_:·.:  - 111  - - -
·:· 
...::__'  ·.:···. 
:: 
- 101  - - -





- - - - - - - -
- 1386  - - - - -
1 41  Tha l'llpa and tha ankln aralncludad under .. Lower II mba 
C"l Celandar days 
YEAR  1  9 7 5 
MAN-HOURS WORKED (1)  19  285  592 
Multiple injuries 
of those not  TOTAL 
specohed 1'1 
8  9 
>56  Fatal  4to 
:~: 
>56  Fatal 
days  aCCI- total  20  days  accl- total 
(5)  dents  days 
(')  denta  (') 
1  - 11  122  83  16  ~  225 
- - 1  75  53  2  - 130 
1  - 25  73  58  14  1  146 
2  - 7  95  ~9  26  - 190 
- - 8  380  275  95  - 750 
9  - 26  120  82  8~  - 286 
- - 6  134  72  69  - 275 
1  - 6  79  49  44  2  174 
1  - 1  - - 1  - 1 
15  - 91  1078  H1  351  7  2177 MINIS A"ITY AND HIAL  TH 
COMMISSION 
Common Statistics on victims 
of accidents underground in coal mines  DETAILED BREAKDOWN OF VICTIMS ACCORDING TO LOCATION 
AND NATURE OF INJURY AND PERIOD OF INCAPACITY 
COUNTRY  FEDERAL  REPUBLIC  OF  GERMANY 
COAL-FIELD  SAAR 
Amputations  Fractures  LuKatlons,  Concuulon  NATURE OF THE INJURY  and  with or without  twlatand  and Inter-
enucleations  dislocation  sprains  nallnjury 
1  2  3  4 
>56  Fatal  >58  Fatal  >58  Fatal  >58  Fatal  PERIOD OF INCAPACITY  diiiYS  acci- total  days  acci- total  days  DCCI- total  days  accl-
(')  dents  (')  dents  (')  dante  (')  dents 
LOCATION OF THE INJURY 
I.  Head and neck  - - - 0,21  0,21  o.•1  0,16  - 0.41  o.os  -
:::::·:<:' 
·>  ::::- :-::-
II  Eyes  - - - 1:::-:  ::  - -
1:~.:>:·:·:  k::..::-.:  :)-:::···· [;.):  .·  ~. 
Ill  Trunk  - - - 0.10  o.os  0,52  a.10  - 2.59  - -
r:T'·.·  :;::·-: 
IV  Upper limbs  - 0,36  - a. 36  0.47  2.07 
I··  .. · 
(excluding the hands)  - - -
(') 
V. Hands  0.52  - 2. 28  1.04  - 4.10  o. 73  - 4.93 
VI. Lower limbs  0,05  - 0,05  1.09  - l.llf  1.~  - 5,60  .  (excludtng feet) (4) 
VII  Feet  - - 0,10  0,62  - 1,50  1,56  - 6. 59 
VIII. Multiple locations  - 0,05  0,05  0,21  0,05  a. 26  0.83  - 3,16  - -
~  ·-:·.·  ,:,::·:- ·.::: 
·:·-:·.: 
".'  :.:  ·.: 
1:::-:  :.r:· 
I···  :.:_ 
·. :-:;:  I  r:s  [:::::<l: 
IX  Not specified 
f::..::.:::::  h-:·.:  ::  :::  \H:·  .:. 
..  !/U:(::  ~  ::::~: :/  1·:><:<  :>::>:·.: 
:: 
..  ::::::::.:  :::-\:: L::  .::·: 
TOTAL  0,57  0,05  2.49  3.63  0, 31  a. 35  5,24  -
1
1
) Number ol hours-by pit ltaH and amp~  ol contractor llrma who balong to a miner a aoclallnauranca aclleme. 
1 11  Including compllcltlona  · 
I1J Tile ahouldara and tha wrlata are included under .. upper llmba" 









Openwounda  Burns and 
contusion  harmful effecta  Poisoning 
and muacular  of electricity  and 
abraalona  and radiation  suffocation 
5  8  7 
>58  Fatal  >58  Fatal  >58  Fatal 
days  acci- total  daya  acci- total  days  acci-
(I)  dents  (5)  dents  (5)  dents 
o. 36  - 10,16  - I  - - .  ·, 
a,10  - 6,69  - - -
0,47  - 3,11  - - -
0.41  - 7.a5  - - -
2. 64  - 27.17  - - -
1.35  - 6. 69  - - -
1.~  - 5. 76  - - -
1,19  - 5, 24  - - -
- - - - - - - -
7.93  - 71.87  - - - - -
(4) The hlpa and th• anklea ana Included under .. Lo-r  II mba 
(1) Caland•r daya. 
Table2b 
YEAR  1  9 7  5 
MAN HOURS WORKED (1)  - 19  285  592 
Multiple lnjurlett 
ofthoaenot  TOTAL 
specified(') 
8  9 
>58  Fatal  4to  21  to  >58  Fatal  20  58  total  days  acci- total  days  days  days  IIICCI- total 
(5)  dents  (•)  (I)  (I)  dania 
o.os  - 0.57  6. 33  4.30  0.83  o. 21  11.67 
- - a,05  3.89  2. 75  0,10  - 6. 74 
0,05  - 1,30  3, 79  3,01  a. 73  o.a5  7.57 
0,10  - o. 36  4.93  3,58  1, 35  - 9.85 
- - 0,41  19,70  14.26  4.93  - 38.89 
o. 47  - 1,35  6.22  4. 25  4,36  - 14.83 
- - o. 31  6,95  3, 73  3, 58  - 14.26 
o.os  - o. 31  4,10  2.54  2. 28  0,10  9.02 
- 0.05  - 0,05  - - 0,05  - 0,05 
- o. 78  - 4. 72  55,90  38,42  18.20  0,36  112.88 MINES SAFETY AND HEALTH 
COMMISSION 
DETAILED BREAKDOWN OF ACCIDENT VICTIMS ACCORDING TO CAUSE AND SITE 
OF ACCIDENT AND PERIOD OF INCAPACITY 
Common Statostics on voctoms 
of accidents underground on  coal mones 
COUNTRY  FEDERAL  REPUBLIC  OF  GERMANY 
COAL-FIELD  TOTAL 
~T,.ACC,DEm  Productoon faces 
Headongs excluding 
shafts and staple-pots 
1  2 
~ 
4to  21to  Fatal 
4to  21  to 
20  56  >56  20  56  >56 
days  days  days  acco- total  days  days  days  CAUSES OF ACCIDENT 
(')  (')  I') 
dents  1 3)  (')  (3) 
I. FALLS OF GROUNDS AND ROCKS  2835  1559  506  11  ~911  1519  693  237 
II. TRANSPORT, TOTAL  217  239  146  5  607  80  68  53 
a) Continuous Transport  95  118  75  2  290  22  19  18 
b) Discontinuous Transport  122  121  71  3  317  58  49  35 
Ill  FALLS AND MOVEMENT OF THE VICTIM, 
TOTAL  1784  1075  299  4  3162  1094  634  143 
a) while movong about the mine  22  15  7  - 44  10  10  2 
b) in the course of other actovoties  1762  1060  292  4  3118  1084  624  141 
IV  MACHINES, TOOLS AND SUPPORTS 
TOTAL  1373  864  302  4  2543  601  326  104 
a) Machines  203  151  86  1  441  106  81  35 
b)Tools  372  192  45  - 609  306  115  34 
c) Supports  798  521  171  3  1493  189  130  35 
V. FALLS OF OBJECTS  1897  1146  361  5  3409  765  311  115 
VI. EXPLOSIVES  - - - - - - 1  -
VII. IGNITIONS OR EXPLOSIONS 
OF FIREDAMP AND COAL DUST  - - - - - - - -
VIII. OUTBURSTS OF GAS, DE-OXYGENATION, 
SUFFOCATION OR POISONING BY NATU-
RAL GASES (CO.. CH  •• CO, HzS), 
TOTAL  1  1  - - 2  - - -
a) Outbursts of Gas  - - - - - - - -
b) De-oxygenation and Poisoning 
by natural G- 1  1  - - 2  - - -
IX. HEATING$ OR FIRES  - - - - - ·- - -
X. INRUSHES  - - - - - - - -
XI. ELECTRICITY  3  4  - - 7  1  - -
XII. OTHER CAUSES  149  67  22  - 238  88  38  13 
TOTAL  8259  4955  1636  29  14879  4148  2071  665 
( ) Number of hours worked by pit stall and employees of contractor forms who belong to a miners socoallnsurance scheme 




























Shafts and staple-pots  Other places 
3  4 
4to  21  to  Fatal  4to  21  to  Fatal 
total 
20  56  >56  acco- total  20  56  >56  acco-
days  days  days  days  days  days 
(')  I')  l'l 
dents 
(')  (')  (') 
dents 
24.64  15  3  5  - 23  326  174  50  1 
203  96  86  77  9  268  308  328  191  9 
60  7  4  4  1  16  18  19  15  -
143  89  82  73  8  252  290  309  176  9 
1872  740  191  65  3  I  499  1330  844  m  5 
22  6  5  - - 11  20  15  8  -
1850  234  186  65  3  488  1310  829  214  5 
1036  57  28  4  - 89  440  225  58  3 
'l27  15  5  2  - l2  94  58  28  1 
m  35  20  2  - 57  244  107  19  -
354  7  3  - - 10  102  60  11  2 
1191  126  go  33  - 249  676  368  134  5 
1  - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - 1  - - -
- - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - 1  - - -
- - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - -
1  1  - - - 1  4  3  2  -
139  14  18  6  - 38  160  81  29  1 
6907  549  416  190  12  1167  ms  2023  686  24 
Table 1e 
YEAR  1  9 7  5 
MAN-HOURS WORKED (1)  216 337  707 
Total of  Group 
accodents underground  accidents (2) 
5  6 
4to  21  to  Fatal 
total  20  56  >56  acci- total  56  Fatal 
days  days  days  days  acci- total 
(')  (3)  (')  dents 
(')  dents 
551  ~695  2429  798  27  7949  - - -
836  701  721  467  25  1914  - - -
52  142  160  112  4  m  - - -
784  559  561  355  21  1496  - - -
2401  4448  2744  729  13  7934  - - -
43  58  45  17  - 120  - - -
2358  4390  2699  712  13  '1814  - - -
726  2471  1v.J  468  12  4394  - - -
181  418  295  151  7  871  - - -
370  957  434  100  - 1491  - - -
175  1096  714  217  5  2032  - - -
1183  3464  1915  643  10  6032  - - -
- - 1  - - 1  - - -
- - - - - - - - -
1  2  1  - - 3  - - -
- - - - - - - - -
1  2  1  - - 3  - - -
- - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - -
9  9  7  2  - 18  - - -
271  m  204  70  1  686  - - -
5978  16201  9465  3177  88  28931  - - -MINES SAFETY AND HEALTH 
COMMISSION 
DETAILED BREAKDOWN OF ACCIDENT VICTIMS ACCORDING TO CAUSE AND SITE 
OF ACCIDENT AND PERIOD OF INCAPACITY 
Common Statistics on v1ct1ms 
of accidents underground 1n  coal mmes 
COUNTRY  FEDERAL  REPUBLIC  OF  GERMANY 
COAL-FIELD  'roTAL 
~THE,CQOm  Product1on faces 
Headings excluding 
shafts and staple-pits 
1  2 
~ 
4to  21  to  Fatal 
4to  21to 
20  56  >56  20  56  >56 
days  days  days 
acci- total 
days  days  days 
CAUSES OF ACCIDENTS 
(')  (3)  (3)  dents  (3)  (')  (') 
I. FALLS OF GROUNDS AND ROCKS  13,10  7,21  {.3~  0,05  22.70  7.0{  3, 20  1,10 
II. TRANSPORT, TOTAL  1,00  1.10  0.67  0,02  2,81  o. 37  o. 31  0, 24 
a) Continuous Transport  0,44  0,55  0,35  0,009  1,34  0,10  0,09  0,08 
b) Discontmuous Transport  0,56  0,56  o. 33  0,01  1, 47  0, 27  0, 23  0.16 
Ill-FALLS AND MOVEMENT OF THE VICTIM, 
TOTAL  a. 24  4,97  1,38  0,02  14.62  5,06  2.93  0.66 
a) while moving about the mine  0,10  0,07  0,03  - o. 20  0.05  0,05  0,009 
b) in the course of other actiVities  8.14  4,90  1,35  0,02  14,41  5,01  2.8R  0,65 
IV  MACHINES. TOOLS AND SUPPORTS 
TOTAL  6,35  3,99  1.40  0,02  11 '75  2. 78  1. 51  0,48 
a) Mach  ones  0.94  0, 70  0,40  0,005  2,01f  0,49  o, 37  0.16 
b) Tools  1, 72  0,89  0, 21  - 2.82  1, 41  0,53  0,16 
c) Supports  3,69  2.41  o. 79  0,01  6,90  0.87  0,60  0.16 
V. FALLS OF OBJECTS  8. 77  5,30  1,67  0.02  15,76  3.54  1,44  0,53 
VI. EXPLOSIVES  - - - - - - o.oo  -
VII  IGNITIONS OR EXPLOSIONS 
OF FIREDAMP AND COAL DUST  - - - - - - - -
VIII. OUTBURSTS OF GAS, DE-OXYGENATION, 
SUFFOCATION OR POISONING BY NATU-
RAL GASES (COo, CH  •. CO. HoS), 
TOTAL  0,005  0,005  - - 0,009  - - -
a) Outbursts of Gas  - - - - - - - -
b) De-oxygenation and Poosonong 
by natural Gases  0,005  0,005  - - 0,009  - - -
IX  HEATINGS OR FIRES  - - - - - - - -
X. INRUSHES  - - - - - - - -
XI  ELECTRICITY  0,01  0,02  - - 0,03  0,005  - -
XII. OTHER CAUSES  0,69  0,31  0,10  - 1 '10  o. 41  0.17  0,06 
TOTAL  38.18  n,go  7,56  0,13  58.78  19,17  9.55  3,07 
(') Number oll'louro wort<ed by pot stall and employ-of contractor forms who belong to a miners  social lnsu ranee scheme 
(1) Accidents onvolving more than live cuualtoes (i.e. who either died or  were unable to resume work underground lor at least e•ghl weeks) 



























Shafts and staple-p1ts  Other places 
3  4 
4to  21to  Fatal  4to  211o  Fatal 
20  56  >56 
acci- total  20  56  >56  acci- total 
days  days  days  days  days  days 
(')  (3)  (3)  dents 
(')  (3)  <') 
dents 
11.39  0,07  0,01  0,0{  - 0,11  1,51  0,80  0, 23  0,005 
0.9~  0.44  MO  0,36  o.o~  1. 2~  1.42  1.52  0,88  o.o~ 
0, 28  0,03  0,02  0,02  0,005  0,07  o.o8  0,09  O,G7  -
0, 65  0,41  0,38  0,34  0,04  1.16  1,34  1, 43  0,81  0,04 
8,65  1.11  0,88  0,30  0,01  I  2.31  6,15  3,90  1,03  0,02 
0,10  0,03  0,02  - - 0,05  o.og  0.07  0,04  -
8.55  1.08  0,86  0,30  0,01  2. 26  6,06  3,83  0,99  0,02 
4, 79  o. 2fi  0.13  0,02  - 0,41  2,03  1,04  o. 27  0,01 
1,05  0.07  0.02  0,009  - 0,10  0,43  o. 27  0,13  0,005 
2.10  0,16  0,09  0,009  - a. 26  1.13  0,49  0,09  -
1,64  0,03  0,01  - - 0,05  o. 47  0, 28  0,05  0,009 
5.51  0,58  0.42  0,15  - 1.15  3.12  1. 70  0,62  0,02 
0,005  - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - 0,005  - - -
- - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - 0,005  - - -
- - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - -
0,005  0,005  - - - - 0.0?  0,02  0,01  -
0.6~  0,07  0,08  0,03  - o. 17  0, 7~  0, 37  0,13  0,005 
31.93  2.5~  1.97  0,88  0,06  5.39  15,00  q,35  3,17  0,11 
Table  1b 
YEAR  1  9  7  5 
MAN-HOURS WORKED (1)  216  337  707 
Total of  Group 
acc1dents underground  accidents (1) 
5  6 
4to  2110 
Fatal 
total 
20  56  >56 
aCCI- total  56  Fatal 
days  days  days  days  acci- total 
(3)  (•)  (3)  dents  (I)  dents 
2.55  21,70  11.23  3,69  0,12  36,74  - - -
3.86  3,24  3,33  2.16  0,12  8,85  - - -
0,24  0.66  0, 74  0,52  0,02  1,93  - - -
3.62  2.58  2.59  1.64  0,10  6.92  - - -
11,10  20,56  12.69  3,37  0,06  36.67  - - -
0, 20  0, 27  o. 21  0,08  - 0,55  - - -
10,90  20.29  12,48  3, 29  0,06  36,12  - - -
3,36  11.42  6,67  2.16  0,05  20,31  - - -
o.81f  1,93  1. 36  0, 70  0,03  4,03  - - -
1, 71  4.42  2.01  0,46  - 6.89  - - -
0,81  5,07  3,30  1.00  0,02  9.39  - - -
5.47  16,01  8.85  2.97  0,05  27.88  - - -
- - 0,005  - - 0,005  -·  - -
- - - - - - - - -
0,005  0,009  0,005  - - 0.01  - - -
- - - - - - - - -
0,005  0,009  0,005  - - 0,01  - - -
- - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - -
0.04  0,04  0,03  0,009  - 0,08  - - -
1, ?5  1  ,go  0.94  _0,32  0,005  3,17  - - -
?7, 53  74.89  43,75  14,69  o.  ~1  133,73  - - -MINI!S AFETY AND HEALTH 
COMMISSION 
Common StatistiCS on victims 
of acc1dents underground 1n  coal m1nes  DETAILED BREAKDOWN OF VICTIMS ACCORDING TO LOCATION 
AND NATURE OF INJURY AND PERIOD OF INCAPACITY 
COUNTRY  FEDERAL  REPUBLIC  OF  GERMANY 
COAL-FIELD  'IDTAL 
Amputations  Fractures  Luxat1ons, 
NATURE OF THE INJURY  and  w1th or without  twist and 
enuc1eat1ons  dtslocalton  spratns 
1  2  3 
>56  Fatal  >56  Fatal  >56  Fatal 
PERIOD OF INCAPACITY  days  acct- total  days  acet- total  days  UCCI·  total 
(')  dents  (')  dents  (')  dents 
LOCATION OF THE INJURY 
I  Head and neck  - - - 59  2+  250  5  - 28 
.;: 
:-:  :·\. 
~:-:. ·:·  .  ·:· .)\X. :::::.::::> 
::.::.  !{::;-.···  ···-: :::::::.::  f.:  ··.·  1  - 3  !:::<::::{ 
II  Eyes  ··<\ 1/:.  :·:: 
L.r::::·-:  1::.  ::::::}:{ 
{::·. ::.::. 
t::::::::::::  [}}:.::  ::·.; ..  '·  ·  .  .;: 
Ill  Trunk  - 1  1  142  25  497  7  - 121 
IV  Upper ltmbs 
(excludtng the hands)  3  - +  203  - 335  27  - 171 
1
11 
V  Hands  86  - 199  619  - 2756  42  - 275 
VI  Lower limbs 
5  - 5  379  1  475  108  - m  (excludtng feet) 1 41 
VII  Feet  8  - 14  360  - 978  65  - 805 





:·  .  .::- ··:-
>.:i!}L 
·::·· 
i::/::::>·  :Lu::::::  <<:::::..:  IX  Not spec•fted 
t  :L:::(iiii !!\:HJ·  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~  @JQ ){(} 
TOTAL  103  3  228  1779  63  5331  271  - 1942 
f • t Number ot houri worked by pit ataff and ampiOYHI of contractor firma who belong to a miner ltoelatlneurance acheme 
111 tneludtng comphcatton1 






>56  Fatal  >56 
days  &CCI- total  days 
1'1  dents  (') 
19  2  169  73 
1  - 9  44 
3  5  21  77 





:·:-:·.:  :.·>.  305  v:  ..  ·:·  :-:  1>::  .'. 
·::  ,.:.··· 
f·::  ;·:\i':  .::  . 
·:·::.  .)·• 
:·.·.  202 







f:· .  .  ··:·  ::·  _.:-
1  4- 7  32 
k•  :-:: 
I 
\;:<·  ··.·  .:::- - :-.;. 
::::.:-..::-.:::  H/\i::: 
24  11  206  q66 
Op11nwounds  Burns and 
contus1on  harmful effects  Po1son1ng 
and muscular  of electnctty  and 
abrasio~s  and radtatton  suffocation 
5  6  7 
Fatal  >56  Fatal  >56  Fatal 
8CCI- total  days  acc1- total  days  acc1- total 
dents  (5)  dents  (5)  dents 
·:·  :·.·  ·.::.::_:\ 
r·.·  :··:  ./  4  2781  - - 25 
1:::  ... :.:: 
·  .. ··:):::=  ::'_:-·:  :-< 
··::·:···:·  :··  ·> 
:·> 
1:::-..  :< 
1·-·:.:.'·  - 765  3  - 68  .  ·:· 
1··.:·.-:\-/  :.: ....  :: 
1:-.· .. 
2  1733  3  - 25  1>·  .:::·:1··  ·<: 
~>:  I<  -1·'. ..  ·: 
1<·.·_::·:··: 
..  ; ..  ·  ···>>.· 
- 2905  5  - 37  ·  .. 1·  . '  1'::. 
,  ...  :·.·.  I··· 
r· ..... .- •  .·  1.·  j·  ...  ?_:: 
:_·~ 
.··.:  ·.:- ·:· 
~  \  ~················ 
itt 
1  7550  2  - 32 
.< 
'::  •::: 
[::.::: .•  :>:: 
1:>: 
>.·1::::::·>.;:::: 
I>  :.·.  ·::  .':> 
- 2916  1  - 26 
1.-:-.::  :·:::  ::: 
·.::  I·:·  .:.  :.:-.:. 
•.:>  .-:  .·.::.;::···· 
I'••  ·.  :::·_  ... 
- 1933  1  - 10  ..  ·, 
·.-:- ... ·  ..:, 
··:··  _::-
.. :··  .· .  .·: 
:: 
2  270  - - 8  :\1>.  :·t··· 
1.>  ....  :::- :.; 
- - - - - - - 3 
9  20853  15  - 231  - - 3 
1'1 Tnenlpe end the ankln ore included under .. Lo-r  limbo 
I") Calender daya 
YEAR  1  9 7  5 
MAN HOURS WORKED (1)  216  337  707 
Multiple injuries 
of those not  TOTAL 
spectfied 1 2) 
8  9 
>56  Fatal  4to  21  to  >56  Fatal 
days  acci~  total  20  56  days  accl- total 
(5)  dents  days  days 
(")  dente  (')  (') 
1  - 13  2397  681  158  30  3166 
1  - 24  695  124  50  - 869 
1  1  32  1355  808  233  34  2430 
2  - 11  2341  783  339  - 3463 
- - 10  5388  4379  105+  1  10822 
10  - 30  1984  12+1  705  1  3931 
1  - 9  1856  1324- 569  - 3749 
1  1  7  183  124- 68  22  397 
1  - 1  2  1  1  - 4-
19  2  137  16201  9465  3177  88  28931 MINIS AI'ITY AND HIAL  TH 
COMMISSION 
Common Statlatlcs on victims 
of accidents underground In coal monas 
\-
COUNTRY  FEDERAL  REPUBLIC  OF  GERMANY 
DETAILED BREAKDOWN OF VICTIMS ACCORDING TO LOCATION 
AND NATURE OF INJURY AND PERIOD OF INCAPACITY 
(Frequency rates) 
YEAR  1  9 1 5 
COAL-FIELD  'roTAL  MAN-HOURS WORKED  (1)  216 337  707 
NATURE OF THE INJURY 
PERIOD OF INCAPACITY 
LOCATION OF THE INJURY 
I. Head and neck 
II. Eyes 
Ill  Trunk 
IV. Upper limbs 
(e~cluding tha hands) 
(0) 
v. Hands 
VI. Lower llmba 
(excluding feet) (4) 
VII. Feat 





>56  Fatal 
Fractures 
with or without 
dislocation 
2 















>56  Fatal 
days  accl- total 
>56  Fatal 
daya  acci- total  total  days  accl- total  days  DCCI·  total 
(0)  dents  (0)  dents  (0)  dents 
0,{7  0.11  1,16  0,02 
0,005  - 0,01 
0,005  0,005  0,66  0,12  2,30  0,03 
0,01  - 0,02  0,94  1,55  0,12 
o,;o  - 0,92  0,19 
1. 75  (),005  0,50 
0,04  - 0,06  1.66  4,52  0,30 
0,009  0,009  0,08  0,06  (),18  0.08 
(0)  dents  c•)  dents 
0.13  O,Qg  0,009  0, 78  0, 34 
0,005  0,04  0, 20 
0, 55  0,01  0,02  0,10  0, 3~ 
~::;:-:::":)r:>:::  :·::  <<::<:. 
0, 79  .  f::  . .  .  0,46 
1, 27 
2.  21 
3, 72 
·:·  ''  . 
.  · 
f··  '': 
j•:  .'· 
1:.::  :·  _1:··. 
r.•.  ·:-1·::  :-1.· 
:<: 
"I·  :.>:.:  ..  1-·:- '·:  :- ·:· 
:·:':  :..  :: 
.·  :·:. 
: .·  l,o\-1 
•  ·.  0,93 
.·· 
0,62 
'  :··:·  ..  ·.·. 
·.:>:.:'····  .:.-:.  f.-:::: 
o. 29  0,0()5  0,02  0,03  0,15 
0,02  12,85 
0,0()9  8,01 
0,005  34,90 
- 13,48 
- 8.94 






>56  Fatal 
days  acci- total 
(5)  dents 
0,12 
0,01  0, 31 
0,01 
0,02  0,17 
0,009  0,15 
0,005  0,12 







>56  Fatal 
days  accl- total 
(5)  dants 
•-::  :··.·  ':;:>. 
.  -:.:· 
Multiple Injuria" 
ofthoaenot 
specl~ed  c•> 
>56  Fatal 
days  accl- total 
(5)  denta 
.  :  ·.  :-:::  0,005 
·:·  .. :.  :-· 
0,06 
'  ..  ··  ·.··· 
·.  :::  :: 
0,005  0,11 
.  '. 
···:  0,005 
0,005  0,15 
'' 
'.: :·•:. 
:  ·:  0,009  0,05 
··:- :;: ':-.·  · ..  · 
0,05 
:':··  .':  ·  .. ·.···!:.::>::.·  .. 
:.  ':·  ·0:·  0,05 
1·:·  .  r.•  . 




:·:- ... :::::'\. 
'.  '  .  0,005  0,04 
.·.···1·<:.:.::· 
1.::.:-.'  ·:-· .. 
·.·  l··:c  ··. 
·. ·.·.1·:- :- 1-:.···  ':,  0,005  0,005  0,03 
I·  · ...  ::. 
TOTAL 
9 
>56  Fatal 
days  eccl-
(1)  denta 
1  1,()3  3,15  0, 73  O,H 
3, 21  0,57  0, 23 
6, 25  3, 73  1,08  0.16 
10,82  3.62  1. 57 
24.91  4.87  0,005 
9.17  5, 74  3, 26  0,005 
8.58  6.12  2. 53 
0,85  0,57  0,31  o. 10 
IX. Not specified  o,o1  lo.oo5  - 0,005  0,009  0,005  0,005 
TOTAL  0,48  o. 1  1,05  8.22  0.29  24,64  1,?5  - 8.98  0.11  0,05  0,95  4,47  0,04  95,  0,07  - 1.07 
I'  J Number of hours worllad by ph ttel 'end empl~  of contractor !Irma who belong to • mlner'aiOCIIIInaurence aclleme. 
I'  I Including compllcetlona.  • 
t1t The ahoulclllrt lr"d the wrlatlare•ncluded under .. upper ilmba·· 
('l Tile hlp  end the an kin  ono Included under .Lower limbe". 
(1) Calender day1. 











133,73 MINES SAFETY AND HEALTH 
COMMISSION 
Common Statistics on victims 
of accidents underground in coal mines 
~m<EACODE"' 
CAUSES OF ACCIDENTS  ty  ~ 
I. FALLS OF GROUNDS AND ROCKS 
II. TRANSPORT, TOTAL 
a) Continuous Transport 
b) Dlacontinuous Transport 
Ill. FALLS AND MOVEMENT OF THE VICTIM, 
TOTAL 
a) while mov1ng about the mine 
b) in the course of  other activities 





V. FALLS OF OBJECTS 
VI. EXPLOSIVES 
VII. IGNITIONS OR EXPLOSIONS , 
OF FIREDAMP AND COAL DUST 
VIII. OUTBURSTS OF GAS, DE-OXYGENATION, 
SUFFOCATION OR POISONING BY NATU-
RAL GASES (COs, CH•, CO, HsS), 
TOTAL 
a) Outbursts of Gas 
b) De-oxygenation and Poisoning 
by natural G._ 
IX. HEATINGS OR FIRES 
X. INRUSHES 
XI. ELECTRICITY 





DETAILED BREAKDOWN OF ACCIDENT VICTIMS ACCORDING TO CAUSE AND SITE 
OF ACCIDENT AND PERIOD OF INCAPACITY 
(absolute figures) 
Production faces  Headings excluding  Shafts and staple-pits  Other places  shafts and staple-pits 
1  2  3  4 
4to  21  to  Fatal  4to  21  to  Fatal 
4to  21  to  Fatal  4to  21  to  Fatal  20  56  >56  20  56  >56  20  56  >56  20  56  >56 
days  days  days 
acci- total  days  days 
aCCI- total 
days  days  days 
aCCI- total 
days  days  days 
ace  ... 
dents  days  dents  dents  dents  (3)  (3)  (')  (3)  (3)  (3)  (3)  t•)  <">  (3)  (3)  (") 
2264  360  60  1 ·2685  810  114  16  _,  940  17  3  1  - 21  22(  2~  7  -
156  51  18  - 225  246  64  25  3  338  62  25  9  1  97  231  6E  20  1 
145  48  16  - 209  73  25  10  1  109  - - - - - 52  1<  4  -
11  3  2  - 16  173  39  15  2  229  62  2.5  9  1  97  179  5~  16  1 
198  45  11  - 254  346  67  16  - 429  63  11  3  - I  77  297  5€  9  -
41  9  2  - 52  81  19  6  - 106  20  3  1  - 24  62  1'i  2  -
~ 
157  36  9  -202  265  48  10  - 323  43  8  2  - 53  235  39  7  -
787  238  29  3  1057  462  68  9  - 539  28  8  3  - 39  260  40  9  -
74  24  5  3  106  50  15  3  - 68  3  2  1  - 6  22  8  1  -
194  23  3  - 220  150  13  - - 163  17  1  2  - 20  102  10  4  -
519  191  21  - 731  262  40  6  - 308  8  5  - - 13  136  22  4  -
450  86  15  - 551  503  92  16  - 611  104  11  - - 115  376  66  13  -
- - - - - 1  - - - 1  -
_,  - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - -·  - - - - - - -
- - - -- - - - - - - - -·  - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - -·  - - - ..  - - -
- - ..  - - - - - - - - -·  - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - -·  - - - 1  - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - -·  - - - - - - -
1  - - - 1  - 2  - - 2  - - - - - 1  - 1  -























TOTAL  ~951  787  134  4  4876  2463  418  83  3  2967  286  60  16- 1  363  147  25?  59  1  1788 
<'>Number of hours worked by pit alllff and employ-of contractor firma who belong to a miners· aoclallnauranca scheme. 
<">Accidents Involving mora than llva caaualtl• (I.a. who althar died or -re  unable to r•ume work underground for at least aiQht waaka) 
(0) C.lendar days. 
T•ble 1• 
YEAR  1  9  7  5 
MAN-HOURS WORKED (1)  30.045.120 
Total of  Group 
accidents underground  accidents (1) 
5  6 
4to  21  to  Fatal  20  56  >56  56  Fatal 
days  days  days  acci- total 
days  accl- total 
dents  (3)  (3)  (")  (•)  dents 
--
3311  501  84  1  3197 
695  206  72  5  978 
270  85  30  1  386 
425  121  42  4  592 
904  179  39  - 1122· 
204  48  11  - 263 
700  131  28  - 859 
1537  354  50  3  1944 
149  49  10  3  211 
463  47  9  - 519 
925  258  31  - 1214 
14}3  255  44  - 1732 
1  - - - 1 
- - - - -
- - - - -
- - - - -
- - - - -
1  - - - 1 
- - - - -
2  2  1  - 5 
287  25  2  - ~14 
8171  1_5_22  292_  _g_  0004 MINI!& SAFETY AND HEALTH 
COMMISSION 
DETAILED BREAKDOWN OF ACCIDENT VICTIMS ACCORDING TO CAUSE AND SITE 
OF ACCIDENT AND PERIOD OF INCAPACITY 
Common StatistiCS on victims 
of accidents underground 1n coal mines 
~''"'ACC'D'"' 
CAUSES OF ACCIDENTS  ty  ~ 
I. FALLS OF GROUNDS AND ROCKS 
II. TRANSPORT, TOTAL 
a) Continuous Transport 
b) Discontinuous Transport 
Ill FALLS AND MOVEMENT OF THE VICTIM, 
TOTAL 
a) while moving about the mine 
b) in the course of  ~ther  activities 





V. FALLS OF OBJECTS 
VI. EXPLOSIVES 
VII. IGNITIONS OR EXPLOSIONS 
OF FIREDAMP AND COAL DUST 
VIII. OUTBURSTS OF GAS, DE-OXYGENATION, 
SUFFOCATION OR POISONING BY NATU-
RAL GASES (COs, CH., CO, H•S). 
TOTAL 
a) Outbursts of Gas 
b) De-oxygenation and Poisoning 
by natural Gues 
IX. HEATINGS OR FIRES 
X. INRUSHES 
XI. ELECTRICITY 







4to  21  to  Fatal 
20  56  >56 
SCCI- total 
days  days  days  dents 
(')  (')  (') 
75,3  11,9  1 ,9<  0,03  89~ 
5.19  1,6q  0.59 - 7.4 
4,82  1,59  0,53 - 6,9 
0,36  o,oq  0,06 - 0 ,5" 
6,59  1  ,4~  0,36 - 8,4 
1,36  0,2C  0,06 - 1,73 
5,22  1 '1  ~  0,29 - 6,72 
26,19  7,W.  0,96 0,09 35,1 
2,4€  0,7S  o,  16  0,09  3,5 
6,45  0,?€  0,09  - 7.3 
17,2?  6,3S  0,69  - 24,3 
14,9?  2,8€  0,49  - 18,3 
- - - - -
- - - - -
- - - - -
- - - - -
- - - - -
- - - - - - - - - -
lo,03  - - - 0,0' 
t3.16  0  2'~  0  0?  - 3  4 
Headings exclud1ng 
shafts and staple-p1ts 
2 
4to  21  to  Fatal 
20  56  >56 
aCCI- total 
days  days  days  dents 
(')  (')  (') 
26,9  3,7<  0,5'1  - 1,28 
8,1(  2,1'  o,8"'l  0,09  1,24 
2,4i:  0,8•  0,33  0,03 3,62 
5.?'  1  2~  0  49  0,06 ?  62 
11 ,5  2,2<  0,53  - 1.,27 
2,6<  0,6  0,19  - 3,52 
8,8<  :1  .5~  0,33  - 0,75 
15,31  2,2E  0,29  - 7,93 
1 ,6E  0,4<;  0,09  - 2,26 
4,9<  0,4~ - - 5,42 
8,7<  1,3~  0,19  - 0,25 
16,7L  3,0E  0,53  - 0,33 
0,0'  - - - 0,0_2 
- ...  - - -
- - - - -
- - - - -
- - - - -
- - - - -
- - - - -
- 0,06  - - o-.o-6 
~  H b.-:s6  0  03  - 13.56 
TOTAL  h31 $) 35,19  4,45  0,1' "62?8  81 ,9? 13,91  2,76 0,09 113.75 
( 1) Number of hours worked by ptt staff and employ-of contractor ftrms who belong to a mtners" aoctaltnsurance scheme. 
(1) Accu:tentlllnvoMng more than f1ve casual ties  (i e. who e1ther dted or were unable to resume work underground for at least eight weeks) 
(0) Calendar days. 
(frequency rates) 
Shafts and staple-p1ts  Other places 
3  4 
4to  21  to  Fatal  4to  21  to  Fatal 
20  56  >56  20  56  >56  acci- total  ace•- total 
days  days  days  days  days  days  dents  dents 
(')  (')  (3)  (')  (')  (') 
0,56 0,09 0,03  - 0,69  7.32 0,79 0,23  - 8.?5 
2.06  0.8~ o  2q  b.o-:s  >;  22  ?.68  2  1Q  0  .. 66  0.0~ 10  c;8 
- - - - - 1,73 0,39 0,13  - 2,26 
2  06  0  8~ o  2q  b.Q3  ·3.Z.2  5.95 1,Z2.. 9,'5? 0.0?  R  ~? 
2,09 0,36 0,09  - 2,56  9,88 1,86 0,29  - ~2,04 
0,66 0,09 0,03  - 0,79  2,06 0,56 0,06  - 2,69 
1,43 0,26 0,06  - .76  7.82  1,29 0  23  -
Q.~'5 
0,93 0,26 0,09  - ,29  8,65 1,33 0,29  - 0,28 
0,09 0,06 0,03  - D,19  0,73 0,26  ~.03  - 1,03 
0,56 0,03 k>,o6  - p,66  3,39 0,33 lo,13  - 3,86 
0,26 0,16  - - P,43  4,52 0,73 Ia. 13  - 5,39 
3,46 k>,36  - - ~.82  2,51  2,19 lo,43  - 5,14 
- - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - ...  - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - 0,03  - - - 0,03 
- - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - 0,03  - p,03  - 0,06 
n_;;q  n  nf - - ln.!..!=; 12.82  O.Hi  ....  I?  aa 
9,51  1,9<;  0,53 0,03 nz,o8 ll3,95  8,55  ~ ,96  0,03 t:9. 51 
YEAR 
MAN-HOURS WORKED (1) 
Total of 




4to  21 to 
Fatal  20  56  >56 
acci- total  days  days  days 
dents 
(')  (')  (') 
10  20  16  67  2.?q  0,03  29.?0 
2'S  .1'S  6,8.5p,39  .O,J6  ~?.<;<; 
8,98  2,8_2  0,99  0  03  12  84 
11..  11..  l...n::l  1  ">;Q  n  .1"'~  10  '70 
30,o8  5,95 1,29  - 37,34 
6,78  1,59 0,36  - 8,75 
2~ 2Q  4.?6  O  .. Q"'i  - 28."iQ 
51' 15  11,78 1,66  0,09  64,70 
4,95  1,63 0,33  0,09  7,02 
15.41  1,56 0,29  - 1?.2? 
30,78  8,58 1,03  - 40,40 
47.69  8  48  1.46  - 57  64 
0.0~  - - -
0.0~ 
- - - - -
- - - - - - - - - -
- - - - -
o.o•  - - - 0 03 
- - - - -
0  Ot  0  06  0  O"'i  0  16 
Q  c;o:;  0.8;;  lo~oh  - 110.l..c; 
271.9" ~  65  9.?1  0,29  1332,63 




56  Fatal 
days  acci- total 
(')  dents MINI!S AFI!TY AND  HI!AL TH 
COMMISSION 
Common Statistics on vict1ms 
of acc1dents underground in coal mmes  DETAILED BREAKDOWN OF VICTIMS ACCORDING TO  LOCATION 
AND NATURE OF INJURY AND PERIOD OF INCAPACITY 
COUNTRY  BELGIUM 
COAL FIELD  'roTAL 
Amputations  Fractures  Luxat1ons. 
NATURE OF THE INJURY  and  w1th or without  twist and 
enucleat1ons  d1slocat1on  sprains 
1  2  3 
>56  Fatal  >56  Fatal  >56  Fatal 
PERIOD OF INCAPACITY  days  &CCI- total  days  acci- total  days  acc1- total 
(')  dents  (5)  dents  I')  dents 
LOCATION OF THE INJURY 
I  Head and neck  - - ..  5  3  8  - - -
> :·t: 
:::::.  :-··· ..  ·=:::  .· 
.:· .. 
1:: .. -:  :··f··:  II  Eyes 
1./.:u.::: 
1>·.  :  ::·  - - - lbU:J::  ::::k:::::::: 
····:· 
::· 1::: 
Ill  Trunk 
- - ..  8  - 8  1  - 1 
IV  Upper limbs 
(excluding the hands) 
I')  1  - 1  18  - 18  ..  ..  -
v Hands 
9  - 9  52  - 52  1  - 1 
VI  Lower l1mbs 
(exclud1ng feet) 1•1  2  - 2  38  - 38  5  - 5 
VII  Feet  2  - 2  25  - 25  - - -
VIII  Mu1t1ple locat1ons  - ..  ...  5  - 5  - - -
i 
r:::·:::>:.: 
1 I  I 
:<  ··::  !;::->\::<  ::):(:-::  ···:···:· 
it 
IX  Not spec1hed 




14  ..  14  151  3  154  7  - 7 
t• 1  Number of hours worked by pit ataff and amployHS of contractor firma who belong to a miner a .oclaltn1uranca 1cheme 
(21 rnclud1ng com~tCitlons 
t






>56  Fatal 
days  &CCI·  total 
(5)  dents 
- - -
- - -
- 2  2 
~::::::  :<· 
.:::-:··:·.·  ::·:::·::. 
.··.  .-:  .·· 
v::::-· .. 
-:  . 
:_.: 
t·:  ';' 
...  ,· 
.-:  .·· 
'  :<· 
:<· 
:-> 
•  .; ...  _.-:· 




;:.;.":  ·.  ... 
- - -
·:  r·:·-:.  :·: 
:::- ,· 
.:::::<<::  [.::_ 
1:/:(:;:::: 
:-:-·.· 
I<:  :·:-·· 
:-:-.  }:.  t::-:: ..  ::::::  :::.:::.·.·: 
..  2  2 
Open wounds  Burns and 
contus1on  harmful effects  POISOning 
and muscular  of electnc1ty  and 
abras1ons  and rad1Bt1on  suffocation 
5  6  7 
>56  Fatal  >56  Fatal  >56  Fatal 
days  8CCI·  total  days  ICC  I- total  days  ace•~  total 
(5)  dents  (5)  dents  (5)  dents 
·.:- ·:-:  :_-::  '-: 
:- ·.· 
5  2  7  :  ':~:  - - - .·. 
[:::.·.  ·.·  ·.···  < 
1::··· 
:::::_ 
I:>  :-:  ·>  ...  :·  7  - 7  - - - 1:- :.-: 
1.:::  · ..  :··  1'=:  :· 
1-:·  :- :.:-__ 
···k 
:·:·  :: 
6 
· ..  :··  :-.:·::  1  7  - - - ·:- .:<  I··· 
:·: :·:.  .·:·  :·· 
i>-:  ··:·  :'·:0 
.··  _.:.:::-:  14  - 14  - - - 1·:·.:-.  ··.·:-:)·::  ··:·· 
:···:>·  :_ .... :··:··.::··:-
·=:  ·.· 
I:·····  ·;:: 
41  41  1  r<·  ·::::::  12::::::::::.  - 1  - 1:/:>.::?  [:>, :·  1>:-:.-:-: 
·.·  .-:  .:··  :-
1::.::. 
:.::  ·:::  .·.:: 
28  - 28  - - - :-<  <::· 
:-..  1:··:.;...':._  .>-:- ··>·  . 
::::<.  ·-:.-: 
I·>  1·:-
10  - 10  - - -
1.:·  :.;. 
·:· 
1.::  1.::  1.::· 
2  - 2  - ..  - ..  ..  ; 
t··· 
[:::.__:.  :· 
:· ... 
- - - - ..  ..  ..  ..  -
113  3  116  1  - 1  ..  ..  -
t 4 ) The hlpa and the anldaa are Included under .Lower limbs 
1  "1 Calender ~ays 
Teble 2e 
YEAR  1  9 7 5 
MAN-HOURS WORKED (1)  }0.045.120 
Multiple InJuries 
of those not  TOTAL 
specified 1•1 
8  9 
>56  Fatal  4to  21  to  >56  Fatal 
days  acci- total  20  56  days  acct- total 
(5)  dents  days  days 
(I)  dania  (')  (') 
- - - - - 10  5  15 
1  - 1  - - 8  - 8 
- 1  1  - - 15  4  19 
- - - - - 33  ..  33 
1  - 1  - ..  105  - 105 
4  - 4  - ..  77  - 77 
- - - - - 37  - 37 
- ..  - - ..  7  - 7 
- - - - ..  - ..  -
6  1  7  - - 292  9  301 MINI!S AFI!TY AND HEALTH 
COMMI8810N 
Common Statistics on victims 
of accidents underground In coal mines  DETAILED BREAKDOWN OF VICTIMS ACCORDING TO LOCATION 
AND NATURE OF INJURY AND PERIOD OF INCAPACITY 
NATURE OF THE INJURY 
PERIOD OF INCAPACITY 
LOCATION OF THE INJURY 
I.  Head and neck 
II. Eyes 
Ill. Trunk 
IV  Upper limbs 
(excluding the hands) 
(') 
V. Hands 
VI  Lower limbs 
(excluding feet) (4) 
VII. Feet 
VIII. Multiple locations 








and  with or without 
enucleallons  dislocation 
1  2 
>56  Fatal  >56  Fatal 
days  acc.l- total  days  acci- total 
<"I  dents  (')  dents 
- - - 0,1  o,o  0,2 
·  .  .:  .. · 
.'· 
- - - k 
1::-:-::::::::· 1·\::·>:  :.:::::::: 
- - - 0,2  - 0,2 
0,0  o,o  ..  0,5  - 0,5 
0,2  - 0,2  1,7  - 1,7 
o,o  - 0,0  1,2  - 1,2 
0,0  - o,o  6,8  - 0,8 
- - - o,  1  - o,  1 
I 
:.::-.:<<· 1-···  <> 
.··:-···  ·.:·::: 
·,  •-:-
::-::.:  >:  :.::. 
1.:.:/:i:::: 
l><hH· v  <: 
i:i.n:  ·.:: 
I:<· 
><).\  1\}:!}:,:, t:::::-<<·  )/:)  ~::  :, :::.-: 





>56  Fatal 
days  DCCI- total 
(')  dents 
- - -
:.::._::- ..  : 
o,o  - o,o 
- - -
0,0  - 0,0 
0,1  - 0,1 
- - -
- - -
1··:  ":.: 
'  ' 
-:- ·:- .  ". 
1::::-.)::.:: 1:::::::::.::.::  :.::::::::.·· 
0,2  - 0,2 
I'  1  Number of houra woi'Qd by pit Iliff and employ.-of contractor llrme who belong to a ml-• aoclallneur""ce oc,...,.. 
1 1Jincludlng complication•.  • 







>56  Fatal 
days  accl- total 
(')  dents 
- - -
- - -
- 0,0  0,0 




- 0,0  0,0 
Open wounds  Burns and 
contusion  harmful effects  Poisoning 
and muacular  of electricity  and 
abrasions  and radiation  suffocation 
5  6  7 
>56  Fatal  >56  Fatal  >56  Fatal 
days  accl- total  days  accl- total  days  acci-
(')  dania  (5)  dents  (5)  dents 
o, 1  o,o  0,2  - - -
0,2  - 0,2  - - -
I 
::: 
0,1  - 0,2  - - -
0,4  ~  0,4  - - -
I 
1,3  1,3  o,o - 0,0 
0,9  ~  0,9  - - -
0,3  - 0,3  - - -
~.o  - o,o  - - -
1- - - - - - - -
3,7  - 3,8  o,o  - o,o  - -
( 1  The hlpo and the anklq orelncludld under .Lower llmbl . 
<'> Celender daYf. 
YEAR 





>56  Fatal  4to 
20  total  days  accl- total  days 
(5)  dents  (I) 
-
o,o  - 90  -
- 0,0  0,0  -
- - - -
:0,0  - o,o  -
'0,1  - 0,1  -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - - -
- o, 1  0,0  92  -




21  to  >56  56 
days  days 















0,1  0,4 
- 0,2 
o,  1  0,6 






0,2  10,0 MINIS SAFETY AND HEALTH 
COMMISSION 
DETAILED BREAKDOWN OF ACCIDENT VICTIMS ACCORDING TO CAUSE A.ND SITE 
OF ACCIDENT AND PERIOD OF INCAPACITY 
Common Statistics on victims 
of accodents underground in coal monas 
COUNTRY  FRANCE 
COAL-FIELD  NORTH 
~'"'ACC,DEN"C  Productoon faces  Headings excludong 
shafts and staple-pots 
1  2 
~ 
4to  21  to  Fatal  4to  21  to 
20  56  >56 
SCCI- total  20  56  >56  CAUSES OF ACCIDENTS  y 
days  days  days 
dents  days  days  days 
(3)  (3)  (3)  (3)  (3)  (3) 
I. FALLS OF GROUNDS AND ROCKS  779  252  81  ?  11H  364  123  35 
II. TRANSPORT, TOTAL  27  27  6  1  61  7?  ?7  11 
a) Continuous Transport  18  19  3  1  ~1  ?7  g  5 
b) Doscontinuous Transport  9  8  3  0  20  45  18  5 
Ill. FALLS AND MOVEMENT OF THE VICTIM, 
175  TOTAL  74  2?  0  271  257  108  31 
a) while movong about the mine  139  55  17  0  211  ?07  '82  ?4 
b) in the course of  other activoties  36  19  5  0  60  50  76  7 
IV. MACHINES, TOOLS AND SUPPORTS 
TOTAL  487  151  46  0  684  258  76  18 
a) Machones  3?  15  10  0  57  2?  10  4 
b) Tools  178  45  7  0  230  130  30  5 
c) Supports  m  91  29  0  397  106  36  9 
V. FALLS OF OBJECTS  668  2?8  70  0  966  385  137  36 
.  VI. EXPLOSIVES  1  0  0  0  1  1  0  0 
VII. IGNITIONS OR EXPLOSIONS 
OF FIREDAMP AND COAL DUST  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
VIII. OUTBURSTS OF GAS, DE-OXYGENATION, 
SUFFOCATION OR POISONING BY NATU-
RAL GASES (CO  •• CH  •• CO, HoS), 
TOTAL  0  0  1  0  1  1  0  0 
a) Outbursts of Gas  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
b) De-oxygenation and Poisoning 
0  0  1  0  1  1  0  0  by natural Gases 
IX. HEATINGS OR FIRES  0  1  0  0  1  0  1  1 
X. INRUSHES  3  0  0  0  3  1  0  0 
XI. ELECTRICITY  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  0 
XII. OTHER CAUSES  124  18  8  0  150  97  1?  1 
TOTAL  2?64  751  234  3  3?5?  H36  485  133 
( ) Number of hours worked by pit stall and employ-of contractor forms who belong to a moners  ooclalonsurance scheme 
(I) Accidents involving more than live cuualt- (I.a. who either died or_,.  unable to resume work undergroynd tor at least eoghl weeks) 



























Shafts and staple-pots  Other places 
3  4 
4to  21  to  Fatal  4to  21  to  Fatal 
total 
20  56  >56  acci- total  20  56  >56  acco- days  days  days  dents  days  days  days  dents  (3)  (3)  (3)  (31  (3)  (•) 
527  4  0  1  0  5  150  33  8  0 
110  12  11  4  0  ?7  11?  71  36  1 
.!,(  0  0  0  0  0  8  8  6  0 
58  12  11  4  0  27  104  63  30  1 
397  30  1?  9  0 I  51  m  153  47  0 
313  27  9  5  0  41  276  113  31  0 
84  3  3  4  0  10  67  40  16  0 
35?  8  4  0  0  12  ?01  78  19  0 
36  1  0  0  0  1  14  10  8  0 
165  7  3  0  0  10  79  31  5  0 
151  0  1  0  0  1  100  37  6  0 
558  26  10  6  0  4?  lt96  215  51  0 
1  0  0  0  0  0  3  1  0  0 
0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
1  0  0  0  0  0  4  0  0  0 
0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
1  0  0  0  0  0  4  0  0  0 
2  0  0  0  0  0  3  0  0  0 
1  0  0  0  0  0  3  1  0  0 
1  0  0  0  0  0  0  2  0  0 
110  15  5  1  0  21  103  18  7  0 
2055  95  42  21  0  158  1418  572  168  1 
Table  1e 
YEAR  1  9 7  5 
MAN-HOURS WORKED (1)  37.629.904 
Total of  Group 
accodents underground  accidents (2) 
5  6 
4to  21to  Fatal 
total 
20  56  >56 
SCCI- total  56  Fatal 
days  days  days 
dents  days  acco- total 
(3)  (3)  (3)  (I)  dents 
191  1297  408  125  7  183?  0  0  0 
220  2?3  136  57  2  418  0  0  0 
22  53  35  15  1  105  0  0  0 
198  170  100  4?  1  313  0  0  0 
543  805  347  109  1  1262  0  0  0 
4?0  649  259  77  0  985  0  0  0 
123  156  88  3?  1  m  0  0  0 
298  954  309  83  0  1346  0  0  0 
3?  59  35  2?  0  125  0  0  0 
115  394  109  17  0  520  0  0  0 
151  491  165  " 
0  700  0  0  0 
762  1575  590  163  0  23?8  0  0  0 
4  5  1  0  0  6  0  0  0 
0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
4  5  0  1  0  6  0  0  0 
0  0  0  0  0  0  ·o  0  0 
4  5  0  1  0  6  0  0  0 
3  3  2  1  0  6  0  0  0 
4  7  1  0  0  8  0  0  0 
2  0  3  0  0  3  0  0  0 
128  339  53  17  0  409  0  0  0 
2159  5?13  1850  556  5  7624  0  0  0 MINES SAFETY AND HEALTH 
COMMISSION 
DETAILED BREAKDOWN OF ACCIDENT VICTIMS ACCORDING TO CAUSE AND SITE 
OF ACCIDENT AND PERIOD OF INCAPACITY 
Common Statistics on victims 





~rnEA~O~'  Production faces  Headmgs excluding 
shafts and staple-pits 
1  2 
~ 
4to  21  to  Fatal  4to  21  to 
20  56  >56  aCCI·  total  20  56  >56 
days  days  days  days  days  days 
CAUSES OF ACCIDENTS 
dents 
(')  ('I  (')  ('J  (')  I') 
I. FALLS OF GROUNDS AND ROCKS  2(), 70  6. 70  ?. 15  0.05  29.60  9.67  3, ?7  0,93 
II. TRANSPORT, TOTAL  0, 7?  o. 7?  0,16  0,03  1, 62  1.91  o.n  o. 29 
a) Continuous Transport  0,48  o.so  0,00  0,03  1,0q  o.n  0, ?4  0,16 
b) Dtscontmuous Transport  0,24  0, 21  0,08  0,00  0,53  1.?0  o. 48  0,13 
Ill  .•  FALLS AND MOVEMENT OF THE VICTIM, 
TOTAL  4,65  1,97  0.58  0,00  7.20  6.83  2.87  0,8? 
a) while movtng about the mine  3,59  1.46  0,45  0,00  5,61  5,50  2,18  0,64 
b) in the course of other acttvities  0,96  0,50  0,13  0.00  1.59  1,33  0.69  0,19 
IV  MACHINES, TOOLS AND SUPPORTS 
TOTAL  12.94  4.01  1.27  o.oo  18,18  6,86  2.0?  0, 48 
a) Machtnes  0,85  0.40  o. 77  o.oo  1,51  0.58  o. /7  0,11 
b) Tools  4. 73  1,2()  0,19  o.oo  6.11  3.45  0,80  o. 13 
c) Supports  7.36  2.4?  0, 77  0,00  10,55  2.8?  0.96  0.?4 
V. FALLS OF OBJECTS  17.75  6,06  1.86  o.oo  {5,67  10,13  3, 64  0.96 
VI. EXPLOSIVES  0,03  o.oo  0,00  0,00  0,03  0,03  0,00  0,00 
VII. IGNITIONS OR EXPLOSIONS 
OF FIREDAMP AND COAL DUST  0,00  0,00  o.oo  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  o.oo 
VIII. OUTBURSTS OF GAS, DE-OXYGENATION, 
SUFFOCATION OR POISONING BY NATU-
RAL GASES (CO,, CH., CO, HoS). 
TOTAL  o.oo  0,00  0,03  o.oo  0,03  0,03  0,00  o.oo 
a) Outbursts of Gas  0,00  o.oo  0,00  o.oo  o.oo  0,00  o.oo  o.oo 
b) De-oxygenation and Poisonmg 
0,00  0,00  0,03  o.oo  0,03  0,03  0.00  0,00  by natural Gases 
IX. HEATING$ OR FIRES  0,00  0,03  0,00  o.oo  0,03  0.00  0,03  0,03 
X. INRUSHES  0,08  0,00  0,00  o.oo  0,08  0,03  0,00  0,00 
XI  ELECTRICITY  0,00  0,00  0,00  o.oo  0,00  0.00  0,03  0,00 
XII. OTHER CAUSES  3,30  0,48  o. 71  0,00  3.99  ?.58  0,3?  0,03 
TOTAL  60,16  19,96  6, 2?  0,08  86.~?  38.16  12.ag  3.53 
(')Number ol houi'W worked by ptt staff and employ-of contractor firms w~o  belong to a miners· socoalonsurance scheme 
(1) Accldantltnvolving more than ftva casual !I"  (o.e.  w~o  eother died or  were unable to resume work underground for at least eoght weeks) 



























Shafts and staple-p1ts  Other places 
3  4 
4to  21  to 
Fatal 
4to  21  to  Fatal 
total  20  56  >56  ace•- total  20  56  >56  acci-
days  days  days  days  days  days  dents  dents  ('J  ('I  (')  ('J  1'1  (') 
13,87  0,11  0,00  0,03  0,00  0,13  3.99  0.88  o. 21  0,00 
?.91  0.3?  o. 29  0.11  o.oo  o.n  (,98  1,89  0.96  0,03 
1,12  0,00  o.oo  0,00  0,00  0,00  0, 21  0,21  0,16  0,00 
1.81  0,3?  0,29  0,11  0,00  o.n  ,,  76  1. 67  0,80  0,03 
10,55  o.8o  0.3?  0, 24  0,001  1, 36  9.12  4,07  1.25  0,00 
B. 32  o.n  0, ?4  0,13  0,00  1  ,Qg  7' 33  3,00  0,82  o.oo 
2. 23  0,08  0,08  o. 11  0,00  0,27  1, 78  1,06  0,43  0,00 
9.35  0,21  0,11  0,00  0,00  0,3?  5,34  2.07  0,50  0,00 
0,96  0,03  0,00  0,00  o.oo  0,03  0,37  o. 27  0, 21  0,00 
4.38  0.1~  0.08  0,00  0,00  0, 27  ?. 10  0,82  0.13  o.oo 
4,01  0,00  0.03  0,00  0,00  0,03  /.87  0,98  0,16  o.oo 
14,83  0,69  0,27  0,16  0,00  1,12  13,18  5, 71  1.36  0,00 
0.03  o.oo  o.oo  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,08  0,03  0,00  0,00 
0,00  0,00  o.oo  0,00  0,00  0,00  o.oo  0,00  o.oo  0,00 
0,03  0,00  o.oo  o.oo  0,00  0,00  0,11  o.oo  0,00  0,00 
0.00  o.oo  0,00  o.oo  0,00  0,00  0,00  o.oo  o.oo  0,00 
0,03  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  o.oo  0.11  0,00  o.oo  0,00 
0.05  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,08  0,00  0,00  0,00 
0,03  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  o.os  0,03  0,00  0,00 
0,03  o.oo  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,05  0,00  0,00 
?.9?  0,40  0,13  0,03  0,00  0.56  2. 7~  0,48  0,19  o.oo 
54.61  ?.5?  1,1?  0,56  o.oo  4, Xl  37.68  15,?0  ~.46  0,03 
YEAR 
MAN-HOURS WORKED (1) 





4to  21to  Fatal 
total 
20  56  >56  acci- total 
days  days  days 
dents 
(')  (')  (') 
5.08  34,47  10,84  3,32  0,05  48.68 
5,85  5,93  3.61  1.51  0,05  11.11 
0.58  1,41  0,96  0, 40  0,03  ?. 79 
5, 26  4.52  2. 66  1,1?  0.03  8. 3? 
14,43  ?1.39  9.?/  MO  0.03  33.54 
11.16  17,{5  6.88  2.05  0,00  ?6.18 
3, 27  4,15  2.34  0,85  0,03  7, 36 
7.92  ?5.35  8. 21  ?. 71  o.oo  35,77 
0,85  1,83  0,93  0,58  0,00  3,35 
3,06  10,47  2.90  0,45  0,00  13.82 
4,01  13.05  4.38  1,17  0,00  18,60 
2(), 25  41,86  15,68  4,33  0,00  61,87 
0,11  0,13  0,03  0,00  o.oo  0,16 
0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  o.oo 
0,11  0,13  o.oo  0.03  o.oo  0,16 
0,00  0,00  o.oo  0,00  o.oo  0,00 
0,11  0,13  o.oo  0.03  o.oo  0,16 
0,08  0,08  0,05  0.03  o.oo  0.16 
0,11  0,19  0,03  o.oo  0,00  o. ?1 
0,05  0,00  0,08  o.oo  o.oo  0.08 
3,40  9,01  1,41  0,45  0,00  10,87 
57,37  138,53  49.16  H.78  o. 13  20?. 60 




56  Fatal 
days  acci- total 
(')  dents 
~.00  o.oo  0,00 
~.oo  0,00  0,00 
~.oo  0,00  0,00 
~.oo  o.oo  o.oo 
o.oo  o.oo  0,00 
0.00  o.oo  o.oo 
0,00  0,00  0,00 
o.oo  o.oo  o.oo 
o.oo  o.oo  o.oo 
o.oo  o.oo  0,00 
o.oo  o.oo  o.oo 
o.oo  o.oo  o.oo 
0,90  0.00  o.oo 
0,00  o.oo  o.oo 
o.oo  o.oo  0,00 
o.oo  0,00  0.00 
o.oo  0.00  0.00 
0,00  o.oo  o.oo 
0,00  o.oo  o.oo 
0,00  o.oo  o.oo 
0,00  o.oo  o.oo  ! 
o.oo  o.oo  0.00 
~  ..._ 
~ 
co MINIS AFITY AND  HIAL  TH 
COMMIUION 
Common Statistics on vtcttms 




NOTH  R 
Amputattons  Fractures 
NATURE OF THE INJURY  and  with or without 
enucleattons  dislocation 
1  2 
>56  Fatal  >56  Fatal 
PERIOD OF INCAPACITY  days  acci·  total  days  accl- total 
(I)  dents  (')  dents 
LOCATION OF THE INJURY 
I  Head and neck  0  0  0  3  2  5 
11. Eyes  0  0  0 
11  Iii i 
Ill  Trunk  0  0  0  23  0  23 
IV  Upper limbs 
(excluding the nands)  1  0  1  38  0  38 
1'1 
V. Hands  16  0  16  105  0  105 
VI  Lower Iomba 
(excluding feet) 1•1  0  0  0  63  0  63 
VII  Feet  1  0  1  37  0  37 
VIII  Multo pte locations  0  0  0  3  0  3 
I  I 
:-:::::::;::::: 
! 
HY?/  ))(::.  ::::::::::::::: 
IX  Not specofoed 
1~  i  l:: i  l  i  l.l il-l  li:i!i:il.:ii:::: l:;:ni:i:::::: 














DETAILED BREAKDOWN OF VICTIMS ACCORDING TO LOCATION 
AND NATURE OF INJURY AND PERIOD OF INCAPACITY 
(absolute figures) 
Open wounds  Burns and 
Luxations,  Concusston  contusion  harmful effects  Potsoning  twtstand  and tnter- and muacular  of electroclty  and  sprains  naltnJury  abrasions  and radtatoon  suffocation  3  4  5  6  7 
Fatal  >56  Fatal  >56  Fatal  >56  Fatal  >56  Fatal 
DCCI·  total  days·  aCCI·  total  days  ICC I·  total  days  ICC I·  total  days  8CCI·  total  dents  ('I  dents  (I)  dents  (5)  dents  (5)  dents 
I  >  ;::::.::::::  ':::  .. :-::::: 
0  0  1  0  1  7  0  7  0  0  0  1"·>::.  :>-:  ::-· 





!\::::):~:  i  ii 
1<:.  1  0  1  ~  0  ~  0  0  0 
l.:u·:·:_::::: 
::::::::::::::::  1//(} 
:::.  1::::::: 
[ I : 
l·::i;(<·  ··:· ·>:::_:-: 
0  11  1  0  1  12  1  13  0  0  0  :::;:::n·: I>  ) 
::::::>< [-:>::.' 
r:rru H::::!U::: !I 
t::::<:>:::;.  :::~  ::-::.: IC::::)):} 
0  3  28  0  ~  1  0  1  :::::  :) 1>:: 
~::..-::n·::: 
:-·  :>·>:::·  1/\::<: :::::::):P  it(:.:::::  }:  .. 
<<<< 
::  I~ I  I  I~ 
0  2 
•••••••••••••••• 
75  0  75  0  0  0 
I  I  ~··············· 
[\:y:::: 1/){::  1:::: 
i\. 
lili:  i>!l(::-:::· 
0  17  74  0  7~  0  0  0 
:-:::-:·  .:;:  i}: 
I  ::::::r:i/' ~ 
I  1::::::::::::::: 
r: 
0  9  0  0  0  I  0  0 
1::'::-:::·n· 
9 
._.;.·.·  :·:-.·  :.::-: 
1  1:!}:// ::::>;:::;:·: 
I 
0  1  0  0  0  8  0  8  1  0 
•••••••••••••••• 





I  (::::::i·f 
I.  Lu!::u:: 
0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  n 
1::::::::::: 
0  34  1  0  3  217  1  ?13  ?  0  ?  0  0  0 
r 
1
1 Number of hourt workecl by pit alaff anCI employ  ...  of contractor firma who belong to 1 miner IIOclallnaurance acheme 
r'J •nc:luCI•ng comphcattona 
n  r  Lower II mba"  1 1  The hlpa ond the onkleo oro Included u  de  .. 
'''  Thesl'louldersend the wnsts 1re tncluded under. upper hmbs 
t  w.)  Calender d1y1 
Teble 2e 
YEAR  1  9 7  5 
MAN-HOURS WORKED (1)  37.629.904 
Multiple injuries 
of those not  TOTAL 
specified 1 11 
8  9 
>56  Fatal  4to  21to  >56  Fatal 
days  acci- total  20  56  daya  ace I·  total  days  days  (5}  dents 
(')  (') 
(I)  dents 
0  0  0  370  67  11  2  ~50 
0  0  0  ~39  33  5  0  ~77 
1  0  1  690  257  48  1  996 
0  0  0  635  119  71  0  825 
1  0  1  1732  7~  199  0  2677 
1  0  1  m  3~  155  0  1210 
0  0  0  ~79  233  ~7  0  759 
6  2  8  1~  52  19  2  213 
1  0  1  1J  3  1  0  17 
10  ?  1?  5?13  'a  5o  5s~  5  7F?4 MINIS AI'ITY AND HIAL  TH 
COMMISSION 
Common Statistics on victims 





Amputations  Fractures 
NATURE OF THE INJURY  and  with or without 
enucleatlons  dlalocatlon 
1  2 
>58  Fatal  >58  Fatal 
PERIOD OF INCAPACITY  days  ICGI- total  days  accl- total 
(")  dents  (S)  dents 
LOCATION OF THE INJURY 
I.  Head and neck  o.oo  o.oo  0,00  0.08  0,05  0.13 
:  .... 
'.;. ·.- .·  ·:::1:.-:·  II. Eyes  0,00  0,00  0,00  1:::. 
1>:.::·:·:-.::  ;.-:-<2 
111  Trunk  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,61  0,00  0,61 
IV. Upper limbs  0,03  0,00  0,03  1, 01  0,00  1.01  (excludtng the hands) 
(') 
V Hands  0,43  o.oo  0,43  2. 79  0,00  ?. 79 
VI  Lower limbs  o.oo  0,00  0,00  1. 67  o.oo  1. 67  (excluding feet) (4) 
VII  Feet  0,03  0,00  0,03  0,98  o.oo  0.98 
VIII  Multtple locations  0,00  0,00  0,00  o.oa  o.oo  0,08 
(/::\ !:-·::.::::  :;: .. :  ..  -.  )--· ···:· 
IX  Notapeclfied 
!if:::\C 
:::::::: I  i 
F:- :.::  - I:> 
1::::.:)::::.  ::::::::-:·.:.·: V-::::::. 
f:·  .  ::::·:::  [·:-:>.·-::· 
















DETAILED BREAKDOWN OF VICTIMS ACCORDING TO LOCATION 
AND NATURE OF INJURY AND PERIOD OF INCAPACITY 
(Frequency rates) 
Openwounda  Burne and 
Luxatlone,  Concuulon  contualon  harmful affects 
twletand  and Inter- and muacular  of  electricity 
Poisoning 
and 
spralna  nalln)ury  abrasions  and radiation  suffocation 
3  4  5  8  7 
Fatal  >58  Fatal  >58  Fatal  >58  Fatal  >58  Fatal 
accl- total  days  accl- total  days  accl- total  days  accl- total  days  accl-
dents  (I)  dents  (S)  dents  (5)  dents  (5)  dents 
1.::.:-'  L-:-<<· I<· 
0,00  o.oo  0,03  o.oo  0,03  0,1ry  o.oo  0.1~  0,00  o.oo  o.oo 
1·:--:··-: 
..  ..  ,':'  . 
·.·  0,03  o.oo  0,03  0,11  0,00  0,11  0,00  0,00  0,00 
0,00  0, 79  0,03  0,00  0,03  0, 32  0,03  0,35  0,00  0,00  o.oo 
1-::··:·  :·:--:· 
0,00  0,08  0, 74  0,00  0, 74  0,03  0,00  0,03 
o.oo  0,05  1.99  0,00  1.99  o.oo  0,00  o.oo 
o.oo  o. 45  1,97  0,00  1.97  0,00  o.oo  0,00 
o.oo  0,00  o. 24  0,00  o. ?4  0,00  0,00  o.oo 
0,00  0,03  o.oo  0,00  0,00  o. 21  o.oo  o. 71  0,03  0.00  0.03 
:-·:·.· 
-:  :: 
o.oo  0,00  o.oo  0,00  o.oo  0,00  0,00  0,00 
:::::L\: 
i·:· ·-. 
::.::-:::- ::::-:.  :: 
o.oo  o,go  0,08  o.oo  0,08  5, 77  0,03  5. 79  0,05  o.oo  0.05  o.oo  0,00 
<' 1  Number of hours wortced by piiiUiff and amplo-of controctor llrme who belong to 1 mlnar aaoclollnouronce oclleme  •  T  o  n  h  ()  h4o hlp  o dl eo 
<'I Co lender deyo. 
nkln  ore Included under .L-IImbe" 
<'!Including comptocotlona  • 
f"J The ehoulden and the wr11t1 1re•neruded under .. upper hmb1 · 
YEAR 





>58  Fatal  4to 
20  total  days  ICC!- total  days 
(5)  dents  (•) 
,' 
:.-.  0,00  o.oo  o.oo  9.83 
0,00  o.oo  0,00  11,67 
0,03  0,00  0,03  18,3~ 
o.oo  o.oo  0,00  16,87 
0,03  o.oo  0,03  46,03 
0,03  o.oo  0,03  19,00 
0,00  0,00  0,00  12,73 
0,16  0,05  o. 21  3, 7? 
0,00  0,03  0,00  0,03  0,35 
0,00  o. 27  0,05  o. 3?  138,53 




21  to  >58  58 
days  days 
(")  (I) 
1. 78  0,{9 
0,88  0,13 
6,83  1.28 
3,16  1.89 
19.82  5. 79 
9.0~  4,1? 
6.19  1.25 
1.38  0.50 
0,08  0,03 
~9.16  14.78 
T•ble Ill 
Fatal 
ICC  I- total 
denta 
0,05  11 ,q6 
0,00  1  ?. 68 
0,03  ?6. 47 
o.oo  ?1. 9? 
• 
0,00  71.14 
o.oo  3?.16 
0,00  ?(),17 
0.05  5. 66 
0,00  0.~5 
0.13  ?0?, 60 MINES SAFETY AND HEALTH 
COMMISSION 
DETAILED BREAKDOWN OF ACCIDENT VICTIMS ACCORDING TO CAUSE AND SITE 
OF ACCIDENT AND PERIOD OF INCAPACITY 
Common Statistics on vict1ms 





~T"'ACCOOENT  Production faces  Head1ngs excluding 
shafts and staple-p1ts 
1  2 
~ 
4to  21  to  Fatal  4to  21  to 
20  56  >56  20  56  >56 
days  days  days  acci- total 
days  days  days 
CAUSES OF ACCIDENTS  ty 
dents 
(')  (')  (')  (')  (')  (3) 
I. FALLS OF GROUNDS AND ROCKS  566  306  H  2  Q48  119  70  n 
II. TRANSPORT, TOTAL  56  61  ?5  0  14?  18  ?0  18 
a) Continuous Transport  34  35  15  0  84  3  4  5 
b) Discontinuous Transport  n  ?6  10  0  58  15  16  13 
Ill. FALLS AND MOVEMENT OF THE VICTIM, 
TOTAL  653  350  50  1  1054  ?49  16?  78 
a) while movmg about the mine  179  83  12  0  m  43  33  5 
b) in the course of othar activities  m  267  38  1  780  206  129  23 
IV. MACHINES, TOOLS AND SUPPORTS 
TOTAL  466  200  50  0  716  133  60  19 
a) Machines  41  14  16  0  71  10  1?  3 
b) Tools  267  86  23  0  376  95  28  1? 
c) Supports  158  100  11  0  269  28  ?0  4 
V. FALLS OF OBJECTS  177  91  28  1  ?9{  55  28  12 
VI. EXPLOSIVES  0  2  1  0  3  0  0  0 
VII. IGNITIONS OR EXPLOSIONS·  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
OF FIREDAMP AND COAL DUST 
VIII. OUTBURSTS OF GAS, DE-OXYGENATION, 
SUFFOCATION OR POISONING BY NATU-
RAL GASES (COa, CH., CO, H•S), 
TOTAL  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
a) Outbursts of Gas  Q  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
b) De-oxygenation and Poisoning 
0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  by natural G-
IX. HEATINGS OR FIRES  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
X. INRUSHES  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
XI. ELECTRICITY  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
XII. OTHER CAUSES  57  10  1  0  68  34  4  0 
TOTAL  1970  1020  /29  4  3??3  608  344  99 
C  l Number of hourt worked by pit atalland  employee~  of contractor firma who belong to a mlnert aoclallneuranoe achema. 
(1) Aooldlnta Involving more than five caaualtln (I.a. who either died or were unable to reaume work underground for at leaat eight weeki) 



























Shafts and staple-pits  Other places 
3  4 
4to  21to  Fatal  4to  21  to  Fatal 
20  56  >56  20  56  >56  total 
days  days  days 
&CCI- total 
days  days  days 
8CCI· 
dents  dents 
(3)  131  (')  (')  <'l  (') 
211  0  0  0  0  0  17  5  3  0 
jfi  1  1  0  1  3  61  51  36  2 
12  0  0  0  0  0  5  4  6  0 
44  l  1  0  1  3  56  47  30  2 
439  10  11  1  0  I  22  314  254  51  0 
81  3  5  0  0  8  128  79  21  0 
358  7  6  1  0  14  186  175  30  0 
?12  ?  1  0  0  3  4{)  33  8  0 
25  0  0  0  0  0  2  5  2  0 
135  2  1  0  0  3  38  28  6  0 
52  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
95  2  1  0  0  3  57  48  20  1 
0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
0  0  0  0  0  0  0  l  0  0 
38  7  0  0  0  7  28  14  1  0 
1051  2?  14  1  1  38  517  407  119  3 
Table  1a 
YEAR  1  9 7  5 
MAN-HOURS WORKED (1)  20  532  640 
Total of  Group 
accidents underground  accidents !2) 
5  6 
4to  21  to 
20  56  >56  Fatal  56  Fatal 
total  days  days  days  aCCI·  total 
days  acci- total 
dents 
(')  (')  (')  (')  dents 
L____ 
26  70?  38?  99  ?  1185  0  0  0 
150  136  133  79  3  351  0  0  0 
15  42  43  26  0  111  0  0  0 
135  94  90  53  3  ?46  0  0  0 
619  1226  777  130  1  2134  0  0  0 
228  353  199  39  0  591  0  0  0 
391  873  578  q1  1  1543  0  0  0 
81  641  294  77  0  1012  0  0  0 
9  53  31  21  0  - 105  0  0  0 
72  402  143  41  0  586  0  0  0 
0  186  120  15  0  3?1  0  0  0 
126  286  168  60  2  516  0  0  0 
0  0  2  1  0  3  0  0  0 
0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
1  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  0 
43  126  28  2  0  156  0  0  0 
1046  3117  1785  448  8  5358  0  0  0 MINES SAFETY AND HEALTH 
COMMI8810N 
DETAILED BREAKDOWN OF ACCIDENT VICTIMS ACCORDING TO CAUSE AND SITE 
OF ACCIDENT AND PERIOD OF INCAPACITY 
Common Statistics on victims 





~'"C'CCOOEN'  Production laces 
Headings excluding 
shafts and staple-pits 
1  2 
~ 
4to  21  to  Fatal  4to  21  to 
20  56  >56  acci- total 
20  56  >56 
days  days  days  dents 
days  days  days  CAUSES OF ACCIDENTS 
(')  (')  (')  <'!  (')  (') 
I. FALLS OF GROUNDS AND ROCKS  77.57  14,90  3.60  0,10  ~6.17  5,80  3.41  1.07 
II. TRANSPORT, TOTAL  2. 73  ?.97  Ln  o.oo  6.9?  0,88  0.97  o.aa 
a) Conttnuous Transport  1, 66  1, 70  o. 73  0,00  4.09  0.15  0,19  o. 24 
b) Discontinuous Transport  1.07  1.27  0,49  0,00  ?.8?  0, 73  o. 78  0.63 
Ill. FALLS AND MOVEMENT OF THE VICTIM, 
31.80  TOTAL  17.05  2.44  0,05  51' 33  12,13  7.89  1, 36 
a) while moving about the mine  a. 12  4,04  0,58  o.oo  13,34  2.09  1,61  D.24 
b) 1n the course of other activities  23,09  13,00  1.85  0,05  37,99  10.03  6. 28  1,1? 
IV. MACHINES, TOOLS AND SUPPORTS 
TOTAL  ?2.70  g, 74  2.44  0,00  34.87  6,48  ?.9?  0,93 
a) Machines  2.00  0,68  0, 78  0,00  3. 46  0,49  0.58  o. 15 
b) Tools  13.00  4.19  1,1?  0,00  18,31  4.63  1, 36  0.58 
c) Supports  7, 70  4.87  0,54  0,00  13,10  1.36  0.97  0,19 
V. FALLS OF OBJECTS  8.38  4.43  1,36  0,05  14. 2?  2.68  1,36  0.58 
VI. EXPLOSIVES  0,00  0.10  0,05  0,00  0,15  0,00  o.oo  0,00 
VII. IGNITIONS OR EXPLOSIONS 
OF FIREDAMP AND COAL DUST  o.oo  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  o.oo  0,00 
VIII. OUTBURSTS OF GAS, DE-OXYGENATION, 
SUFFOCATION OR POISONING BY NATU-
RAL GASES (CO,, CH•, CO, HoS), 
TOTAL  0,00  o.oo  o.oo  o.oo  0,00  0.00  o.oo  a.oo 
a) Outbursts of Gas  0,00  0,00  o.oo  0.00  o.oa  0,00  o.oo  o,oa 
b) De-oxygenation and Poisoning 
0,00  o.oo  0,00  0,00  0,00  o.oo  0,00  0,00  by natural Gases 
IX. HEATINGS OR FIRES  0,00  a,oo  o.oo  o.oo  o.oo  o.oo  o.oo  0,00 
X. INRUSHES  o,ao  0,00  o.oo  o.oo  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00 
XI. ELECTRICITY  0,00  0,00  0,00  o.oo  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00 
XII. OTHER CAUSES  (, 78  0.49  0,05  0,00  3, 31  1.66  0,19  0,00 
TOTAL  95.94  49,68  11.15  o. 10  56.97  ?9.61  16,75  4.82 
( 1) Number of hours worked by pot staff and employMS of contractor forms who belong to a mmers' soc tal tnsurance scheme 
(1) Accidents Involving more than ftve casualties  (i.e. who erther dred or were unable to resume work underground for at least e1ght weeks) 



























Shafts and staple-p1ts  Other places 
3  4 
4to  21 to  Fatal  4to  21  to  Fatal 
total  20  56  >56 
8CCI·  total  20  56  >56 
8CCI-
days  days  days 
dents 
days  days  days  dents 
(')  (')  (')  ('!  (')  (') 
10, ?8  0,00  0,00  0,00  o.oo  o.oo  0,83  o. ?9  0,15  0,00 
2. 73  0,05  0,05  o.oo  0,05  0,15  2.97  ?.48  1  '75  o. 10 
0.58  0,00  o.oo  0,00  o.oo  0,00  0, 24  0.19  o. ?9  0,00 
2.14  0,05  0,05  0,00  0,05  0,15  2. 73  ?. ?9  1.46  0,10 
21.38  0.49  0.54  0,05  0.00 1 1,07  15.29  1  ?. 37  2.48  0,00 
3.94  0,15  0, ?4  0,00  0,00  0,39  6.23  3,85  1.02  .o.oo 
17,44  0,34  0, 29  0,05  0,00  0,68  9,06  8.52  1.46  0,00 
10.33  0,10  0,05  o.oo  0,00  0,15  1.95  1.61  0,39  0,00 
1, 2?  0,00  0,00  0,00  o.oo  0,00  0,10  D.24  0,10  0,00 
6.57  0,10  0,05  0,00  0,00  o. 15  1.85  1.36  o. 29  0,00 
2.53  0,00  0,00  0,00  o.oo  0,00  o.oo  0,00  o.oo  0,00 
4.63  0,10  0.05  0,00  o.oo  0,15  2. 78  ?.34  0.97  o.os 
0,00  o.oo  o.oo  0,00  0,00  0,00  o.oo  0,00  0,00  o.oo 
0,00  0,00  0,00  o.oo  0,00  o.oo  o.oo  0,00  0,00  0,00 
0,00  0,00  o.oo  0,00  0,00  o.oo  o.oa  0,00  0,00  o.oo 
0,00  0,00  o,ao  a.oo  0,00  0,00  o.oo  0,00  0,00  0,00 
0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  o.oo  o.oo  0,00  o.oo  o.oo 
0.00  0,00  0,00  o.oo  0,00  o.oo  0,00  0,00  o.oo  0,00 
0,00  0,00  0,00  O,OG  0,00  a.oo  o.oo  o.oo  0,00  o.oo 
o,ao  0,00  0,00  o.oo  a.oo  0,00  o.oo  0,05  o.oo  0,00 
1.85  a.34  o.oo  0,00  a.ao  0,34  1, 36  0,68  0,05  o.oo 
51.19  1,07  0,68  0,05  o.os  1.85  25.18  19.82  5,80  a. 15 
- ---
YEAR  1  9  7  5 
MAN-HOURS WORKED (1




4to  21  to 
Fatal 
total 
20  56  >56 
acci- total  days  days  days 
dents 
(')  (')  (') 
1, 27  34,19  18,60  4.8~  0,10  57,71 
7.31  6.62  6. 48  3,85  0,15  17.09 
o. 73  2.05  1.09  1.?7  0.00  5,41 
6~7  4.58  4,38  2.58  0,15  11.98 
30,15  59,71  37,84  6,33  0,05  103.93 
11 '10  17.19  9.69  1.90  0,00  28,78 
19,04  42.52  28.15  4.43  0,05  75.15 
3.94  31, ~?  14,3?  3. 75  0,00  49. ?9 
0,44  2.58  1,51  1.0?  0,00  5.11 
3,51  19,58  6.96  2.00  o.oo  28.54 
0,00  9,06  5,84  0, 73  o.oo  15,63 
6.14  13.93  8.18  2.9?  0,10  25.18 
o.oo  0,00  0,10  0,05  0,00  0,15 
0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  o.oo  0,00 
o.oo  o.ao  o,ao  o.oo  0,00  0.00 
0,00  0,00  o.oo  0,00  0,00  o.oo 
0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  o.oo 
0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0.00  o.oo 
0,00  a.oa  0,00  o.oo  0,00  0,00 
0,05  0,00  0,05  0,00  0,00  0,05 
?.09  6,14  1, 36  0,10  0,00  7.60 
5a.94  151.81  86.93  21.8?  a. 39  ~60. 95 
-




56  Fatal 
days  acci- total 
(I)  dents 
o.oo  o.oo  o.oo 
o.oo  o.oo  o.oo 
o.oo  o.oo  0,00  I 
o.oo  o.oo  0.00 
o.oo  0,00  0,00 
0,00  o.oo  o.oo 
o.oo  0,00  o.oo 
o.oo  o.oo  o.oo 
o.oo  o.oo  o.oo 
o.oo  o.oo  o.oo 
o.oo  o.oo  o.oo 
0,00  o.oo  o.oo 
0,00  o.oo  0,00 
0,00  0.00  0,00  i 
I 
a.oo  o.oo  o.oo 
0,00  o.oo  o.oo 
o.oo  o.oo  0.00 
I 
I 
o.oo  o.oo  o.oo 
o.oo  o.oo  0,00 
0,00  o.oo  0,00 
0,00  o.ao  o.oo 




N MINI!S AFI!TY AND HEALTH 
COMMISSION 
Common Stattattcs on vtctlms 
of acctdents underground tn coal mtnes  DETAILED BREAKDOWN OF VICTIMS ACCORDING TO LOCATION 
AND NATURE OF INJURY AND PERIOD OF INCAPACITY 
NATURE OF THE INJURY 
PERIOD OF INCAPACITY 
LOCATION OF THE INJURY 
I  Head and neck 
II  Eyes 
Ill Trunk 
IV  Upper ltmbs 
(excluding the hands) 
1 1) 
V Hands 
VI  Lower limbs 
(excludmg feet) 1 41 
VII  Feet 
VIII  Mulltple locat•ons 






Amputattons  Fractures 
and  with or without 
enucleattons  dtslocatton 
1  2 
>56  Fatal  >56  Fatal 
days  ace•- total  days  ace•- total 
I')  dents  ('I  dents 
0  0  0  7  3  9 
·.·. 
... 
·,  .·:···  1·-::'  . 
0  0  0  :"< I>  :::: 
l:·.-.. :.-::.:: 1:-:::::.:::;  k-::<::.·: 
0  0  0  15  1  16 
0  0  0  29  0  79 
5  0  5  75  0  75 
0  0  0  55  1  56 
0  0  0  21  0  21 






11  I .  I 





>56  Fatal 
days  DCCI·  total 
(')  dents 




13  0  l3 
6  0  6 
12  0  12 
16  0  15 
0  0  0 




!;:-:-·::::::.  ::::}//  >:,:.::::::: 
~  0  .9 
f
1
) Number of hours worked by pit staff and employees of contractor f1rm1 who belong to 1 miner stoclal•neuranceacMme 
f4J •nclud•ng complications 





>56  Fatal 
days  acct- total 
('I  dents 
5  0  5 
0  0  0 
3  1  • 





0  0  0 
~. ·.  .  .. 
1.>:::-·:-. 




:  .. ::.::-:::-:  :-:-::.:::::. 















Open wounds  Burns and 
contuston  harmful effects  Potsontng 
and muscular  of electrictty  and 
abrastons  and radtatlon  suffocation 
5  6  7 
Fatal  >56  Fatal  >56  Fatal 
acci·  total  days  aCCI- total  days  acct- total 
dents  (5)  dents  (5)  dents 
'::: 
.  •·:-
0  16  0  0  0  •::: 
·:  ... :::· 
.·:-: 
0  ~  0  0  0 
.· 
... 
:1.  ·::  0  g  0  0  0 
.·. 
0  11  0  0  0 
.:- '1·: 
·:: 
0  65  0  0  0 
1.·:- :.<:  .:::::·  k:. 
·:· 
:-:1-:- ::-.. :.:: 
0  44  0  0  0 
-:._·:.:.  :  . 
.. :··· 
0  8  0  0  0  '-:  .  ·:::-
·:-1··:- .::· 
·:: .  .' 
0  18  0  0  0 
[-: 
:·  1·.·  :/1·· 
1-··  1.::·.·.::· .. 
0  0  0  0  0  1  0  1 
0  175  0  0  0  1  0  1 
141  The hlpt and the ankles are included under .. Lower tlmba 
1"') Calender days 
Table 2a 
YEAR  1  9  7  5 
MAN-HOURS WORKED (1)  20  532  640  . 
Multtple InJuries 
of those not  TOTAL 
spectfted 1 21 
8  9 
>56  Fatal  4to  21  to  >56  Fatal 
days  a  CCI- tot  at  20  56  days  ace  I- total 
(5)  dents 
days  days 
(I)  dents  (')  (') 
0  0  0  3?5  13?  30  3  ~90 
0  0  0  311  3?  •  0  m 
3  0  3  437  345  43  ?  8?7 
0  0  0  483  183  ~6  0  71? 
1  0  1  675  55~  158  0  1387 
3  0  3  552  313  118  1  98~ 
0  0  0  218  135  ?9  0  38? 
0  1  1  113  88  19  2  ??2 
0  0  0  3  3  1  0  7 
7  1  8  3117  1785  448  8  5358 MINES AFETY AND HEALTH 
COMMISSION 
Common Statistics on victims 
of accidents underground in coal mines 
COUNTRY 
COAL FIELD  -





>56  Fatal 
PERIOD OF INCAPACITY  days  ace I-
(')  dents 
LOCATION OF THE INJURY 
I.  Head and neck  o.oo  o.oo 
II  Eyes  0,00  o.oo 
Ill  Trunk  o.oo  0,00 
IV  Upper limbs 
(excluding the hands)  0,00  o.oo 
(') 
V  Hands  0, 24  0,00 
VI  Lower limbs 
0,00  o.oo  (excluding feet) (4 ) 
VII  Feet  o.oo  0,00 






with or without 
dislocation 
2 
>58  Fatal 
total  days  acci- total 
(')  dents 
o.oo  0,34  0.15  0.44 
·>  '- ''-
o.oo  _·::.:  ·.··:  ·,·, 
·<:>_  1·:::.- _·: 
·.:.:-:·:· 
0,00  0, 73  0.05  0, 78 
o.oo  1.41  o.oo  1.41 
o. ?4  3.55  0,00  3.65 
0,00  ?.58  0,05  {, 73 
o.oo  1.0?  0,00  1.0? 
0,00  0.05  0,05  o. 10 
:.·:·: 
-:-.- ::: 1:.<·  <:. 
·i:;;.;:.;;(: 1\((:, 
I\•••••• 
IX. Not specified 
1>:  :::_:< 
1.::.)::.:::: 
1:,.;  :.·, 
f::ru::::: 1//.:::::. :\:·  H:-cc: 
















DETAILED BREAKDOWN OF VICTIMS ACCORDING TO LOCATION 
AND NATURE OF INJURY AND PERIOD OF INCAPACITY 
(Frequency rates) 
Open wounds  Burns and 
Luxations,  Concuuion  contusion  harmful effects 
twlatand  and Inter- and muscular  of electricity 
Poisoning 
and 
sprains  nailnjury  abrasions  and radiation  suffocation 
3  4  5  8  7 
Fatal  >56  Fatal  >56  Fatal  >56  Fatal  >56  Fatal 
DCCI- total  days  accl- total  days  accl- total  days  acci- total  days  aCCI· 
dents  (')  dents  (')  dents  (5)  dents  (5)  dents 
o.oo  0,10  o. 74  o.oo  0, 74  0, 78  0,00  0, 78  0,00  0,00  0,00 
0,00  0,00  0,00  0,19  0,00  0.19  o.oo  o.oo  0,00 
" 
o.oo  0,63  0,15  0,05  0.19  O.H  o.oo  0,44  0.00  o.oo  o.oo 
"·:  .>  :>--:-
o.oo  0, 29  0.54  0,00  0,54  o.oo  0,00  o.oo 
0,00  0.58  3.17  o.oo  3.17  o.oo  o.oo  o.oo 
o.oo  0, 78  [,14  0,00  2.14  o.oo  0,00  0,00 
0,00  0,00  0,39  o.oo  0.30  0,00  0,00  0,00 
-:: 
'' --:  :' 
0,00  o.oo  o.oo  0,00  0,00  0,88  0,00  0,88  o.oo  0,00  o.oo  .. -' 
"  : 
. -.  :  ,'  . 
:.:. 
·::  1:::  0,00  o.oo  o.oo  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,05  0,00 
1:::;:-:::-<  ::::<<:· 
~. ':-
b::.::''':  .:.:  .. : 
0,00  {,39  0, 39  0.05  0.44  8,52  o.oo  8,5[  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,05  o.oo 
r I Number of hours -'<ad  by pit ataff and amp~  of contractor firma who belong to a miner aaoclallnaurance actleme. 
(4 ) Tha hlpt and the ankln aralnctuded under .lower  lim~ 
(1) Calendar da.,...  r•)lncludlng compllcatlona.  •  . 
f1' The ehouldera and the wr11t1are Included under .. upper limbe" 
Tablelb 
YEAR  1  9 7  5 
MAN-HOURS WORKED (1)  20  532  640 
Multiple  Injuria~ 
of those not  TOTAL 
specified ('J 
8  9 
>56  Fatal  4to  21  to  >56  Fatal 
total  days  acci- total  20  56  days  accl- total 
(5)  dents 
days  days 
(I)  dents  (')  (') 
0,00  0,00  o.oo  15.83  5, 43  1. 46  0.15  ?3.86 
0,00  0,00  0,00  15,15  1.56  0.19  o.oo  15,90 
0,15  o.oo  0,15  21. ?8  16.80  2.09  0,10  40.?8 
0,00  0,00  0,00  23.52  8.91  ?. ?4  0,00  34,58 
0.05  0,00  0,05  3?.87  26.98  7. 70  0,00  67.55 
0,15  o.oo  0,15  ?6.88  15, ?4  s. 75  0.05  H,9? 
0,00  0,00  0,00  10,62  5.57  1.41  o.oo  18.50 
0,00  0.05  0,05  5,50  4, 29  0,93  o. 10  10,81 
0,05  0,00  0,00  o.oo  0,15  0,15  0,05  0,00  0,34 
0,05  0,34  0,05  0,39  151.81  86.93  ?1.8?  0.39  ?60,95 MINES SAFETY AND HEALTH 
COMMISSION 
DETAILED BREAKDOWN OF ACCIDENT VICTIMS ACCORDING TO CAUSE AND SITE 
OF ACCIDENT AND PERIOD OF INCAPACITY 
Common Statostics on voctoms 






Productoon faces  Headongs excludong 
shafts and staple-pots 
1  2 
~ 
4to  21  to  Fatal  4to  21  to 
20  56  >56  20  56  >56 
days  days  days 
acci- total  days  days  days 
CAUSES OF ACCIDENTS  ty 
dents 
(')  (')  (')  (')  (')  (') 
I. FALLS OF GROUNDS AND ROCKS  1446  504  173  4  2227  551  236  67 
II. TRANSPORT, TOTAL  92  98  37  1  228  97  50  39 
a) Continuous Transport  50  52  23  1  H~  30  14  15 
b) Discontinuous Transport  32  36  14  0  82  67  35  24 
Ill. FALLS AND MOVEMENT OF THE VICTIM, 
TOTAL  879  445  80  1  1405  558  291  68 
a) while moving about the mine  354  149  34  0  537  283  127.  33 
b) in the course of other activitoes  525  296  46  1  868  275  164  35 
IV. MACHINES, TOOLS AND SUPPORTS 
TOTAL  1008  399  115  0  1522  453  165  50 
a) Machines  77  35  30  0  143  37  25  9 
b) Tools  m  150  38  0  659  255  67  22 
c) Supports  460  213  47  0  720  160  73  19 
V. FALLS OF OBJECTS  916  376  118  1  1411  502  201  58 
VI. EXPLOSIVES  3  3  2  0  8  1  0  0 
VII  IGNITIONS OR EXPLOSIONS 
OF FIREDAMP AND COAL DUST  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
VIII. OUTBURSTS OF GAS, DE-OXYGENATION, 
SUFFOCATION OR POISONING BY NATU-
RAL GASES (CO., CH  •• CO, HoS), 
TOTAL  0  0  1  0  1  1  0  0 
a) Outbursts of Gas  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
b) De-oxygenation and Poisonong 
0  0  1  0  1  1  0  0  by natural Gues 
IX. HEATINGS OR FIRES  0  I  0  0  1  0  1  1 
X. INRUSHES  3  0  0  0  3  1  0  0 
XI  ELECTRICITY  0  0  0  0  0  2  1  0 
XII. OTHER CAUSES  262  54  16  0  332  150  23  4 
TOTAL  4609  1980  542  7  7138  2316  968  287 
(
1
} Number of hours worked by pit staff and employees of contractor f1rms who belong to a miners' soc1a1 insurance scheme 
(S) Accidents involvtng more than f1ve casualt1ee  (1  e  who etther died or were unable to resume work underground for at least etght weeks). 



























Shafts and staple-pots  Other places 
3  4 
4to  21  to  Fatal  4to  21  to  Fatal 
20  56  >56  20  56  >56  total 
days  days  days  a  CCI- total 
days  days  days 
8CCI-
dents  dents 
(')  (3 )  (')  ('I  (')  (') 
854  4  0  1  0  5  210  67  28  0 
185  15  17.  5  1  39  217  154  107  3 
59  0  (  0  0  0  24  21  17  0 
127  15  17  4  1  37  193  143  90  3 
918  48  26  13  0  I  89  825  555  147  0 
443  35  18  8  0  61  517  283  83  0 
475  13  10  5  0  28  308  272  64  0 
658  12  7  2  0  21  318  177  ~· 
0 
71  2  1  0  0  3  22  22  15  0 
345  g  5  1  0  15  165  85  19  0 
252  1  1  1  0  3  131  70  10  0 
761  35  17  7  0  59  726  392  112  1 
1  0  0  0  0  0  3  1  0  0 
0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
1  1  0  0  0  1  4  0  0  0 
0  1  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0 
1  0  0  0  0  0  4  0  0  0 
2  0  0  0  0  0  3  0  0  0 
1  n  0  0  0  0  3  1  0  0 
3  0  0  1  0  1  2  5  1  0 
177  28  11  4  0  43  208  73  22  0 
3572  143  80  34  1  258  2519  1435  461  4 
Table  1e 
YEAR  1  9 7  5 
MAN-HOURS WORKED (1)  71  &:>8  585 
Total of  Group 
accodents underground  accodents (2) 
5  6 
4to  21  to 
Fatal  20  56  >56  56  Fatal 
total  days  days  days  acci- total  days  acci- total 
dents  ('l  (')  (')  (')  dents 
305  2211  90?  269  4  3391  0  0  0 
491  422  328  189  5  944  0  0  0 
52  115  96  55  1  267  0  0  0 
429  307  232  132  4  681  0  0  0 
1527  2310  1319  308  2  3939  0  0  0 
883  1189  575  159  0  1924  0  0  0 
5H  1121  743  149  2  2015  0  0  0 
539  1791  748  211  0  2750  0  0  0 
59  138  84  54  0  276  0  0  0 
269  901  307  80  0  1288  0  0  0 
211  752  357  77  0  1186  0  0  0 
1231  2179  986  295  2  346/  0  0  0 
4  7  4  2  0  13  0  0  0 
0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
4  6  0  1  0  7  0  0  0 
0  1  0  0  0  1  0  0  0 
4  5  0  1  0  6  0  0  0 
3  3  2  1  0  6  0  0  0 
4  7  1  0  0  8  0  0  0 
8  4  6  2  0  12  0  0  0 
303  648  161  46  0  855  0  0  0 
H19  9588  4462  1324  13  15387  0  0  0 MINES SAFETY AND HEALTH 
COMMISSION 
DETAILED BREAKDOWN OF ACCIDENT VICTIMS ACCORDING TO CAUSE AND SITE 
OF ACCIDENT AND PERIOD OF INCAPACITY 
Common Statistics on v1ct1ms 





~mEACCODEW  Production faces 
Headings excluding 
shafts and staple-p1ts 
1  2 
~ 
4to  21  to  Fatal 
4to  21  to 
20  56  >56 
&CCI- total  20  56  >56 
days  days  days  days  days  days 
CAUSES OF ACCIDENTS 
dents  (3)  (3)  (3)  (3)  (3)  (3) 
I. FALLS OF GROUNDS AND ROCKS  20.a  8.~1  2.41  0,06  31,01  7' 67  3, 29  0,93 
II. TRANSPORT, TOTAL  1, 2B  1,36  0,52  0,01  3.18  1, 35  o. 70  0,54 
a) Continuous Transport  0,84  0,86  0,32  0,01  2,03  0.42  0,19  a. 21 
b) Discontmuous Transport  0,45  0,50  0.19  0,00  1,14  0,93  0,50  0.33 
111:  FALLS AND MOVEMENT OF THE VICTIM, 
TOTAL  12,24  6, 20  1,11  0.01  19.57  7. 77  4,05  0,95 
a) while mov1ng about the mme  4,93  2.07  o. 47  o.oo  7,48  3.94  1.77  0,46 
b) 1n the course of other activities  7,31  4,12  0,54  0,01  12,09  3,83  2. 2B  0,49 
IV. MACHINES, TOOLS AND SUPPORTS 
TOTAL  1~.04  5.56  1,60  0,00  21.20  6,31  2. 30  o. 70 
a) Machmes  1,07  0,50  0,42  o.oo  1,99  0.52  0,35  0,13 
b) Tools  6,56  2,0q  0,53  0,00  9.18  3,57  0,93  0,31 
c) Supports  6.~1  2.97  0,65  o.oo  10,03  2. 23  1.02  o. 26 
V. FALLS OF OBJECTS  12.76  5, 24  1,64  0,01  19.65  6.99  2.80  0,81 
VI. EXPLOSIVES  0,04  0,04  0,03  0,00  0,11  0,01  0,00  o.oo 
VII. IGNITIONS OR EXPLOSIONS  o.oo  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  o.oo 
OF FIREDAMP AND COAL DUST 
VIII. OUTBURSTS OF GAS, DE-OXYGENATION, 
SUFFOCATION OR POISONING BY NATU-
RAL GASES (COs, CH •. CO, H•S), 
TOTAL  o.oo  0,00  0,01  0,00  0,01  0,01  o.oo  0,00 
a) Outbursts of Gas  0,00  0,00  0,00  o.oo  0,00  o.oo  o.oo  0,00 
b) De-oxygenation and Poisomng  0,00  o.oo  0,01  o.oo  0,01  0,01  o.oo  0,00  by natural Gases 
IX. HEATINGS OR FIRES  o.oo  0,01  0,00  0,00  0,01  0,00  0,01  0,01 
X. INRUSHES  0,04  0,00  o.oo  0,00  0.04  0,01  o.oo  0,00 
XI. ELECTRICITY  0,00  o.oo  o.oo  0,00  o.oo  0.03  0,01  o.oo 
XII. OTHER CAUSES  3,65  o. 75  o. 22  0,00  4. 62  2.09  0,32  0,05 
TOTAL  6~.18  27.57  7,55  0,10  99,4\)  32.25  13,48  4,00 
'  ( ) Number of hours worked by pit staff and employea of contractor firma who belong to a moners  sociaiinsurance scheme. 
<"> Accldenlllinvoivlng more than five cuuaiti• (I.e. who either died or were unable to ruuma work underground for at least eight weeka) 



























Shafts and staple-p1ts  Other places 
3  4 
4to  21  to  Fatal 
4to  21  to  Fatal 
total  20  56  >56  acci- total  20  56  >56  acci-
days  days  days  days  days  days 
dents  dents 
(3)  (3)  (3)  (3)  (3)  (3) 
11.89  0,05  0,00  0,01  0,00  0,07  2.92  0,93  0,39  0,00 
2.59  o. 21  o. 24  0,08  0,01  0,54  3,02  ?. 29  1, 49  o.o~ 
0,82  0,00  o.co  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,33  0,29  0,24  0,00 
1.77  o. 21  o. 24  0,06  0,01  0,52  2.69  1.99  1,25  0,04 
12,78  0.67  0,39  0,18  0,001  1, 24  11.49  7. 73  2,05  0,00 
6,17  0,49  o. 25  0,11  0,00  0,85  7. 20  3.94  1,16  o.oo 
6, 61  0,18  0,14  0,07  o.oo  o. 39  4,29  3, 79  0,89  0,00 
9. 30  0,17  0,10  0,03  0,00  o. 29  4,43  2.46  o. 61  o.oo 
0,99  0,03  0,01  0,00  0,00  0,04  0, 31  o. 31  o. 21  o.oo 
4,80  0,13  0,07  0,01  0,00  0,21  2,30  1.18  o. 26  0,00 
3,51  0,01  0,01  0,01  0,00  0,04  1.82  0,97  0,14  0,00 
10,60  0,49  0, 2~  0,10  0,00  0.82  10,11  5,46  1,56  0,01 
0,01  0,00  0,00  0,00  o.oo  0,00  0,04  0,01  0,00  0,00 
o.oo  0,00  0,00  o.oo  o.oo  0,00  0,00  o.oo  0,00  0,00 
0,01  0,01  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,01  0,06  0,00  0,00  0,00 
0,00  0,01  0,00  0,00  o.oo  0,01  0,00  o.oo  o.oo  0,00 
0,01  0,00  0,00  o.oo  o.oo  0,00  0,06  o.oo  o,oo  o.oo 
0,03  o.oo  o.oo  o.oo  0,00  0,00  o.o~  o.oo  o.oo  0,00 
0,01  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,04  0,01  0,00  o.oo 
o.o~  o.oo  0,00  0,01  0,00  0,01  0,03  0,07  0,01  0,00 
2.46  0,39  0,15  0.06  0,00  0,60  2.90  1,02  0,31  0,00 
49.7 ~  1.99  1.11  O,H  0,01  3,59  35,08  19.98  6, 42  0,06 
Table  1b 
YEAR  1  9 7  5 
MAN-HOURS WORKED (1)  71  8o8  585 
Total of  Group 
accidents underground  accidents (2) 
5  6 
4to  21  to  Fatal 
total  20  56  >56 
acci- total  56  Fatal 
days  days  days  days  acci- total 
dents  (3)  (3)  (3)  (3)  dents 
~. 25  30,79  12,63  3, 75  0,06  47,22  0,00  0,00  0,00 
6,84  5,88  4.57  2. 63  0,07  13,15  0,00  0,00  0,00 
0,35  1,5()  1,34  0, 77  0,01  3, 72  o.oo  0,00  0,00 
5.97  4. 2B  3, 23  1.84  0,06  9.48  o.oo  0,00  0,00 
21.26  32.17  18.37  4. 29  0,03  54.85  o.oo  o.oo  o.oo 
12,30  16,56  8.02  2.21  o.oo  26.79  o.oo  o.oo  0,00 
8,97  15,61  10,35  2.07  0,03  28.06  0,00  o.oo  0,00 
7.51  24.94  10,42  2.94  o.oo  38,30  o.oo  o.oo  o.oo 
0,82  1,92  1,17  o. 75  o.oo  3.84  0,00  0,00  o.oo 
3, 75  12.55  4, 28  1.11  o.oo  17.94  o.oo  o.oo  0,00 
2.94  10,47  4.97  1.07  o.oo  15.52  0,00  0,00  0,00 
17.H  30,34  13,73  4.11  0,03  48.21  0,00  0,00  0,00 
0,06  0,10  0,06  0,03  o.oo  0,18  0,00  0,00  0,00 
0,00  o.oo  o.oo  0,00  0,00  o.oo  0,00  0,00  o.oo 
0,06  o.oa  0,00  0.01  o.oo  0,10  o.oo  0,00  0,00 
0,00  0,01  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,01  o.oo.  o.oo  o.oo 
0,06  0,07  0,00  0,01  o.oo  0.08  0,00  o.oo  o.oo 
o.o~  0,04  0,03  0,01  0,00  0,08  0,00  o.oo  0.00 
0,06  0,10  0,01  0,00  o.oo  0,11  0,00  o.oo  o.oo 
0,11  0,06  0,08  0,03  o.oo  0,17  o.oo  o.oo  o.oo 
~. 22  9.02  2. 24  0,64  0,00  11.91  o.oo  0,00  0,00 
61.5~  133.52  62.1  ~  18.44  0,18  214. 2B  0,00  o.oo  o.oo MINH AI'ITY AND HIIAL  TH 
COMMISSION 
Common Statistics on vtct1ms 
of aCCidents underground 1n coat monas 
NATURE OF THE INJURY 
PERIOD OF INCAPACITY 
LOCATION OF THE INJURY 
I. Head and neck 
11.  Eyes 
Ill  Trunk 
IV  Upper limbs 
(excluding the hands) 
I") 
v  Hands 
VI  Lower lombs 
(excludong feel) f'l 
VII  Feet 
VIII  Multople locatoons 






enucteat1ons  , 
>56  Fatal 
days  acci-





with or without 
dislocation 
2 
>56  Fatal 
total  days  acci- total 
(•)  dents 
17 
50  51 
78  76 
26  230  223 
151  H5 
72 
JO  602  591 
DETAILED BREAKDOWN OF VICTIMS ACCORDING TO LOCATION 





>56  Fatal 
days  accl- total 
(')  dents 
53  51 
11  11 
18  18 
53 





>56  Fatal 
days  acci- total 
(5 )  dents 







>56  Fatal 
days  acci- total 
(0 )  dents 
29  29 
11  11 
32  33 
47 
163  160 
144- 137 
29  28 
28  28 






>56  Fatal 
days  acci- total 





>56  Fatal 
days  acc1- total 
(5)  dents 
(I  I 
:::::··.::.·::·1:::::::::_:::.:::::·.:·::::::.· 
'''  Numllllr olllours worked by pit ala' I and employ-ol oontractor llrme w11o belong to 1 miner aaoclal lnaurance ICherne 
,:a,tncludtng comprtcauone 
'''The hlpe 1nd the ankiH are Included under .. Lower limbe" 
,., ca  ..  ndlr  daya 
,.,, Tne anoulders and the  wr~1t1 aretntluded under .. upper limbs" 
YEAR  1  9 7 5 
MAN-HOURS WORKED (l)  71  808  585 
Multiple injuries 
of those not 
specified,., 
8 
>56  Fatal 
days  acci- total 
(5)  dents 
17 















































15387 MINI!& AFI!TY AND HI!AL  TH 
COMMISSION 
Common Statistics on v1ct1ms 
of acc1dents underground in coal mmes 
NATURE OF THE INJURY 
PERIOD OF INCAPACITY 
LOCATION OF THE INJURY 







>56  Fatal 
days  acCI-
(•)  dents 




wltl'l or wltl'lout 
dislocation 
2 
>56  Fatal 
total  days  acci- total 
(•)  dents 





DETAILED BREAKDOWN OF VICTIMS ACCORDING TO LOCATION 
AND NATURE OF INJURY AND PERIOD OF INCAPACITY 
(Frequency rates) 
Open wounds  Burns and 
Luxatlons,  Concussion  contusion  l'larmful effects 
twist and  and inter- and muscular  of electricity 
POISOning 
and 
spra1ns  nal injury  abrasions  and radiation  suffocation 
3  4  5  6  7 
Fatal  >56  Fatal  >56  Fatal  >56  Fatal  >58  Fatal 
accl- total  days  accl- total  days  acci- total  days  aCCI·  total  days  acci-
dents  (•)  dents  (S)  dents  (5)  dents  (5)  dents 
o.ao  0,07  0,11  a.oa  0,11  a.40  o.oa  a,40  o.oa  a,oo  a.oa 
total 
:::: 
:: .....  <· 
II. Eyes  o.ao  o.ao  o.aa  r··  ·. >. 
.  :  .. :)· 
:.· 
[:-..  ·.·.·.  .:- ... ;::- :··· 
Ill. Trunk  o.oo  o.oo  o.oo  a. 10  0,01  o. 71  o. 74  0,00  o. 71 
IV  Upper limbs 
(excluding the l'lands)  0,01  o.ao  0,01  1,09  0,00  1.06  0,15  0,00  0,15 
(3) 
V  Hands  0,40  o.oo  o. 36  3, 20  0,00  3,11  o. 25  0,00  o. 25 
VI  Lower limbs 
0,01  0,00  0,01  2,10  (excluding fset) (4 )  0,01  2.02  o. 75  0,00  0, 74 
VII  Feet  0,04  0,00  0,03  1.00  o.oo  0,99  0,03  0,00  0,03 
VIII. Multiple locations  o.oo  o.oo  a.oo  0,10  0,01  O, 11  0,03  o.oo  0,03 
i 
}?:.:> 
..  :· :-.:·  ..  .  :::: 
IX  Not specified  I>  :::-
[:::::::::::: I 
:·.·  1:::·:·  ::::  1:::  :':;. 1:::  ::::- 1::::(\  ..  1-:::::CU: 
~-..  :_:::}  1-<:  ·:} 1::::-::.·:-:::· 1.\):_::- 1::::::::}::: 
TOTAL  0.47  o.ao  0.42  8' 38  0,11  g, 23  2,02  0,00  1. 98 
t'  I Number or hou,. worllecl by pit ataH and amplov-of contractor firma who belong to a miner 1 aoclallnaurance acheme. 
f111ncludlng comphcattonl  · 
l1J The 1houlders and the wrtatl are 1ncluded under ,upper llmba" 
0,01  o,oa  a.01  0,15  0,00 
0,14  0,01  0,15  a,45  0,01 
··:- :  :· 
1:-:::.::·.  :-
... .·.·.·  ·;::::c:c. 
o. 67  0,00 
2. 27  0,00 
2,01  0,00 
0.40  o.oo 
0,00  0,00  0,00  0.39  0,00 
.  . 
0,03  0,00 
1:::.:::.  ·.::: 
o. 26  0,01  0, 28  6, 77  0,01 
0,15  o.oo  0,00  a.oo  . 
o. 46  0,00  0,00  0,00 
a. 55  0,01  0,00  0,01 
2. ?3  o.oo  0,00  0,00 
1,91  0,00  a.oo  o.oo 
o. 39  0,00  0,00  0,00 
o. 39  0,03  0,00  0,03 
0,03  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,01  0,00 
5,51  0,04  o.oa  a,04  o,a1  0,00 
!'I  The hlpa and the anklaa ara Included under .Lower limbe  . 





MAN HOURS WORKED (1) 




>56  Fatal  410 
days  acci- total  20 
(5)  dents 
days 
(•) 
a.aa  a.oa  o.ao  11.11 
0,00  0,00  0,00  11.93 
0,06  0,00  0,06  18.80 
0,00  o.oo  0,00  17,31 
0,03  a.oo  0,03  37,57 
0,05  o.oo  0,06  20,78 
0,01  0,00  0,01  11.14 
o. 24  0,04  o. 28  4.19 
0,08  o.oa  a.08  0, 68 
0,47  0.04  0,52  133,52 
1  9  7  5 
71  808  585 
TOTAL 
9 
21  to  >56  58  days  days 
(•)  (•) 
3, 33  0, 78 
1,09  o. 17 
11.18  2.07 
4. 79  1,94 
21,45  6.16 
11.03  4.93 
6, 32  1. 49 
2.59  o. 78 
a. 36  a, 13 

























1--1  ..._ 
N 
00 MINES SAFETY AND HEALTH 
COMMISSION 
DETAILED BREAKDOWN OF ACCIDENT VICTIMS ACCORDING TO CAUSE AND SITE 
OF ACCIDENT AND PERIOD OF INCAPACITY 
Common Statistics on victims 





~~•~c,~m  Product1on faces  Headmgs excluding 
shafts and stapte-p1ts 
1  2 
~ 
4to  21  to 
Fatal 
4to  21  to 
20  56  >56  20  56  >56 
days  days  days  ace•- total  days  days  days 
CAUSES OF ACCIDENTS 
(3)  (3)  (3)  dents  (3)  (')  (3) 
I. FALLS OF GROUNDS AND ROCKS  3  1 
II. TRANSPORT, TOTAL  1 
a) Continuous Transport 
b) Discontonuous Transport  1 
Ill. FALLS AND MOVEMENT OF THE VICTIM, 
TOTAL  10  2 
a) while moving about the mme  6  2 
b) on the course of other activities  4 
IV. MACHINES, TOOLS AND SUPPORTS 
TOTAL  6  2  2 
a) Machines  1 
b) Tools  4  1  1 
c) Supports  2  1 
V  FALLS OF OBJECTS  1 
VI. EXPLOSIVES 
VII. IGNITIONS OR EXPLOSIONS. 
OF FIREDAMP AND COAL DUST 
VIII. OUTBURSTS OF GAS, DE-OXYGENATION, 
SUFFOCATION OR POISONING BY NATU-
RAL GASES (COt, CH•, CO, H1S), 
TOTAL 
a) Outbursts of Gas 
b) De-oxygenation and Poisoning 
by natural Gues 
IX. HEATINGS OR FIRES 
X. INRUSHES 
XI. ELECTRICITY 
XII  OTHER CAUSES  4 
TOTAL  25  5  2 
(')Number of houra worked by  p~  otaflond employ-of controctor firms who belong to a miners' social Insurance schema 
!1) Accldenta •nvohnng more thon II.,. couoltiM (I.e. who either died or were unable to resume work underground lor at 1e01t eight weeks) 





Shafts and stapte-p1ts  Other places 
3  4 
4to  21  to  Fatal  4to  21  to  Fatal  20  56  >56  20  56  >56  total  days  days  days 
acci- total 
days  days  days 
aCCI· 
















MAN-HOURS WORKED (1) 
Total of 
1  9  7  5 
437  139 
accidents underground 
5 
4to  21  to 
Fatal  20  56  >56 
days  days  days 
8CCI- total 
13)  (3)  (3)  dents 
3  1  If 
1  1 
1  1 
10  2  12 
6  2  8 
If  If 
6  2  2  10 
1  1 
4  1  1  6 
2  1  3 
1  1 
4  4 
25  5  2  32 




56  Fatal 
days  acci- total 
(3)  dents MIND SAFETY AND HEALTH 
COMMISSION 
DETAILED BREAKDOWN OF ACCIDENT VICTIMS ACCORDING TO CAUSE AND SITE 
OF ACCIDENT AND PERIOD OF INCAPACITY 
Common Statistics on victims 








shafts and staple-pits 
1  2 
~ 
4to  21 to  Fatal 
4to  21  to 
20  56  >56  ace I- total  20  56  >56 
days  days  days 
dents 
days  days  days 
CAUSES OF ACCIDENTS 
(')  (3)  (I)  (I)  <"l  c•J 
I. FALLS OF GROUNDS AND ROCKS  7  2 
II. TRANSPORT, TOTAL  2 
a) Continuous Transport 
b) Dlacontlnuous Transport  2 
Ill. FALLS AND MOVEMENT OF THE VICTIM, 
TOTAL  23  5 
a) while moving about the mine  a  5 
b) In the course of  other activities 
9 
IV. MACHINES, TOOLS AND SUPPORTS 
TOTAL  H  5  4 
a) Machines  2 
b) Tools  g  3  2 
c) Supports  5  2 
V. FALLS OF OBJECTS  2 
VI. EXPLOSIVES 
VII.IGNmONS OR EXPLOSIONS 
OF FIREDAMP AND COAL DUST 
VIII. OUTBURSTS OF GAS, DE-OXYGENATION, 
SUFFOCATION OR POISONING BY NATU-
RAL GASES (CO., CH., CO, HaS), 
TOTAL 
a) Outbursts of Gas 
b) De-oxygenation and Poisoning 
by natural G-
IX. HEATINGSOR FIRES 
X. INRUSHES 
XI. ELECTRICITY 
XII. OTHER CAUSES  g 
TOTAL  57  12  4 
<' l Number o1 houra worked by pit llllfl  and empto,_  of  contractor firma who belong to a miners aoclallnsurance schema 
<"l Accklenta llniOivtng more than live caouattt ..  (I.a. who either died or_,.  unable to raeuma work underground lor atleaataight waeka) 





Shafts and staple-pits  Other places 
3  4 
4to  21 to  Fatal  4to  21 to  Fatal 
total 
20  56  >56 
acci- total  20  56  >56 
accl- days  days  days 
dents  days  days  days 
















MAN-HOURS WORKED (1) 
Total of 
1  9 7 5 
437  139 
accidents underground 
5 
4to  21  to 
Fatal  20  56  >56 
accl- total  days  days  days 
dents  <"l  (I)  (") 
7  2  9 
2  2 
2  2 
23  5  28 
a  5  19 
9  9 
14  5  4  23 
2  2 
9  3  2  H 
5  2  7 
2  2 
9  9 
57  12  4  73 




56  Fatal 
days  accl- total 
(")  dents MINI!S AI'I!TY AND HUL  TH 
COMMISSION 
Common Statistics on victoms 







NATURE OF THE IIIIJURY  and  woth or without 
enucleatoons  dislocatoon 
1  2 
>58  Fatal  >58  Fatal 
PERIOD OF INCAPACITY  days  acco- total  days  acco- total 
(•)  dents  (•)  dents 
LOCATION OF THE IIIIJURY 
I  Head and neck 
!II 




Ill  Trunk 
IV  Upper limbs 
(excluding the hands) 
I') 
V  Hands  1  1  1  1 
VI  Lower limbs 
(excludong feet) £4 ) 
VII  Feet 
VIII  Multiple locations 
,, I 
I  I  ! 
1:::-::::::1:-:: 
k/:·:\ 
IX  Not specofied 
!:::::!i:l::!:. I 









DETAILED BREAKDOWN OF VICTIMS ACCORDING TO LOCATION 
AND NATURE OF INJURY AND PERIOD OF INCAPACITY 
(absolute figures) 
Open wounds  Burns and 
Luxations,  Concussoon  contusoon  harmful ellects  Poosoning 
twist and  and onter- and muscular  of electrocoty  and 
spraons  nalon1ury  abrasio"s  and radoatoon  sullocation 
3  4  5  6  7 
Fatal  >56  Fatal  >58  Fatal  >56  Fatal  >56  Fatal 
occi- total  days  acci- total  days  8CCI·  total  day~  acci- total  days  acci- total 
dents  ,.,  dents  ,.,  dents  (5)  dents  (5)  dents 
I/ 
~.-:-:::..::···  ··:  :·:-
j::- r::  :  ·:: 
·::: 
1:·  .. :·.:. 
<·. 
1::- .L  l~:/:::··: 
.;.·  •-:-.  .; 





·  .. 
\<:····::: 
1:::  :.;: 
····::-:? 
; .  .;:, 
:-·-: ..  :-:: 
j:<>  ·;.:-: ..  ;.  :.:: 
·::::-. 
:::· 
1.:::.  :.; 
~::::·:~: 
1:,:-.. 
.  :·· 
··:·:·  .:.::. 
hH)} :~cr_f.; 
:::-::::::  v·  I>  :<  ?·~·:>::::  .·· 
/  :  .  .;·  ,·.  I·>  <· 
·:- :-···  f.:- ·:- 1::. 
::::.  ..  ;  .;.:-.:·:··  :~  :-:-:: 
·.;:-. 




::::  :\)  ~ : 
[.:~  ~  1:::::::.::- 1<<:  t·:  ...:.::. 
F 
I<·  1<·.·:.·.  :·:-.·.:-:: 
1:2·:::<:  :.;· 
:.:::  :):  I··  f· 
1'::  f'·  I<· 
::: 
:-:- ·  .. 
·:··:-.  :.::  :.·:.  :.-_:-_~  ·::- ··:·:··· 
!.:-.:  . 
.  :::·:-.,. ·:- :-·>  ·:·  ·:- .:,:> 
··::- .:·  ·.·  I···  ;:-.  ·::  ·, 
1·-:·:  :·-<:  < 
:·· 
: 1>::.:·  ~Lid) 
k:::::.:.-::  1>±2  k·>_::·  'c:·;<  ::>:  .)-\\ 
1·-:  ..  ·.  .·I·:· 
.:-:::v:.  k 
·.::1··:  k.:: 
r.:- ±  1:>·:·.:· 






f 1,  Number of houra worked by pit ataff end employ ...  of contractor firma who belong to 1 miner 1 eoclal 1naurance achemtl  1 1  The hlpo and the an 
o•o Calendar days 
kl  r  In  luded under .. lower Umba  .. 
121 tnclud•ng complications 
,  .. , The shoulders and the wnsts are encluded under .. upper hmbs 
Teble Ia 
YEAR  1  9 7 5 
MAN-HOURS WORKED (l)  437  139 
Multople injuries 
olthose not  TOTAL 
specohed r•t 
8  9 
>56  Fatal  4to  21  to  >56  Fatal 
days  acci- total  20  56  days  accl- total 
(5)  dents 
days  days  (I)  danta  (•)  (') 
2  2 
2  1  3 
1  1 
10  2  2  H 
2  1  3 
~  ~ 
~  1  5 
25  5  2  32 MINIS AFIETY AND HEALTH 
COMMISSION 
Common Statistics on victims 
of acc1dents underground In coal mines 
NATURE OF THE INJURY 
PERIOD OF INCAPACITY 
LOCATION OF THE INJURY 
I  Head and neck 
II  Eyes 
Ill. Trunk 
IV  Upper limbs 
(excluding the hands) 
(') 
v Hands 
VI  Lower limbs 
(excluding feet)(') 
VII  Feet 







>56  Fatal 
days  acc.i-





with or without 
dislocation 
2 
>56  Fatal 
total  days  accl- total 
(')  dents 
1:: ...  ·  ,  ..  :.; 
·>  .;.::.'  :;..;.  :- ·'.;.  <:-:' 
2  2  2 
r 
::.::·.;.,:,.; .. 1:·.·>  ·.· 
IX. Not apeclfied 
I  :\:::::.::\  1::-::u:::::•· 
I>  ::.:::: k  .. .: 
j::- :_::  1:<·,.,.:.·: [:;::::::/ 




: ...  ····· 
.  ·: 
I< 
l:::•.t\i: 
DETAILED BREAKDOWN OF VICTIMS ACCORDING TO LOCATION 
AND NATURE OF INJURY AND PERIOD OF INCAPACITY 
(Frequency rates) 
Open wounds  Burns and 
Luxatlons,  Concussion  contusion  harmful affects  Poisoning 
twlatand  and Inter- and muacular  of electricity  and 
sprains  nal injury  abraalona  and radiation  suffocation 
3  4  5  e  7 
Fatal  >58  Fatal  >58  Fatal  >58  Fatal  >56  Fatal 
IICCI·  total  days  accl- total  days  acci- total  days  accl- total  days  acci-
dents  (')  dents  (')  dents  (5)  dents  (5)  dante 
········· 
f 
::-.  ·-:-:-: 
·.·1··. 
:  ... 
".'  .. 
:·>  .:-. I> 
[::-::.:/( 1:::::.)/  1:.:::::::::•  ••:-:•.  .· ...  :-•. 
t 
11  Number of houra WOflled by pltllaff  and amployeM ol contractor llrmo who belOng to 1 miner oooclallnouranca tehama. 
t1J Including compllcatiOno.  • 
( 1  The hlpo and tha ankiH aralncludld under .Lower limbe 
(11  Celender daye. 
f1J The ohouldara ond the wrll'-lrllncludad under .. upper limbo 
YEAR 
MAN-HOURS WORKED (1) 




>56  Fatal  4to 
20  total  days  acci- total  days 









1  9 7 5 
437  139 


























73 MINES SAFETY AND HEALTH 
COMMISSION 
DETAILED BREAKDOWN OF ACCIDENT VICTIMS ACCORDING TO CAUSE AND SITE 
OF ACCIDENT AND PERIOD OF INCAPACITY 
Common StatiStics on victims 
of acc1dents underground m coal mines 
COUNTRY  UNITEll  KINGDOM 
COAL-FIELD 
~'"''"'"'0"' 
Production laces  Headings excludmg 
shafts and staple-p1ts 
1  2 
~ 
4to  21  to  Fatal 
4to  21  to 
20  56  >56 
8CCI·  total  20  56  >56 
days  days  days  days  days  days 
CAUSES OF ACCIDENTS  y 
dents  (3)  (3)  (3)  (3)  (3)  (3) 
I  FALLS OF GROUNDS AND ROCKS  82  5  87  45 
II. TRANSPORT, TOTAL  18  5  ?3  17 
a) Contmuous Transport 
b) Discontinuous Transport 
Ill. FALLS AND MOVEMENT OF THE VICTIM, 
6  - 6  11  TOTAL 
a) while movmg about the mine 
b) m the course of other activities 
IV. MACHINES, TOOLS AND SUPPORTS 
TOTAL 
a) Mach1nes  20  2  22  14 
5  - 5  3  b) Tools 
c) Supports  9  3  12  -
V  FALLS OF OBJECTS  16  - lfi  10 
VI. EXPLOSIVES  1  - 1  -
VII  IGNITIONS OR EXPLOSIONS 
OF FIREDAMP AND COAL DUST  - - - -
VIII  OUTBURSTS OF GAS, DE-OXYGENATION, 
SUFFOCATION OR POISONING BY NATU-
RAL GASES (CO  •. CH •• CO, H2S),  - - - -
TOTAL 
a) Outbursts of Gas 
b) De-oxygenation and Po1soning 
by natural Gases 
IX  HEATINGS OR FIRES  - - - -
X. INRUSHES  - - - -
XI. ELECTRICITY  - - - -
XII. OTHER CAUSES  12  1  13  3 
TOTAL  169  16  185  103 
(1)  Number of hours worked by p1t staff and employees of contractor ftrms who belong to a mtners  soctal msurance scheme 
(1) Accldents•nvolvlng more than five casualt•• (I.e. who either died or were unable to resume work underground for at least etghl weeks). 




















Shafts and staple-pits  Other places 
3  4 
4to  21  to  Fatal  4to  21  to  Fatal 
total  20  56  >56 
8CCI- total  20  56  >56  acci-
days  days  days  days  days  days  dents  dents  (3)  (3)  (3)  (3)  (3)  (31 
47  - - - 10  1 
17  3  1  4  135  14 
11  2  - 2  52  1 
I 
16  - - - 4  2 
3  - - - 9  -
- - - - - -
10  2  2  16  ~ 
2  - - - 1  -
- - - - 1  5 
- - - - - -
- - - - - -
- - - - - -
- - - - - -
3  3  4  7  11  1 
109  10  5  15  240  28 
Table  1e 
YEAR  1  9  7  5 
MAN-HOURS WORKED  (1)  303  199  425 
Total of  Group 
accidents underground  accidents (2) 
5  6 
4to  21  to  Fatal 
total  20  56  >56 
acci- total  56  Fatal 
days  days  days  days  acci- total 
dents  (3)  (31  (3)  (3)  dents 
11  137  8  145 
150  174  20  194 
53  71  1  72 
6  38  6  44 
9  17  - 17 
- 9  3  12 
20  44  4  ~ 
1  2  2  4 
6  1  5  6  1  5  6 
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
12  29  6  35 
268  522  55  577  1  5  6 MINES SAFETY AND HEALTH 
COMMISSION 
DETAILED BREAKDOWN OF ACCIDENT VICTIMS ACCORDING TO CAUSE AND SITE 
OF ACCIDENT AND PERIOD OF INCAPACITY 
Common Statistics on victims 
of accidents underground in coal mmes 
COUNTRY 
COAL-FIELD 
UNITED  KINGroM 
~~·=··~ 
Production faces  Headings excludmg 
shafts and staple-pits 
1  2 
~ 
4to  21  to  Fatal  4to  21  to 
20  56  >56  acci- total  20  56  >56  CAUSES OF ACCIDENTS  ty 
days  days  days 
dents  days  days  days 
(')  (')  (')  (')  (')  (') 
I. FALLS OF GROUNDS AND ROCKS  0. 270  0.016  0. 287  O.H8 
II. TRANSPORT, TOTAL  0.059  0.016  0.076  0.056 
a) Continuous Transport 
b) Discontinuous Transport 
Ill. FALLS AND MOVEMENT OF THE VICTIM, 
0.020  - 0.020  0.036  TOTAL 
a) while moving ~out  the mine 
b) in the course of  other activities 
IV. MA.CHINES. TOOLS AND SUPPORTS 
TOTAL 
a) Machines  0.066  0.007  0.073  0.046 
b) Tools  0.016  - 0.016  0.010 
c) Supports  0,030  0.010  o.ow  -
V. FALLS OF OBJECTS  0.053  - 0.053  0.033 
VI. EXPLOSIVES  0.003  - 0.003  -
VII~NITIONS  OR EXPLOSIONS 
OF FIREDAMP AND COAL DUST  - - - -
VIII. OUTBURSTS OF GAS, DE-OXYGENATION, 
SUFFOCATION OR POISONING BY NATU- - - - -
RAL GASES (CO., CH  •• CO, H•S). 
TOTAL 
a) Outbursts of Gas 
b) De-oxygenation and Poisoning 
by natural Gases 
IX. HEATINGS OR FIRES  - - - -
X. INRUSHES  - - - -
XI. ELECTRICITY  - - - -
XII. OTHER CAUSES  o.ow  0.003  0.043  0.010 
TOTAL  0.557  0.053  0.610  0.340 
( J  Number of hour> worked by pit atiiH and empl~  of contractor firma who beiO"!I to a miners aoclallnauronce scheme. 
<"l Acclclenta lnvot¥11111 more than !Iva cuualtl• (I.a. who either died or ware unable to ruume work underground lor  at 1-t  eight weeks). 





















Shafts and staple-p1ts  Other places 
3  4 
4to  21 to  Fatal  4to  21  to  Fatal 
total  20  56  >56  acci- total  20  56  >56  acci-
days  days  days  dents  days  days  days  dents 
(')  (')  (')  (')  (')  (') 
0.155  - - - 0.033  0.003 
0.056  0.010  0.003  0.013  0.449  O.Olf6 
0.036  0.007  - 0.007  0.171  0.003  I 
0.053  - - - 0.013  0.007 
0.010  - - - 0.030  -
- - - - - -
0.033  0.007  - 0.007  0.053  0.013 
0.007  - - - 0.003  -
- - - - 0.003  0.016 
- - - - - -
- - - - - -
- - - - - -
- - - - - -
0.010  0.010  0.013  0.023  0.036  0.003 
0.359  0.033  0.016  O.Olf9  0. 791  0.092 
YEAR  1  9 7  5 
MAN-HOURS WORKED (1)  303  199 425 
Total of  Group 
accidents underground  accidents (1) 
5  6 
4to  21  to  Fatal 
total 
20  56  >56 
acci- total  56  Fatal 
days  days  days 
dents 
days  acci- total 
(')  (")  (')  (0)  dents 
0.036  O.lf52  0.026  0.~78 
0. ~95  0.57~  0.066  0.6W 
0.175  0.234  0.003  0. 237 
0.020  0.125  0.020  0. H.5 
0.030  0.056  - 0.056 
- 0.030  0.010  0.040 
0.066  0.145  0.013  0.158 
0.003  0.007  0.007  0.013 
0.020  0.003  0.016  0.020 
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
o.ow  0.096  0.020  0.115 
0.884  1. 722  0.181  1.903 MINt:S AFeTY AND Ht:AL  TH 
COMMIUION 
Common Statistics on vtcttms 
of accidents underground tn coal mtnes 
COUNTRY  UNITED  KINGDOM 







with or without 
dtslocation 
2 
PERIOD OF INCAPACITY 
>56 I  Fatal 
days  acci-
>56 I  Fatal 
total  I  days  acci- I  total 
<'>  dents  <">  dents 
LOCATION OF THE INJURY 
I.  Head and neck  22  11  33 
DETAILED BREAKDOWN OF VICTIMS ACCORDING TO LOCATION 





> 561  Fatal 
days  acci- I  total 





>58 I  Fatal 
days  acc•·  I  total 







>56 I  Fatal 
days  acc•·  I  total 






Fatal  >56 
days 
(5) 







>56 I  Fatal 
days  acct- 1  total 
(5)  dents 
II. Eyes  -
3 
;.........  ~ )!  ~  ~1  ill 
Ill Trunk 
IV  Upper limbs 
(excluding the hands) 
1'1 
V  Hands 
VI  Lower limbs 
(excluding feet) r•1 
VII  Feet 
VIII  Mull•plelocattons 
66  67 
115  -' 115 
- '  1 
251  2  I  253 
- ,.  7 
20  20 
D1·.·-~  ....  ·.·.·.·.· .. 
.  1••·•·••••••••·1······························· 
3  Cll~ 
•• 




.  ~~  f 
·II  ·IU  ~ 
-
YEAR  1  9 7 5 
MAN-HOURS WORKED(')  303  199 425 
Multtple Injuries 
of those not 
specthed I'J 
8 
> 561  Fatal 
days  acci- I  total 
(5)  dents 





21  to 
58 
days 
















15  41 




12  18 















TOTAL  l7  l7  468  16  I 484  22 
''  1 Number of lloura WOI'IIecllly pit atllff end empeoy.. of oontrector flrme wllo belOng toe mi-'IIIOCiellneurenoe  echeme. 
'''  oncluOtng complicellone 
,  .. , The shouiCMrt and the wu1t1 ere mclucted under .. upper hmbl 
23  15 
1 41  Thl  hlpe end the enkl•  ere Included under .. L-IImtle 
I'JCelendlfdep 
10  23  26  522  55  577 
....... 
'  w 
U'1 MINIS AP:ITY AND HEALTH 
COMMISSION 
Common Statistics on victims 
of accodents underground In c:oal  mines  DETAILED BREAKDOWN OF VICTIMS ACCORDING TO LOCATION 
AND NATURE OF INJURY AND PERIOD OF INCAPACITY 
COUNTRY  UNITED  KINGOOM 
COAL-FIELD 
Amputations  Fractures  Luxatlons, 
NATURE OF THE INJURY  and  with or without  twiatand 
enucleations  dlsloc:atlon  sprains 
1  2  3 
>56  Fatal  >56  Fatal  >56  Fatal 
PERIOD OF INCAPACITY  days  acc.i- total  days  ac:ci- total  days  DCC: I·  total 
(")  dents  (I)  dents  <">  dents 
LOCATION OF THE INJURY 
I. Head and neck  - - - 0.073  0.036  0.109  - - -
1: 
II. Eyes  0.010  - 0.010  .  '  .:,._ 
f..·<.::-:  !:.:·:_.: .. -:  l:;:.:.::-:::· k·:- .' 
Ill Trunk  - - - 0. 218  0.003  0. 221  - - -
IV. Upper lombs 
0.003  - 0.003  0. 379  - 0.379  0.066  - 0. 066  (excluding the hands) 
(') 
V  Hands  0.003  - 0.003  0.003  - 0.003  - - -
VI. Lower limbs  0.030  - 0.030  0.828  0,007  0.834  0.007  0.003  0.010  (excluding feet)<') 
VII  Feet  0.010  - 0.010  0.023  - 0.023  - - -
VIII. Multiple locations  - - - 0.020  0.007  0.026  - - -
[ 
!>·<·:·.·:·  :-:  .. 
::- :.(: 
.  ;:.  ,:::  ::<·. 
Vt>.::: 
.  ::::::  :-: 
IX. Notapeclfoed  ~::::  :·u: 1>·:._:<::.  ~i:)::y~: 
:.:- ..  :'::: 
1:-:.;:.·: .. :- 1:::.  ::: 
1::):::/) :.:.::{::-·:  [\ ):·:. 1:\.:·:.U· 1::::::::-:::::  <:.::.::.-: 
TOTAL  0.056  - 0.056  1.543  0.053  1.596  0.073  0.003  0.076 
r• l Num..., of hou,. WOfllecl by pit tltllland empl-of contractor llrme w11o belong to 1 miner 1 eoclallnturance ocheme. 
r•o•ncludlng compllcatlone.  • 






>5&  Fatal 
days  ac:c:l- total 
(")  dents 
0.007  0.007  0.013 
- - -
0.023  0.007  0.030 
.:·.::-:::_:-: 1>-::·:·  .  .  ::::·:;·-::· 





- 0.007  0.007 
.. 
1::.  ·. 
:::::::::::  ~-:::<  .. 
···.·.·· 
0.030  0.020  0.0~9 
Open wounds  Burna and 
contusion  harmful effects  Poisoning 
andmuac:ular  of  electricity  and 
abraaiona  and radiation  suffocation 
5  6  7 
>56  Fatal  >56  Fatal  >56  Fatal 
days  ac:c:i- total  days  acc:i- total  days  acci- total 
(")  dents  (5)  dania  (5)  dents 
r::  1···00:::· 
0.003  - 0. 003  0.003  - 0.003 
1::: 
·:·I··· 
- - - - - -
- - - - -
- - - - - -
~ 
- - - - - - ::. 
:< 
",  ,:-... 
- - - - - -
·:.· 
:· <:  ... 
- - - - - -
·::· 
1·:- - - - - - - ,,·  ..  ·I··· 
' 
- - - 0.003  0.030  0. 033 
0.003  - 0.003  0.003  - 0.003  0.003  0.030  0.033 
r'l The hlpt and the anklll  are Included under ,Lo-llmbl . 
r'l C.lender daya. 
Teble lb 
YEAR  1  9 7 5 
MAN HOURS WORKED (1)  - 303  199  424 
Mulllplelnjurl811 
ofthoHnot  TOTAL 
specified (1) 
8  9 
>56  Fatal  4to  21to  >5&  Fatal 
days  accl- total  20  56  days  acct- total 
(5)  dents 
days  days 
(I)  !Mnta  (I)  <"> 
- 0.007  0.007  0.086  0.0~9  0.135 
- - - 0.010  - 0.010 
0.003  o.ow  0.0~3  0. 2~4  0.0~9  0. 294 
- - - O.H9  - 0. 449 
0.003  - 0.003  0.010  - 0.010 
- - - 0.864  0.010  0.874 
0.003  - 0.003  0.036  - 0.036 
- 0. 026  0.026  0.020  0.040  0.059 
- 0.003  0.003  0.003  0.033  0.036 
0.010  0. 076  0.086  1. 722  0.181  1.903 MINES SAFETY AND HEALTH 
COMMISSION 
DETAILED BREAKDOWN OF ACCIDENT VICTIMS ACCORDING TO CAUSE AND SITE 
OF ACCIDENT AND PERIOD OF INCAPACITY 
Common Statistocs on vlctoms 
of accidents underground on  coal mines 
COUNTRY  COMMJNITY 
COAL-FIELD 
~'H,ACC'O'N'  Productoon faces  Headongs excludong 
shafts and staple-pots 
1  2 
~ 
4to  21  to  Fatal  4to  21  to 
20  56  >56 
acco- total  20  56  >56 
days  days  days  days  days  days 
CAUSES OF ACCIDENTS 
dents 
(')  (')  (')  (')  (')  (') 
I. FALLS OF GROUNDS AND ROCKS  6545  2573  739  16  98?3  1883  1044  3?0 
II. TRANSPORT, TOTAL  465  388  201  6  1060  4?4  182  117 
a) Continuous Transport  300  718  114  3  645  125  58  43 
b) Doscontonuous Transport  165  160  87  3  m  799  1  ?4  74 
Ill  FALLS AND MOVEMENT OF THE VICTIM, 
TOTAL  2861  1565  390  5  48?1  7008  994  2?7 
a) whole moving about the mine  m  173  43  - 633  380  158  41 
b) on the course of other actovities  24H  1392  347  5  4188  1628  836  186 
IV. MACHINES, TOOLS AND SUPPORTS 
TOTAL  3168  1501  H6  7  51?7  15??  561  165 
a) Machines  354  211  171  4  690  193  17?  47 
b) Tools  1037  365  86  - 1488  716  196  57 
c) Supports  1777  925  239  3  ?944  613  ?43  61 
V  FALLS OF OBJECTS  3763  1608  494  6  5371  1771  604  189 
VI  EXPLOSIVES  3  3  7  - 8  ?  1  -
VII. IGNITIONS OR EXPLOSIONS' 
OF FIREDAMP AND COAL DUST  - - - - - - - -
VIII. OUTBURSTS OF GAS, DE-OXYGENATION, 
SUFFOCATION OR POISONING BY NATU-
RAL GASES (COo, CH•, CO, HzS), 
TOTAL  1  1  1  - 3  1  - -
a) Outbursts of Gas  - - - - - - - -
b) De-oxygenation and Poisoning 
by natural Gases  1  1  1  - 3  1  - -
IX. HEATING$ OR FIRES  - 1  - - 1  - 1  1 
X. INRUSHES  3  - - - 3  1  - -
XI. ELECTRICITY  4  4  - - B  3  3  -
XII. OTHER CAUSES  506  178  39  - 673  337  72  18 
TOTAL  16819  7712  ?31?  40  268q3  8952  346?  1037 
( l Number of houra worked by pit stall and amployaa of contractor firms who belong to a miners soclalonsurance scheme 
<'! Accldenttlnvolvlng more than live cuualtlu (o e. who either died or were unable to resume work underground lor at least eight weeks) 



























Shafts and staple-pots  Other places 
3  4 
4to  21  to 
Fatal 
4to  21  to  Fatal 
total  20  56  >56 
BCCI- total  20  56  >56  acci-
days  days  days  days  days  days  dents  dents  (3)  (')  I')  ('J  (')  (') 
4?67  36  6  7  - 4-9  756  255  85  1 
718  173  128  97  11  404  756  558  318  13 
??8  7  4  4  1  16  94  52  36  -
500  166  124  86  10  386  662  506  187  13 
3731  351  230  81  3  I  665  2452  1455  378  5 
579  61  26  9  - 96  599  315  93  -
?657  290  204  n  3  569  1853  1140  285  5 
2?53  97  u  9  - H-9  1018  447  111  3 
367  20  8  3  - 31  138  88  44  1 
969  61  26  5  - 92  511  202  42  -
917  16  9  1  - 26  369  152  25  2 
7564  765  118  40  - 423  1778  826  759  6 
3  - - - - - 3  1  - -
- - - - - - - - - -
1  1  - - - 1  5  - - -
- 1  - - - 1  - - - -
1  - - - - - 5  - - -
2  - - - - - 4  - - -
1  - - - - - 3  1  - -
6  1  - 1  - 2  7  B  4  -
477  54  31  10  - 95  453  159  51  1 
13478  978  556  2.40  14  1788  7235  3715  1206  29 
Tabla  1a 
YEAR  1  9 7 5 
MAN-HOURS WORKED (1)  318  6o8  551 
Total of  Group 
accodents underground  accidents !2) 
5  6 
4to  21  to  Fatal 
total 
20  56  >56  acci- total  56  Fatal 
days  days  days  days  acci- total 
dents 
(')  (')  I')  (")  dents 
1107  10270  3838  1151  37  15?4-1  - - -
1645  1819  1255  728  35  3837  - - -
182  577  341  197  6  1071  - - -
14-63  129?  914  579  79  7770  - - -
4790  7672  4144  1076  15  13007  - - -
1007  H-57  671  187  - 7315  - - -
3783  6215  3573  889  15  10692  - - -
1574  5805  2547  731  15  9098  - - -
271  705  t29  m  10  1359  - - -
755  2325  789  190  - 3304  - - -
548  2775  1329  326  5  4435  - - -
1869  7077  3156  982  17  11 ?77  - - -
4  8  5  2  - 15  - - -
- - - - - - - - -
5  8  1  1  - 10  - - -
- 1  - - - 1  - - -
5  7  1  1  - 9  - - -
4  4  2  1  - 7  - - -
4  7  1  - - 8  - - -
19  15  15  5  - 35  - - -
664  1350  390  118  1  1859  - - -
1  ?185  33993  15454  4795  110  54344  - - -MINH SAFeTY AND HEALTH 
COMMISSION 
DETAILED BREAKDOWN OF ACCIDENT VICTIMS ACCORDING TO CAUSE AND SITE 
OF ACCIDENT AND PERIOD OF INCAPACITY 
Common Statlstica on victims 
of accidents underground in coal minas 





shafts and staple-pits 
1  2 
~ 
4to  21to  Fatal 
4to  21  to 
20  56  >56 
&CCI- total  20  56  >56 
CAUSES OF ACCIDENTS  ty 
days  days  days 
dents 
days  days  days 
t•)  (3)  (3)  (3)  (3)  (') 
I. FALLS OF GROUNDS AND ROCKS  20.S4  7,92  2. 3?  0,05  30,83  9,05  3, 28  1,00 
II. TRANSPORT, TOTAL  1.~  1, 2?  0,63  0,0?  3,33  1,33  0,57  0,37 
aJ Continuous Transport  0,94  o. 72  0,36  0,009  ?.02  0,39  0,18  0,14 
b) Discontinuous Transport  0.52  0,50  0,?7  0,009  1,30  0,94  0.39  o. 23 
Ill. FALLS AND MOVEMENT OF THE VICTIM, 
TOTAL  8.98  4.91  1, ??  0,016  15,13  6.30  3.12  o. 71 
a) while movinG about the mine  1.31  0,54  0,13  - 1.99  1.19  0,50  0,13 
b) in the course of other activities  7. 67  4, 37  1.09  0,016  13,14  5,11  1.6?  0,58 
IV. MACHINES, TOOLS AND SUPPORTS 
TOTAL  9.94  4, 71  l.W  0,02  16,08  4. 78  1' 75  0.5? 
a) Machines  1.11  0.66  0,]8  0,01  2.17  0.61  0.38  0,15 
b) Tools  3,75  1,15  0, 27  - 4.67  2. 75  0.62  0,18 
c)Supporta  5,58  2.90  0, 75  0,009  g, 74  1.92  0, 76  0,19 
V. FALLS OF OBJECTS  10,H  5.05  1.55  0,02  16,86  5.56  1.90  0,59 
VI. EXPLOSIVES  0,009  0.009  0,006  .  0.075  0.006  0,003  -
VII. IGNITIONS OR EXPLOSIONS  - - - - .  - - - OF FIREDAMP AND COAL DUST 
VIII. OUTBURSTS OF GAS, DE-OXYGENATION, 
SUFFOCATION OR POISONING BY NATU-
RAL GASES (CO., CH  •• CO, HoS), 
TOTAL  0,003  0,003  0,003  0,009  0,003  .  - -
a) Outbursts of Gas  .  - - - - - - -
b) De-oxygenation and Poisoning  0,003  0,003  0,003  by natural Gaees  - 0,009  0,003  - -
IX. HEATINGS OR FIRES  - 0,003  - - 0.003  - 0,003  0,003 
X. INRUSHES  0,009  - - - 0,009  0,003  - -
XI. ELECTRICITY  0,01?  0,01  - - 0,075  0,009  0,009  -
XII. OTHER CAUSES  1,59  o,w  0,12  - ?. 11  l.Ofi  0, 23  0,06 
TOTAL  52,79  ?4. ?~  7. ?6  0,13  84.41  28.10  10,87  3.75 
( ) Number ol hours wortced by pit otsH and employeM of contractor firms who belong to a m1ners  toclellnsurance scheme 
(0 ) Acci-lnvolving  mora than fo ..  caaualtlea (I.e  who either died or -re  unable to resume work underground for at least eight weekS). 



























Shafts and staple-pits  Other places 
3  4 
4to  21 to 
Fatal 
4to  21  to  Fatal 
total  20  56  >56  acci- total  20  56  >56  acci- total 
days  days  days  dents 
days  days  days  dents  (3)  (3)  (')  (3)  (')  (') 
13,38  0,11  0,0?  0,07  - 0,15  2,37  0,83  0,27  0,003  3,H 
0, 29  0,54  o,w  0, 29  0,035  1, 27  ?.37  1. 75  1,00  0,04  5,16 
0, 72  0.02  0,013  0,13  0,003  0,05  0,30  0,16  0,11  - 0,57 
1.57  0,52  0,39  0, 77  0,03  1.21  2.08  1,59  0,89  0,04  4.59 
10,14  1,10  o. 72  o. 75  0,0091  2.09  7. 70  4.57  1,19  0,016  1M6 
1.82  0,19  o.oa  0,078  - 0,30  1.88  0,99  0, 29  - 3,16 
8.32  0,91  0,64  o. (3  0,009  1. 79  5,82  3,58  0,90  0,016  10,30 
7.07  0,30  0,14  0,078  - 0,47  3.?0  1,39  0,35  0,009  4,94 
1,15  0,06  0,03  0,009  - 0,10  0,43  0,28  0,14  0,003  0,85 
3.04  o. 19  0,08  0,016  - 0,29  1,60  0,63  0,13  - 2.37 
2.88  0,05  0,03  0,003  - 0,08  1,16  o.~  o.o8  0,006  1  '72 
8.05  0,83  0,37  0.13  - 1. 33  5.58  ?.59  0.81  0.02  9.00 
0,009  - .  - - - 0,009  0,003  .  - 0,013 
- - - - - - - - - - -
0,003  0,003  - - - 0,003  0,016  - - - 0,016 
- 0,003  - - - 0,003  - - - - -
0,003  - - - - - 0,016  - - - 0,016 
0,006  - - - ·- - 0,013  - - - 0,013 
0,003  - - - - - 0,009  0,003  - - 0,013 
0,0?  0,003  - 0,003  - 0,006  0,02  0,074  0,012  - 0,06 
1,34  0,17  o. 10  0,03  - 0,30  1, 4?  0,50  0,16  0,003  2.08 
42,30  3,07  1, 75  o. 75  0,04  5,61  2:?. 71  11.66  3, 79  o,og  38.24 
T8ble  1b 
YEAR  1  9 7  5 
MAN-HOURS WORKED (1)  318  608  551 
Total of  Group 
acctdents underground  accidents (1) 
5  6 
4to  21to  Fatal  20  56  >56  accl- total  56  Fatal 
days  days  days 
dents 
days  ace I- total 
(')  (")  (")  (I)  dents 
3?,(~  12,05  3.61  0,1(10  47,84  - - -
5, 71  3,94  2. 28  O, 110  12.04  - - -
1,65  1,07  0.62  0,019  3,36  - - -
4,06  2.87  1.66  0,091  8.69  - - . 
24,08  13,3?  3.38  0,047  W,82  - .  . 
4.57  2.11  0,59  - 7.27  - - -
19,51  11.21  2. 79  o.m  33,55  .  .  -
18,22  7.99  2.29  0,047  28.56  -- - . 
2.71  1,35  0,67  0,031  4.77  - - -
7,30  2.~  0,60  - 10,37  - - . 
8,71  4,17  1,02  0,016  13,9?  - - -
22.21  9.90  3,08  0,0]8  35,74  - - . 
0,075  0,015  0,006  - 0,047  - - -
- - - - - - - -
0,025  0,003  0,003  - 0,031  .  - -
0,003  - - - 0,003  - - -
0,022  0,003  0,003  - 0,028  - - -
0,013  0,006  0,003  - 0.0??  - - -
0,022  0,003  - - 0.075  - - -
0,047  0,0~7  0,016  - 0,110  - - -
4. 237  1  .2:?~  0,370  0,003  5,835  - - -
106,67  ~.so  15,05  0,35  170.57  - - -MINI!I AFeTY AND HI!AL TH 
COMMIIIION 
Common StatistiCS on VIctims 
of accidents underground 1n  coal m1nes 
COUNTRY 
COAL FIELD 





>56  Fatal 
COMMUNITY 
Fractures 
w1th or without 
dislocation 
2 
>56  Fatal 
PERIOD OF INCAPACITY  days  &CCI·  total  days  acci- total 
(')  dents  (')  dents 
LOCATION OF THE INJURY 
I.  Head and neck  - - - 78  3?  277 
::  n::::-.::::: li.  ~~  ri 
II  Eyes  1  - 3  I·-:\:-
1/))?  :_:::;:.  t:::}-:::.:-
Ill  Trunk  - 1  1  ?00  ?6  556 
IV  Upper hmbs 
(excluding the hands)  5  - 6  299  - 431 
r'J 
v_ Hands  1{5  - 238  90?  - 3039 
VI  Lower hmbs 
8  - 8  568  2  665  (exclud~ng feet) r•> 
VII  Feet  13  - 19  457  - 1075 
VIII  Multiple locatiOns  - 2  7  ?9  14  53 
II  I  ~·············· I 
:·:·:-:-.: 
I 
IX  Not specified 
t?ft 
:-.:-



















DETAILED BREAKDOWN OF VICTIMS ACCORDING TO LOCATION 
AND NATURE OF INJURY AND PERIOD OF INCAPACITY 
(absolute figures) 
Open wounds  Burns and 
Luxat1ons,  Concuss1on  contus1on  harmtu  I effects  Poisoning 
twist and  and 1nter- and muscular  of electnc1ty  and 
sprams  nallnJury  abrasions  and rad1at10n  suffocation 
3  4  5  6  7 
Fatal  >56  Fatal  >56  Fatal  >56  Fatal  >56  Fatal 
DCCI·  total  days  aCCI·  total  days  aCCI·  total  days  3CCI·  total  days  acct- total 
dents  (•)  dents  (>)  dents  (5)  dents  (5)  dents 
:::  .: 
. :'.:- - 33  27  l  177  107  6  2817  - - {5  :  __  :-:- 1-:-
.  · :::: 
.::-: . 
1.-::_.;::._  :._:_ 
1:-:-::::::_:-[-: 
-:.:  1-:  :._.  :.:  '.}:: 
:- ._ 
1:::::  :::::~--- :.;.  l  - 10  62  - 783  3  - 68  .  :- --h:  :)  ,:.:: 
- .. :::::-:.  __ .  ·.·  F-:  :-:_:·::  _:-. 
c:::  1.-·-
r.:  :·.:v.  -:-
- . 175  13  8  34  115  ~  1773  3  - {5  ·_:·  1:::  .:·:_ 
:  ..  :.  ..  : 
I  rr 
::_:::.::::.::: 1::::::::::::::.  :- .. 
-.  ::--' 
:.::  - 182  161  - 2967  6  - 38 
1.:::>  ..  ::1<··-:·::1-::  .t 
·-::  :::· 
:':' 
c:-. 
··_-:  1:-: 
1/::::::-:::  .::::.::  - 29~  [:- 509  1  7754- 3  - 33  ·  ...  :.;.,  1:::  <:-:> 
·  .. - :_·::  k-·rc: ::·-_:::-.;:  r :_::.>: 
1-·  :::C:::  :::::  :;-;- :::~:::-::::::·:: 
1·-·  ..  - .-.-: 
- 538  374  - 3088  1  - 26  :.  __ 
-.. 
;.-:1·-·  :.:.  1-::'  1·: 
:_.:  .. 
-· 
-:- -:-·  :-<:  :-_  :.::· 
._ ..  ::  1-:-.:  :::  - 807  ::- 173  - 1977  1  - 10 
..  :  .•  .:r-: 
I:> 
:---:::.::.·:- -:-•-:--:·  t>·.  1.-.  :-.  .  _:._.::. 
~  .·:: 
:: 
·-:-.  - 65  1  4  7  62  7  300  2  - 10  ::::: 
r·-_  :·:-. I>>  .. :  1:·::.:  ·.· 
·::·:·  ._::  _:·:-._:.-.  1<:<:< 
r:\.:.::  1->>::-:::  ~:-:.:· ·:.::. r:- - .:  u 
I 
!):  ·::.:-- I:>  :.-.  1:>·  ::: 
7  - 7  - - - 1  - ~ 
/:/H:: 1:::-:>:::::-: 
::.:::::::::  1·: .. :.::.::::: 
- ?094- 43  14  278  1565  13  214-56  19  - 235  1  - 4 
tJ l Number of hours worked by pit 1taff and empJoyMS of contractor firma who belong to a miner aeoclal•naurance ac.....,.a 
tfl) tnclud•no comphcatlona 
c"l Tha hlpa and the ankles are Included under  Lower 11mba 
I''  I Calender days 
1  .. , The shoulders and the wrtsts are tncluded under, upper ltmbs' 
Table 21 
YEAR  1  9 7  5 
MAN-HOURS WORKED (1)  318  6o8  551 
Multiple InJuries 
of those not  TOTAL 
spec1hed 1•1 
8  9 
>56  Fatal  4to  21  to  >56  Fatal 
days  acci- total  20  56  days  a  eel- total 
(5)  dents  days  days 
(•)  denta  (I)  (I) 
1  - 13  3195  920  n~  w  ~379 
2  - {5  155~  202  70  - 1826 
5  2  37  2707  1612  Jq7  41  4757 
2  - 11  3585  1127  511  - 52?3 
3  - 13  8096  5921  1603  1  15621 
18  - 38  3478  ?03~  1136  2  6650 
?  - 10  2660  1778  713  - 5151 
18  4  27  488  311  131  26  956 
7  - 7  51  ?7  10  - 88 
58  6  181  25814  1393?  4795  110  44-651 MINES AFETY AND HEALTH 
COMMISSION 
Common Statistics on victims 
of accidents underground in coal m1nes  DETAILED BREAKDOWN OF VICTIMS ACCORDING TO LOCATION 
AND NATURE OF INJURY AND PERIOD OF INCAPACITY 
COUNTRY  COMWNITY 
COAL-FIELD 
Amputations  Fractures  Luxation&,  NATURE OF THE INJURY  and  with or without  twist and 
enucleat1ons  dislocation  sprains 
i  2  3 
>56  Fatal  >56  Fatal  >56  Fatal 
PERIOD OF INCAPACITY  days  acc.i- total  days  acci- total  days  accl- total 
(I)  dents  (I)  dents  (I)  dents 
LOCATION OF THE INJURY 
I.  Head and neck  - - - o. 24  0,1a  a.a6  o.a3  - 0.1a 
11  Eyes  I· 
a.aoJ  - a.a09 
1··:·:.:.-:· :::.,  ::-:  :  ...  _:.: 
Ill  Trunk  - a.003  a.ao3  0,63  o,aa  1. 75  0,19  - a.s~ 
IV  Upper limbs  o.a2  (excluding the hands)  - 0,07  0,94  - 1. 35  0.17  - a. 57 
(3) 
V  Hands  o. 39  - o. 74  ?.83  - 9.57  0,19  - 0,92 
VI. Lower limbs 
(excluding feet) (4) 
a,003  - a.aaJ  1. 78  0,006  {,07  0,52  - 1.69 
VII. Feet  a.a4  - a.a6  1. 43  - 3, 37  a. ?1  - ?,53 
VIII. Multiple locations  - a,006  O,Oa6  0.09  o.a4  0,17  o.a6  - a. ?O 
!  I~ 
=  - 1:- ..  1:-.:. 
:: 
.  ·::  1-::·.:-·  :-
IX. Not speclf1ed  ~:::.:::::>  I>  .  .:: 
r::·  .::.:: 
1:::  :-.. 
1:<))  :<>::} !:::::::::::::;: ~-: :·.::.  ::::: .. :::): u:.::  ·:::- .·:::.:::-:_.:-
TOTAL  0,48  0,009  0,86  6,07  ~.23  1g,07  l,  33  - 6,56 
('I Number of houro worked by pit ltaH and employ.- of contractor llrmo who belong to a miner 1  eoclalln~<~rancaachama. 
(111ncludlng complication•  • 






>56  Fatal 
days  accl- total 
(I)  dents 
0.08  0,006  0,56 
0,003  - a.03 
a.a4  0.03  a. 11 
1-:-
.. 
0.003  a.01  0.02 
I> 
..  -:::.:-::::  ~\:::  :-
0,13  o.a4  a.n 
Opanwounds  Burns and 
contusion  harmful effects  Poisoning 
and muscular  of electricity  and 
abrasions  and radiation  suffocation 
5  8  7 
>56  Fatal  >56  Fatal  >56  Fatal 
days  accl- total  days  aCCI·  total  days  acci-
(')  dents  (5)  dents  (5)  dents 
0.3~  o,a{  8.8~  - - 0,08 
0,19  - 2.46  0.009  - a. ?1 
o. 36  0,01  5,H  0,009  - o.a8 
0,51  - 9.31  0.07  - a.12 
1. 60  a,003  ?4.33  a,a09  - 0,10 
1,17  - 9.61  0,003  - 0,08 
a. 53  - 6,19  o.aoJ  - 0,03 
0,19  - 0.94  0,006  - o,a3 
0,006  - O,Oa6  - - - o.ao3  -
lt-,91  a,04  67.21  a.a6  - a. 74  a.aa3  -
I'J The hlpa and the ankiH ara Included under .Lo-r  limbo  . 
l'l  Calender daya. 
Table 2b 
YEAR  1  9  7  5 
MAN  HOURS WORKED (1)  - 318  fOB  551 
Multlplelnjurl.,. 
olthosanot  TOTAL 
specified(') 
8  9 
>56  Fatal  4to  21  to  >56  Fatal  20  56  total  days  acci- total  days  days  day•  accl- total 
(5)  dents  (I)  (I)  (I)  dents 
a,003  - a.a4  1a.03  2.89  o. 70  a,13  13,74 
o.aa6  - a.a8  ~.sa  a.63  a. n  - 5, 73 
a.a2  0,006  0,12  8,50  5, a6  1. 25  0,13  14.93 
a,006  -- o,a3  11,25  3,54  1.60  - 16.39 
0,009  - O,Oit- 25,1t-1  18.58  5,03  o.aaJ  49,03 
0,06  - 0.12  10.92  6.38  3,57  a.a06  20.S7 
a,006  - a.03  8.35  5,58  2. 74  - 16.17 
0,06  0,01  o.oa  1,53  0.98  a. 41  0,08  3.00 
0,01  0,02  - o.a2  0,16  0,08  0,03  - o. 78 
a.01  a. 19  a.92  0,57  81.02  43.73  15.05  0.35  140.14 ANNEX  II 
TERMS  OF  REFERENCE  AND  RULES 
OF  PROCEDURE  OF  THE  MINES  SAFETY  COMMISSION 
(Decisions  from  the  Council  of Ministers  of 
9  July  1957,  11  March  1965  and  27  June  1974) II/3 
COUNCIL  OF  t11 N  I  STERS 
DECISION 
of  9  July  1957 
concerning  the  terms  of  reference  and  rules 
of  procedure  of  the Mines  Safety Commission 
Having  taken note  of  the Recommendations  adopted  by  the Conference 
on  Safety  in Coalmines  and  of  the  proposals  submitted by  the High  Author-
ity in connection with  the Conference's  final Report, which  afford  a  working 
basis  for  the  improvement  of  safety in coalmines,  and 
having  regard  to  their Decisions at  the Council's  36th and  42nd  sessions 
on  September  6,  1956  and  on  May  9  and  10,  1957,  setting up  the Mines  Safety 
Commission, 
THE  REPRESENTATIVES  OF  THE  GOVERNMENTS  OF  THE  MEMBER  STATES  MEETING 
AT  THE  SPECIAL  COUNCIL  OF  MINISTERS, 
- hereby  lay down  that  the  terms  of  reference  of  the aforesaid Commission 
shall be  as  follows: 
1.  The  Commission  shall  follow  developments  regarding  safety in coalmines,  including 
those  regarding  the  safety regulations  instituted by  the public authorities,  and 
assemble  the  necessary  information concerning progress  and  practical results ob-
tained,  more  especially  in the matter  of  accident  prevention. 
To  secure  the necessary  information,  the  Commission  shall  apply  to  the  Governments 
concerned. 
The  Commission  shall evaluate  the  information in its possession and  submit  to  the 
Governments  proposals  for  the  improvement  of  safety in coalmines. 
2.  The  Commission  shall help  the  High Authority  to work  out  a  method  of  compiling 
intercomparable accident statistics. 
3.  The  Commission  shall ensure  the  prompt  forwarding  to  the quarters directly concerned 
(including  in particular mines  inspectorates  and  employers'  and  workers'  associa-
tions)  of  relevant  information assembled  by  it. 
4.  The  Commission  shall ascertain,  by  regular contact with  the Governments,  what  action 
is being  taken  to  implement  the  proposals  of  the  Conference  on  Safety in Coalmines, 
and  such proposals  as it may  itself draw  up. 
5.  The  Commission  shall propose  such  study  and  research as  it deemsmostindicated for 
the  improvement  of  safety, with notes  as  to  the way  in which  these  can best be ef-
fected. 
6.  The  Commission  shall facilitate  the  exchange  of  information and  experience among 
persons  responsible for  safety matters,  and  propose  appropriate measures  for  this 
purpose  (e.g.  organization of  study sessions,  establishment of documentation ser-
vices). 
7.  The  Commission  shall propose  appropriate measures  for  ensuring  the necessary liaison 
among  the  rescue  services of  the Community  countries. II/4 
8.  The  Commission  shall submit annually  to  the Council  of Ministers  and  the  High  Author-
ity a  Report  on its activities and  on developments  regarding  safety in coalmines  in 
the different member  States.  In this connection,  it shall  in particular examine  the 
statistics compiled  on accidents  and  incidents  in coalmines. 
- The  Representatives  of  the  Governments  further  lay  down  that  the  rules 
of  procedure  of  the  Commission  shall be  those  set forth  in the Annex  to 
the present Decision. 
- The  Representatives  of  the Governments  trust  that  the  High  Authority will 
arrange  for  the Commission  to start work  at  the earliest possible moment. 
This Decision was  adopted  by  the Council  at its forty-fourth  session, 
on July  9,  1957. 
For  the Council, 
J.  REY 
President. I I/5 
RULES  OF  PROCEDURE 
of  the Mines  Safety Commission 
CHAIRMAN 
ArticLe 1 
The  Chairman  of  the Mines  Safety Commission  shall be  a  Member  of  the High 
Authority  of  the European Coal  and  Steel Community. 
ArticLe  2 
The  Chairman  shall conduct  the work  of  the Commission  in accordance with these 
Rules  of  Procedure. 
MEMBERS 
Article  3  ( 1) 
The  Commission  shall consist of 36  members  appointed by  the Governments;  each 
country  shall have  four  members,  of whom  two  shall be  representatives  of  that country's 
Governments.  one  of  the  employers  and  one  of  the workers. 
Each  Government  shall  send  in writing to  the Chairman  a  nominal roll of  the 
members  appointed  by  it. It shall notify  the Chairman of  all changes  in this. 
Each  Government  may  appoint  for  any particular meeting of  the Commission  one  or 
two  advisers,  whose  names  it shall  send  to  the Chairman. 
I.L.O.  PARTICIPATION 
Article 4 
Representatives  of  the  International Labour  Organization shall be  invited  to 
attend  the  proceedings  of  the Commission  in a  consultative capacity. 
ORGANIZATION 
(a)  Restricted Committee 
ArticLe 5 
A Restricted Committee  shall be  set up,  to consist of  Governments  representa-
tives  on  the Commission. I 1/6 
ArtiaZe  6 
The  Chairman  of  the Commission  shall act  as  Chairman of  the Restricted Committee. 
ArtiaZe  '1 
The  function of  the Restricted Committee  shall be  to  ensure  permanent  liaison 
among  the  Governments  of  the member  States  and  between  them  and  the Commission,  more  espe-
cially for  the  purpose of  exchanging relevant  information.  The  Restricted Committee  shall  see 
to  the preparation of  the Commission's  activities. 
ArtiaZe  8  ( 1) 
The  Restricted Committee  shall be  convened  by  the Chairman. 
The  Chairman  shall be  required  to  convene  it when  asked  to  do  so  by  the  represent-
atives of five  or more  Governments. 
(b)  Working  Parties 
ArtiaZe  9 
The  Commission  of  the Restricted Committee  may  set up  Working  Parties  of  experts 
to consider  specific  technical matters. 
Artiale 10 
The  Working  Parties shall decide  their own  modus  operandi. 
ArtiaZe  11 
The  Restricted  Committee  shall be  given reports  by  the  Working  Parties on  the 
results  of  their proceedings,  which it shall  subLlit  to  the Commission with  the  comments 
of  its members. 
In  the  event  of differences  of  opinion within the Working  Parties,  the views 
expressed  shall be  given,  together with  the names  of  those  expressing  them. 
SECRETARIAT 
ArtiaZe  12  ( 1) 
The  High  Authority shall be  responsible for  the secretarial arrangements  in 
connection with  the work  of  the Commission,  the Restricted Committee  and  the Working 
Parties. 
These  arrangements  shall be  underthe charge  of  a  High Authority staff member 
appointed  to act as  Secretary. 
All documents  shall be  in  the  six official  languages  of  the Community. II/7 
WORKING  PROCEDURE 
ArtiaZe  13 
The  Chairman  shall fix  the  agenda  and  the dates  of meetings after consultation 
with  the members  of  the Restricted Committee. 
A-rtiaZe  14  {  1) 
The  Chairman  shall allow to  speak any  member  of  the Commission or  representative 
of  the  International Labour  Organization  asking  to  do  so. 
The  Chairman may  allow advisers  to  speak. 
ArtiaZe  15 
The  members  of  the High  Authority shall have  the right  to attend meetings  of  the 
Commi$sion  and  of  the Restricted Committee,  and  to  speak  there. 
The  Chairman  may  bring with him  advisers,  whom  he  may  allow  to  speak. 
ArtiaZe  16 
Where  the  Commission  or the Restricted Committee  deems  it desirable  to obtain 
information concerning  the various  aspects  of  safety in coalmines,  it shall request  this 
from  the Governments  of  the member  States. 
ArtiaZe  17  ( 1) 
24  members  shall constitute a  quorum.  Conclusions  shall be  adopted  by  major-
ity of  the members  present. 
Proposals by  the  Commission  under 1,3 of its terms  of reference shall,  however, 
require  a  vote  in favour  by  two-thirds of  the members  present,  and  by.not less  than nineteen 
members  in all. 
Any  dissenting op1n1ons  shall be  br~ught to  the attention of  the  Governments 
should  the members  expressing  them  so  request. 
(1)  Amended  having r-egaztd  to deai.sion of the Counait of the EU'l'opean  CormtUnities  of 1  Jan-
WU'Y  1973  (Offiai.at Jourenat  of the Eul'opean  Ccmrnunities  L8  of 1  JanWU'Y  1973)". II/8 
THE  COUNCIL 
DECISION  (1) 
of March  11,  1965 
of  the Representatives  of  the  Governments 
of  the Member  States  assembled  in  the  Special 
Council  of Ministers  to modify  the  decisio11 
of  July  9,  1957 
concerning  the  terms  of  reference  and  rules 
of  procedure  of  the Mines  Safety Commission 
THE  REPRESENTATIVES  OF  THE  GOVERNMENTS  OF  THE  MEMBER  STATES  ASSEMBLED 
IN  THE  SPECIAL  COUNCIL  OF  MINISTERS  -
having  regard  to  the decision of  July  9,  1957  regarding  the  terms  of 
reference  and  rules  of  procedure  of  the Mines  Safety Commission,  and 
having  regard  to  the  High Authority's  proposal  of  January  7,  1964, 
and 
seeing  that  this decision  in no  way  affects Article  118  of  the  Treaty 
setting up  the  European  Economic  Commununity, 
DECIDE: 
Article  1 
The  terms  of  reference of  the  Mines  Safety Commission  laid  down  by  the  decision 
of  July  9,  1957  are replaced  by  the  provisions  in the  annex. 
Article  2 
The  prov1s1ons  of Article  17  of  the  rules  of  procedure  annexed  to  the Decision 
of  July  9,  1957  are  replaced  by  the  following  provisions: 
"Should  the  Mines  Safety Commission  or  the  Restricted  Committee  consider it 
desirable  to  receive  information regarding  the various  fields  for  which it is 
responsible,  it shall  apply  to  the  Governments  of  the  member  States." 
This  decision was  adopted  by  the  Council  at its one-hundredth  session,  on 
March  11,  1965. 
For  the Council 
M.  MAURICE-BOKANOWSKI 
President 
(1)  See  "Journal  officieZ de  Za  Communaute  europeenne  du  charbon et de  Z'acier" no.  46 
of 22nd  March  1965. II/9 
TERMS  OF  REFERENCE  FOR  THE  MINES  SAFETY  COMMISSION 
1.  The  Commission  shall follow  developments  regarding  safety and  measures  to  avoid  at work-
ing-points  conditions which  represent  a  danger  to health in coalmines,  including  to  this 
end  the  safety regulations instituted by  the public authorities and  assemble  the  necessary 
information concerning progress  and  practical results obtained. 
To  secure  the necessary  information,  the  Commission  shall apply  to  the Governments  con-
cerned. 
The  Commission  shall evaluate  the  information  in its possession and  submit  to  the  Govern-
ments  proposals  for  the  improvement  of  safety  and  health conditions  in coalmines. 
2.  The  Commission  shall  help  the  High Authority  to work  out  a  method  of  compiling  inter-
comparable  statistics on  accidents  and  damage  to health attributable  to vocational 
activities in coalmines. 
3.  The  Commission  shall  ensure  the  prompt  forwarding  to  the quarters directly concerned 
(including  in particular mines  inspectorates  and  employers'  and  workers'  associations) 
of relevant  information assembled  by  it. 
4.  The  Commission  shall ascertain,  by  regular  contact with the  Governments,  what  action 
is being  taken  to  implement  the  proposals  of  the Conference  on  Safety  in Coalmines, 
and  such proposals  as  it may  itself draw up. 
5.  The  Commission  shall propose  such  study  and  research as  it deems  most  indicated  for 
the  improvement  of  safety,  and  of  healthy working  conditions  in coalmines,  with notes 
as  to  the  way  in which  these  can be  effected. 
6.  The  Commission  shall facilitate  the  exchange  of  information and  experience  among  per-
sons  responsible for  safety matters  and  the maintenance of  healthy working conditions, 
and  propose  appropriate measures  for  this purpose  (e.g.  organization of  study sessions, 
establishment of  documentation services). 
7.' The  Commission  shall propose  appropriate measures  for  ensuring  the  necessary  liaison 
among  the  rescue  services  of  the  Community  countries. 
8.  The  Commission  shall  submit  annually  to  the Council  of Ministers  and  the  High Autority 
a  Report  on  its activities and  on developments  regarding  safety and  protection of  health 
in coalmines  in  the different member  States.  In this connection,  it shall  in particular 
examine  the statistics compiled  in  these fields. II/10 
COUNCIL DECISION 
of 27  June 1974 
on the extension of the responsibilities of the Mines Safety and Health Commis-
sion to all  mineral-extracting industries 
(74/326/EEC) 
THE COUNCIL OF THE  EUROPEAN 
COMMUNITIES, 
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European 
Economic  Community, and  in  particular Article  145 
thereof; 
Having  regard  to  the draft of  the Commission; 
Having regard to the Opinion of the European Parlia-
ment('); 
Having  regard  to  the  Opinion  of  the  Economic  and 
Social  Committee; 
Whereas  the  representatives  of  the  Governments  of 
the Member States meeting within the special Council 
of  Ministers,  by  Decision  of  9  and  I 0  May  1957,  set 
up  a  Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission  whose 
terms of refe1ence as  laid down  by  Decision of 9 July 
1957 (2)  of  the  representatives  of  the Governments uf 
the  Member  States  meeting  within  the  Special 
Council  of  Ministers,  amended  by  Decision  of  11 
March  1965 (·')  are  to  follow  developments  in  safety 
and in  the  prevention  of occupational  risks  to  health 
in  coal  mines  and  to  draw  up  proposals  appropriate 
for  the  improvement  of  safety  and  health  in  coal 
mines; 
Whereas this  body  has  proved  to  be  an  effective  and 
suitable  instrument  for  safeguarding  the  health  and 
safety  of  workers  in  coal  mines ; 
Whereas  problems  of  safety  similar  to  those  in  coal 
mines  also  exist  in  other  mineral-extracting  indus-
tries; 
Whereas the prevention of occupational accidents and 
diseases,  as  well  as  occupational  hygiene,  are  among 
the objectives of the Treaty establishing the European 
Economic  Community; 
( 1)  0 J No C  40,  H.  4.  I 'J74,  p.  64. 
(!)  0 J No  2H,  .H.  H.  I 'J.S7,  p.  487/57. 
(>)  0 J No 46,  22.  -~- I %5, p.  6'J8/65. 
Whereas the Council resolution of 21  January 1974 (4) 
concerning  a  social  action  progr~mme envisages  an 
action  programme for  workers which aims  inter alia 
at  improvement  in  safety  and  health  conditions  at 
work; 
Whereas  the  Safety  and  Health  Commission  should 
be  assigned  the  task  of  extending  to  all  mineral-
extracting  industries  the  preventive  action  which  has 
hitherto been  confined  to  coal  mines ; 
Whereas  the  representatives  of  the  Governments  of 
the Member States meeting within the Council agreed 
to  assign  this  task  to  the Safety and  Health Commis-
sion, 
HAS  DECIDED  AS  FOLLOWS : 
Article  1 
1.  Preventive  action  against  risks  of  accident  and 
occupational  risks  to  the safety  and  health of  workers 
in all  mineral-extracting industries except simple exca-
vation,  excluding  the  protection  of  the  health  of 
workers against the dangers arising from  ionizing radi-
ations which  is  subject to special  regulations pursuant 
to  the  Treaty  establishing  the  European  Atomic 
Energy  Community shall  be  the  responsibility of  the 
Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission  within  the 
terms of reference laid down by  Decision of 1  t  March 
1965 of the representatives of the Governments of the 
Member States  meeting within  the special  Council of 
Ministers. 
2.  Mineral-extracting  industries  shall  be  taken  to 
mean the activities of prospecting and of extraction  in 
the strict sense of the word as  well as  of preparation of 
extracted  materials·  for  sale  (crushing,  screening, 
washing),  but  not  the  processing  of  such  extracted 
materials. 
3.  Simple excavation  shall  be  taken  to  mean  work 
whose  purpose  is  not  the  extraction  of  materials  for 
usc. 
(4)  OJ  No C  U,  12.  2.  J'J74,  p.  I. II/11 
Artidt 2 
1.  This  Decision  shall  etHer into force  on  the fifth 
day  followinp,  it~  publkation  in  the  0./li'fi,t/ Joumclf 
of tbt·  Europttill  Co1111111f1liti£-.\". 
2.  It  shall  :tpply : 
- to  the  untkrground  actiVIties  of  the  mineral-
extracting industries: as  from  the day laid down  in 
parngraph  1 ; 
to  the  other  actiVIttl'S  of  the  mincml-extmcting 
industries: as  from  I  January  I 976. 
Done at  Luxembourg, 27  June  1974. 
For  tbe  Cmmcil 
K.  GSCHEIDLE ANNEX  III 
TERMS  OF  REFERENCE  OF  THE  VARIOUS  WORKING  PARTIES 
OF  THE  MINES  SAFETY  AND  HEALTH  COMMISSION 
(as  at  31.12.1975) III/3 
I  - Working Party  on  Electrification - Chairman  Mr  Stassen 
Terms  of  reference 
1.  Comparing  adopted  safety  and  accident  prevention provisions  relating  to: 
(a)  electric shock, 
(b)  fire hazard, 
(c)  explosion  hazard. 
2.  Ascertaining  the  present position  in Community  countries with  regard  to  safety 
regulations  on  underground  electrical  networks  of  low  and  medium  voltage  (up 
to  1  100  V)  and  feeder  cables  for  movable  equipment,  with  due  regard  to  the 
specifications  for  the  said  cables. 
3.  Reporting  on  steps  to  be  taken when  work  has  to  be  carried  out  on  electrical 
equipment  under  voltage. 
4.  Studying  the  construction of  high-tension  cables  (of  up  to  6  000  V)  used  under-
ground,  and  protective  equipment. 
5.  Study  of  the  problem of  stray currents. 
6.  Periodic  reports  on  oil-powered  contactors  used  in  gassy  environments. 
7.  To  follow  the  development  of  techniques  designed  to  eliminate  entirely  the 
production of  sparks  on  electrical  contact  lines  (battery motors  excluded). 
8.  Investigation of  the  use  of  remote-control  circuits  1n  automated  mining 
operations. 
9.  The  Mines  Safety  and  Health Commission  instructs  the  Working  Party  on 
Electricity: 
l(i)  to  take  due  note  of  the  results of  the  work  of  the  CENELEC  Committee  of 
Experts  entrusted with  harmonizing  the  rules  covering  the  design of 
electrical equipment  for  use  in explosive  atmosphere; 
(ii)  to  examine  the  draft directive of  ~he Commission of  the  European 
Communities  dealing with  the  co-ordination in Member  States of  legislation 
on  electrical  equipment  to be  used  in explosive  atmosphere; 
2  to  propose,  if appropriate,  modifications  to  the  above  documents  to  make  them 
applicable  to  coal  mines  in  countries  of  the  European  Community; 
3  to  suggest  the  means  by  which  harmonization of  the  certification procedures 
and  reciprocal  acceptance  of  the  test methods  and  test certificates could 
be  achieved; 
4  to  compare  the rules  covering installation and  use  of underground  electrical 
equipment  now  current  in each  to  the  Community  countries,  particularly  in 
respect of  the  dangers  of  firedamp  ignition;  to  ensure  that  the  rules  are 
uniform or  to  examine  the  equivalence of certain rules,  so  that  such  equipment 
can be  used without modification  in all  the  Community  countries. III/4 
II  - Working  Party  on  Rescue  Arrangements,  Fires  and  Underground  Combustion-
Chairman  Mr  Coenders 
A.  General  terms  of  reference 
(Art.  7  of  the  Terms  of Reference  of  the  Mines  Safety  and  Health Commission) 
Exchange  of  experience  between  the  Community  countries  and  the United  Kingdom 
on: 
1.  Rescue  operations  and  action against  spontaneous  combustion,  beatings  and 
fires  on  the  occasion of  accidents  or  other events  underground  requiring  the 
assistance of  rescue  teams,  from which  useful  lessons  have  been  learned: 
2.  Organization  of  rescue  operations  underground  and  the presentation of  reports 
every  two  years; 
3.  The  prevention of  spontaneous  combustion,  beatings  and  fire outbreaks  under-
ground,  the  fighting  and  control  of  spontaneous  combustion,  beatings  and 
fires,  and  reopening  sealed-off workings. 
B.  Special  terms  of  reference 
1.  Comparison of practical  arrangements  of  rescue  operations  existing in the 
Community  countries  and  the  United Kingdom  and  possibly  the drafting of  a 
standard plan of procedure  for  the  Communitl  as  a  whole. 
2.  Exchange  of  experience  and  practical knowledge  in  the  following fields: 
(a)  methods  and  apparatus  for  the  early detection of  combustion,  beatings 
and pit fires, 
(b)  CO  self-rescuers, 
(c)  Oxygen  deficiency warning devices, 
(d)  Fires  in  long plant, 
(e)  Sealing off  abandoned  workings, 
(f)  Specifications  and  testing conditions  for  fire-resistant  fluids .for 
mechanical  power  transmission. 
3.  Condensed  comparative  survey of new  regulations  and  guidelines promulgated 
by  the  mining authorities of member  countries  and  the  United Kingdom  on 
rescue  arrangements,  first  aid  and  fire fighting  and  prevention. 
C.  Analysis  of results  (partial or overall)  of research projects at present  in 
progress  so  as  to: 
1.  Improve  borehole  rescue  techniques, 
2.  Define  the  standards  to which  flameproof  clothing should  conform. 
D.  Studies  to  be  completed  by  the  Group  of Experts  on  Budryk's  theory on  the 
following  subjects: 
1.  Extent of  instability of  diagonal ventilation roadways, 
2.  Effects of  a  fire  on workings  with  descensional ventilation, 
3.  Resources  to  be  applied  to  combat  the  danger  of explosion during firefighting. 
III  - Working  Party on  Winding  Ropes  and  Shaft Guides:  Chairman  Mr  Martens 
Terms  of reference 
1.  Follow-up  of progress  made  in  the  testing of winding ropes  by  means  of appropri-III/5 
ate  instruments  in order  to obtain  information concerning its application  in 
the  mines  of  the  Community  and  the  United  Kingdom. 
2.  Testing of  couplings  for  circular and  flattened winding ropes. 
3.  Arrangements  for  the  installation and  inspection of  capels. 
4.  Testing of  guides  for winding  cages  in drafts  and  guide  mechanisms  for  cable 
haulage  in  roadways. 
5.  Maintenance  required  to  ensure  safe operation of  windi~g ropes  and  balance  ropes. 
6.  Use  of  studies  on  the  dynamic  behaviour  of  shaft  and  roadway  ropes. 
7.  Exchange  of  views  on  the  properties operating conditions  and  strength of winding 
ropes  of particular interest. 
8.  Discussion  on  accidents  involving winding  and  hauling ropes  and  their  cuuplings, 
which  could  provide  new  information. 
IV  - Working Party  on  Mining Accident Statistics:  Chairman  Mr  Koch 
Terms  of  reference 
In order  to  enable  the  Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission  to  draw  conclusions  on 
accident prevention,  the  frequency  of  underground  accidents  in  the  Community  coal 
mines  should be  examined,  with  the  following objectives: 
1.  To  decide  on  suitable mathematical  statistical  systems, 
2.  To  evaluate,  with  their aid,  chronological  differences  in frequency  together 
with  differences  from  country  to  country  or  coalfield  to  coalfield. 
V  - Working Party  on  Combustible  Dusts:  Chairman  Mr  Delacote 
Terms  of  reference 
Taking  into account  the  mechanism of  dust  combustion  and  of  flame  propagation  and 
the  various  factors  which  may  influence  this,  including  the  fact  that methane  is 
frequently  involved  in  this  phenomenon,  the  working party is  instructed  to  carry 
out  a  study of precautions  against dust  combustion,  in particular: 
(a)  dust neutralization  (dust  control  in situ,  stone dusting,  spraying,  dust 
fixation  by  means  of  spreading salts  and  coagulating pastes,  etc.),  this  study 
to  include  the  comparative  analysis  of  the  regulations  and  instructions  applied 
in  the  Community  countries  and  the  United  Kingdom,  along with  the methods  of 
application of  the  different processes, 
(d)  dust barriers pf various  types  to halt dust  expLosions,  mixed  dust-methane 
explosions  and  pure  methane  explosions. 
The  working party may  make  any  suggestions  for  research work  considered  necessary 
to  advance  the  knowledge  of  the  phenomena  studied  and  to  promote  safety  in  these 
fields. 
VI  - Working Party on Health  in Coal  Mines:  Chairman  Mr  Wilson 
Studying,  from  the  standpoint of  technical  prevention  and  industrial medicine,  the 
prevention of environmental  risks  to  the health of workers  in coal  mines. III/6 
1.  General  directives  concerning  airborne  dust  control  methods 
where  powered  supports,underground  crushers,  coal  cutting 
and  qetting  and  roadway  drivage  machinery  is  used. 
2.  Dust  measurement  (methods,  frequency,  measuring points,  conclusions  to  be  drawn 
etc.)  and  where  necessary establishing a  scale  of  comparison  of  the  various 
methods  employed. 
3.  Establishment  of  airborne  dust  thresholds.  Definition  of 
categories  of  permissible  dustiness.  Steps  to  be  taken 
when  faced  with  various  categories  of  dustiness. 
4.  Medical  problems: 
(a)  Among  the  medical  problems  involved  1n  the  control  of  ambient  health hazards 
to  coal  mine  workers,  priority must  be  given  to  the  study  of  the  following 
factors: 
climate,  noise,  vibration,  lighting,  gas,  etc. 
(b)  The  Secretariat is  to  be  instructed: 
(i)  to  set  up  a  medical  consultative  committee, 
(ii)  comparison  of  the  provisions  in  force  in  the  various  countries 
concerning  the  organization of  company  medical  services:  selection 
and  training of  doctors,  relations  between medical  serviees  and 
technical  departments  and  a  list of  the  tasks  and  functions  of  indust-
rial  medicine, 
(iii)  a  draft  scheme  to  standardize pre-recruitment medical  examinations, 
periodic  checks  and  checks  in special  instances, 
(iv)  a  draft  scheme  for  a  minimum  degree  of  standardization  in  the  detection 
of  disorders  and  in  the  radiological  supervision  of workers  as  regards 
pneumoconiosis  prevention, 
(v)  a  draft  scheme  for  standards  and  criteria in workings  in which  miners 
already suffering  from  a  deterioration  in pulmonary  function  do  not 
run  the  risk of  this  deterioration progressing  further. 
VII  - Working  Party  on Effects  of  Working  Time  on  Safety at  Work,  especially  in Diffi-
cult or Unhealthy Conditions. 
In  suspension. 
VIII- Working  Party  on  Psychological  and  Sociological  Factors  affecting Safety: 
Chairman Mr  Schnase 
Terms  of  reference 
1.  Community  safety  campaigns. 
2.  Recommendation  on  the  employment  of  foreign  and  young  workers. 
3.  Practical  measures  for  the  prevention of accidents,  taking  into  account 
psychological  and  sociological  factors. 
IX  - Working  Party  on Ventilation  and  Mine  Gas  - Chairman  Mr  CARVER 
A.  General  terms  oE~~fere~ce 
The  Work1ng  Party  on  Vent1lat1on  and  Mine  Gas  will  examine  general  problems  of 
ventilation,  particularly where  prevention of  firedamp  explosions  is  concerned  and 
other means  or  measures  should  be  applied  in order  to  suppress  or  control  firedamp. 111/7 
In  addition  to  the  study  of  firedamp  explosions  occurring  in 
the  Community  and  the  United  Kingdom,  attention will  also  be 
devoted  to  usable  results  of  research  in  the  field  of  fire-
damp  outbursts,  in particular where  maximum  permissible  levels 
in  ventilation air of  firedamp  and  other poisonous  gases  are 
concerned,  and  the  advance  estimation of  firedamp  emission 
before  a  working  is  started. 
Attention will  also  be  devoted  to  appropriate  speeds  for  the 
flow  of  ventilation air,  measures  to  be  taken  in  the  event of 
deceleration  of  the  flow  of air,  measures  for  the  stabilzation 
of  ventilation  and  the  means  and  procedures  for  monitoring 
ventilation. 
B.  Special  terms  of  reference 
1.  To  study  all  the  aspects  of  the  accident  which  occurred at 
Lens  Lievin  which  might  be  interesting  and  important  for  prevent-
ing  firedamp  explosion  and  in particular  to  propose  measures 
which  can  be  taken  to  control  the  emission  of  firedamp  coming 
from  old  workings  and  from  cul-de-sacs  and  districts being 
salvaged. 
2.  Preparation  of  a  report  or  interim report  on  "Methamunder 
conveyors". 
3.  Preparation  of  a  report  on  "Ignitions  of  firedamp  by  power 
loaders  and  heading  machines". 
4.  Preparation  of  a  report  on  use  of  CH4  monitoring  instruments 
in  the  Community  Countries. 
5.  Preparation  of  a  report  on  "Heavy  gas  emissions". 
6.  Preparation of  a  report  on  "Effects  of  firedamp  on  the  risk of 
explosion  with  coal  dusts  {in  collaboration with  the  Working 
Party  on  "Flammable  Dusts"). 
7.  Drafting  of  uniform  requirements  and  test specifications  for 
CH4  monitoring  instruments. 
(see  point  5  of  the  agenda) 
8.  Preparation of  a  report  on  "Use  of  diesel  engines  underground 
in  mines". 
9.  Drafting  conclusions  concerning  'Outbursts'. 
X  - Working  Party  on  'Mechanization'  - Chairman  Mr.  Medaets 
Taking  into  consideration  current  techniques  in winning  and 
roadway  driving,  linings  and  roadway  conveyors,  the  working 
party  is  instructed to  study  particular ways  of  preventing 
accidents  connected  with  mechanization. III/8 
In particular,  it is  to 
a)  compile  a  schedule  for  machinery  manufacturers  of  the 
minimum  work  safety  requirements  for  mechanical  protection 
of  machines  and  equipment~ 
b)  study  safety provisions  such  as:  visual  and  acoustic  sig-
nalling,  operating  controls  and  in  particular  the  ability 
to  stop  machines  from  any  point  on  the  face  or  roadway, 
taking  account  of  modern  means  of  telecommunication  and 
remote  control,  electrical protection of  motors  in  the  event 
of  overloading  or  jamming  of  equipment,  lightin~ etc. 
XI  - Working  Party  on  'Roof  control'  - Chairman  Mr.  Carver 
The  Working  Party  is  instructed to  examine,  by  exchanging 
experience  and  evaluating  the  results  of  research,  whether it 
is  possible  to  draw  up  measures  or  practical directives  for 
the  prevention  of  falls  of  ground,  taking  into  account  the 
individual  features  of  coal  measures  and  workings. 
1.  In  particular:  In  the  interest of better  roof  control,  parti-
cularly within  the  tontext  of  working  schedules,  it will 
study  : 
a)  general  measures  to  be  taken  into  consideration  in  avoiding 
falls  of  ground,  in  the  light of  the  type  of  measures  and 
conditions  of  working,  e.g.  sequence  of  working  the  seams, 
features  of  the  working  areas  (length,  speed  of  advance, 
etc.),  type  and  characteristics  of  the  lining~ 
b)  specific  measures  to  deal  with  individual difficulties 
which  may  or  may  not  foreseeably  arise  in  the  long  term, 
such  as  disturbance  zones,  protective  banks,  working  of  a 
face  at right-angles  to  the  end  of  an  old  seam,  etc. 
c)  specific  measures  to  be  taken  when  starting off  a  face  in 
order  to  prevent  abrupt  subsidence  of  the  roof. 
2.  It will  also  compare  mining  regulations  on  support  and  draw 
up  minimum  roof  control  requirements,  taking  into  account  the 
characteristics  of  the  various  faces  (overall  seam  thickness, 
dip,  dead  rock ...••..  ). ANNEX  IV 
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A.  MINES  SAFETY  AND  HEALTH  COMMISSION 
FEDERAL  REPUBLIC  OF  GERMANY 
Government  Representatives 
Ministerialrat Dr.  R.  LINTZEN,  Referat  III  A  1, 
Bunderministerium  fur  Wirtschaft  und  Finanzen,  5300  Bonn 
Dipl.-Ing.  A.  COENDERS,  Prasident  des  Landesoberbergamts 
Nordrhein-Westfalen,  4600  Dortmund,  Goebenstrasse,  25-27 
Employers'  Representative 
Bergass.  a.D.H.  HARNISCH,  Bergwerksdirektor  Bergbau  AG, 
Dortmund  Postfach  872,  4600  Dortmund. 
Workers'  Representative 
E.  STEBEL,  Leiter  des  Sachgebiets  Arbeitsschutz,  IG 
Bergbau  und  Energie,  4630  Bochum,  Alte  Hattingerstrasse,19 
Technical  Advisers 
H.  BERG,  Ministerialrat,  Ministerium  fur  Wirtschaft, 
Mittelstand  und  Verkehr  des  Landes  Nordrhein-Westfalen, 
4  Dusseldorf,  Haroldstrasse,  4 
Berghauptmann  K.  HUEBNER,  Leiter  des  Oberbergamts  fur  das 
Saarland  und  das  Land  Rheinland-Pfalz,  6600  Saarbrucken, 
Am  Staden,  17 
BELGIUM 
Government  Representatives 
J.  MEDAETS,  directeur-generaal  der  m~Jnen, Ministerie  van 
Economische  Zaken,  Montoyerstraat  3,B  1040  Brussel 
J.  STASSEN,  inspecteur  general  des  mines,  ministere  des 
affaires  economiques,  rue  Montoyer,  3,  B  1040  Bruxelles 
Employers'  Representative 
G.  DEGUELDRE,  Directeur  de  l'Institut d'Hygiene  des  Mines, 
22,  Hovermarkt,  B  3500  Hasselt 
Workers'  Representative 
S.  CANTARELLI,  F.G.T.B.,  rue  Victor  Rousseau  24,  Apt.  16  -
B  6520  FELUY 
Technical  Adviser 
E.  VANDENDRIESSCHE,  secretaire  general  de  la Centrale  des 
francs-mineurs,  26-32,  avenue  d'Auderghem,  Bruxelles  4 IV/6 
FRANCE 
ITALY 
Government  Representatives 
L.  KOCH,  ingenieur  en  chef  des  mines,  Direction  des  mines, 
Ministere  de  l'industrie,  du  commerce  et  de  l'artisanat, 
99,  rue  de  Crenelle,  75  Paris  7e 
B.  SCHNELL;  ingenieur  general  des  mines,  Conseil  general 
des  mines,  35,  rue  St.  Dominique,  75007  Paris 
Employers'  Representative 
F.  POT,  directeur  general  des  services  techniques  des 
Charbonnages  de  France,  9,  avenue  Percier,  75  Paris  8e 
Workers'  Representative 
L.  CHAUVEAU,  federation  nationale  des  syndicats  chretiens 
des  mineurs,  8,  rue  de  Navarre,  75  Paris  5e 
Technical  Adviser 
St.  NOWAK,  4  rue  Charcot,  62  Lens 
Government  Representatives 
Prof;  Dott.  Ing;  A.  GALATI,  ministero  dell'industria  e 
commercio,  Direzione  generale  delle miniere,  Serv. 
sicurezza mineraria,  via  Veneto  33,  00100  Roma 
P.  SCIUTO,  Ing.  Direzione  Generale  Miniere,  Officio 
Nazionale  Minerario  Idrocarburi,  Via  Molise  2,  00187  Roma 
Employers'  Representative 
Prof.  M.  CARTA,  Istituto arte  mineraria  della  facolta 
d'ingegneria,  piazza  d'Armi,  Cagliari  (Sardegna) 
Workers'  Representative 
Dott.  G.  CRAVIOTTO,  segretario  generale  della Federe-
strattive,  via  Isonzo  42,  Roma 
Technical  Advisers 
Comm.  Dott;  R.  PURPURA,  direttore generale  del  ministero 
del  lavoro  e  riposo,  via  Aiaccio  14,  00198  Roma 
Dott.  c.  MICHELAZZI,  ispettore  generale  del  ministero  del 
lavoro  e  della  previdenza  sociale,  via  Flavia  6,  Roma IV/7 
LUXEMBOURG 
Government  Representative 
A.  SCHUSTER,  ingenieur-directeur  du  travail et des  mines, 
inspection  du  travail  et  des  mines,  19,  avenue 
Gaston-Diderich,  Luxembourg 
Employers'  Representative 
E.  SCHMIT,  ingenieur  en  chef,  Administration  Centrale, 
Arbed,  B.P.,  1802,  Luxembourg 
NETHERLANDS 
Government  Representatives 
Ir.  A.H.W.  MARTENS,  inspecteur-generaal  der  mijnen, 
Staatstoezicht op  de  mijnen,  Apollolaan,  9,  Heerlen  (L) 
Ir.  Th.  M.  JANSEN,  Inspecteur  der  mijnen,  Staatstoezicht 
op  de  mijnen,  Apollolaan  9,  Heerlen 
Employers'  Representative 
Ir.  G.B.  DEBETS,  directeur,  Oranje-Nassau  Mijnen,  Heerlan 
(L) 
Workers'  Representative 
J.M.  WEIJERS,  vice-vorzitter  van  de  Nederlands  Katholieke 
Mijnwerkersbond,  Seringenstraat,  9,  Passart-Zuid 
UNITED  KINGDOM 
Government  Representatives 
J.  CARVER,  HM  Chief  Inspector  of  Mines  and  Quarries, 
Health  and  Safety  Executive,  Thames  House  North,  Millbank, 
London  SW1P  4QL 
J.A.  MARSHALL,  Assistant  Secretary,  Hea+th  and  Safety 
Executive,  Thames  Ho~se North,  Millbank,  London  SWIP  4QL IV/8 
Technical  Adviser:  L.D.  RHYDDERCH,  Deputy  Chief  Inspector 
of  Mines  and  Quarries,  Health  and  Safety  Executive, 
Thames  House  North,  Millbank,  London  SW1P  4QL 
Employers'  Representative 
B.  GODDARD,  Director  of  mining  environment,  National 
Coal  Board,  The  Lodge,  South  Parade,  Doncaster,  Yorkshire 
Workers'  Representative 
M.  McGAHEY,  Vice-President  of  the  National  Union  of  Mine-
workers,  5,  Hillside  Crescent,  Edinburgh,  Scotland 
Technical  Adviser 
A.  BULMER,  Head  of  Safety  and  Engineering  Department, 
National  Union  of  Mineworkers,  222  Euston  Road,  London 
NW1  2BX 
IRELAND 
Government  Representatives 
J.  TONNER,  Grade  1  Industrial  Inspectors,  Department  of 
Labour,  Ansley  House,  Mespil  Road,  Dublin  4 
J.  SINCLAIR,  Grade  1  Industrial  Inspectors,  Department  of 
Labour,  Ansley  House,  Mespil  Road,  Dublin  4 
Employers'  Representative 
R.J.  ANDERSON,  Administration  Superintendent  of  Operations, 
Mogul  of  Ireland  Ltd.,  Silvermines,  Nenagh,  Co.  Tipperary 
Workers'  Representative 
D.  SHAW,  National  Group  Secretary,  Irish Transport  and 
General  Workers'  Union,  Liberty  Hall,  Dublin  1 IV/9 
DENMARK 
Government  Representative 
B.  SVENDSEN,  Fabriksinspect¢r,  Arbejdstilsunets  Gr¢nlands 
kreds,  Direktoratet  for  Arbejdstilsynet,  Rosenvaengets 
Alle  16-18,  DK  2190,  K¢henhaven  ¢ 
DAN  BUCH,  Afdelingsingeni¢r,  Ministeriet  for  Gr¢nland, 
Hausergade,  3  DK  1128  K¢benhaven  K 
INTERNATIONAL  LABOUR  ORGANIZATION,  Geneva 
A  representative  of  the  International  Labour  Office 
sitting as  an  observer 
B  - RESTRICTED  COMMITTEE 
The  Restricted  Committee  consits  of  the  Government 
members  of  the  Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission IV/10 
WORKING  PARTIES 
C  - VENTILATION  AND  FIREDAMP 
GERMANY 
K.  PALM,  Abteilungsdirektor,  Landesoberbergamt  Nordrhein-
Westfalen,  4600  Dortmund,  GOEBENSTRASSE  25-27 
Dipl.-Ing.  H.  BUSCHE,  Bergwerksdirektor  der  Bergbau  AG 
Niederrhein  Bergwerksdirektion Friedrich  Heinrich,  4132 
Kamp-Lintfort,  Postfach  88 
Dipl.-Ing.  E.  SCHUBERT,  Leiter der  Prufstelle  fur 
Grubenbewetterung  der  Westfalischen  Berggewerkschaftskasse, 
4630  Bochum,  Hernerstrasse,  43-45 
.E.  STEBEL,  Hauptverwaltung  der  Industriegewerkschaft 
Bergbau  und  Energie,  4630  Bochum,  Alte  Hattingerstrasse  19 
BELGIUM 
H.  GREGOIRE,  Inspecteur  Generaal  der  mijnen,  Administratie 
van  het  Mijnwejen,  3  Montoyerstraat,  B  1040  Brussel 
J.  PATIGNY,  ingenieur divisionnaire,  Havermarkt,  3500 
HASSELT 
M.  COLINET,  33,  rue  de  Monceau-Fontaine,  6031  Monceau-sur-
Sambre 
E.  VANDENDRIESSCHE,  113,  rue  de  Trazegnies,  6080  Courcelles 
FRANCE 
R.  LELEUX,  ingenieur divisionnaire  des  TPE  (Mines), 
arrondissement  mineralogique  du  Nord/Pas-de-Calais,  941 
rue  Ch.-Bourseul,  59508  DOUAI 
BELIN,  Cerchar,  Verneuil-en-Halatte,  BP  06,  60  - Creil 
SIMODE,  ingenieur  en  chef  a  la direction  de  l'economie  et 
de  !'information,  Houilleres  du  bassin  de  Lorraine,  5,  rue 
Ambroise-Thomas,  57-Freyming 
GRISARD,  ingenieur principal,  chef  du  service  "securite 
des  mines"  Charbonnages  de  France,  9,  avenue  Percier, 
75-Paris  8e 
LARREUR,  54,  rue  Henri-Martin,  62-Lievin ITALY 
IV/11 
Dott.  Ing.  R.  BONAZZA,  Capo  del  distretto minerario,  via 
Trieste  1,  58100  Grosseto 
Prof.  Dott.  Ing.  G.  BULGARELLI,  via  Genova  22  - 35100  Padova 
Prof.  M.  CARTA,  istituti arte mineraria della  facetta 
d'ingegneria,  paizzi  d'Armi,  09100  Cagliari  (Sardegna  -
italia) 
NETHERLANDS 
Ir.  Th.  M.  JANSEN,  Inspecteur  der  m1Jnen,  Staatstoezicht 
op  de  Mijnen,  Apollolaan  9,  Heerlen 
Ir.  J.W.  ZURHAAR,  Elisabeth-Straat  7,  Linne-Roermond 
UNITED  KINGDOM 
J.  CARVER,  (1)  HM  Chief  Inspector  of  Mines  and  Quarries, 
Health  and  Safety  Executive,  Thames  House  North,  Millbank, 
London  SW1P  4QL 
W.  BROCKLEHURST,  HM  Senior District Inspector  of  Mines 
and  Quarries,  Health  and  Safety  Executive,  Thames  House 
North,  Millbank,  London  SW1P  4QL 
R.A.  SWIFT,  Chief  Ventilation  Engineer,  National  Coal 
Board,  The  Lodge,  South  Parade,  Doncaster,  Yorkshire 
A.  BULMER,  Head  of  Safety  and  Engineering  Department, 
National  Union  of  Mineworkers,  222,  Edson  Road,  London, 
NW1  2BX 
(1)  Chairman  of  the  Working  Party  as  representative  of  the 
Restricted Committee IV/12 
D  - WINDING  ROPES  AND  SHAFT  GUIDES, 
WINDING  ENGINES  AND  WINCHES 
GERMANY 
Dr.-Ing.  H.  ARNOLD,  Leiter des  Seilprufstelle der  West-
falischen  Berggewerkschaftskasse,  4630  Bochum,  Dinnendahl-
strasse,3 
Dipl.-Ing.  H.  ROEHLINGER,  Leiter  des  Seilprifstelle  der 
Saarbergwerke  AG,  66  Saarbrucken,  Trierer Strasse  1 
Dipl.-Ing.  R.  HELFFERICH,  Geschaftsfuhrer  der  DEILMANN-
HANIEL  GmbH,  4600  Dortmund-Kurl,  Haustenbecke  1 
BELGIUM 
G.  MIGNION,  ingenieur  en  Chef,  directeur  des  mines, 
Administration  des  mines,  3,  rue  Montoyer,  B  1040  Bruxelles 
G.  VAN  GUCHT,  Mijningenieur,  Administratie  van  het 
Mijnwezen,  afdeling  Kempen,  Thonissenlaan  18,  B  3500 
Hasselt 
M.  VERWILST,  Association  des  industries  de  Belgique  (AIB), 
29,  avenue  A-Drouart,  Auderghem 
FRANCE 
ITALY 
M.C.  POIRIER,  Ing.  a  la Direction Technique  des  Charbonnages 
de  France,  9,  avenue  Percier,  75  - Paris  Be 
c.  ROGEZ,  chef  du  peste  central  de  secours  des  houilleres 
du  Nord  et du  Pas-de-Calais,  rue  Notre-Dame-de-Lorette, 
62-Lens 
M.  SUEUR,  Houilleres  du  bassin  de  Lorraine,  direction  des 
travaux,  service  electromecanique,  57-Merlebach 
Prof.  Dott.  Ing.  c.  MORTARING,  Istituto di  meccanica 
applicata  del  politecnico  di  Torino,  corso  Duca  degli 
Abruzzi  24,  Torino 
NETHERLANDS 
Ir.  A.H.W.  MARTENS  (1),  inspecteur-generaal  der  m1Jnen, 
Staatstoezicht  op  de  mijnen,  Apollolaan  9,  Heerlen  (L) 
Ir.  VAN  BLARICUM,  Staatstoezicht  op  de  mijnen,  Apollolaan 
9,  Heerlen  (L) 
(1)  Chairman  of  the  Working  Party  as  representative  of  the 
Restricted  Committee IV/13 
UNITED  KINGDOM 
G.E.  WINDER,  Head,  Mechanical  Engineering  Section,  Depart-
ment  of  Energy,  Safety  in  Mines  Research  Establishment, 
Red  Hill,  Off  Broad  Lane,  Sheffield,  53  7  HQ 
J.  HOPKINSON,  HM  Senior  Inspector  of  Mechanical  Engineering, 
Health  and  Safety Executive,  Thames  House  North,  Millbank, 
London  SW1P  4QL 
P.  WOOD,  Head  of  Shafts  and  Winding,  National  Coal  Board, 
The  Lodge,  South  Parade,  Doncaster,  Yorkshire 
EXPERTS  ON  WINDING  ROPES  ======================== 
GERMANY 
Dipl.-Ing.  H.  GRUPE,  Seilprufstelle  der  Westfalischen 
Berggewerkschaftskasse,  4630  Bochum,  Dinnendahlstrasse  9 
Dipl.-Ing.  w.  GOETZMANN,  Seilprufstelle  des  Westfalischen 
Berggewerkschaftskasse,  4630  Bochum,  Dinnendahlstrasse  9 
FRANCE 
P.  BURGUN,  Directeur-adjoint principal  de  !'Association 
des  industriels  de  France,  10,  rue  de  Calais,  75  - Paris  9e 
M.  BOULICAULT,  ingenieur  des  mines,  arrondissement 
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ANNEX  V V/3 
The  recommendations,  assessments,  principles  and  reports prepared by  the 
Mines  Safety  and Health  Commission  since  the  beginning of its activities and 
distributed to  the  Governments  and  other interested bodies  for further action 
or for  information,  are published every  other year in its annual  report. 
They  have  been  classified chronologically by  subject. 
The  situation with regard  to  implementation of  the  above-mentioned 
recommendations  and  proposals  is indicated, with explanatory notes,  in the 
following  tables. 
The  following  symbols  are used in the tables: 
C  national regulations which  are already  in accordance with  the 
recommendations 
C'  recommendations  which have not been embodied  in regulations,  but which 
have  been  implemented  de  facto 
NRC  recommendations  for which new  regulations  implementing  them have been 
issued 
NRP  reco~endations for which new  regulations  implementing  them  are being 
drawn  up 
E  the preparation of new  regulations  is being studied 
?  there is uncertainty regarding  the  steps  to be  taken 
A  the national authorities have  decided not  to bring their regulations 
into line with  the  recommendations. V/5 
A- RESCUE 
Proposals  from  the Mines  Safety Commission  Ge l'lllaZlT 
for the  improvement  of safety and  United 
Jr.R./Wph.  Saar  Belgium  Prance  Italy  Kingdom 
health conditions  in coalminea 
I  - Recommendation  regarding  the  consulting of 
foreign  experts  in  the  case  of  rescue  operations 
connected with major mining  accidents 
In certain serious mining  accidents  advice 
requested by  the  leaders  of  the  rescue  operation 
from qualified foreign experts  in mine-rescue matters. 
The  heads  of Mine  Rescue  Stations  are  provided 
for  this  purpose with  a  plan containing the 
C'l)  1)  1)  C' 
1) 
C'  most  important  addresses  and  information needed.  C'  C'  C' 




C'  C'  ? 
1)  The  main  First-Aid Stations  are  in  touch with  the main  Rescue  Stations  in the  Community  countries. V/6 
B - FIRES  AND  UNDERGROUND  COMBUSTION 
Gel'llltlll;Y  Proposals  from the Kines Safety Commission 
tor the illlp1'0V8JII8Jlt  of safety and 
health condi  tiona in coalmines  li'.R./Wph  Saar 
I  - RecollllllE!ndations  regarding  equipment  for shafts 
1n  connect1on w1th  the prevention of f1res 
(First Report  of  the  Safety Comudssion,  P·  11 
(German  text) 
1.  Steps  to prevent any  accumulation of grease 
and  coaldust  (First Report  of  the Mines 
Safety Commission,  p.  15  (German  text)  and 
Report  of  the  Conference,  p.  54,  No.  2, 
para.  C.) 
- Skip-winding installations  should  as  far 
as  possible be sited only  in upcast shafts; 
- Equipment  in new  shafts  should be  of 
aerodynamic  form; 
- all suitable steps  should be  taken  to 
avoid  in every  case  any  accumulation of dust 
to ensure that  any  such  accumulation is 
removed 
2.  Preferred siting of methane-drainage  lines 
in upcast shafts  (First Report  of  the Mines 
Safety Comm1ssion,  p.  16  (German  text)  and 
Report  of  the Conference,  p.  54,  No.  3,  Par.  d) 
- This  recommendation of  the  Conference 
applies particularly  to pressure  lines 
3.  Siting electric cables,  compressed-air 
mains  and  gas-drainage pipes  (First Report 
of  the Mines  Safety  Commission,  p.  16 
(German  text)  and  Report  of  the  Conference, 
p.  54,  No.  3,  par.  e) 
- electric cables  and  leads,  compressed-air 
drains  and  gas-drainage pipes should not 
be sited in the  haulage  compartment  : 
- electric cables  should not all be  sited 
in the  same  shaft 
II -Guidin2 Principles for fighting mine  fires  by 
send1ng  down  water  (Second  Report  of  the  Mines 
Safety  Commiss1on,  p.  26)  supplemented 5.2.1973 
(lOth  Report  of  the  MSCH,  annex  VI) 
1.  Installation 
a)  At  the  top  of every shaft reaching  to  the 
surface there must  be  a  device which  can send down 
at least 50  litres of water per minute  and  per 
square metre  of shaft  cross-section 
b)  This  device must  be  installed in such a  way  that 
the  supply of water  can at no  time  be  seriously 
affected,by drawing-off or  flowing-away  of water 
at other points 
c)  The  water pipes  and  the  spray  jets must  be  set in 
such  a  way  that  they  are protected from frost 
d)  The  damming  device  or devices  must  be  set outside  the 
shaft-top building in such  a  way  that  they  can be 
operated at any  time.  They  must be marked  by  means 
of  an  instruction plate. 
C'  A  1) 
C'  C' 
c  c 
c  c 
c  c 
c  c 
c  c 
c  c 
c  c 
c  c 
1)  All skip-winding equipment still in use  is installed in downcast  shafts; 
2)  No  methane-drainage  lines in service; 
3)  ·Recommendation  does  not apply;  there is no multiple  compartment  shaft; 
Belgium  France 
A  A 
E  E 
c  c 
c  E 
c  E 
c  E 
C'  E 
C'  E 
C'  E 
C'  E 
United 
Italy  Kingdom 
C'  A 
c  A 
c  E 
2)  c 
C'  - 3) 
C'  C' 
E  A  4) 
E  A  4) 
E  A  4) 
E  A  4) 
4)  There  are doubts  as  to  the practicability of the  recommendation;  minimum  water quantities are laid down Proposals  from the Mines  Safety Coaniaaion 
for the improvement  of safety and 
health condi  tiona in coalminea 
e)  At  each filling station of every main  shaft 
a  fire point  should be provided such  as 
spraying ramps,  hoses,  or equivalent apparatus 
f)  This  apparatus  should be  operated either from 
the filling station or the shaft outlet 
g)  A device  should be  installed at each  level to 
restrict the air flow  in the galleries  coming 
from  the air intake shaft, if it should be 
necessary,  when  the air flow  is reversed 
accidentally or on  purpose 
(This  device  should not necessarily be  installed 
close  to  the  shaft;  the most  important point 
V/7 
is that it should be  up-wind  of  the first 
bifurcation from  the  filling station.  Nevertheless, 
since  each mine  is different,  the effects  of 
using  this  device  should be  evaluated beforehand by  the 
use  of  a  simulator or  some  equivalent method). 
2.  Fires  in down-cast  shafts 
a)  Immediate  measures 
- it is essential  to  indicate in the fire-
fighting plan the maximum  amount  of water 
which  can be  sent  down  each of  the  downcast 
shafts, without  creating additional dangers 
for  the workers  by  its effects on  the 
ventilation. 
- the  damming  device which  can be  operated at 
this  stage must  not  release more  than this 
prescribed quantity of water. 
- until  the  leader of  the  rescue  operations 
has  issued his  instructions  and  as  long  as 
there has  been no  reversal of ventilation, 
water  may  be  sent  down  only  by  opening  the 
damming  device prescribed for  this purpose. 
b)  Measures  to be  taken on  the  instructions of 
the  leader of  rescue  operat1ons 
- the  leader of  the  rescue  operations must 
therefore decide 
- taking into account  all the  circumstances 
- either to  send  down  an  increased quantity 
of water - or must  he  give  orders  that reversal 
of  the ventilation be brought  about  O!  encouraged. 
- to facilitate the  reversal of  the ventilation 
in the burning downcast  shaft,  once  this has been 
opened  and  the main  fan stopped,  water  can be  sent 
down  the upcast shaft. 
- if reversal of  the ventilation has  already 
occurred - either as  a  result of  the 
upward  current produced by  the heat of  the 
fire or deliberately - downcast  shafts  should 
be  treated as  though  they were  upcast  shafts. 
ll.R./Wph.  Saar 
c  c 
c  c 
A  1)  c 
A  2)  A  3) 
A  4)  A  3) 
A  4)  A  3) 
A  3)  A  3) 
c  C' 
c  C' 
Belgium  France 
C  E 
_)'es  E 
E  E 
A  E 
A  E 
A  E 
A  3)  E 
C'  E 
C'  E 
United 
Italy  ICiJlBdom 
C  A 
E  A 
E  A 
E  A  2) 
E  A  2) 
E  A  2) 
E  A  5) 
E  A  5) 
E  A  5) 
1)  Fireproof doors  to restrict the airflow are required in all mines  in the  intakes  close  to the  shaft. 
2)  There  are  doubts  as  to  the practicability of  the  Recommendation;  minimum  water quantities are laid down. 
3)  Not  suitable for inclusion in regulations. 
4)  There are doubts  as  to  the practicability of  the  Recommendation. 
5)  Not  suitable for  inclusion in regulations; must  be  decided separately in each case. Proposals  from the Mines  Safety Co11111ission 
tor the improvement  ot safety and 
health conditions in ooalmines 
- if the  calculated water quantiy  appears 
to be  too small  to extinguish  the fire 
immediately,  or to hinder its spread, 
additional precautions  must  be worked  out 
and  laid down  in the  fire-fighting plan: 
- simultaneous  supply  of water down  all 
downcast  shafts, 
- partial shutting-off of  the burning shaft 
at surface level, 
- shut underground fire-doors,  etc  •• 
3.  Fires  in upcast shafts 
- in upcast  shafts, water  may  be  sent down 
only  on  the  instructions of the  leader of 
the  rescue  operation 
- as  long  as  there  are still any  workers 
in the pit,  only  so much  water may  be 
sent  down  as will alow  the  fumes  of  the 
fire  to  continue  to be  extracted whilst 
the water is falling 
Note.  A commentary  and  examples  (with  diagrams),  regarding 
the  calculation of  the effect of falling water 
on  the ventilation are  given  in  the  Second  Report of 
the  Mines  Safety Commission  pp.  29-50 
III - Recommendations  for  the  sealing-off by  dams 
of mine  fires  and  underground  combustion 
(Second  Report  of  the Mines  Safety  Commission, 
.F.:...21> 
Introductory  remark 
The  following  Recommendations  are  not  binding. 
They  are not  intended  to  give  Inspectorates 
"ready-made"  regulations;  on  the  contrary, it 
remains  for  the  competent  authorities  to 
decide  how  these  Recommendations  are  to be 
applied  as  regulations,  circulars or service 
instructions. 
These  Recommendations  refer only  to  the 
actual fighting of  the fire or combustion; 
they  do  not refer to  the measures  to be  taken 
as  a  matter  of priority to  rescue men  following  the 
outbreak. 
A - When  a  mine  fire has  broken out  or underground 
combustion developed,  it is  indispensable  to 
V/8 
take  the necessary preparatory steps  for  any  later 
sealing-off by  dams  which  may  be necessary while  the 
direct firefighting operations  are still 
going on 
- In the  event  of sealing-off by  dam  becoming 
necessary,  as  a  general  rule  the first stoppings 
to be erected must  be  advance  dams. 
These  advance  dams  are in fact  the  real subject of 
the present  Recommendations. 
B - Structure and erection of  the  advance  dams 
1.  If there is no  risk of explosion 3)  : 
a)  to make  the  advance  dams  themselves 
as  air-tight as  possible and  to 
create  the  closest possible seal 
between  the  dam  and  the  surrounding walls; 
b)  there  is nothing against shutting off first 
of all the  intake air. 
1)  Not  suitable for  inclusion in regulations. 
GermazJ;Y 
N.R./Wpb.  Saar 
A  1)  A  1) 
A  2)  A  2) 
A  2)  c 
c  c 
c  c 
c  c 
c  c 
c  c 
c  c 
2)  There  are doubts  as  to  the practicability of  the Recommendation. 
3)  For  the  ass·essment  of  the risk,  see  chapter A - II a),  p.  52 
Belgium  France 
A  1)  E 
A  2)  E 
A  2)  E 
E  E 
E  E 
c'  C' 
C'  C' 
C'  C' 
C'  C' 
United 
Italy  Kingdom 
E  A  2) 
E  A  2) 
E  A  2) 
E  A  2) 
E  A  2) 
C'  C' 
C' 
C'  C' 
E  C' Note: 
Proposals  from  the Mines  Safety Commission 
for the improvement  of safety and 
health conditions in coalmines 
2.  If there  is  a  risk of  explosion: 
a)  to have  at all  times  the most precise 
information possible regarding  the 
degree  of explosion risks  in  the  fire 
zone; 
it may  be necessary  to provide  the 
men  constructing the  advance  dams  with 
fireproof  clothing; 
b)  to ensure  that the  advance  dams  are 
as  air-tight as  possible;  to ensure 
that  they  are  strong enough  to resist 
an explosion: 
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c)  to ensure  that for  the entire period 
during which  the  stopping is being 
erected,  there  is  sufficient ventilation 
of  the  fire  zone  to  counter  as  far  as 
absolutely  possible  the  formation  of  an 
explosive  gas  mixture; 
d)  to ensure  that all suitable measures 
are  taken  to  reduce  as  far  as  possible 
the effects  of  any  explosion which may 
occur;  (dust barriers,  stone-dusting 
or water  through barriers); 
e)  to  the  greatest possible extent,  the 
dams  on  the  intake  and  return sides 
should  be  sealed simultaneously; 
only  the  number  of workers  and members 
of  the staff strictly necessary for 
this work  should stay behind; 
as  soon as  the  dams  have  been sealed, 
the  danger  area must be  completely 
evacuated. 
C - The  final  dams  must  be  durable, built of 
br1ck or concrete  under  the protection 
offered by  the  advance  dams.· 
Additional details  to  the  foregoing 
Recommendations  are  given  in  a  Commentary 
(Second  Report  of  the  Mines  Safety CoDDDission, 
pp.  53/58) 
IV  - General  2uidelines  for  the  opening-up  of sealed-off 
fue areas  (Doc  1304/3/64) 
1.  GENERAL 
Special reasons  for opening-up  a  district 
sealed-off after a  fire: 
- recovery of bodies 
- salvage of material 
- recovery of  roadways  and workings 
- reduction  of  the sealed-off area 
- inspection of  the district,  and,  if necessary, 
- direct fire-fighting 
1)  Not necessary. 
Gel'IIIN'lY 
ll.R./Wph.  Saar  Belgium  France 
c  c  C'  C' 
c  c  E  C' 
c  c  C'  C' 
c  c  C'  C' 
c  c  C'  C' 
c  c  C'  C' 
c  c  C'  C' 
c  c  C'  C' 
c  c  C'  C' 
2) 
2)  The  opening-up  of fire areas is  carried out  on  the responsibility of  the manager,  who  prepares  a 
reopening plan - taking into account  the  scale  and  type of fire  and  the ventilation situation in 
the  fire  area - in collaboration with  the Main  Rescue Station.  The  action plans  of  the Main 
Rescue  Stations very  largely embody  the  guidelines  laid down  in Doc.  1304/3/64. 
United 
Italy  Kingdom 
E  C' 
C'  A  1) 
C'  C' 
C'  C' 
C'  C' 
C'  C' 
C'  C' 
C'  C' 
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The  following hazards  can arise from  reopening 
a  sealed-off district: 
- release of  CO,  foul  air and  hot  damp  air, 
- explosion of  firedamp  or fire gas,  where 
the fire is not yet extinguished, 
- recrudescence  of  the fire,  which  need not 
necessarily occur  immediately,  but  even 
after some  time has  elapsed. 
Recrudescense  of  the fire  can  occur only when 
fresh air reaches  the seat of  the fire,  so 
that with all operations  involved in reopening 
a  fire  area it is of  pri~importance to  inspect 
the  individual air currents  constantly. 
All places  suspected of having been seats of 
fire or beatings  must  be  ascertained with 
the  utmost  speed. 
2.  BASIC  RULES 
2.1 Sealed-off districts may  be  reopened  only 
after the  competent  authorities  have been 
notified or have  given their permission. 
2.2 Before  opening  commences,  gas  samples  must 
be  taken  from  the  fire  area,  at each  stopping 
and  from all sampling pipes. 
2.3 The  gas  samples  are  analysed  and  the results 
assessed  from  the point of view of  explosion 
risk in the  sealed-off area and  the  state of 
the  seat of  the .fire. 
2.4 The  cooling-off  time of the  seat of  the  fire 
must  be  taken  into account. 
2.5 If possible,  the  sealed-off district should 
be  inspected before  any  air is circulated or 
any  operations  are started. 
2. 6  Before  opening  commences,  a  plan should be 
drawn  up  jointly with  the Main  Rescue  Centre. 
2.7 This  plan must  cover the  following  points: 
- the method, 
- nature,  scope  and  order of operations, 
- direction and  supervision, 
- checking of  the ventilation system and  of 
the  eomposi tion of  the air, 
- coumunications, 
- preparation of material, 
- evacuation,  prohibition of access  to  and 
remanning  of endangered workings, 
- deployment  of  the  Rescue  Team, 
- connection  and  disconnection of electrical 
equipment  and  cutting-off  the  supply of 
electricity in both  equipment  and  part of 
network  concerned, 
- opening and  closing of  the  compressed air, 
water and  methan-drainage pipeline valves, 
- re-sealing of  the  fire  area in emergency. 
2. 8  The  method  to be  adopted  for  eopening 
s~ealed-off districts depends  on  the presence 
or othezwise of 
- non explosive gaseous  mixtures which  remain 
non-explosive  on dilution with air, 
- non-explosive  gaseous  mixtures which may 
become  explosive  on  dilution with air,  or 
- explosive  gaseous  mixtures. 
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Fire  areas  may  be  opened at one  point or at 
several points.  In  the latter case,  a 
continuous  direct circulation of air is 
automatically established and  the fire area 
is permeated with fresh ail'.  An  examination 
should be  made  of  the effects of the  opening 
of  the  area on  the ventilation system of  the 
pit as  a  whole  and within  the  fire area.  c  C'+C  C'  C'  C'  C' 
2.9  A sealed-off district may  be  reopned by 
- breaching one  or more  stoppings  (with or 
without  the  use  of  an  air-lock),  or 
- cutting a  new  entry  into  the  fire-area. 
Before  opening a  sealed.off area,  provision 
should be made  for  immediate  reclosure if 
necessary.  c  c  c  C'  C'  C' 
2.10 Stoppings  may  be  opened  only  on  the  instructions  of 
the manager  underground  and  under  the  constant 
supervision of personnel  appointed by  him.  c  c  C'  c  c  C' 
2.11 Workings,  into which  the  opening  of  a  stopping 
may  release  toxic  gases  or foul air, 
or where  there is a  risk of explosion,  must 
be  evacuated  and  put out of bounds  to personnel 
before  opening.  c  c  C'  c  C'  C' 
2.12  Since  conditions  in the district,  the  state 
of  the seat of  the fire  and  the  risk of  gas 
explosion may  change  during  the  opening 
operation  the  composition of  the  fire gases 
or fumes  must  be  checked  at regular intervals.  c  c  c  c  C'  C' 
2.13  The  kind  and  number  of  samples  and  the points 
at which  they  are  to be  taken should be  fixed 
in advance.  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C' 
2.14  In doing so,  the possibility of  gas  accumulations 
forming  should be  allowed for.  (In general, 
the  formation  of  gas  layers is fostered by 
low  air velocities  and  differences  in 
temperature).  c  c  C'  c•  c  C' 
2.15 Where  a  stopping  is  opened  in the knowledge 
that a  fire  is not yet extinguished,  or where 
the fire is  revived  as  a  result,  the  area in 
question must  be  resealed at once,  if. the 
composition of  the fire gases or fumes 
changes  in such  a  way  that an  explosion  1)  hazard might  arise.  c  c  C'  C'  C'  A' 
2.16 With non-explosive  gas  mixtures  in the fire 
area,  this  is necessary only if extinguishing 
A 2)  1)  operations  seem unlikely  to  succeed.  C'  C'  c•  C'  A 
2.17 It is  the  responsibility of the  Rescue  Team 
to open  and  inspect  fire  areas,  even after 
they have  been ventilated.  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C' 
2.18  On  the  intake side, breaching of  stoppings 
need not be  carried out  by  the  Rescue  Team 
provided that no  gas  hazard is  to be  reckoned with.  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
2.19  When  deploying  the  Rescue  Team,  allowance 
should be  made  for the  adverse  climatic conditions 
which  are  likely  to obtain at any  point where 
they  may  be employed.  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C' 
1)  Reopening of an  area where  a  known  fire exists is not normally considered. 
2)  Opening  of sealed off areas  is prohibited while  there  is known  to be  an explosive mixture behind. V/12 
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V - OPENING-UP  SEALED-OFF  DISTRICTS  CONTAINING 
NON-EXPLOSIVE  GAS  MIXTURES 
1.  Opening-up  one  side only 
Asealed-off district containing non-explosive 
gas  mixtures  may  be  opened  on  one  side  even  if 
the  fire is not yet extinguished. 
It must  first be  extablishe whether  the 
remaining stoppings  and  seals  are sufficiently 
air-tight and  that  there  is no  risk of releasing 
fire gases,  in particular carbon monoxide  in 
other parts  of  the working,  which  may  be  connected 
with  the  fire  area. 
If the  stopping  to be  opened is  on  the  return 
side,  special attention should be  paid  to 
the  release of  CO  or  of  other toxic or 
dangerous  gases  or foul air. 
The  decision  as  to whether  to  carry  out 
operations  in the fire area without ventilation 
air or with auxiliary ventilation depends 
on  the purpose  of  the  reopening  of  the area, 
the  expected duration of  the  Rescue  Team 
1 s  operations 
and  the possible hazards  involved.  Auxiliary 
ventilation is especially desirable for extended 
operations within  the fire  area. 
a)  Working without ventilation air, 
especially behind  an  airlock,  has  the 
advantage  of'eliminating the risk of 
reviving  the  fire.  When  carrying out 
extinguishing operations without ventilation 
air and  under unfavourable air conditions, 
it is  advisable first  to  set up  water sprinklers 
or nozzles  and  to put  these  into operation 
only after the  Rescue  Team  has  left the  fire area. 
b)  If auxiliary ventilation is  used,  it should 
preferably be  by  suction. 
It is  advisable  to isolate  the  fire  area 
ventilated by  an  auxiliary fan  from  the 
non-ventilated section by  means  of  an 
auxiliary stopping if the  seat of  the fire  is 
situated in the non-ventilated section. 
2.  Opening  on  two  sides  to establish a  circulation 
of  a~r round  the sealed-off area 
Asealed-off  area  containing non-explosive  gas 
mixtures  may  be  ventilated only if it is likely 
that  the  fire is extinct. 
While  ~entilation is being extablished,  a 
Rescue  Team  wearing breathing apparatus may  enter 
the  fire  area to  examine  conditions within it 
and  to extinguish  any  fires. 
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1)  It is forbidden  to start opening  sealed off areas,  either from  one  point or from  two  places, 
while  there is known  to be  an  explosive mixture behind  the  stoppings. 
2)  Experience hitherto has  shown  that blowing auxiliary ventilation is preferable,  to ensure  that no 
explosive gases  are  sucked in by  the  auxiliary  fan. 
3)  The  use  of blowing auxiliary ventilation is preferred. 
4)  Not  suitable for  inclusion in regulations;  the  use  of forcing or auxiliary fans  would  depend  on 
individual circumstances. 
United 
Italy  Kingdom 
C'  C' 
C'  C' 
c• 
3)  A  4) 
c• 
c•  C' 
C'  c• V/13 
Proposals  from  the Mines  Safety Commission  German;y 
for the  improvement  of safety and  United 
B.R./Wph  Saar  Belgium  France  Italy  Kingdom 
health conditions in ooalmines 
VI  - REOPENING  OF  SEALED-OFF  DISTRICTS  CONTAINING 
GAS  MIXTURES  WHICH  MAY  BECOME  EXPLOSIVE  ON 
DILUTION  WITH  AIR 
1.  QEenins  on  one  side onlx 
1.1  A sealed-off area conta1n1ng  gas mixtures 
which  may  become  explosive  on  dilution with 
air may  be  opened  on  one  side only,  even if 
the fire is not yet extinguished;  c  c  C'  C'  C'  A 
1.2  It must  first be  checked whether  the  remaining 
stoppings  and  seals  are sufficiently air-tight 
and  that  there is no  risk of  releasing 
fire gases,  in particular carbon monoxide, 
into other parts  of  the workings which  may 
be  connected with  the  fire  area.  c  c  C'  C'  C'  A 
1.3  If the  stopping  to be  opened  is on  the  return 
side,  particular attention must  be  paid  to 
the  possibility of releasing co,CH4  or foul 
air  c  c  C'  c  C'  A 
1.4  All  operations  must  be  carried out without 
ventilation air.  c  c  C'  c  C'  A 
1.5  There  must  be  continuous  sampling  and 
evaluation of  the  results of  analysis  to 
check whether  the  gas  mixture  remains  non-
explosive.  c  c  C'  c  C'  A 
1.6  For extinguishing operations,  see  section III.I. 
If the  size of  the  sealed-off area is  to be 
reduced,  a  new  explosion-proof  stopping must 
be  erected.  In  order to be  able  to erect 
this  stopping under  tolerable climatic 
conditions  and  possibly without wearing 
breathing apparatus,  auxiliary ventilation 
may  have  to be  provided.  c  c  C'  C'  C'  A 
1.7  For  this purpose,  an auxiliary  stopping 
must  first be  erecred  and  sealed in an 
unventilated atmosphere.  (Before  constructing 
the main  stopping,  it should be  considered 
whether  to erect several successive  auxiliary 
stoppings,  according  to  the possible hazards).  c  c  C'  C'  C'  A 
1.8  The  section of  roadway  thus  recovered must 
then be ventilated by  an auxiliary  fan  so  as 
to create suitable air conditions  for  the 
erection of  the main  stopping.  c  c  C'  C'  C'  A 
1.9  When  starting up  the  auxiliary ventilation, 
it must be  remembered  that  the  gas mixture 
becomes  explosive  on  dilution with air.  It 
is  therefore essential  to  ensure that there  I 
is  no  source of ignition in the workings  to 
be  ventilated.  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  A 
1.10  In addition, it is essential  to make  certain 
that  the  fan  used  cannot  cause  any  risk of 
ignition.  c  c  C'  C'  C'  A 
l.ll Before starting up  the  auxiliary ventilation, 
all workings  likely to be  exposed  to  the hazards 
of fire gases  or explosions  must first be  evacuated 
and  access  thereto prohibited.  c  c  C'  C'  C'  A Propoaala  from the Minea  Safety CODDiaaion 
for the improvement  of aafety and 
health condi  tiona in coalminea 
1.12 Electrical equipment must  be  cut off 
from  the power  supply 
1.13  In addition,  the ventilation must,  as  far 
as  possible,  be  regulated so  that no 
explosive  gas  mixtures  can be  released over 
long distances. 
1.14 For  this  purpose,  the quantity of air 
circulated should,  if necessary,  be  increased. 
2.  oeening  on  two  sides  to extablish a 
c~rculat~on of  a~r through  the  f~re area. 
2.1  This  method  of  opening  automatically 
results  in  the  formation  of  a  through 
air-current  in  the  open district, but 
not necessarily in other parts of  the 
district.  The  method  can be  used  only 
if there  are no  remaining  signs  of fire in the 
district. 
2.2  In addition; a  period  long enough  for 
the seat of the fire  to  cool off must 
have  elapsed since  the  estimated time 
of extinction. 
2.3  If possible,  the  Rescue  Team  should carry 
out  an  inspection in  an  unventilated 
atmosphere. 
2.4  Failing this,  the  results of  the snuffle 
pipe  tests  should be  used  to determine  the 
condition of  the  seat of  the  fire. 
2.5  Furthermore,  it should  be  considered in 
such  cases whether  the method  described in 
section IV.l might  not be  preferable. 
2.6  In each  case,  it is essential  to  check 
the  likelihood of  a  recrudescence  of 
the  fire during ventilation,  by  means  of 
fire  gas  samples. 
2.7  This  applied particularly in the  case of 
a  much-branched district. 
2.8  Before ventilating  the fire area,  all 
working  exposed  to  the hazards  of fire 
gases  or explosions  of fire gases  or fire-damp 
when  the  stopping is  opened must be evacuated. 
2.9  All electrical installations in these 
workings  must  be  cut off from  the  power 
supply. 
2.10  On  safety  grounds,  it is advisable  to open 
the  return stopping first. 
2.11 After  the  Rescue  Team  has withdrawn  to 
less dangerous  zones,  the  intake  stopping should 
be  opened. 
2.12 When  ventilating  the  fire area,  the quantity of 
air and  the  content of inflammable  gases  in 
the air-current circulation  through  the  fire 
areas,  and  in the  current into which it subseq-
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2.13 The  two  air-currents  should be mutually 
adjusted in such  a  manner  as  to ensure 
V/15 
that no  explosive mixture  of  gases  is present 
over  long distances after their junction. 
2.14 Access  to  the fire area is prohibited until 
it has  been ventilated. 
VII- OPENING  OF  FIRE  AREAS  CONTAINING  EXPLOSIVE  GAS 
MIXTURES 
Sealed-off districts may  not  be  reopended,  either 
on  one  side or on  two  sides,  if the presence  of 
explosive  gas mixtures  behind  the  stoppings  is 
established. 
VIII- OPENING  OF  FLOODED  FIRE  AREAS 
The  composition of  the  air in fire areas  flooded 
to extinguish  the fire must  be  checked after 
draining. 
In workings with  solid coal,  allowance must  be 
made  for the  increased hazard of  spontaneous  ignition 
after drainage. 
Where  fire areas  have  been  isolated by  local 
flooding  instead of by  stoppings,  the rules 
mentioned in section I  to V should be  observed, 
insofar as  applicable, when  opening  a  district. 
IX- REMANNING  OF  FIRE  AREAS 
After ventilating a  fire  area,  workings  may  not 
be manned  until a  Rescue  Team  has  established 
that all workings  are free  of noxious  gases. 
If the fire area is merely being  reduced  in size, 
workings  free of noxious  gases  uiay  be  manned 
only when  the  remainder of  the fire  area has 
been  sealed-off by  permanent  stoppings. 
X- GUIDELINES  FOR  THE  CONSTRUCTION  OF  ADVANCE  FIRE 
STOPPINGS  FROM  PLASTER  (doc.  4928/63/2) . 
In all cases where it is possible and  advantageous, 
the erection of plaster stoppings  to seal off fires 
and  beatings  is  recommended. 
Is  this process  applied in practice  as  laid down 
in the  guidelines  contained in  the  report? 
Is  the  application of  this process prescribed 
by  regulations?. 
Is  this process  applied in practice in a  manner 
differing from  the principles laid down? 
Is  the  application of  this modified process 
prescrived by  regulations? 
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1)  The  construction of  advance  stoppings against will be  the  subject of new  regulations when  the 
fire-fighting directives are  revised. 
2)  The  choice of means  is, however,  left to  the mine-manager. 
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USE  FOR  FOAMED  URETHANE 
Opinion on  the  use  under~round of  foamed 
urethane in coal mines  (7th Reeort  of  the Mines 
Safeti and Health Commission 1  annex VI) 
The  Miues  Safety  and Health  Commission  considers 
it desirable that  the  producers  of  the  foamed 
urethane plastic should further develop  the 
compound  at present available in such  a  way  that, 
while  retaining unchanged  the  positive properties 
which it now  has,  it satisfies  the  requirement set 
out  in the  Commission's  opinion. 
Are  there  any  regulations  governing  the  use 
underground of  foamed  urethane? 
PLASTER  STOPPINGS 
Opinion on  the  construction of plaster stoppings 
usins  the  hidromechan1cal erocess  (doc.3481/3/69); 
V/16 
instructions  for  construction  (8th Reeort of  the Mines 
Safeti and Health  Commission 1  annex  V) 
Is  this  recently  developed process  in use? 
Is  its use  governed  by  any  regulation? 
FOURTH  REPORT  ON  SPECIFICATIONS  AND  TESTING 
CONDITIONS  RELATING  TO  FIRE-RESISTANT  FLUIDS 
USED  FOR  POWER  TRANSMISSION 
Part II - Seecifications  and  test conditions 
~Ee·  19  onwards) 
1.  Fire-resistant fluids  for hydraulic power 
transmission  and  hydraulic  control, before 
being used  in mine  workings  must  be  given 
a  certificate of  approval. 
This  certificate must  indicate that  the 
product has  been subjected  to  the  following 
tests: 
a)  Laboratory  tests  (articles  3  -7) 
aa)  to determine  criteria of  flammabi 1i  ty 
(article 3,  p.22) 
bb)  to determine health criteria (article 4, 
p.23) 
cc)  to determine  technical criteria 
(article 5, p.23 
b)  Long-term tests during normal  operations 
(article 8,  p.27) 
2.  These  tests  are carried out under  an  authorised 
body. 
3.  Authorisation for  use  underground  should be 
dependent  on  presentation of  the  certificate 
mentioned in 1.  above. 
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1)  The  use  underground  of  liquid plastic products  requires  the  approval of the Obergamt.  Approval 
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has  !;O  far only been granted for  its use  in rock consolidation.  Its use  for coating surfaces  is not permitted. 
2)  Directives 'for the  construction of stoppings of 21.4. 71  - 18.13.1 II - 1. V/17 
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XIV- FIRST  REPORT  ON  TESTS  AND  CRITERIA  OF  FLAMMABILITY  FOR 
TEXTILE  CARCASS  CONVEYOR  BELTS  USED  IN  COAL  MINES 
(12th Re2ort of the Mines  Saftel and  Health Comm1ssion, 
annex VI) 
Is account  taken of the tests and  criteria of 
flammability  for textile carcass  conveyor belts 
defined in this report, i.e. 
- drum  friction test?  c  c  E  no 
1)  ves 
- flame  test?  yes  c  c  E  no  yes 
Article 9  - Withdrawal  of a22roval 
At  the request of the  authorised body,  the 
permitting authority may  withdraw  the  approval  for 
the  fluid to be  used in mine  workings.  c  c  C'  C'  E  c 
1)  Currently no  coal mine  in operation. V/18 
C.  ELECTRIFICATION 
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ll.R./Wph  Saar  Belgium  France 
health oonditiona in ooalmines 
I- RECOMMENDATIONS  REGARDING  ELIMINATION  OF  OIL 
FROM  UNDERGROUND  ELECTRICAL  EgUIPMENT  ~1st 
REPORT  OF  MINES  SAFETY  COMMISSION 2  2· 7  -
German  text) 
1.  a)  Resistances  installed underground  should not 
contain any  combustible oil.  (Exceptions  are 
allowed  for  the  starting-up resistances  of 
large motors  driving water pumps).  c  c  c  c 
b)  Condensers  and  transformers  installed 
underground must  not  contain either combustible 
oil or di4ectric substances which  can give 
off noxious  gases.  c  c  c  c 
- Otherwise effective measures  should be 
taken  against  the  dangers  to workers 
caused by  the  use  of  these devices.  c  c  c  c 
c)  Switches  and  relays,  used  underground  and 
operation on  voltages  below  1,100 v,  must 
not  contain  any  fl8.1111lab le oils.  c  c  c  c 
2.  Recommendation  to begin detailed investigation 
into  the  degree  of  increased safety which  can 
be  achieved,  when  prescribing an  explosion-proof 
housing for normally  spark-producing  components 
only,  and  a  design of  the  "increased safety"  type 
A 2)  3)  E  4)  for all other equipment.  - c 
3.  Is  the  policy followed  of  reducing  the  use 
of  oil in cut-off devices  by  reason of  the 
potential dangers  of explosion and  fire?  yes  c  yes  yes 
4.  Are  new  purchases  restricted to  apparatus 
using no  oil or,  if this  is  not possible,  only-
small quantities of oil?  yes  c  E  yes 
II- RECOMMENDATIONS  FOR  SHOTFIRING  LEADS 
(2nd  Report  of Mines  Safety  Comnussion,  p.lO) 
1.  Recommendations  for all shotfiring leads 
- Every  conductor must  be provided with at 
least one  good-quality insulation.  c  c  c  c 
- All  connections  must  be properly  insulated.  c  c  c  c 
- Every  shotfiring lead must  have  the 
appropriate  degree of flexibility  c  c  c  C' 
- The  conductors  must  be  of  such  cross-
sectional area that  thy do  not occasion 
an  excessive voltage  drop.  c  c  c  C' 
- The  shotfiring leads  must  be  made  up  and 
laid so  that  the  risk of any  fault current, 
resulting from  contact with metal objects, 
is  reduced.  C'  c  c  c 
- Before  any  shotfiring operation in particular 
workings  and before  the  simultaneous  firing 
of  a  fairly  large number  of shots,  the  ohmic 
'resistance of the circuit must  be measured.  c  c  c  c 
1)  In hazardous  zones  only. 
2)  Cannot be  laid down  in inspectorate regulations. 
3)  Not  applicable. 
4)  Approval  regulations  have  been  issued for equipment  in the "increased safety" category,  but  the 
type  of protection is left to  the  individual  firms. 
5)  A British Standard for  "increased safety" apparatus  has  been published. 
United 
Italy  Kingdom 
C'  C' 
C'  C'  1) 
C'  C' 
c  c 
5)  c  -
yes  C' 
no+ 
yes  C' 
C'  c 
C'  c 
C'  c 
C'  c 
c  c 
c  c 2. 
3. 
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a)  Te~ora!1 shotfiring leads 
- Careful inspection before each firing. 
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- Regular  and  thorough  testing by  an  expert 
either at  the  surface  or in an  underground 
workshop. 
A  thorough  checking must  consist of  at least: 
- a  careful  inspection of  the  lead over its 
whole  length. 
- measurement  of  the insulation between  the 
two  conductors,  if the  lead consists  of  a 
cable or rubber-covered  lead. 
- measurement  of  the  ohmic  resistance of 
the  lead. 
b)  Permanent  shotfiring leads 
- Regular  and  thorough  checks  by  an  expert. 
- Written record of  every  thorough  check, 
with  the  date. 
Further  recommendations  for  Eermanent  and 
te~ora!1 shotfiring leads  used  1n  gass~ 
mines 
The  shotfiring leads  must  fulfil conditions 
which  ensure  sufficient safety with 
regard to: 
a)  mechanical  strength  and  in particular 
tensile,  bending  and  abrasion strength. 
b)  electrical insulation. 
c)  impermeability  (to moisture)  of  the 
insulation and  the  sheathing. 
Recommendation  that  checking  standards 
which  correspond  to  the  conditions  be  laid 
down. 
SueElementa!1  recommendations  for eermanent 
shotfiring leads  used  in  gass~ eits 
- Permanent  leads  shojld be  so  arranged 
that,  as  far as possible,  damage  during 
firing of  the shots  or from other causes 
is  avoided. 
-If the shotfiring lead consists of  two 
separate  conductors,  these  should be 
arranged sufficiently far apart 
and  in such  a  way  that  inspection is possible. 
- In shafts  and  dipping roads,  the  leads  must 
have  an  adequate mechanical  strength. 
Ge:mum;r 
B'.R./Wph  Saar 
llelgiwa  France 
c  c  c  c 
C'  c  c  c 
C'  c  c  c 
c 2)  c  c  c 
C'  c  c  c 
c  c  c  c 
A  3)  c  c  c 
c  c  c  C' 
c  c  c  C' 
c  c  c  C' 
c  c  c 
2) 
C'  c  c  C' 
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C'  c  c  c 
1)  Safety  is ensured py  proper  insulation;  leads  must  not be used if there is any visual evidence  of 
damage  to  the  insulation. 
2)  Not  applicable. 
3)  Seems  unnecessary  and would  increase administrative work. 
United 
Italy  Kingdom 
C'  c 
C'  A  1) 
c  c 
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2)  c 
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NRP  c 
NRP  c 
NRP  c 
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III- RECOMMENDATIONS  REGARDIN8  TilE  PROTECTION  OF 
UNDERGROUND  DISTRIBUTION  NETWORKS  AGAINST  THE 
DANGER  OF  CAUSING  ELECTRIC  SHOCKS  (2nd  Report 
of  the Mines  Safety Commission,  p.l3) 
I.  The  following  recommendations  refer only  to 
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the  MT  networks  defined below;  Medium  Tension  (MT)  : 
the  normal  voltage  range  for working  equipment  used 
underground with  three-phase A. C.  (between 380  and 
1.100  V).  These  networks  should fulfil all there-
commendations  set out below. 
These  recommendations  refer neither to  the 
HT  networks,  nor  to voltages which  are  lower 
than  the  medium-tension  range  and  are  used 
for particular purposes  (lighting,  drilling 
apparatus,  telephone installations, etc  ••• ) 
for which  some  easing of the restrictions 
may  be  allowed.  Overhead wire networks 
with bare  trolley wires  are also excluded. 
II.  Protection against  the  risk of electric shocks 
A - First order precautions 
(Protection against direct  contact with 
a  live phase) 
1.  Every  chance  contact with  a  live phase 
should be  avoided  as  far as  possible 
by  laying  the  conductor out  of  the 
workmen's  reach,  by  interposing 
effective barriers,  by  sheathing  the 
phase  or by  insulating it. 
2.  The  cables  and  leads  used  in medium-tension 
underground networks  should be  mechanically 
protected either by means  of  a  metal  armouring 
connected  to  the pilot lead,  or by  a  flexible 
envelope  of  the best possible design. 
- Leads  without metal  armouring must 
be  electrically protected by  separate 
or  common  protective screens,  which  trip 
safety devices  in the event  of  a  fault. 
3.  Only  trained men  should be  allowed  to 
open  the  housings  of accessible  live 
parts  (medium-tension voltage  range) 
and  this  only  under  conditions which 
have  been  clearly laid down  in  advance. 
4.  The  repair  and  maintenance  of  the 
electrical equipment  should be 
entrusted only  to  trained personnel. 
B - Second  order precautions 
(Equipotential  connection between 
conductive parts of  the  installation) 
1.  All  underground  networks  must  be 
provided with  an  equipotential 
connection between  the  conductive 
(not  live in normal  operation) 
components  of  the  installation and 
the  other metal elements  connected 
thereto,  such  that its conductance 
is sufficient  to prevent  the occurrence,  between 
any  two  points  accessible to  a  workman 
simultaneously,  ofa voltage higher  than  the 
weak  voltage. 
2.  This  equipotential connection  (protective  lead) 
must  ensure electric connection between  the 
conductive  elements  of the  installation over 
the whole  length of  the network.  It must  be 
GermazJY 
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maintained in satisfactory  condition  and  must 
be  inspected  as  often as  is necessary  to 
ensure  this. 
3.  The  above-mentioned equipotential 
connection  (protective  lead)  must  be 
earthed to at least one  point of  the 
network  via an earth connection of  the 
lowest possible resistance. 
4.  This  earth connection must  be  combined with 
the star-point earth connection,  if a  star-point 
is employed. 
C -Third order precautions 
(Reduction of fault  duration) 
1.  Any  fault  current must  be  considered 
dangerous  in underground medium-tension 
networks  if, when  the fault current  flows 
through  the protective  lead  and  connected 
conductive  component  of  the  installation 
of earth,  there  is  produced  between  any 
two  points  accessible  to  a  workman  simultaneously 
a  voltage  exceeding  the  level of  a  weak  voltage, 
regardless  of whether it occurs  between parts of 
the  installation or between  such parts  and  earth. 
2.  If the  star-point of  a  network  is earthed 
via a  weak  impedance  or without  any 
impedance,  so  that  the  presumed  fault 
current is not restricted to  a  low  value, 
then  the  network must  be provided with 
safety devices which  can  at any  time  automatically 
isolate  the  damaged  section of  the networkfrom 
the  current source  (or render it completely 
dead)  before  the  fault  flowing  through  the  protective 
components  of  the installation or earth reach  a 
dangerous  value 
- Since  the  complete  or partial cutting7off 
of  a  line voltage  can  have  serious 
effects  on  the  current  supply  to  important 
equipment,  appropriate preventive measures 
should be  taken. 
- Only  when  the  line has  been repaired or 
the fault eliminated,  or at the  direction 
of  a  specialist who  has  taken all necessary 
precautions,  may  that section of the network 
be brought  under voltage  again. 
3.  If the star-point of  a  network  is insulated 
or earthed v1a some  1mpedance,  wh1ch 
restr1cts fault currents  to a  low  value, 
the network must  be fitted with supervising 
devices which  are  always  in  a  state of 
readiness  and which  are  capable: 
a)- either of  checking  the  insulation of  the 
various parts  of  the network  and  of 
indicating any  damage  they may  have  suffered 
or 
- of  automatically  cutting off the 
damaged  section of  the network  from 
its source of current  (or rendering  the entire 
network  dead) . 
- If no  automatic cut-off device  is installed, 
the responsibility for  cutting-off should 
be  entrusted to  an  expert who  can  intervene 
as  soon  as  the warning signal of  the 
supervisory  system is  tripped or if the fault 
assumes  major dimeo.sions. 
1)  Not  applicable,  as  only isolated ciruits are used. 
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- If cutting-off has  been necessitated by 
one  of  the  two  cases  cited above,  the 
restoration of current may  be  accepted 
only after repair of the  line or 
el1minat1on of  the  fault,  or onl;r  at the 
direction of an  e~ert off1cial,  who 
has  tken all necessary precautions. 
- If no  automatic cut-off device is 
installed,  the  rubber-covered  leads  of 
mobile  machines  should be  fltted w1th 
an  automatic  device which  renders  them 
dead  as  soon  as  there  occurs  a  fault 
current which  is  caused by  damage  to 
the insulation of  an  individual phase. 
b)  - or of  automatically  cutting off the 
the  damaged  section of  the network  from 
its  source  of  current  (or rendering  the 
entire network  dead)  as  soon  as  a 
double  fault occurs  leading  to  a  dangerous 
fault  current in the  protective lead 
and  co~nected parts  of  the installation. 
- In  this  instance,  the  current may  be 
switched  on  again only after the  line 
has  been  repaired or  the fault eliminated. 
The  comments  on  this  Recommendation  are 
given  in  the  Second  Report of the  Mines 
Safety  Commission,  PP·  15/22. 
RECOMMENDATIONS  REGARDING  THE  PROTECTION  OF 
UNDERGROUND  ELECTRICAL  NETWORKS  -AGAINST  FIRE 
AND  FIREDAMP-EXPLOSION  RISKS  (Doc.  1156761/4) 
1.  Recommendations  rel!jardin~ the  ~rotection of 
undeq~round electrical networks  against 
fire  risk 
A- First order l!recautions  - avoidance  of 
fire risk 
1)  Avoidance  of  excessive heating of 
cables  in normal  use  by  providing 
adequate  conductivity.  Avoidance  of 
unforeseen  local beatings  by  the use 
of suitable designs  and  by  proper 
supervision. 
2)  Reduce  the possibility of faults  and 
short-circuits  occurring between 
conductors,  or between  conductors,and 
earth, by  adequate  insulation or 
proper spacing of the  conductors. 
B - Second-order precautions - protection 
against  the effects of  a  heating or  a 
fault 
1)  Use  of heat- stable insulations. 
2)  Use  of protective sheathing for  equipment 
V/22 
Ge l'lllally 
li.R./Wpb.  Saar 
c  c 
c  c 
1)  1)  - -
c  c 
c  c 
c  c 
and  for  cables,  made  of flame-resistent  and 
non-propagating material.  c  c 
- Use  of oil  as  a  non-conductor  only 
if no  fire risk for  the workers  is 
involved.  c  c 
3)  Accumulations  of  flammable  or  combustible 
materials  and pipelines  for  combustible 
gases  should be sited well  away  from 
electrical equipment.  c  c 
Not  applicable 
Not  suitable for  inclusion in regulations. 
Belgium  France 
c  c 
c  c 
c  c 
c  c 
c  c 
c  c 
c  c 
c  c 
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C'  C' Proposals  from the Mines  Safety Commission 
for the improvement  of safety and 
health condi  tiona in coal  mines 
C - Third-order precautions  - measures 
regarding  the network 
1)  Automatic protection of networks 
against  abnormal  overloads. 
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2)  Automatic protection of  networks 
against short-circuit;  these protective 
devices  must  be  capable  of 
handling  the  maximum  short-circuit 
current at their point  of  installation. 
Selecting and  regulating of  these 
devices  in relation  to  the minimum 
short-circuit current which  can  occur 
at  the  end  of  the  section  they  protect 
3)  Steps  to  give  effective protection 
against  low-current  faults,  which 
might  get  past  the  above-named  protective 
devices  and  cause  dangerous  heating. 
2.  Recommendations  for  the  protection of  underground 
electrical networks  against  firedamp-explosion 
risks 
A.  First-order precautions  - prevention of 
accumulations  of  firedamp 
1)  The  firedamp  content at  the  site of 
the electrical apparatus  must  be  kept 
whithin  the  limits prescribed by  the 
Inspectorate. 
2)  The  ventilation situation must  be 
checked before  any  new  installation or 
extension of electrical equipment. 
3)  There  must  be  a  thorough  investigation 
of  the possible  consequences  of  any 
alterations  in working method,  of 
ventilation or gas  omission,  which 
might  cause  problems  in  the vicinity 
of electrical equipment. 
B.  Second-order precautions  - protection 
against  ignition 
1)  In gassy workings:  use  of electrical 
equipment which  is permitted.by  the 
Inspectorate only  under  its  own 
specified conditions. 
2)  The  electrical equipment  must  be 
installed,  used,  supervised  and  maintained 
in such  a  way  as  to keep it flameproof. 
All  cables must  be  of  adequate 
mechanical  strength. 
All  cables must  be  installed and 
maintained without  damage. 
C.  Third-order precautions  - cutting off  the 
circuit 
1)  Networks  must  be  designed  and  installed 
in such  a  way  that any  fault  current 
which  may  arise between phase  and  earth 
is  reduced  to  a  low  value or quickly 
cut off. 
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2)  In such mines  where  CH
4 
is  a  hazard,  all apparatus must  be  designed  to  prevent  open  sparking  and must  be 
so certified. V/24 
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2)  A protective relay,  preferable automatic, 
must  be  provided  against between-phase 
faults  and  earth faults.  c  c  c  c  c 
3)  Precautions  must  be  taken  to  avoid 
accidents when  faults  are being  sought 
or dealt with.  c  c  c  c  c 
4)  Protection must  be  given  to  leads  without 
metallic sheathing,  and  to  those which 
supply movable  machines,  by  means  of 
individual or collective screens which 
bring a  protective device  into operation 
if a  fault  occurs.  c  c  c  c  c 
5)  If the  firedamp  content rises  above  the 
prescribed  limit,  all the  sections  of 
the network  involved must  be  cut  off.  c  c  c  c  c 
Issuing  instructions  to maintain in 
operation certain machines  which 
provide ventilation.  c  c  c  c  c 
Restarting only when  the  firedamp 
content has  fallen below  the  permissible 
value,  and  only  on  th~ orders  of  a 
trained person.  c  c  c  c  c 
Supplementa!l precautions  for Eits  liable  to 
sudden  outbursts  of &as 
1.  Risk  of  damage  b~ Earticles Erojected by 
an outburst of  gas 
- The  threatened  zones  in which  projection  c  1)  c 2)  can occur  should not be  electrified.  A  c  c 
- The  electrical equipment  and  cables  c  2)  should be  protected against heavy  blows.  A  c  c  c 
- The  electrical equipment  should be  c 2)  designed  to  give  adequate  robustness.  A  c  c  c 
2.  The  risk of  fired~ concentrations 
- Increased ventilation  C'  C'  C'  c  c 2) 
- Use  of remote-indicating methane-met-ers 
or ventilation-fault detectors which  can 
cut off  the  threatened section of  the  c 2)  network.  C'  C'  c  c 
1)  The  use  of electricity is forbidden  in pits  liable to  sudden  outbursts  of  gas,  excepting for  lighting 
and  shot-firing.  Exceptions  can,  however,  be  approved  by  the  senior mining  engineers:  when  using 
armoured  cables,  telephone installations  and  methanometers  in  intake  airways-provided  that no  damage 
is likely  to  occur  as  a  result of  a  gas  outburst - and  also  in main  return airways. 
2)  No  pits  liable to  sudden outbursts  of  gas.  However,  in pits or parts of mines  which are considered 
to be  liable to  sudden  outbursts  of  gas,  the use  of electricity,  excepting for  lighting purposes 
and  portable  lamps,  must  be  authorized by  a  senior mining  engineer,  subject  to  the  observance  of all 
other measures,  precautions  or restrictions which might  be  included in the  authorization  such  as  for 
example  the  above-mentioned  recommendations. 
3)  Introduced recently  in some  individual mines  which are not necessarily  subject  to outbursts,  but 
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- Relaxation shot-firing only  after all 
equipment has  been  switched off. 
3.  - Supplementary electrical precautions 
a)  Preferable  use  of  a  starpoint earthed 
via a  strong  impedance,  e.g.  by  means  of 
an  insulation detector. 
b)  Quickest possible  automatic protection 
of  the network  against all insulation 
faults,  even if formed  by  resistances 
between phase  and  earth. 
V - CONCLUSIONS  AND  RECOMMENDATION  CONCERNING  THE  USE 
OF  EXPLOSION-PROOF  ELECTRICAL  APPARATUS  FOR  NOMINAL 
VOLTAGE  ABOVE  1100  VOLTS  (lOth Report  MSHC, 
annex VIII,  June  1973) 
In  respect of  the  circuit-breakers,  it will be 
observed  that  the  conclusions  contained  in the 
Report  of  1964  (see  third report of The  Mines 
Safety  and Health  Commission,  annex VIII,  pages 
391-404) _are  now  out-of-date,  since  considerable 
efforts have  been made  in all  the  Member  States 
to  eliminate or  reduce  the  quantities of oil used. 
Different  types  of oil-less apparatus  can be 
found  (using sulphur hexafluoride,  air or water) 
and  all have  given satisfaction and  their utilization 
has  made  considerable  advances. 
During  the  reporting period,  the  design  of  circuit 
breakers  of  the  "increased safety"  category with 
additional protection of  the  contacts  has  been 
accepted in different Member  States,  and  the new 
purchases  of  circuit-breakers  containing a  large 
quantity of oil have  been either restricted or 
forbidden. 
In  the  contactors without  oil,  considerable 
progress  has  been  achieved,  particularly as  a 
result of  the  introduction of  vacuumrbreak 
contactors. 
In  these  circumstances,  the  Mines  Safety  and  Health 
Commission  considers it necessary  to  recommend 
to  the  Member  States  to  continue  their policy 
of  reducing  the  use  of oil in cut-off devices 
by  reason of  the potential dangers  of explosion 
and  fire  resulting from  the presence  of  an  appreciable 
quantity of oil in such  devices. 
Consequently,  the  Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission 
recommends  that new  purchases  be  restricted to 
apparatus  using no  oil or, if this  is not possible, 
only  small quantities  of oil. 
1)  Is  the  policy followed  of  reducing  the  use of 
oil in cut-off devices by  reason  of  the 
potential dangers  of  explosion  and  fire? 
2)  Are  new  purchases  restricted to  apparatus 
using no  oil or,  if this  is not possible, 
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1)  No  pits  liable to sudden outbursts  of gas.  However,  in pits or parts  of mines  which  are  considered  to be 
liable to  sudden outbursts of gas,  the use  of electricity,  excepting for  lighting purposes  and portable  lamps, 
must be  authorized by  a  senior mining  engineer,  subject  to  the  observance  of all other measures,  precautions 






C' Proposals  from the Mines  Safety Co11111ission 
tor the improvement  ot safety and 
health conditions in coalmines 
VI  - CABLES  SUPPLYING  MOBILE  MACHINES  AND  THEIR 
ELECTRICAL  PROTECTION 
Recommendations  arising out  of  the  "Report 
adopted  by  the Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission 
V/26 
on  20th  June  1969  on  the  characteristics and  electrical 
protection of  cables  supplying mobile  machines  (coal 
cutters,  loading machines,  etc.)  used  underground  in 
coal  mines  in  the various  Community  countries"  1) 
(8th Report of  the  Mines  Safety and  Health  Commission, 
~) 
The  Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission  recommends 
that electrical equipment  supplying current  to 
mobile  machines  should meet  the  following  minimum 
requirements: 
A.  Power  should  automatically be  cut off  from  cables 
supplying mobile  machines  in  the  following 
cases: 
a)  phase  to phase  faults 
b)  faults  between  phase  and  earth 
c)  faults  between  phase  and  polarised screen 
d)  faults  between  conductor or polarised 
screen  and  earth 
e)  breaking of  the  monitoring circuit 
B.  The  electrical installations defined  above 
should be  designed  in such  a  way  that  any 
fault arising in  the  cable  cannot result in 
unintentional starting of  machines  connected 
to  the  supply. 
C.  CI  or  CB  insulation monitors  and  BS  safety 
blocks not  automatically monitored  should 
incorporate  a  device which  monitors  their 
operation and  integrity.  They  should  also 
have  a  fault-indicating device. 
D.  The  BS  safety block  should be  arranged  so 
that  the  supply  cable  cannot become  live  again 
after power has  been  cut  off due  to a  fault. 
E.  The  monitoring circuit should not  give  rise 
to any  risk of  igniting firedamp. 
F.  The  earth  conductors  should be  symmetrically 
arranged. 
G.  Finally  1  the Hnes  Safety and Health Commission 
recommends  that: 
1.  The  power  to a  cable  supplying  a  mobile 
machine  should be  cut  off when  the  first 
fault between  phase  and  screen  (polarised 
screen or earth  conductor)  appears  and, 
GermalJY 
N.R./Wp~  Saar 
c  C' 
c  C' 
C'  C' 
c  c 
c  c 
C'  C' 
C'  C' 
C'  C' 
C'  C' 
c  c 
c  c 
1)  See  7th Report  of  the  Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission,  Annex  v. 
2)  There  is no polarised screen. 
3)  There  are precautions  additional  to BS. 
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4)  Yes,  but  on  condition that this  measure is extended  to the whole  network which  is practically impossible. V/27 
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2.  In view of  the  present state of  the  art it 
suggests  the  use  of  cables  provided with 
screens  (polarised screens  or earth 
conductors)  of  one  of  the  types described 
in  annex  V,  page  13  of  the  7th Report  of 
the Mines  Safezy  ~d  H2alth Commission 
except  types  A  ,  B  ,  D •  c  c  c  c  E  C' 
3.  These  cables  should be  used  in conjunction 
with  the  following devices: 
- protection by  means  of  current  intensity 
appropriate  to  the  length  and  cross-section 
of  the  cables,  c  c  c  c  E  ? 
- a  permanent  insulation monitor  (CI  or 
CB),  c  c  c  c  E  C' 
- a  safety block  incorporated in the gate-end 
box.  c  c  c  c  E  c V/28 
D.  WINDING  ROPES  AND  SHAFT  GUIDES 
Proposals  from the Mines  Safety Commission  Germ!.\llY 
for the improvement  of safety and 
Belgium  France 
health conditions in coalmines  N.R./Wph  Saar 
I  - REPORT  ON  TilE  ELECTRO  MAGNETIC  EXAMINATION  OF 
WINDING  ROPE  (doc.  nr.  8470/64/2). 
Steps  taken to develop  electro-magnetic  testing  1)  2)  c'  2)  methods  and  results obtained.  C'  C'  C' 
II - REPORT  ON  TilE  USE  OF  ACCELEROMETERS  TO  TEST 
WINDING  INSTALLATIONS  doc.  3725/1/61,  p.  9 
(German  text). 
Tests with accelerometers  should be  continued 
on  a  large scale.  C'  C'  - -
Use  of accelerometers  should be  extended.  NRP  E  - -
1)  Electromagnetic monitoring is  required  in  the  special  case  of  cables  consisting of flat wires  in 
multiple layers  and  other winding  ropes  which  are heavily  loaded. 
2)  Trials  to  improve  electro-magnetic testing methods  are underway. 
3)  Electromagnetic examination of  cables  is not  compulsory. 
United 
Italy  Kingdom 
C'  3)  C'  2) 
E  C' 
E  C' V/29 
E.  VENTILATION  AND  MINE  GAS 
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I  - PRACTICAL  CONCLUSIONS  ON  THE  APPLICATION  OF  THE 
THEORY  OF  STABILISATION  OF  VENTILATION  (sixth 
report of  the  Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission  -
Annex  III) 
1.  SuEervision of ventilation 
The  supervision of ventilation in  a  m~n~ng 
system requires  an overall view,  and  should 
therefore be entrusted to  a  single man  specially 
appointed,  having at his  disposal all  the necessary  C'+  c  1)  A 2)  means  for  carrying out his  task.  NRP  c  C'  c 
2.  Fundamental  factors  in ventilation 
Apart  from  a  regular  inspection and  anlysis  of 
ventilation conditions  in mines,  ventilation 
officials  require  to  have  data on: 
- the  actual characteristics  of  the main  and  3)  auxiliary ventilation fans,  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C' 
- the  order of magnitude  of  the  aerodynamic  effect  C+ 
of natural ventilation in  summer  and winter,  NRP  c  C'  C'  C'  C' 
- the potentials  of  the  intersections  (at least  4)  the main  ones).  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C' 
3.  Additional  reEresen tations  of  ventilation 
systems 
In order to obtain a  precise picture of  the 
overall structure of ventilation systems  and  to 
reveal possible instabilities, it would  be 
advisable when  necessary  to have,  in addition 
to  the  regulation diagrams,  representations  of 
other  types,  such  as,  for  example: 
a)  a  representation of  the whole  of  the mine 
workings  in perspective  (isometric or  any  5)  C'  other equivalent system).  c  c  E  C'  c 
b)  a  diagram without  any  topographical  information.  C'  C'  6)  C'  C'  4)  C'  c 
4.  Characteristics  of ventilation 
The  representations  mentioned  in conclusion 
No.  3  should make  available all the  data 
necessary  for  the  understanding of analysis  of 
ventilation,  particularly: 
a)  at the measuring points 
- the  air quanti ties  c  c  C'  c  c  c 
- the  direction of  the  airflow  c  c  C'  c  c  c 
- the methane  content  c  c  C'  c  c  c 
- the  temperatures  c  c  C'  7)  c  A7) 
- the pressures  (at least at the principal 
A 7)  intersections)  c  c  E  C'  E 
1)  In every colliery with over  500  workers  the  engineer responsible is also assisted by  a  supervisor who  ensures 
application of  the ventilation measures.  In each coalfield an  engineer has  been  specially entrusted with 
studying  the  application of  the ventilation stabilisation theory  adopted by  the Mines  Safety and Health Commission. 
2)  It is  a  statutory duty of  the  undermanager  or,  in some  cases,  the manager  of  a  mine  to verigy  the sufficiency of 
the ventilation. 
3)  Applies  to  recent ventilators, but not to old  ones. 
4)  These  are being carried out. 
5)  Applicable to some  coalfields,  but not all. 
6)  Carried out by  means  of  network plans  in ventilation calculations made  by  electronic computers. 
7)  Not  systematically recorded. Proposals f'rom  the Mines  Safety Coaaiaaion 
f'or the improvement  of' safety md 
health condi  tiona in coalminea 
b)  in addition 
- the  lengths  and  average  cross-sections  of 
the  roadway 
- the  calculated resistances 
V/30 
- the  angles  of  inclination,  particularly at 
the  ends  of  the  inclined and vertical section 
- the positions of  the  air doors  and  control 
doors,  and  of  the barriers 
5.  Inspection of ventilation conditions 
In each mine,  there  should be  a  systematic analysis 
of  the ventilation system,  at least once  a  year 
and  after any  major modification o£  the  system, 
in order to detect  any  probable  cases  of 
instability under  the normal  operating conditions 
In addition,  cases  of instability which may  be 
caused by  the  introduction of additional  aeromotive 
sources,  or  the  changing  or elimination of  the 
existing aeromotive  sources,  should  also be 
examined 
6.  Informing  the  personnel 
Taking  into account  the  importance  of ventilation 
for  the whole  of  the  underground workings,  each 
responsible person  should be  informed  of ventilation 
conditions within his  own  field. 
Furthermore it is essential that  separate meetings 
should be  held  once  a  year at least,  as well  as 
after any  major modification in the ventilation 
system,  at which  the  colliery ventilation engineer 
will explain  the  ventilation conditions  obtaining 
at  the pit,  together with  any modifications which 
have  recently been made,  in  the  presence of: 
a)  the  management  officials,  the  technical 
departments,  the  chief of  the  rescue  team and 
the  officials  responsible for ventilation; 
b)  the  local officials,  each  in  respect  of his 
own  speciality. 
On  these  occasions,  attention should be  drawn  to 
districts where  instabilities are  already  likely in 
normal  conditions  and,  in particular cases  of 
instability which  make  the  occurrence  of  a  fire 
likely. 
7.  Exercises  on  plans 
Once  a  year at least,  the  management  or the 
competent  mining authority should organise  an 
exercise  on  plans  covering measures  to be  taken 
in  the event of an underground fire.  This  should 
be  attended by  the mine  owner  or his  representative, 
the ventilation engineer and  the  competent officials 
responsible  for  the organisation of fire fighting 
and  rescue  operations. 
1)  Now  being studied by  the users. 
Germall\1 
B'.R./Wph  Saar 
C+C'  c 
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c  c 
c  C' 
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C'  c 3) 
C'  C' 
C'  4)  E 
2)  Headlines  for  the  evaluation of pressure measurements  are now  being drafted. 
3)  This  instruction is  not usually  given at separate meetings. 
4)  Will be  regulated by  the  fire-fighting plan. 
Belgium  France 
E  C' 
E  C' 
E  C' 
E  c 
C'  E  1) 
C'  E  1) 
C'  c 
C'  C' 
C'  c 
C'  C' 
E  5) 
5)  These will be  organised after implementation of  the  Budryk  plan,  but  the ventilation officials  and 
the  rescue  centres  already  contact  each other from  time  to  time. 
United 
Italy  Kingdom 
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8.  Position of  regulation doors 
V/31 
When  doors  are necessary  for  regulating ventilation 
they  should be placed as  near as  possible  to 
roadway  junctions,  taking  into account  other 
requirements,  in order  to  facilitate  access  in 
smoky  conditions. 
9.  Measures  and  equipment  for  slowing-down 
ventilation 
In all collieries,  devices  for rapidly  slowing-
down  ventilation in order  to  stabilise it shall be 
installed in all intake  airways,  subject  to 
exceptions  to be  previously  determined,  after each 
roadway  junction or branch,  and  as near  as  possible 
to  it. 
10.  Instructions  to officials  in  the  event  of 
underground  fire 
Apart  from  the  usual  prov~s~ons regarding  the 
obligation  to attack  any  seat of  a  fire  in order 
to  extinguish it as  soon  as  possible,  and  to 
inform the officials  and  managementwithout  delay, 
there  should be  instructions  to officials laying 
down  the  other measures  to be  taken  in  the  event 
of  a  mine  fire  in order  to  slow  down  ventilation 
so  as  to  avoid  an  increase  in  the  air supply  to 
the  seat of  the fire. 
11.  Instructions  to management  officials  in  the  event 
of  underground  fire 
No  decision to modify  the ventilation is  to be 
taken  by  the management  staff without  a  study being 
made  of  the  consequences,  by  means  of  application 
of  the  theory  of  the stabilisation of ventilation, 
and without  the help  of plans  and  ventilation 
schemes  which  have  previously been  prepared in 
respect  of all the  possible  causes  result  from 
the  fire  or  from  the  structure of  the mine 
(ventilation by  multiple  fans  etc ..  ). 
Gel'11181lY 
B'.R./Wph  Saar 
Belgium  France 
A  1)  A  2)  E  3) 
A  4)  c  E  5) 
A  6)  A  7)  E  8) 
C'  A  7)  E  C'  9) 
1)  Owing  to  the different  local  conditions  a  uniform regulation would  be  unsuitable. 
2)  The  decision is  to be  taken  by  the head  of  the  fire-fighting unit. 
3)  As  soon  as  possible,  but not  automatically. 
United 
Italy  Kingdom 
C'  A  1) 
C'  A 
C' 
c  C' 
4)  Experience has  shown  that it is more  convenient  to have  a  central store of materials  for  constructing 
regulation doors. 
5)  Now  being studied by  the  users. 
6)  The  ventilation must  not be modified except  on  the  express  order of  the officials in charge. 
7)  The  decision is  to be  taken  by  the  leader of  the  fire-fighting unit. 
8)  Not  supervisors  level but  thechiefs of rescue  teams  and  the  rescue  centres. 
9)  To  be specified.after implementation of  the  Budryk  plan. V/32 
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II - CONDITIONS  UNDER  WHICH  EXEMPTION  MIGHT  BE  GRANTED  TO 
RAISE  MAXIMUM  PERMITTED  CH4  LIMITS  (12th Report  of  the 
Mines  Safety  and Health  Conmussion,  Annex  V) 
2)  Prerequisites for granting exemptions  to maximum 
permitted  CH4  limits 
2.1.  A reasoned  application  from  the  producer 
2.2.  Documents  to be  enclosed: 
a)  a  forecast  on  the  emission of  firedamp  (2.2.1) 
b)  a  ventilation forecast  (2.2.2) 
c)  firedamp  capture  (2.2.3) 
d)  other methods  of  reducing  firedamp  emission 
(2.2.4) 
3)  General  conditions  for  raising maximum  permissible 
CH4  levels 
The  conditions  under which  an  exemption  is granted 
are  to be  specified by  the Mines  Inspectorate.  The 
regulations  laid down  by  the  Inspectorate,  as  they 
apply  in normal  cases,  remain  in force  unless 
otherwise expressly stated in the  exemption. 
In particular, it should be  pointed out  that  CH 
monitoring with hand-held  instruments  prescribe~ 
by national  regulations  is not  to be  discontinued 
where  automatic  CH4  monitoring is used  and will 
have  to be  carried out  in accordance with  the 
provisions  in force. 
3.1.  Automatic monitoring of  CH4  content  in the 
airflow,  alarms. 
3.1.1.  Monitoring of  CH4  content  in  the  airflow is 
obligatory if an  exemption is  to be  granted. 
Monitoring must  be  carried out: 
- automatically  and 
- continuously  and  with  sufficient frequency  by 
means  of reliable  and  accurate  equipment. 
3.1.2.  Depending  on  local  requirements,  readings 
should be  monitored either centrally or 
locally.  It should be  specified whether all 
readings  or only  some  are  to  be  recorded, 
e.g.  whether  recording is  required in  the 
case  of  readings  from  a  measuring head or 
installation located at a  point where  the 
full  amount  of firedamp  emitted from  the 
working  area is mixed  with  the air current 
(in principle at  the  end of  the  return airway). 
3.1.3.  The  way  in which  firedamp  content is  to be 
monitored  (mean  content  in the  airflow or  local 
German;y 
N.R./Wph  Saar 
C+NRP  c 
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content)  must  be  clearly specified.  t---.:C=-+...:N:..::RP=----!----'C=---+--c=--+--C=---+--=2:...)_4 _...:1;.!.)_----I 
The  following  points  should  also be  specified: 
3.1.4.  The  location of  the points  at which  CH4  content 
is  to be monitored,  as  these points  may  vary 
according  to  the  type of working  areas  and  to 
the wording  of  the  exemption.  f--:C::..;+...:;N:.:;RP::,_-I----=C::.___-l-__;C::..__+--C::..__+-!:.2!...)  --+-..!1-.t..)_~ 
A CHA  recorder may,  in particular,  be  required 
at  tlie  return end  of  the  face,  at right angles 
to  the electricity supply  devices  in the return 
airway if such  devices  exist and  at  the far  end 
of  the  return airway  as  indicated in p. p  3. 1. 2.  C+NRP 
1)  not applicable 
2)  the  regulations  do  not envisage  exemptions. 
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3. 1. 5.  The  frequency  of  the  checks  and  calibration 
of  the measuring heads  of  the  automatic 
monitoring  equipment. 
3.1.6.  In  the  case  of  failure  of  the  automatic 
monitoring equipment  the  exemption  should  be 
lapsed.  However,  if such  failure  affects  only 
one  measuring head  and  lasts  less  than  24  hours, 
the  exemption may  be  maintained  under  special 
conditions,  including  in particular intensified 
monitoring  and  measurements  taken with hand-
H.R./Wph  Saar 
C+NRP  C 
Belgium  France 
c  c 
United 
Italy  Kinsdom 
2)  1) 
held instruments.  1  __  c~+~N~RP=--+--~C~--+---~c--~~--~C---4--~2~)---+--~l~)~~ 
3.1. 7.  A visual and/or  a  acoustic  alarm must  be 
triggered off at a  continuously manned  location, 
if the permissible  CH4  limits  are  exceeded. 
3.2.  Additional monitoring of  CH4  content  using 
hand-held  instruments.  Additional monitoring 
(supplementing  the  routine monitoring prescribed 
in  the  regulations)  using hand-held  instruments 
may  be  required in places where  an increase  in 
c  c  c  2)  1) 
CH 4  is  feared  likely.  1  __  c~+....:N~RP=--i-----c::;__f-_..::.c  _  __,l--..::c_-+---=2:.£)  _  __,__....:1~)~--l 
3.3.  Switching  on  and  off of electrical equipment. 
3.3.1.  When  the  maximum  permitted  CH4  levels  are 
exceeded,  the electrical installations  in the 
area in question  should,  if not  intrinsically 
safe,  cut  out  immediately  and  preferably 
automatically.  Multi-powered  (by electricity 
or  compressed  air)  auxiliary  fans  might  be  re-
commended. 
3.3.2.  Resumption  of power  should be by manual 
operation only,  by  a  specially appointed person 
or another person  answerable  to him  and  carryin~ 
C+NRP  c  c  c  2)  1) 
out his  instructions.  1 _..::.C~+N~RP~__, __  ..::c __  -+---=C---r--....:c~__,r--....:2~)--+--c::;__~ 
3.4.  Ventilation measures. 
3.4.1.  Care  must  be  taken  to ensure  that  the  quantity 
of air and  the minimum  air speed  are  such  that 
the  mixture  of  firedamp with air prevents  the 
formation  of  CH4  roof  layers. 
3.4.2.  Where  there is  a  risk of  CH4  roof  layers,  the 
air speed must  be  subject  to  continuous  auto-. 
matic monitoring  accompanied  by  warning  lights 
and/or  acoustic signals  at a  ~ontinuously manned 
C+NRP  c  c  c  2)  C' 
control point.  ~C~+~N~RP=-~--C~-+--~C---~-~C-'_~_..::2~)--+_....:A::;_  _  _, 
3.5.  Shotfiring operations. 
Shotfiring operations will remain  subject  to 
the  regulations  in force  in the  various 
countries. 
3.6.  Use  of light alloys. 
No  light alloys may  be  used where  the  use  of 
C+NRP  c  c  c  _yes  c 
such  components  would present  an  ignition  hazard~C~+~N~RP=--4-~C::;__+-_..:::.C_~r--..::c  _  __, _____  +--....:C~'-~ 
3.7.  Use  of diesel engines. 
In areas  for which  exemption is  granted in 
respect of admissible  CH4  content,  diesel  engi-
nes  may  be  used only  if suitable precautions 
are  taken  to ensure  that such use  does  not 
create additional hazards  or increase existing 
ones. 
3. 8.  Evacuation of workings. 
Should  the maximum  CH4  content  in the  general 
body  of  the  air or localized areas  be  exceeded 
by  a specific amount  the working areas  must  be 
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evacuated.  An  evacuation procedure must  be 
drawn  up  in advance,  and  the  procedure  for  alert-
ing personnel  laid down.  The  importance  of  a 
suitable,  intrinsically safe  connnunications 
network,  or of other warning devices  should be 
stressed. 
3.9.  Informing  and  instructing personnel. 
A procedure  should be  laid down  whereby  personne 
and  possibly  their representatives working  in 
areas  subject  to  an  increase in  CH4  limits  are 
informed.  Specific instructions should be 
given  to  supervisory officials and  officials 
authorized  to  take  action where  maximum 
permissible  limits  are  exceeded or where 
evacuation is  required. 
3.10.  Control by  the  Inspectorate. 
The  various  information documents  concerning 
working  operations  in areas  for which  an 
increase  in maximum  CH4  levels  has  been 
authorized must  at all times  be  available  to 
the officials of  the  local Inspectorate. 
4.  Measures  relating  to  the  granting of  exemptions 
to  increase maximum  permissible  CH4  levels  in 
special cases. 
In special cases,  measures  must  be  laid down  in 
addition  to  those mentioned  in Chapter 3. 
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F.  MECHANISATION 
Gel'III8ZI;y'  Proposals  from the Mines  Safety Comaission 
for the  improvement  of safety and 
health condi  tiona in coal  mines  N.R./Wph  Saar 
»elgiUIII  France 
I  - RECOMMENDATIONS  REGARDING  LOCOMOTIVE  EQUIPMENT 
(First Report  of  the  Safety Commisswn,  p.20  -
German  Text - April  1959) 
1.  New  locomotives  must  be  equipped with fixed, 
rigid cabins which at all times  give  the driver 
a  clear view  along  the  roadway,  ahead  and 
behind,  without  any  need  for him  to put his 
head  out  of  the  cabin.  (Fixed  cabins  are 
understood  to  cover  those  forming  a  part of 
the structure or which  can be  removed  only 
laboriously with  special  tools). 
2.  The  locomotives  in service must  be modified 
to meet  this  requirement, 
- locomotives which  cannot be modified should 
gradually  be  withdrawn  from  service, within 
a  period to be  fixed  by  the  responsible 
inspectorate,  or 
- only be  used  in  roadways  which  are wide 
and  high  enough  to eliminate  accident risk 
3.  For particular types  of  locomotive,  or in 
certain circumstances,  the  responsible Inspectorate 
can  grant exceptions  from  the  above  regulations, 
provided  that safety regulations  of equal  stringency 
are  laid down. 
II - RECOMMENDATIONS  REGARDING  THE  NEUTRALISATION  OF 
DIESEL-ENGINE  EXHAUST  FUMES  (First Report of  the 
Safety  Commission,  p.  23  - German  text - April 
1959) 
- General  use  of better starters 
- Intensified research into improving  combustion 
by  the  use  of  catalysts 
- Draw  attention  to  the  existence of  this  process 
- Continuation of  the  research  into  an  automatic 
transmission system,  which  would make  it possible 
to  give  Diesel  engines  a  constant  rpm. 
Subsequent  resumption of trials with  the 
Houdry  carbon monoxide  purification process. 
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1)  In  the  case  of main-road  locomotives,  with the  exception of  "a clear view behind",  which  is 
difficult technically. 
2)  No  application made  to gateroad  locomotives,  because  the  risk of accident  is  increased. 
3)  For  trolley  locomotives. 
4)  For other  than  trolley  locomotives. 
5)  Not  applicable. 
6)  The  problem of  the  low  CO  content of Diesel engine exhaust  fumes  is solved by blocking  the 
injection pump  at  a  pumping  capacity at which  the  CO  content shows  a  marked rise. 
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G - HEALTH  IN  COAL  MINES  AND  MEDICAL 
Proposals  from the Mines  Safety Commission 
for the improvement  of safety and 
health conditions in coalmines 
I  - DUST  CONTROL 
RECOMMENDATION  EMBODYING  DIRECTIVES  OF  SUPPRESSING 
DUST  CONCENTRATIONS  IN  UNDERGROUND  WORKINGS  (8th  Report 
of the Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission,  Annex  VI) 
With  due  regard  to  the basic principles  set out 
and,  in particular,  to  the need  for  the  different 
dust  control processes  to be  combined  to  suit locally 
prevailing conditions,  the  dust  control methods  should 
be  applied in accordance with  the  directives  of  the 
recommendation,  namely: 
A.~ 
1)  Coal winning 
i.L - Seam  injection 
- Is  any  attention paid  to  the  degree 
of efficiency of the different processes 
suggested? 
1. 2.  - Spr~ying 
2)  Stowing 
a)  In  general: 
2.1.  Prior sprinkling of  the  soil 
2.2.  Prior sprinkling of  the  site to  be  stowed 
b)  When  hydraulic  stowing is employed: 
2. 3.  Specific consumption  of ventilated 
air maintained at  the  lowest possible  level 
2.4.  Use  of soil of  fine  mechanical  composition 
and sufficiently humid  to prevent  subsequent 
fissuring during  transport  and  forced ventila-
tion 
2. 5.  Prevention of air stagnation  in  the  stowage 
zone  when  tipping  the  goaf 
3)  Caving 
3.1.  Seam  injection 
· 3.2.  Spraying 
B.  SHAFTS  AND  ROADWAYS 
4)  Drilling of mine  chambers 
(shot holes) 
4.1.  Wet  drilling,  dry  dust extraction 
5)  Shotfiring 
5.1.  Use  of wet  tamps  or gelatine pastes, 
supplemented by  previous  sprinkling 
of  the floor  and  sides  of  the  roadways 
and  the dirt resulting from previous 
shots. 
5.2.  Use  of water screen where wet  tamps 
cannot be  used 
6)  Loading of excavated material 
6.1.  Abundant  and  systematic sprinkling of 
excavated material 
1)  Only wet  tamps  are used. 
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7)  Machine  drivers 
7 .1.  Suitable distribution of  the  dust 
extraction and ventilation flow  rates 
so as  to keep  the  dust  against  the 
drivage  front at  the  maximum  distance 
away  from  the  machine  operators 
7.2.  Purification of  the  dusty  air before 
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it is diluted in the  general ventilation 
system 
8)  Various  rock working operations 
8.1.  Use  of wet mechanical  picks 
9)  Various  material handling operations 
9.1.  Arrangements  for withdrawal,  transfer, 
tipping  and  loading  (e. g.  determining 
the minimum  height  of  fall,  ensuring 
that meterials  are  completely  tipped 
out  at  loading  and  unloading points) 
9.2.  Use  of  additional products  ensuring or 
maintaining surface wetting 
II - ORGANISATION  OF  SERVICES 
RECOMMENDATION  ON  THE  ORGANISATION  OF  SPECIAL 
SERVICES  RESPONSIBLE  FOR  THE  INSPECTION  OF  DUST 
CONDITIONS  IN  UNDERGROUND  WORKINGS  (8th  Report 
of  the  Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission,  Annex  VII) 
The  Commission  recommends  the  following methods 
of  operating: 
1.  The  managementof  each pit shall appoint  from 
among  its staff a  person who  shall be  responsible 
for  dust control  and  is not directly  concerned 
with production  and  output. 
2.  The  said person,  and  any  assistants,  shall be 
responsible  for  dust  control operations,  any 
improvements  required,  and  dust  sampling. 
3.  Dust  is  to be  sampled  in all working places. 
The  frequency  and  location of  sampling or 
measurements  are  to be  recorded  in  accordance 
with  the  standards  laid down  in the various 
countries  and  made  available  to  the  appropriate 
administrations  and  the mine's  medical  department. 
4.  A department belonging  to  the  company  or 
coalfield shall assemble  the  results of 
measurements,  be  responsible  for  training 
persons  in charge  of  dust  control operations 
in each mine,  and  work  out  and  co-ordinate 
instructions  for  use  by  the  latter. 
5.  The  special services  belonging  to  the 
company  or coalfield shall keep  in  touch with 
the  relevant  technical  and  medical  departments 
so  as  to  take  any  precautions  needed  for  reducing 
inadmissible dust  concentrations  or moving  staff 
following  the  results  obtained during  the periodical 
medical examinations. 
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III - RECOMMENDATIONS  ON  THE  FIXING  OF  CLIMATIC 
LIMITS  (The  unabridged  text is  reproduced  in 
doc.  3034/4/62) 
1.1. 
1.2. 
The  basis  is  the  American  effective  temperature 
(O  eff basic scale). 
Air velocities  above  3  metres/sec should  be 
considered  as  only  3  metres/sec in determining 
the American effective  temperature. 
The  temperature  data must  be  given  so  as 
to make  possible  a  comparison  on  the 
basis  indicated under  1. l. 
1. 3.  The  climatic limits  determined shall be 
maximum  values. 
1.4. 
More  favourable  climatic values  for  the workers 
shall remain  unchanged. 
There will be  further  investigation  into  the 
effectivepess  and  accuracy  of  the various 
climatic indices. 
2.  Determination  of  a  maximum  climatic value 
2. 2.  Work  on  location is  forbidden  in working 
places where  the  temperature  exceeds  320  eff A 
(basic scale),  excepting  the  cases  named  in  2. 3. 
and  2. 4. 
2. 3.  An  exception  can  be  made  to  the  ban  on 
working  on  location in  temperatures 
above  320  eff A (basic scale)  if the  competent 
authority  has  given permission  and  the workers 
in question have  been medically  examined. 
In this  case  the  following  conditions  must  also  be 
fulfilled: 
2.3.1.  The  responsible  authority  can  only  issue 
permission for  a  fixed period  and  for  given 
working  operations. 
2.3.2.  The  work  must  be  carried out  under medical 
supervision. 
Guidelines  must  be worked  out,  in collaboration 
with medical  experts,  covering the medical 
examination en  vis  aged  under  2. 3. 
2.3.3.  Work  must  not  continue  uninterrupted 
for more  than  one  hour.  A suitable break 
must  then be  arranged  in  a  better  'climate'. 
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The  duration of  uninterrupted working  time,  as 
well  as  the  duration  and  frequency  of  the 
breaks  and  the  climatic range  in which  this 
break is spent,  as  also all other necessary 
provisions  are  to be  laid down  in writing by 
the  competent  authority  together with  the 
responsible  doctor before  the work  begins. 
2.3.4.  Acclimatised persons  must  be  chosen.  Persons 
over  40  years  of  age  should not be  put  to 
this work. 
Persons  under  21  and  over  45  years  of  age 
must  not  be  put  to  this work. 
2. 4.  An  exception  can also be  made  to  the  ban  on 
working  on  location  in  temperatures  above 
320  eff A (basic scale) if danger  threatens 
or in special  circumstances  calling for 
inunediate  action. 
In such  case,  however: 
2.4.1.  The  competent  authority  and  the  responsible 
doctor must  be  inunediately  informed. 
2.4.2.  This  work  must  be  performed  as  soon  as  possible 
under  the  conditions  listed in 2.3.1.  to 2.3.4. 
3.  Climatic range  between  32° eff A and  280  eff A 
(basic scale) 
3. 1. 1.  Only  persons  shown  by  medical  examination  to 
be  suitable can  be  employed  in this  climatic 
range. 
The  medical  examination must  pay  particular 
attention to  the heart  and  to blood  circulation. 
Persons  continually  employed  in this  climatic 
range  must  be  examined medically at least  once 
a  year. 
In addition,  the  following  provisions  apply: 
3.1.2.  As  soon  as  a  working-point  reaches  a  temperature 
above  280  eff A (basic scale)  the  competent 
authority must  be  informed  in writing. 
3.1.3.  The  length of stay  in  the  climatic range  between 
30°  and  32° eff A (basic scale)  is restricted to 
5  hours,  and  in the  range  between  28°  and  300 
eff A (basic scale)  to  6  hours. 
3.1.4.  For work  in  a  climatic range between 28°  and  32° 
eff A (basic scale)  a  method  of  payment 
corresonding  to  these  conditions  must  be  applied 
to eliminate  any  overloading. 
3.1.5.  The  provisions  quoted in 3.1.3  and  2.1.4 apply 
to all persons who,  during one  shift, have  to 
work  more  than half  the  time  of  that shift in 
one  of  the  climatic ranges  mentioned  above. 
1)  Laid  down  generally  in the  mine  rescue plans. 
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4)  .•.  ban  on work  on  location in excessively high  temperatures  ••• 
5)  If 300  eff A (basic scale)  is reached or exceeded,  the Mines  Inspectorate must  be  informed. 
6)  Six hours. 
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IV  - RECOMMENDATIONS  REGARDING  MEDICAL  EXAMINATION 
(Second  Report  of  the  Mines  Safety  Commission,  p.  79) 
1.  Pre-Entry Medical  Examinations 
- All  applicants  for  employment  at collieries 
should undergo  a  pre-entry medical  examination. 
- This  must  establish  that  the  applicant 
shows  no  symptoms  rendering him unfit for 
such  employment. 
The  pre-entry medical  examination must  include: 
- a  general  examination 
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- such  special examination  as  may  be  deemed  necessary 
for  the purpose. 
- The  examinations  effected must  include,  as 
regards  the  chest,  a  radiograph or radiophotograph 
of  format  not  smaller  than  70  x  70  mm. 
- The  latter to be  supplemented if need  be  by  a 
standard-format  (1  :  1)  radiophotograph. 
- The  nature  of  these  examinations  and 
- the practical details,  together with 
- the  criteria on  which  the  doctor  should base 
his  findings, 
- should  be  defined by  medical  experts. 
- In  the  case  of  recruitment for work,  whether 
below or  above  ground,  where  the  worker will 
be  exposed  to a  dust  hazard,  the  examination 
must  show  a  normal  pulmonary  image. 
- The  concept  of normal  pulmonary  image  must 
be  defined by  medical  experts. 
- These  are  to be  regarded  as  minimum  medical 
recommendations. 
- The  points  concerning  the  number  and  type  of 
examinations  to be  carried out, 
- the effecting of  radiological examinations 
- the  definition of  the  normal  pulmonary  image 
- are subject  to  review  in each  country 
- whenever  this  is felt  to be  appropriate  in 
the  light of progress  in medical  and  radiological 
knowledge 
- working  conditions,  and 
- preventive measures. 
2.  Special Examinations 
a)  The  object  of  special medical  examinations 
should be -to establish - taking into account, 
according  to  circumstances,  the  opinions  of: 
- the  training 
- vocational-guidance  and  applied psychology 
- and  other services  concerned  a  worker's  fitness 
for  certain specific occupations 
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Such  examinations  are  essential in  the  case  of 
jobs: 
- Which,  either in  themselves  or  owing 
to  the  conditions  under which  they  are performed, 
involve  a  special hazard  to  the  worker himself 
or  to others  as  regards  health and/or safety. 
- which  involve special health or safety  require-
ments, 
- or which  demand  particular physical aptitutes 
or characterological qualities. 
No  attempt  has  been made  here  to list in full 
the  cases  in which  special examinations  are necessary 
this being left to  the  competent  authorities  in 
each  country. 
Examples  include: 
- winding  enginemen, 
- staple pit enginemen, 
- motormen  (drivers  of  locomotives,  mobile 
haulers  and  surface vehicles), 
- workers  assigned  to  hot workings, 
- all those  employed  on  cage handling. 
Routine  examinations  during  emplo~ent 
a)  Periodic health  checks 
- The  object here is  to establish whether  the 
subject is still fit for  duty, 
- to detect  any  symptoms  of  occupational disease 
at  the earliest possible stage, 
- where  appropriate  to help  supervise  the  subject's 
health generally. 
- All personnel  should undergo  such  check-ups  at 
intervals. 
- The  interval is  fixed  at  two  years. 
- The  interval is  reduced  for workers  under  21. 
1)  The  interval is one  year; 
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- The  interval should be  considered  as  a  maximum 
figure. 
This  interval  can  also be  reduced: 
- if the state of health of  a  worker  indicates 
that such  a  reduction is desirable; 
- in relations  to  the  type  of work  performed; 
- because  of  the  nature  of  the place at which  the 
work  is being done. 
b)  Medical  examinations  on  specific occasions 
1.  In  the  case  of  reassignment 
- Workers  whom  it is proposed  to  assign 
to  jobs  involving hazards  not previously 
taken  into account  for  the man  concerned 
should be  re-examined. 
2.  Medical  examination  following  absence  from work 
- Where  a  man 
1 s  return  to work  after an  illness 
or accident  involves  risk  to  the  safety of 
himself or others,  he  may  be  subjected  to  a 
special examination, 
- the  type  and  extent of which  should be  fixed 
in each  case  according  to  the  circumstances. 
V - GUIDELINES  CONCERNING  THE  DESIGN  AND  USE  OF  COAL-GETTING 
AND  HEADING  MACHINES  RELATING  TO  THE  REDUCTION  OF  AIRBORNE 
DUST  (11th  Report  of  the Mines  Safety  and  Health 
ColiDllission,  annex  XI) 
Coal-getting machines  (8) 
- General  observations  on  the quality of air entering 
working areas,  water  infusion where  possible; 
maintenance  of  cutting horizons. 
Directives  for  coal producers  on  the  use of drum  power-
loaders  (9) 
-water spraying on  power  loaders  (9.1) 
- location of  sprays  (9. 2) 
a)  internal 
b)  external 
- avoidance  of jet blockage  by  adequate  pressure  and 
outflow of water  (9.3) 
- minimizing coal fragmentation by  adequate  travel  speed 
of power  loaders,  by  suitable drum  speed  and  by 
maintaining picks  in  good  condition  (9.4) 
Directives  for  constructors  on  the  construction of  drum 
power  loaders  (10) 
To  ensure minimal breakage  of coal: 
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local doctors  or an  industrial medical officer. Proposals  from the Mines  Safety Coamiasion 
for the improvement  of safety and 
health conditions in coalmines 
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1.  picks  should be  as  few  as  possible;  their shape 
and  distribution on  the  drum  should be  such  that 
the  coal  is not broken  unnecessarily; 
2.  the  body  of  the  drum  should be  designed  to  transfer 
the  cut  coal continuously  to  the  conveyor  to  avoid 
build-up,  the need  for  clearing up  and  consequent 
secondary breakage  of  the product,  as well  as 
projection into the air stream; 
3.  the  drum  should be  capable  of  removing more  coal 
than it cuts; 
4.  the  speed of  travel of  the  power  loader should  be 
variable while  in motion; 
5.  the  drum  speed  should be variable;  a  maximum  pick 
speed of  4 m/sec  is suggested; 
6.  provision should be  made  for  adjusting  the  height 
if the drum  to  avoid  cutting in the  roof  and  floor; 
it is  an  advantage  to  provide facilities  for 
automatic  control by  suitable sensing devices 
wherever  these  can be  used. 
To  ensure effective spraying,  machines  should be  provided 
with  {11): 
ll.R./Wph  Saar 
_y_es  A  1) 
yes  A  1) 
yes  A  1) 
yes  A  1) 
yes  A  1) 
yes  A  1) 
Belgium  Frsnce 
C'  C' 
C'  C' 
C'  C' 
E  C' 
E  C' 
















1.  a  water filtering arrangement;  1  ____  c_'--~----A  __ 
1 _>-+--~C-'  __  ~--~C-'  __  ~--~E~--+---c~·--~ 
2.  piping  to  take  the water  to  the  inside of  the  drum; 
the  junction between  the body  of  the machine  and 
the  drum  should be  made  by  a  gland  designed  for 
pressure well  above  the working pressure; 
1 
____  c_'--~----A  __  1 _>-+----c_•  __  ~----C-'  __  ~  ___  E  ____  +-__  C_'  __  ~ 
3.  distribution channels  in  the  drum  to  take  the water 
to  the  picks;  1  ___  c~'--+---A  __ 
1 _>-+--~c-'  -+--~c-'  __  +-__  ..;:;E;...__ __  +-_c~·----1 
4.  pipes with  a  sufficiently large internal diameter 
to  allow  an  adequate  supply of water without excessive 
loss  of  pressure;  account  must be  taken of the fact 
that  already or in  the near future  production 
methods  may  call for water supplies of,  for 
example,  200  1/min at a  pressure of 15  atm;  I---C-'_~----A  __ 
1
_)-+--C-'  __  -+----"c_•  __  ~  ___  E  ____  +-_c_'_---t 
5.  one  or more  systems  to  feed  the external sprays; 
the position of the  jets  (for example  on  the  body 
of  the  machine  and/or  on  the  cowl),  the direction 
of projection,  the  diameter  and  operating angle 
of  the  jets should all be  adaptab~e to operating 
conditions. 
To  complete  the  dust  suppression  arrangements,  particularly 
in view  of  t~1.e  use  of more  and  more  powerful machines, 
it is  advisable  (12): 
a)  to provide  an  automatic water control system to 
ensure  that water is  flowing before  the  drum 
can  rotate;  an  "override"  system should be 
provided for use  by  fitting staff only; 
b)  to design  the  machine  to permit  the fitting of 
a  cowl. 
The  possibility of fitting a  dust extractor to  the machine 
should be  allowed  for  in case  the  systems  already 
described prove  inadequate. 
Coal  ploughs  (13) 
a)  it is essential that seams  be  infused correctly 
on  ploughed faces 
b)  where  infusion is  impossible or insufficient, 
plough  runs  should be  sprayed either continuously 
or duriug  the passage  of  the plough only; 
alternatively,  sprays  should be fitted on  the 
plough itself. 
C'  A  1)  C' 
C'  A  1)  C' 
C'  A  1)  C' 
C'  A  1)  C' 
c  A  1)  C'  c' 
c  A  1)  C' 
1)  The  mines  inspectorate  cannot  (legally)  prescribe  conditions  to  the  constructors  of machiniery. 
However,  the mine  owners  can  only  use  machiniery which  complies with  the  above  requirements. 
E  c' 
E  E 
E  E 
E  E 
E 
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c)  the methods  outlined for external spraying on  the 
drum  power  loaders  apply equally to ploughs. 
1 
....  ~c~--~--~A~l-)-+---------r---c~·--~--=E----t--=E  _____ 
1 
d)  in addition,  spraying must be  adequate on  the 
plough  runs  and  at  the discharge points  between 
faces  and  transport roads.  1  ....  ~c~--~--~A~l-)-+---c~·--~---c~·--~--=E----r--=E~---I 
- Directives  on  road heading machines 
General observations  on  working conditions 
a)  in the  seam  (14); 
b)  the  importance  of dust:  the need for de-dusters  (15); 
c)  the need for  cooperation between  coal producers  and 
the makers  of machines  and  of de-dusting equipment 
(16). 
- Technical  measures  relating to ventilation and  the filtra-
tl.on  of  dust 
a)  in general,  the  forcing  of ventilation through 
ducts  ( 17 a); 
b)  the particular case  of  auxiliary extraction 
ventilation  (17b); 
c)  air filtration  (18). 
Recommendations  on  the  construction of heading machines 
19.  The  number  of  cutting picks  on  a  heading machine 
should be  reduced  to  the minimum;  they  should be 
of  such  shape  and  so arranged  on  their mountings  as 
to  reduce  fragmentation  as  far as  possible. 
20.  A water supply  should be provided on  the machine  to 
give sufficient output  and pressure  for each  cutting 
tool;  the  arrangements  are similar to  those  for 
power  loaders. 







A  1)  C'  C'  E  C' 
A  1)  C'  C'  E  C' 
A  1)  C'  C'  E  C' 
A  1)  C'  C'  E  C' 
A  1)  C'  C'  C' 
A  1)  C'  C'  C' V/45 
H - PSYCHOLOGICAL  AND  SOCIALOGICAL  FACTORS  AFFECTING  SAFETY 
Gel"111811;Y  Proposals  from the Mines  Safety Coamiaaion 
for the improvement  of'  aaf'ety and 
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I  - RECOMMENDATIONS  ON  THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  AND  SOCIOLOGICAL 
FACTORS  AFFECTING  SAFETY  (3rd report of  the M1nes  and 
Safety  Commission,  p.  425) 
1.  Measures  which will make  it possible for 
workmen  to recognise dangers  and  to  carry 
out  their work  in such  a  way  that these 
dangers  are  avoided. 
1.1.  Recognising dangers 
1.1.1.  Before starting work  in  a  district,  a 
section of  a  working  or  a  workingpoint  and 
before  any  planned major  change  in the 
manpower  deployment  or in working  conditions 
it is  important  to  check all the  safety precautions 
tomeet  any  dangers  to be  encountered. 
1. 1. 2.  During  the work,  regular reports  on  the 
following points must  be  prepared  on  the 
basis  of  the safety conditions which  have 
to be  observed  under  continuous  supervision: 
a)  changes  in operating conditions 
b)  accidents  or incidents 
c)  dangerous  situation encountered during work 
The  data brought  together in  these  reports 
should be  systematically assessed with a 
view  to  improving or adapting  the  safety 
precautions  in force. 
1.1.3.  After  the work  has  been  finished,  the  data 
assembled  on  the basis  of daily experience 
should be  used  to  prepare  a  report of 
experience which  should at  least  include 
information 
regarding  the winning methods  used, 
the  dangers  which  have  arisen and  the 
precautions  taken  to deal with  them, 
together with  any  accidents,  incidents  and 
dangerous  situations which have  occurred 
during  the working  operations 
1.2.  Making  known  the  dangers  to all  concerned 
1.2.1.  Before starting work  in  a  district,  a 
section of  a  working or  a  workingpoint or 
in  the  event of  a  major  change  in the 
operating conditions,  it is advisable  to 
arrange  a  discussion between  representatives 
of  the  management,  supervisory staff and 
members  of  the safety sevices  as  ~-tell  as 
the workers  concerned  or  their representatives, 
in order: 
- to  inform each  individual with  regard  to 
the work  envisaged 
- to study  in detail the work  to  be  carried 
out. 
c  c  C' 
c 
C+C'  C+C'  3) 
C+C'  C'  C' 
C'  C'  4) 
C'  C'  4) 
C'  c  4) 
C'  c  4) 
1)  No  report is drawn  up,  verbal or written instructions  given to  the personnel  concerned. 
2)  As  regards  the pattern of work  and  not actual operations as mentioned in the text. 
3)  Such  situations  are discussed at management  or supervisor level,  no  report is drawn  up. 
4)  No  report is drawn  up  although  account is  taken of experience gained. 
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- to settle upon  the method  of work  C'  C'  C'  C' 
1. 2. 2.  The  workers  concerned should be  informed by 
the  most  appropriate means  of the method  of 
work  chosen.  c  c  C'  C  C'  C' 
1.2.3.  During  the execution of the work,  the management 
and  the  supervisory staff should  refer to  the 
regulations  and  instructions  to be  observed 
as  often as  necessary  to  counteract  the  effects 
of habit. 
1.2.4.  If it is  considered necessary  to issue new 
safety instructions,  these  should be  brought 
regularly  to  the  notice of  every worker 
concerned. 
c  c 
c  c 
C'  c  C' 
C'  c  C'  3) 
1. 2.  5.  Reports  made  by  each  of  the workmen  regarding 
dangerous  situations which arise during  the 
work  should be  brought  to  the notice  of  the 
management  staff  •  C'  c  C'+C  C'  C'+C 
1.3.  Instruction in the manner  in which  the work 
is  to be  carried out  w~thout danger 
1.3.1.  Every worker assigned  to underground work 
must be  able to show  that he  has: 
- a  general  training as  an  underground worker; 
- a  special  training for  the work  to which he  is 
to be  assigned; 
- the necessary additional  training  to  cover 
the  special working  conditions  at the 
point where  he will work. 
1.3.2.  Should  there  be  a  change  in  the work  or in 
the working  conditions,  the  necessary  additional 
training must  be  provided. 
1.3.3.  Instruction in safety precautions  is  to be 
considered as  an  integral part of vocational 
training 
1.4.  Supervision  to  check  that safety regulations 
are  observed  dur~ng work 
1.4.1.  During  the work,  the  safety conditions must 
be  subject  to  continual  supervision. 
1.4.2.  The  duty  to  see  that safety  regulations  are 
observed,  and  the  responsibilities resulting 
from  this duty,  fall upon  the management 
and  supervisory staff. 
1.4.3.  The  supervision,  which  must  be  exercised 
with authority,  should in its ever-day 
action seek  to  improve  the  training and 
education of  the workmen  on  the basis  of 
daily experience,  and  should  give rise to 
fines  or penalties only in very  serious  or 
repeated  cases  of  infringement. 
c  c 
c  c 
c  c 
C'  6)  c 
c  c 
c  c 
c  c 
c•  c• 
C'  4)  C'  5) 
C'  C'  5) 
C'  C'  5) 
C'  C'  C' 
C'  C'  C' 
c  c  C' 
c  c  c 
C 1  7)  c•  C' 
1)  This  takes  place at engineer or supervisor level,  or even at Safety Committee  level, but not at meetings 
where  all the people mentioned  are present. 
2)  Workers'  safety representatives  may  give their opinion  and  submit  their observations  in the form provided 
for  in the  labour  legislation. 
3)  By  means  of service instructions  issued by  the management  of  the mine,  or of  service notes  issued  by 
departmental heads  and  supervisors. 
4)  Convention of  the  Joint National Mines  Commission. 
5)  Systematic training courses  are provided up  to  1963.  After  1963,  no new  staff were  engaged  and  therefore 
apprenticeship  and  training are only provided where  new  machinery  and  equipment  is  introduced. 
6)  Laid down  by  the  responsible  authorities for particular cases,  otherwise generally  included in the 
enterprises manual. 
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2.  Trainins the manasement  and  suEervisorx staff 
in the matter of  safetx 
2.1.  General 
2.1.1.  Steps  must  be  taken  to ensure that  the  supervisory 
staff does  not  change  posts  frequently  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
2.1.2.  The  vocational  training should be  adapted  to 
the particular features  of the staff member's 
task  and  his  responsibilities,  and  in particular 
to  the  requirements  of his  place  in  the hierarchy 
1)  of management  or supervisory  staff.  C'  c  C+C'  C'  C+C'  C' 
2.1. 3.  The  transition from  one  grade  to  another 
should be possible for  a  given person  ly 
after he  has  actually proved  to  have  the  required  2)  knowledge  and  skill.  C'  c  C'  C'  C'  C' 
2. 2.  Guidelines  for  the vocational  tra1n1ng of the 
manasement  or su2ervisoEl  staff 
2. 2.1.  The  management  and  supervisory  staff must 
have  an  adequate knowledge  of: 
- the safety  regulations;  c  c  C'  c  C'  c 
- the  safety precautions  to be  taken;  c  c  C'  c  C'  c 
- the  available safety equipment  and  its use;  c  c  C'  c  C'  c 
- the instructions  in force  for  the different 
vocational  groups  whose  work  they  are 
called upon  to supervise,  and  the  instructions 
for  the  exercise  of activities at the working 
points  for which  they  are  responsible.  c  c  C'  c  C'  c 
2.2.2.  The  management  and  supervisory  staff must  be  able: 
- to point out in  a  suitable way  to  the 
workers  under  their orders  the  dangers 
associated with  their work;  C'  c  C'  c  C'  c 
- to instruct  these workers  as  to how  best 
to  carry out  the  work  in order  to avoid 
these dangers.  C'  c  C'  C'  C'  c 
2.2.3.  The  management  and  supervisory staff should  3)  4)  be  trained in how  to  issue  instructions.  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
2.2.4.  Special attention must  be  apid  to the 
continual further  training of all management 
and  supervisory staff.  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
2.2.5.  The  management  and  supervisory  staff must  both: 
- account  for  and  report  on  the  execution  of 
their work,  and  C'  C'  ·C'  C'  c•  C' 
- account  for  and  report  on  all accidents 
and  other notable  incidents which have 
occurred during  the working period at  the 
points  for which  they  are  responsible.  c  C'  C'  C'  c  C' 
2.2.6.  The  management  and  supervisory staff must  be  able: 
- to draw  up  accident reports correctly;  c  C'  C'  5)  C'  C'  C' 
- to assess  and  use  the data in these report;  C'  C'  C'  5)  C'  c•  C' 
- to study  and  establish the  causes  of  accidents;  C'  C'  C'  5)  C'  c'  C' 
1)  For the shotfirer. 
2)  By  limited competition in 
3)  For  the management  staff. 
the E.N.E.L.  (Ente Nazionale per  l'Energia Elettrica). 
No  systematic training in management  for other grades. 
4)  .This  is not considered as 
5)  For  the management  staff. 
a  subject for  training.  Preference  is given  to constant  supervision of the staff. 
For  supervision staff in certain cases  only. Proposals  from the Mines  Safety Co111niaaion 
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- to work  out means  to  aboid  accidents; 
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- to receive  the  training necessary  to  this  end. 
2. 3.  Staff responsible for  training 
2.3.1.  The  staff responsible  for  the training 
activities set out  in paragraphs  1.3  and  2 
must  be  numerous  enough  and  must  have  available 
the necessary means  and  time  to carry  out  their 
task properly. 
2.4.  Drawing  up  of  an  accident  report;  training 
of staff responsible  for  fill1ng  in  such  reports 
2.4.1.  The  accident  report must,  taking into account 
all the  appropriate human  and  technical 
factors,  give all necessary  inform~tion and 
in particular: 
- the  circumstances,  the  consequences  of  the 
accident,  the  causes, 
- the precautions  proposed  to avoid similar 
accidents. 
2.4.2.  Each  of  these  items  of  information referred 
to in point 2.4.1 must  be  capable  of  formulation 
as  an  answer  to  a  clear  and  precise question. 
2.4.3.  The  breakdown  and  layout of  the  form  used 
for  accident  reports must  clearly  show  which 
questions  have  to be  answered by  each of  the 
members  of  the staff contributing to  the 
preparation of  the  reports. 
2.4.4.  There  must  be  suffcient  room  on  the  form for 
supplementary  remarks  or sketches which  may 
be provided by  the  person or persons  concerned. 
2.4.5.  Each  of  the  persons  contributing  to  the 
preparation of  the  report must be  informed 
with regard  to: 
- the  importance  of  each question, 
- the way  to provide  correct  answers  to  the 
questions. 
2.4.6.  Practical instruction should be provided  to 
draw  the  attention of  the  employees  concerned 
to  the  consequences  of  omissions, neglectful 
or unclear answers  to  the questions. 
2.4.7.  Systematic attention should be paid to 
ensure  that  the  answers  are  complete,  aacurate 
and  precise. 
2.4.8.  The  accidents  reports  referred to in this 
cahpter are to be  drawn  up  for  the  sole 
purpose  of accident prevention. 
2.5.  Appointment  and  promotion of management  or 
superv1sory staff 
2.5.1.  Care  should be  taken  to ensure that there  is 
available  an  adequate number  of management 
or supervisory  staff possessed of  the 
requisite skills both in  the  technical  and 
safety fields. 
Gel'lllall;V 
N.R./Wph  Saar 
C'  C' 
C  C' 
c  c 
c  c 
c  c 
c  c 
C'  C'  3) 
C'  c'  3) 
c  C' 
c  C' 
C'  C' 
c  C' 
C'  C' 
c  c 
1)  For  the  management  staff.  For  supervision staff in certain cases  only. 
Belgium  France 
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C'  l)  C' 
C'  C' 
c  C' 
c  C' 
c  C' 
c  C' 
C'  C' 
C'  C' 
C'  C' 
4)  C' 
c  C' 
C'  C' 
C+C'  C' 
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Italy  Kingdom 
C'  C' 
C'  C' 
2)  c 
A  5) 
C'  C' 
C'  C' 
C'  C' 
C'  A 
C'  C' 
C'  A 
C'  A 
2)  A 
C'  C' 
C'  C' 
C+C'  c 
2)  Systematic training courses  were  given up  to  1963.  After  1963,  no  new  staff were  engaged  and  therefore 
apprenticeship  and  training are  only  provided where  new  machinery  and  equipment  is  introduced. 
3)  The  form used by  the professional mining organisation does  not  complyentirely with  this provision 
4)  Does  not exist. 
5)  It is not considered necessary  to provide  such  training. V/49 
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2.5.2.  The  election of  this staff is  the  responsibility 
of  the  employer,  who  must  at least  inform 
the  competent  authority of  the  persons  entrusted 
with supervision of working operations,  together 
with  the  necessary data justifying the  selection. 
2.5.3.  To  ensure  a  selection which  promises 
success,  there  should be  laid down  the 
minimum  requirements  for  appointment  to  a 
post  in one  of these categories,  either by 
direct appointment  or by  promotion, 
together with  the certificates  and  other 
documents  which  are  the necessary requisite 
for  such  an  appointment. 
2.5.4.  The  competent  authority  should be  in a  position 
to  check  the  knowledge  and  skills of  the manage-
ment  or  supervisory staff - both 
from  the human  and  technical points of view -
should this  authority  consider it necessary, 
at least in the  case of a  major failure  or  of 
repeated failures  in the  performance  of duties. 
3.  Usefulness  of psycho-technical examinations 
3.1.  On  assignment 
3 .1.1.  It is  recommended  that  the  application of  a 
relatively simple psycho-technical examination 
upon  assignment  should be  developed  as  far  as 
possible,  in order  to: 
- determine  the  general  intellectual level 
of the  candidate; 
- to exclude  those  candidates whose  intellectual 
level  lies below  a  pre-determined minimum. 
3.2.  Before  the  exercises  of  specific duties 
3.2.1.  In every  instance,  the workmen  who  are  to be 
amde  responsible  for  the  execution of particular 
working operations 
- with which  there is ass'ociated  a  particular 
responsibility  in respect of collective safety 
or 
- which  call for particular intellectual or 
personality  characteristics 
should be  subjected to  a  special psycho-technical 
examination  to determine whether  they have  the 
capacities  required for  this  activity. 
3.2.2.  The  competent  authority must,  in co-operation 
with  the  representatives  of  the employers 
and  employees,  keep  up  to date  the list 
of work  for which  those special examinations 
are  to be prescribed  and,  to  this end,  should 
list the  duties which  have  been  shown  by  experience 
to  call for  such  tests  and  for which  such  tests 









c  c  c 1)  A 2) 
c  3)  C'  c 4) 
c  c 5)  A  A 
c  C'  6)  C'  C+C'  7) 
c  C'  6)  C'  C'  7) 
C+E  8)  C'  9)  C'  E 
E  3)  3)  A  E 
1)  The  managing  director of  the mine  informs  his  chief engineer of  the name  of  the  departmental head in 
charge of technical matters. 
2)  As  regards  the  reasons  for  the  choice. 
3)  Does  not exist in practice. 
4)  The  law  lays  down  a  provision  concerning the academic qualifications  of directors and  departmental heads. 
5)  Psycho-technical examinations  are  required for certain duties only  (winding-enginemen,  locomotive drivers). 
6)  This  ceased when  recruitment was  discontinued. 
7)  Cf.  2)  on  previous  page. 
8)  For winding-enginemen  and  locomotive  drivers. 
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3.3.  Before  ani 2romotion  of  a  worker  to  a 
suEerviso!l: 2ost 
3. 3.1.  Before  the  promotion  of  any  workman  to  a 
supervisory post,  a  suitable psycho-technical 
A  1)  A  1)  c  2)  examination must be  carried out.  C'  E  A 
3. 4.  Princi2les underllina  the  various  psycho-
techn1cal examinations 
3.4.1.  The  psycho-technical examinations  listed 
under  3.2  and  3.3 should,  as  far  as  possible, 
aid  the vocational specialisation of  the worker 
in question.  c  c  C'  C'  C'  A 
3.4.2.  The  management  must  lay  down  the  criteria 
which  have  to be  met  by  the  candidat·e  on 
assignment,  or  later, when  directed to  special  3)  tasks,  C'  C+E  C'  C'  C'  A 
and  must  seek  the  advice  of  psychologists when  3)  so  doing.  C'  C+E  C'  C'  C'  A 
3.4. 3.  The  psychologist's  assessment will be  valid 
only  for  a  restricted period and must  be 
compared with  the  assessments  of  the  3)  2) 
vocational behaviour  of  the person in question.  C'  C+E  C'  C'  E  A 
1)  Eligibility for  promotion within  the  supervisor grade  is determined  during  the vocational  training  laid-down  by 
the  responsible authorities. 
2)  Where  there was  in fact  a  psychological  department. 
3)  Psycho-technical examinations  are  required for  certain duties  only  (winding-enginemen,  locomotive drivers).  Other 
enterprises  have  these  types  of examination for other duties. V/51 
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II - RECOMMENDATIONS  AS  TO  PRINCIPLES  TO  BE  OBSERVED 
IN  VIEW  OF  THE  POSSIBLE  INFLUENCE  OF  PAYMENT  AT 
PIECE  RATES  ON  SAFETY  IN  COALMINES  (4th  report of  the 
Mines  Safety  and  Health Commission,  Annex  IV). 
1.  Piecework  arrangements 
1.1.  Minimum  age;  medical  examinations 
1.1.1.  To  be  assigned  to piecework,  a  miner must 
- be  not  less  than  18  years  of  age 
- have  underground  a  medical  examination  to 
establish his fitness  for  such work. 
1.1.2.  Similar examinations  must  follow at regular 
intervals. 
1. 2.  Make-up  of piece rates 
1.2.1.  Written particulars  of  the  operations  to 
be  performed  must  be  given  to  the  men 
concerned,  including such  information  as 
is needed  to  calculate  the  amount  payable 
therefor. 
1.2.2.  In  the  interests of  safety,  the  piecework 
arrangement  employed  must  either 
- provide  that operations  of  importance  to 
safety  shall be  paid  on  a  separate basis, 
or 
- contain equivalent  financial  safeguards 
for  the  proper execution  of  such  operations. 
1.3.  Fixing of  norms  and  of rates payable  therefor 
1.3.1.  The  men  must  have  the right  to discuss  the 
fixing  of  piecework  norms  and  rates with  the 
employer. 
1.3.2.  If  agreement  is not reached,  the men  or 
their representatives  must  have  the  right 
to start conciliation proceedings  under 
4  below. 
1.4.  Form  of  piecework 
1.4.1.  One-man  piecework  should preferably  be permitted 
only  where  the  operations  concerned are not 
of  a  nutre  to  allow  any  other form of piecework. 
1. 5.  Determination  of  the  norm 
1.5.1.  The  norm must  be  determined  in accordance with: 
- the  amount  of  time  actually available during 





C'  5) 
C'  5) 
C'  5) 
C'  5) 
A  6) 
C'  5) 
1)  Recommendations  not  applicable;  miners  are not paid on  piece rates. 
c  c  c 
c  c  c 
c  4)  c  c 
C'  C'  c 
C' 
C'  C'  C' 
C'  C'  c 
C'  C'  c 
C'  C' 
C'  C'  c 
2)  Questions  relating  to  pay  cannot be  dealt with by  the  responsible authorities.  Such  questions are 
settled by  means  of collective agreements. 
3)  Pursuant  to  the  Mining  Regulation  and  to  the provisions  relating to young workers. 










4)  Periodic  X-ray  examinations  (every  15  months  at most).  Periodic clinical examination only where  signs 
of pneumoconiosis  are detected or on  medical  advice. 
5)  Settled by  collective agreement. 
6)  For  certain operations,  one-man  piecework is considered by both sides to the  agreement  as  the most 
appropriate  type of remuneration. 
7)  The  collective  agreement  does  not provide for  conciliation procedures,  although such procedure exists 
and  the  Mirtistry  of Labour  and Social Security acts as  an arbitrator  (whose  decisions are not binding); 
- 1) Proposals  from the Mines  Safety Coamission 
for the  improvement  of safety and 
health conditions in coalmines 
the  amount  of work  the men  can fairly be 
expected  to perform during  this  time, 
having regard to  the working  conditions; 
the  amount  of  time  required to perform  the 
operations  properly. 
1.6.  Calculation of  the  end wage 
1.6.1.  The  basis  and  mode  of  calculation must  be 
sufficiently  simple  for  any  worker  to be 
able  to work  out for himself  the  sum  due  to 
him for  a  given period. 
1.7.  Performance  in piecework 
1.7.1.  Regulations  should be  laid down  requiring 
that periodic checks  be  carried out  on  the 
amounts  of workperformed  for  the  purpose 
of determining  the wages  payable  therefor. 
and  that  the  findings  be  duly notified to 
the men  concerned 
1.7.2.  Particulars must  be  supplied to  the men  of 
all additions  and  deductions  affecting the 
amount  of  the  end wage,  together with 
details  as  to how  these were  calculated. 
2.  Changes  in conditions  at the workplace 
2.1.  A piecework  arrangement  my  be  terminated 
or  amended  if the  employer  and  the  men  are 
agreed  that genuine difficulties warranting 
this  course have  been objectively  found 
to exist. 
Failing  such  agreement,  the  men  must  have 
V/52 
the  right  to  ask nevertheless  that  the 
arrangement  be  terminated or  amended  forthwith. 
2.1.1.  If the men  cannot be  paid at piece rates 
for  so  long  as  the  difficulties persist, 
they  must  be  paid  a  prope·r wage  appropriate to 
their grade. 
3.  Managerial  and  supervisory staff 
3.1.  In  the  interests of  safety,  extra supervision 
must  be  provided in workings  where men  are 
employed  on  piecework. 
3.1.1.  Since failure  to carry  out  safety operations 
in good  time  can  result in particular hazards, 
the  supervisory personnel  must  give  the  men 
strict and  relevant instructions  to this effect, 
and  check  regularly  to see  that  these  are carried 
out 
3.2.  Payment  of managerial  and  supervisory  staff 
3.2.1.  Since managerial  and  supervisory staff are 
responsible not  only  for  the  organisation 
and  smooth  running of operations,  but 
also for  the  safety of  the men  engaged 
in  them,  they  should  as  a  rule be paid out 
1)  Settled by  collective agreement. 
Gel'lllaliY 
ll.R./Wph  Saar 
C'  l)  C' 
C'  l)  C' 
C'  1)  C' 
C  I  1)  C' 
C'  1)  C' 
c'  1)  C' 
C'  1)  C' 
c'  1)  C' 
C'  1)  C' 
C'  C' 
C'  C' 
2)  The  collective  agreement  guarantees  m1n1mum  pay  and  ancillary allowances. 
3)  Cannot  be  subject  of Mines  Authority prescriptions.  Settled according  to area. 
Belgium  France 
C'  C 
C'  C 
C'  c 
C'  c 
C'  c 
C'  c 
C'  c 
C'  c 
C'  c 
C' 
c  c 
United 
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on  a  basis  independent  of  the  ups  and  down 
A  1)  of  production.  C'  c  c  c  -
They  may  be  granted production  or output 
bonuses  provided they  have  at the  same 
time  a  sufficient financial  incentive to 
A  1)  devote  the necessary  attention  to safety.  C'  C'  c  c  -
4.  Settlement  of disputes 
4.1.  There  should be  a  conciliation  system for 
dealing with  any  disputes  arising between 
management's  and men's  representatives 
with  regard to piecework  arrangements  or their  2)  implementation.  C'  C'  C'  c  2)  -
4.1.1.  The  conciliation system should  operate by 
means  of  a  board on which  employers  and 
workers  are equally represented,  and which 
should  approach disputes  in the light of  2)  the  present  recommendations.  C'  C'  C'  c  2)  -
4.1.2.  The  fact  that proceedings  of  this kind  are 
pending must not  affect  the  terms  of 
C'  2)  employment  of  the  men  concerned,  C'  C'  c  C'  -
who  must  continue  to be entitled to  a  fair  2)  wage  appropriate  to  their grade.  C'  C'  C'  c  c  -
~-
1)  Cannot  be  subject  of  Mines  Authority prescriptions.  Settled according  to area. 
2)  Settled by  collective  agreement. V/54 
I  - INFLAMMABLE  DUST 
Germany  Proposals  from the Mines  Safety Co11111ission 
for the  improvement  of safety and 
health condi  tiona in coal  mines  N.R./Wpb.  Saar 
Memorandum  on  information necessary for  the  examination 
of  coal-dust explosions  on  ignitions  of  firedamp  in 
mines  (adopted  by  the  Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission, 
6.2. 73,  lOth  Report,  Annex  VII) 
In  this  memorandum  used  by  the  mines  inspectors when 
investigating accidents? 
- Information  on  the  procedure  for binding  dust  by  means 
of hygroscopic salts,  another effective  technique  for 
neutralizing inflammable  dust  (11th  report  of  the  Mines 
Safety  and Health  Commission,  annex  VI) 
Is  any  further  information available? 
- Information report  on  water barriers for  containing dust 
explosions  underground  (11th  report ofthe Mines  Safety 
and Health  Commission,  annex  VII) 
Is  any  further  information available? 
Triggered barriers  and  recommendation  for  their use 
- underground  (11th  report  of  the Mines  Safety  and  Health 
Commission,  annex  VIII) 
At  the  present  stage  of  research  the  Mines  Safety  and 
Health  Commission  feels  that  triggered barriers ~  be 
more  effective  than  conventional  methods  of  suppressing 
explosions  at certain points  in  the mine  such  as  headings, 
gallery  and  face  junctions,  gateroads,  the boundaries 
of ventilation districts  and  at particular danger paints. 
The  Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission  has  recommended 
that barriers  already  available  should be  installed so 
that their behaviour under working  conditions  may  be 
tested. 
Has  this  recommendation  been  implemented? 
1)  Currently,  no  coal  mine  in operation. 
2)  Tests  are  envisaged  during  1976 
yes  c 
c  c 
c  c 
2)  c 
Belgium  France 
yes  yes 
E  NRP 
E  NRP 
E  E 
United 
Italy  Kingdom 
c  C' 
no  l)  no 
no 
1)  no 
no 
1)  yes V/55 
GENERAL  REMARKS  ON  STEPS  TAKEN  IN  ITALY 
It should  be  noted that pursuant  to Article  23  of  the Mining Regulations 
in force,  the  subject referred to in Section II,  page  V,  43  has been 
included in the  collective  agreements. 
The  Italian coal mines,  of  course,  comprise  only  the  Sulcis coalfield 
in Sardinia and  are  currently not being worked. 
The  Italian Government  only  recently decided  to  consider reopening  this 
coalfield and  then  crrying out  an extensive  survey  to  determine its potential. 
It should  also be  noted that from page  IX,  45  onwards  of  the questionnaire 
concerned,  the  symbol  'C'  and  other  symbols  used in the  answer refer to 
clauses  1n the  collective agreement  in force  and  not  to provisions  codified 
in  laws  or regulations. ANNEX  NO.  VI 
LIST  OF  SPECIALISTS  FUR  :OOREHOLE  RESCUE 
WORK  AND  EQUIPMENT  AVAILABLE  IN  COMMUNITY 
COUNTRIES 
Position on 1st Januar,y,  1976 OOB'l'EN'I'S 
1.  Introduction  1 
2.  Specialists and  apparatus for rescue drilling  2 
from  Underground 
2.1  - Germany  {Federal Republic)  3 
- Ruhr  3 
- Saar  4 
2.2  - Belgium  6 
2.3  - France  1 
2.4  - United Kingdom  10 
3.  Specialists and  apparatus for drilling rescue holes  11 
from  the Surface 
3.1  - General remarks  12 
3.2  - Germany  {Federal Republic)  13 
- Ruhr  13 
- Saar  16 
3.3  - Belgium  17 
3.4  - France  18 
3.5  - United Kingdom  19 VI/1 
1.  Introduction 
The  present list is intended to supply all the centres concerned in 
the ooal industry with information on the appliances available in the 
countries of the Community  for drilling rescue holes from underground and 
from  the surface as well as organisations and  specialists in this field. 
The  drilling appliances with their accessories shown  in this list 
can in an emergency be placed at the disposal of any coalfield in the 
Community. 
The  rescue services in each country should be contacted direct, 
or through the Secretariat of the Mines Safety and Health Commission, 
The  Commission  of the European Communities,  Floor A.2,  Jean Monnet 
Building,  the Kirchberg,  Luxembourg,  Telephone,  Luxembourg 43011. 
During the night the following telephone numbers  m~  be obtained: 
Luxembourg,  3.15.05;  310.325;  31.90.48. VI/2 
2.  SP.roiALISTS  .A:RD  APPARA'fUS  FOR  RESCUE  DRILLING  FROM  UNDERGROUND VI/3 
2.  1  GERMANY  (FEDERAL  REPUBLIC) 
Ruhr 
2.1  1.  Note 
The  availability of the apparatus below together with accessories 
depends  on  the rescue centre at Essen.  The  apparatus is 
available in fairly large numbers  in the Ruhr  collieries or at 
the depot of the rescue centre at Essen and  can be dispatched 
immediately when  required. 
2.1  2.  Addresses of organisations and  specialists 
2.1  2.1  Hauptstelle fttr das Grubenrettungswesen,  43,  Essen-Krey, 
Schonscheidtstr.  28,  Telephone:  Essen 2-18-66 
(The  switchboard is continuously manned) 
Director of the rescue centre:  Herr A.  Schewe  (member  of the 
Rescue Working  Party). 
Private address:  4640  Wattenscheid-HSntrop,  Langaoker  11; 
Telephone Wattenscheid 7-12-13 
Technical Director of the rescue centre:  Herr F.J. Koch 
(member  of the Rescue Working  Party) 
Private address:  4100 Duisbourg 1,  Gneisenausstraase 270; 
Telephone  (02131)  Duisberg 35-03-57• 
The  following experts are at the disposal of the rescue centre: 
Mining engineers,  w.  Both,  M.  Funkenmeyer 
2.1  2.2  For drilling rescue holes from  underground,  the assistance of 
the following specialists from  the drilling division of SKBV 
can be  obtained by applying to the Essen rescue centre: 
Herr K.  Trosken,  4300  Essen Haarzopf am  wttnnesberg 37; 
Telephone:  Essen 71-33-21  and 
Mining engineers,  B.  Schafeld,  v.  Mertens,  B.  Gatman 
2.1  3.  Appliances  and  accessories available for drilling rescue 
holes from  underground 
2.1  3.1  Drilling machines 
1.  Turmag  P  30,  1220 mm.  dia. 
2.  Turmag  P VI/12-120,  610  mm.  dia. 
3.  Turmag  P  1200,  1200  mm.  dia. 
All the above  machines for drilling large diameter holes are 
compressed-air driven. 2.1  3.2  Drill rods 
1  •  4-tn  di  a.  regular 
- P VI/12-120 
2.  5i'' dia. regular 
- p 30-
3.  5-!t'  dia. regular 
special - HG  170  -
VI/4 
With  the rods,  there is a  sufficient number  of guide rods for 
oriented drill holes. 
2.1  3.3  Roller bits 
1.  Non-removable  roller bits 98  to 216  mm.  dia. 
2.  Enlarging roller bits up to 1400  mm.  dia. 
2.1  3.4  Valves  and  "preventors" 
2.1  4.  Auxiliary apparatus  (communication) 
2.1  4.1  Location apparatus 
2.1  4.2  Sound  location apparatus for mines 
2.1  4.3  Telephones for drill holes 
2.1  4.4  Intrinsic safety telephones with loudspeaker 
2.1  4.5  Radio  apparatus for use underground 
2.1  4.6  Television apparatus 
2.1  5.  Auxiliary apparatus  (supply and  rescue) 
2.1  5.1  Containers 
2.1  5.2  Rescue  cages 
1.  Dahlbusch apparatus 370  mm.  dia. 
2.  Dahlbusoh  apparatus 430  mm.  dia. 
2.1  5.3  Pressurised chambers 
2.1  6.  AuxiliarY apparatus  (miscellaneous) 
Saar coalfield 2.1  6.1 
VI/5 
Note 
Requests for the apparatus below  should be addressed to 
the following departments of Saarberg:  Interplan GmbH 
Safety underground,  surveying and  mine  damage 
Rescue Oentre at Friedriohsthal  (Saar) 
2.1  6.2  Addresses of services and  experts 
2.1  6.2.1  Safety 
Director,  R.  Muller  (member  of the Rescue Working  Party), 
6605  Friedrichstal  (Ostschaohtanlage) 
Telephone:  Sulzbach:  (06897)  8100  and  88182 
2.1  6.2.2  Saarberg Interplan GmbH 
Director:  Bergassessor H.J. Ertle 
66,  Saarbrueken,  Stengelstr.;  Telephone  (0681)  - 54030 
2.1  6.2.2.1  Drilling service: Director: Drilling engineer Pitz 
Telephone:  Saarbrucken (0681)  54030 
2.1  6.2.3  Rescue  centre, Friedrichsthal  (Saar) 
Director:  Bergassessor F.  Antweiler 
6605  Friedrichsthal  (saar) 
Telephone:  Sulzbach  (06897)  8100  and  88182.  (The  rescue 
centre is permanently manned  by a  full-time rescue team). 
2.1  6.3.  Apparatus  and  accessories available for drilling rescue holes 
from underground 
2.1  6.3.1  Drills 
1.  Turmag  P  30  up to 1220  mm.  dia.. 
2.  Turmag  P  1200 up to 1200  mm.  dia. 
3.  Turmag P VI/12-120  up to 610  ~. dia. 
4.  ·  Wirth HG  170  up to  2000  mm.  dia. 
All the drilling machines  for large diameter holes are operated 
by compressed air.  The  Wirth drill can also be operated 
electrically and  can therefore be used at the surface.  The 
time required for transport is very variable.  In 
unfavourable local conditions, it may  be two  or three days 
before the apparatus is ready to operate. VI/6 
2.1  6.3.2  Drill rods 
1.  4-i''  dia. regular - P VI/12-120 -
2.  5-t''  dia. regular - P  30  + P  1200 
3.  5i"  dia. H 2/90  special - HG  170 -
Each  set of drill rods is accompanied  by a  sufficient number 
of guide rods for oriented drilling. 
2.1  6.3.3  Roller bits 
1.  Non-detachable roller bits,  98  to  216  mm.  dia. 
2.  Enlarging bits up to 2000  mm.  dia. 
2.1  6.3.4  Valves  and  "preventors" 
100  mm.  dia. 
2.  2  llELGIUM 
2.2  1.  Note 
2.2  2. 
2.2  2.1 
The  Belgian coal industry has two  machines  specially 
designed for drilling large diameter rescue holes.  Each 
colliery has the material for making holes for first contact. 
They  have  contracted out to Messrs.  Foraky,  specialising in 
large diameter drilling.  The  necessar,y operations for 
detection and first contact,  and  arrangements  on  the spot-
for drilling will be carried out while awaiting the arrival 
of the equipment  and  the specialists from  Messrs.  Foraky, 
which will be prompt,  in accordance with the agreements. 
In addition,  an  agreement  has been made  with the Central 
Rescue Station,  Belle Roche,  Merlebaoh,  France,  for the 
provision of necessar,y facilities in emergencies. 
Addresses of the firm and the organisations concerned 
Address of the firm  : 
Foraky,  13,  Place des Barricades,  Bruxelles 1000  ; 
Telephone:  Bruxelles  (02)  218-53-06  and  (02)  218-20-53 
In order to obtain the equipment  when  required,  contact the 
rescue centre:  Centre de coordination et de  sauvetage, 
Hasselt,  Kempisohe  Steenweg 555 
Telephone:  Hasselt  (011)  22-28-87  (The  telephone exchange 
is continuously manned  by full-time rescue teams) 
or outside office hours  :  Hasselt  (011)  22-50-00 
/2.2 VI/7 
- Director:  Monsieur M~e  (member  of the Rescue Working Party) 
Telephone:  Hasselt  (011)  22-77-58 
Private address:  Europalaa.n  10,  B 3500,  Hasaelt 
- Seoretar.y of the centre:  Monsieur A.  Sikivie 
Telephone:  Hasselt  (011)  22-28-87 
2.2  2.3  Apparatus  and  accessories available for drilling rescue 
holes  from  underground 
Material for detecting trapped miners would  be supplied from 
the Lorraine coalfield,  France,  but apparatus for fixing the 
geophones  etc. is available locally. 
Holes used for first contact:  Drilling machines,  rods and 
all personnel required to drill such holes,  are avai.lable. 
The  machines are of the type Cable-o-Ma.tio  supplied by 
Diamant  Boart.  If needed,  supply containers and apparatus 
for communication would  come  from the Lorraine. 
Holes  for rescuing trapped miners:  Two  P  1200  machines  and 
the crews to operate them  are available.  'l'heae  machinea  oa.n 
bore holes up to 610  mm.  in diameter.  However  the chassis 
of the machines  are fixed,  and  as a  result,  casing of the holes 
would be difficult.  As  with other items,  the requisite ohaaais 
and  tubing,  and  escape cage,  would  be supplied from  the 
Belle Roche  Central Rescue Station,  Lorraine,  France; 
Telephone:  Merlebach 04-19-95. 
2.3  FRANCE 
2.3  1.  Note 
2.3  2. 
The  availability of the apparatus below together with 
accessories will be authorised by the Central Rescue Station, 
Belle Roche,  Merlebaoh.  The  apparatus is mainly located in 
the Lorraine,  Nord  and  Pas-de-Calais coalfields,  and with 
the specialist firm  "LONGYEA.R". 
Addresses of organisations and  specialists 
Belle Roche  Rescue Centre in the Lorraine coalfield at 
F  57  Merlebach,  Telephone:  Merlebach 04-19-95 
The  switchboard at the rescue centre is manned  continuously. 
Directors 
Monsieur J. Cretin, Divisional Mining Engineer  (member  of 
the Rescue Working Party). Vl/8 
2.3  2.2  Rescue Centre of Nord  and  Pas-de-Calais coalfield, 
Rue  Notre-Dame  de Lorette,  F  62  Lens  (Pas-de-Calais) 
Telephone:  Lens  28-24-31. 
(The  switchboard at the rescue centre is continuously manned). 
Director: 
Monsieur G.  Rogez,  Mining Engineer  (member  of the Rescue 
Working  Party). 
2.3  2.3  Monsieur R.  Grisard,  Mining Engineer,  Head  of the Safety 
Service of Od.F  (mem&er  of the Rescue Working Party) 
9,  Av.  Peroier,  F 75  Paris Be  ,  Telephone:  Paris 225-95-00 
2.3  3.  Apparatus and  accessories available for drilling rescue holes 
from underground 
2.3  3.1  Drills 
1.  1  Turmag  P 30  up to 610  mm.  dia.,  complete with 
1 Swivelling support,  flittable and telescopic 
1  Tu.rmag  prop 
1  winch 
2.  Equipment  for 508  mm.  tubing with the P 30 drill, with 
1  plate for screwing and  unscrewing 486  x  508  mm  tubes 
1  appliance for guiding and  retaining tubes 
1  hydraulic brake for tubes of 508  mm.  dia. 
70  m.  tubes of 486  x  508  mm.  in lengths of 
0.50 m- 0.75 m- 1.00 m- 1.20 m  and 
1  of 3  m with the handling pulley. 
2.3  3.2  Drill rods 
1.  100 drill rods 1.50 m.  in length 
2.  6  guide rods of 193  mm.  dia.  and  1.50 m.  length 
3.  25  guides of 600  mm.  dia. 
2.3  3.3  Roller bits 
1.  4  trioone bits of 193  mm.  dia. 
2.3  4.  Auxiliary apparatus  (communication) 
2.3  4.1  Detection apparatus VI/9 
2.3  4•2  Sound  location apparatus 
1.  8  genephones  consisting of Hall Sears receivers, 
types HS-J,  model  12 
2.  8 pre-amplifiers,  type VBI-Grundig,  built-in battery. 
3.  8  amplifiers type E.  OMY  3-Hartmann  and  Braun, 
supplied from  mains  200  V  - 5VA 
2.3  4.3  1  lumisoript type 151-8,  Hartmann  and :Braun{8  tracks). 
2.3  5·  Auxiliary equipment  (supply and rescue) 
2.3  5.1  Containers 
1  container 0.30  m,  1 of 0.60 m,  1 of 0.90 m 
and  1 of 1.50 m,  for rods NQ  and  BQ 
2.3  5.2  Rescue  oages 
2.3  6. 
2  Dahlbusch cages,  (370  and  430  mm.  dia.) 
Auxiliary equipment  (miscellaneous) 
1  friction winoh  for fitting the rope to the rescue 
cage 
1  return end 
1  tension and  control device,  with pull-lift and 
dyna.nometer 
1  Westphalia winch,  model  1033,  equipped with 
attldner HW  hydrostatic transmission. VI/10 
2.4  UIJI'l'ED  KII'ODOM 
The  apparatus listed below is held in stock by the National 
Coal Board  and  can be made  available upon request. 
2.4  2.  Addresses of organisations and  specialists 
2.4  2.1  Mr.  R.B.  Dunn,  Director General Mining,  National Coal Board, 
Hobart House,  Grosvenor  Place,  London  SW1 X 7  AE. 
Tel:  London  01  235-2020. 
2.4  2.2  Mr.  B.  Goddard,  Director of Environment,  National Coal Board, 
17  South Parade,  Doncaster,  South Yorkshire. 
Tel:  Doncaster  66611 
2.4  2.3  Mr.  J. Blunt,  General Manager  Rescue Stations,  National Coal 
Board,  17  South Parade,  Doncaster,  South Yorkshire. 
Tel:  Doncaster  66611. 
2.4  2.4  Mr.  K.  Shaw,  Chief Exploration Engineer,  National Coal Board, 
Huthwaite,  Sutton-in-Ashfield. 
Tel:  06-235-2161. 
2.4  3.  Apparatus  and  accessories available for drilling rescue 
holes from  underground 
2.4  3.1  Drills 
1.  Hauaherr Box drills, model  HBM,  electric,  capacity 
180 metres,  800  mm  dia. 
2.  1 Dresser Raise drill, model  300,  electric,  capacity 
180  metres,  1,2 m dia. 
3.  1  Turmag Box drill, model  P 30,  compressed air, 
capacity 180  metres,  800  mm  dia. 
4.  1  Busse & Grafer Box drill, model  P  30,  compressed air, 
capacity 180 metres,  800  mm  dia. 
5.  1  Busse  &  Grafer Box drill, model  P VI/  12,  compressed air, 
capacity 60  metres,  800  mm  dia. 
6.  Wirth Box  Raise drill, model  HG  100,  electric,  capacity 
275  metres,  1,4 metres dia. 
7.  Turmag Box drill, model  P  1200,  compressed air, 
capacity 180 metres,  800  mm  dia. 
Auxiliary Equipment 
2•4  4.1  Communication  equipment 
2.4  4.2  Rescue  cage 450  mm  dia. VI/11 
3.  SPECIALISTS  AND  APPARATUS  FOR  DRILLING  RESCUE  HOLES  FROM  THE  SURFACE VI/12 
GENERAL  REMARKS  ( 1) 
The  possibility of saving emtombed  men  by drilling from  the 
surface depends essentially on the depth.  For rescue purposes,  the 
maximum  depth is considered to be about  500  m.  On  the other hand, 
in certain conditions drill holes for searching and  supply purposes 
can be successfully carried out  to  a  depth of about  1000 m. 
A distinction should be made  between holes for searching and 
supply purposes  on the one hand  and  rescue holes on  the other. 
Holes for search and  supply purposes  should be of a  minimum 
diameter of 6  inches,  remembering that the smallest turbine has a 
diameter of 5 inches.  In the looser overburdens,  a  sufficiently 
large diameter should be chosen for an intermediate tubing of 
7  inches. 
Rescue drilling can be carried out using normal  clay flushing, 
at a  diameter of 26  inches down  to a  safety zone  above  the 
objective.  The  extent of the safety zone  should be determined 
according to the circumstances,  taking into account  the local 
conditions.  When  the safety zone is reached,  the flushing liquid 
should be removed  and drilling continued with air flushing.  It 
is also possible to carry out  preliminary drilling with a  coring 
bit (at inches)  and air flushing,  and  then to enlarge it with 
water flushing. 
Drilling for search and  rescue purposes requires  a 
considerable time as is shown  by the following example  giving the 
estimated times for eaoh operation. 
1. 
1.1 
Drilling for search and  supply purposes 
Depth of 500  metres 
Transport  (  300  k:m)  and  setting up  equipment 
(including 12 hours to mark out,  level and 
strengthen a  drilling base of 50  x  50  metres) 
Drilling including direction and  tubing work 
0  - 300  m  (8 5/8 ") 
300  - 500  m  (8") 
Total time 
24  hrs. 
48  hrs. 
48  hrs. 
5 days 3.1  1.2 
3.1  2. 
Vl/13 
Depth of 1000 m 
Transport  and  assembly 
Drilling 
0  - 300  m 
300  - 1000  m (400  m carboniferous) 
Total time 
Drilling and  rescue holes 
Depth up to 500 m 
Drilling and  sealing off with cement 
0  - 300  m (drilling pilot hole of 17t " 
diameter and  enlarging to 26") 
300  - 500  m (17i ") 
(  23"  ) 
Setting tubes 
Drilling in safety zone 
Total time 
+ search drilling 
24  hrs. 
48  hrs. 
240 hrs. 
13  days 
5 days 




18  days 
23  days 
3.2  GERMANY  (FEDERAL  REPUBLIC) 
Ruhr 
1.  Note 
Coordination of specialists and  use of equipment  for drilling 
rescue holes from  the surface are the responsibility of the 
Rescue  Centre at Essen.  This centre should be  informed in 
case of emergency.  Addresses for the firms listed under 
paras.  3.2.3.1  and  3.2.3.2,  on  pages  14  and  15,  can be obtained 
from this centre,  whose  telephone number  is  Essen 2-18-66. 
Addresses of organisations and  specialists 
The  institutions and  specialists quoted for drilling holes 
from  underground are also available for drilling from the 
surface.  These are given on  page 16 in section  3.2.3.2.3 • 
Additional  equipment  and  personnel oan be supplied from 
specialist drilling firms. Vl/14 
3.2  3.  Specialised drilling firms 
3.2  3.1  The  following companies  have  equipment  for drilling pilot 
holes up to 6"  india.: 
Name  of  Type  of drilling machinery available 
Company 
0-500 m  - 1000  m  - 1500  m 
Aufschllger  2 !tag 500 
Deutsche 
Sohachtbau  SMG  FS  291 
Deutsche  Ideco H 30 
Texaco  AG  Ideoo  H 525 
Deutsche  1  Ideco H 30 
Tie:fbohr  AG  1  Ideco H 525 
Etsohel &  UH1,E&M  6 UMA  2,  E&M 
Meyer  U1,E&M 
Long Year 
21  L34  + L38 
Craelius 
D 2000 
a8ttker  3  G8ttker 0  63 
5  "  G 200 
11  "  G 250 
9 
fl  G 300 
3  "  G 400 
1  "  G 450 
10  "  G 500 
2  "  G 750 




Mobil  Oil  SMG  61100/30 
Preussag AG  SMG  ZA.  292  SMG  ZA  292  SMG  ZA  292 
Rhein  braun  1 Wirth L10 
1 Wirth L15 
Thiele  3  :BOMA.G  300  2 Failing 2500 
FOREX  Ideco H 25  Ideco H 40 
Ideco H 525 
Osterr.  Ideco 
Mineral8lverw.  S:BS-DIR  700 
' VI/15 
The  companies listed below have  equipment  for drilling rescue 
boreholes of. at least 18  5/8  inches in diameter. 





Texaco  AG 
Deutsche 
Tiefbohr AG 
Type  of drilling maohiner,y available 
0-500 m 
SMG  FB  291 
Ideco H  30 
Ideco H 525 
1  Ideoo H 525 
- 1000 m 
Franks Explorer III 
2  BSCO  80-B 
3 JSCO  80-B 
1  EMSCO  A-800 
Etsohel &  1 SB  1,  E&M 
Meyer 
G8ttker  3 a8ttker a  63 
3 G8ttker G 400 
1  08ttker G 450 
10 G8ttker G 500 
2  CJ8ttker a 750 
Preussag Aa  2 Franks Explorer III 
Rheinbraun  1 Wirth L  10 
1  Wirth L  15 
Wintershall AG  CABOT  Explorer 900 
FOREX  Ideoo H 40 
Ideco H 525 
Osterr. 
Mineral8lverw.  Ideco SBS-DIR  700 
( fahrbare Bohranlage) 
Note  on drilling equipment  and  accessories 
3.2  3.2.1  Drilling for search and  supply purposes 
Nearly all the firms listed have the required tools and tubes 
for drilling holes for search and supply purposes at a 
diameter of 6 to 8  inches. Vl/16 
3.2  3.2.2  Tubes 
For tubing rescue holes,  tubes up to 24"  diameter are 
required.  The  stocks of tubes of this size vary according 
to the firm.  However,  it can be assumed  that the total length 
required can be  obtained from all the firms listed. 
3.2  3.2.3  Air compressors 
3.2  4. 
To  carry out  search drilling with air flushing,  the 
appropriate compressors will be found  at the following· 
firms: 
ATLAS  COPCO  Deutschland  GmbH 
4300  Essen-Frillendorf,  Ernestinenstrasse 155 
Telephone  (0201)  2-47-1 
{0201)  24-72-01  - after office hours 
Etsohel  &:  Meyer 
8670  Hof/Saale,  A~st-Mohl-Strasse 38,  Postfaoh 3309 
Telephone:  (09281)  99  21 
and 
8000  Mttnohen  82,  Rofanstrasse 47a 
Telephone:  (089)  42-27-03  or  42-55-80 
Rheinische Braunkohlenwerke  AG,  Gruppe  Nord, 
Bohrbetrieb und Wasserwirtsohaft 
5151  Niederaubem,  Postfaoh 40 
Telephone:  (02271)  8-11 
FOREX  Forages & Exploitations Petrolieres 
20,  Avenue  Rapp,  Paris  (7e) 
Telephone:  5-55-14-00 
Saar 
Preliminary note 
In order to request the following equipment,  the following 
services of Saarberg Interplan GmbH  should be  contacted: 
Safety underground  surveying and mine  damage  and  the 
rescue centre at Friedriohsthal (Saar). 
Addresses of organisations and experts 
The  same  organisations and  specialists for drilling work  from 
underground are also competent  for oarr.ying out drilling work 
from  the surface.  The  addresses are shown  in paragraphs 
3.2.3.1.  and  3.2.3.2.  ,  on  pages  14  or 15. VI/17 
Drilling organisations 
Saarbergwerke AG  has the following equipment  and  accessories: 
3.2  4.3.1  Drills including carriages 
1.  Salzgitter SG  750,  for directed drilling up to 159  mm, 
with enlargement  possible,  up to 270  mm  dia.: 
sufficient for up to  100 metres deep. 
2.  Salzgitter FB  298  for directed drilling up  to 216  mm, 
with enlargement  possible up to 270  mm  dia.: 
sufficient for up to 1300  metres deep. 
All the drilling machines  are operated b,y  a diesel engine 
and  are mobile.  The  Salzgitter SG  750  machine  can be 
transported in a  few  hours but the machine  FB  298  is more 
powerful  and takes several days to transport  and  erect. 
3.2  4.3.2  Drill rods 
2  3/8 inches Regular ll - ACME  + 3i "  IF 
can be used with the 2  types of drill listed under 3.1. 
3.2  4.3.3  Bits 
The  roller bits up to  216  mm  have already been mentioned  in 
connection with machines  for underground. 
3.2  4.3.4  Valves  (complete locking) 
Type  Wirth 6 5/8  inches for pressure up to 140 k8/cm2• 
General 
It should be noted that the drilling machines  belonging to 
the service for drilling at great depths are in continuous 
use,  except when  being moved  from  one  place to another. 
Allowance  should be made  for the transport times required, 
as  indicated above. 
3.3  •  BELGIUM 
3.3  1.  Note 
The  remarks  on page 8  on drilling from underground,  also 
apply for drilling from  the surface. 
Requests for experts and for equipment  are made  by the 
Rescue  Centre,  Haaselt,  who  will be responsible for the 
coordination of drilling work. VI/18 
3.3  2.  .Addresses of organisations and  experts 
Relevant  addresses are given on  pages  6  Uld  7,  paragraphs 
2.2.2.1  &Dd  2.2.2.2. 
3.4  1.  Irote 
Requests for drilling equipment  and  experts,  as well as for 
coordination of drilling work,  are dealt with by the serVices 
listed on pages  7  and a,  paragraphs  2.3.2.1,  2  & 3 • 
3.4  2.  Addresses of organisations  and  experts 
IJ.Ihe  addresses  are on  pages  7 and 8 • 
3.4  3.  Drilling firms 
3.4  3.1  JOREI  Forages & Exploitations P'trolieres 
35, · rue St  •  Dominique,  Paris 7  e 
~elephone: 70595-00  (Lignes groupees) 
3.4  4.  Drilling EXperts 
Requests for experts and  equipDent to be addressed to: 
K. Maurice Lepreux 
24,  rue Boisaieres,  Paris 16e 
Telephone:  704-59-06. 
3.4  5.  Drilling Equipnent 
3.4  5.1  Drilling Equipment  available at the Rescue Centre Belle-Roohe 
1 Joy oleo-hydraulic drill - 22  HD  (400 metres in NQ.u). 
3.4  5.2  Drilling Equipment  available at FOREX 
3.4  5.  2.1 Drilling Equipment  for search and  supply ( 6  inch dia.) 
For depths up to 1000 metres: 
Ideco H 25 
For depths up to 1500 metres: 
Ideco H 40 
Ideoo H 525 
3.4  5.2.2 Drilling Equipment  for rescue work  (18 5/8 inch dia.) 
For depths up to 500  metres 
Ideco H 40 
Ideco H 525 VI/19 
3.4  6.  Note  on drilling equipment  and  accessories 
The  information given on  page 9,  paragraphs 2.3.5  and  2.3.6 
is also applicable here. 
3.5.  UNITED  KIN<IDOM 
3.5  1.  Note 
The  National Ooalboard  own  one Wirth 1.4 drill rig (details 
given below)  for large diameter borehole rescue purposes which 
is capable of drilling to a  depth of 360  metres.  However,  the 
Board has a  contract with For~  Ltd to maintain and  ensure 
that this 1.4 rig, together with its associated equipment,  is 
alw~s available for use.  The  contract also includes for 
Fora.k:y  to ma.ke  available as many of their own  riga as may be 
required for drilling location holes.  In addition the ~oard 
themselves hold a  considerable number  of rigs suitable for 
location hole drilling purposes. 
3.5  2.  Addresses of organisations and specialists 
3.5  2.1  See  paragraph 2.4. 2 (same  as underground  equipment)  on  page  10. 
3.5  3.  Apparatus  and  accessories available for drilling rescue holes 
from  the surface 
3.5  3.1  Drill 
Wirth 1.4 drill rig, trailer mounted  and  powered  by a 
12  cylinder 4 stroke Deutz Diesel engine;  air cooled two  stage 
high pressure compressor mounted  on the rig and racking 
platform in the mast;  a  two  drum  type draw works  is mounted 
on the chassis. 
3.5  3.2  Drill rods 
Seamless steel drill pipe, 4i  11  dia., total length = 
370  metres,  approx. 
3·5  3.3  Hole casings 
3.5  3.4 
3.5  4. 
3.5  4.1 
3.5  4.2 
Total length of approximately 2500  metres of internal 
diameters varying from  534  mm  to 915  mm. 
Drill bits 
Range  of drill bits varying from  670  mm  to 1016  mm  in diameter. 
Auxiliary apparatus 
Communication  equipment. 
Rescue  cage - 450  mm  dia. ANNEX  VII 
Minimum  safety  requirements  for  winding  and  balance  rope 
suspension  gear,  for  shaft winding  and  sinking  installations 
(adopted  by  the  Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission  on  2nd 
December  1975  and  submitted  to  the  Governments  of  Member 
States  as  a  proposal  following  Article  1  of  its Terms  of 
Reference  and  for  implementation  and  follow-up  in  accordance 
with  Article  4  of  those  Terms  of  Reference). VII/1 
1.  Field of  application 
1.1  These  requirements  apply  to  winding  and  balance  rope  suspen-
sion  gear  in  shaft winding  installations  designed  for  man-
riding,  and/or  mineral  and  materials,  winding  or  sinking 
installations. 
1.2  The  provisions  of  items  3.1  to  3.8  and  3.15  and  3.16  shall 
apply  to  winding  and  balance  rope  suspension  gear  in  other 
installations  not  included  in  item  1.1. 
1.3  T~e folloying  shall  not  be  considered  as  w~nding rope  suspen-
S1on  gear  or  balance  rope  suspension  gear 
1.3.1  the  ends  of  the  winding  or balance  rope  attached  to  the  sus-
pension  gear 
1 • 3 • 2 
3  the  main  load-bearing  elements  of  the  conveyance  ,  the  attach-
ment  points  on  the  conveyance  for  the  bridle  chains  and 
winding  rope  suspension  gear  and  the  suspension  beams  and 
attachment  points  for  the  balance  rope  suspension  gear 
1  see  item  2.4 
2  see  item  2.5 
3  see  item  8.4 
2.  Definitions 
2.1  Examination  (German: 'UeberprGfung' ,French:  'contr5le') 
Examinations  are  to  be  carried out  by  a  competant  person 
nominated  by  the  Manager  of  the  Mine.  They  are  made  to  deter-
mine  externally visible  damage  or  defects. 
2.2  Inspection  is  to  be  carried out  by  a  competant  person  who  has 
received  appropriate  engineering  training  (e.g.  overman 
mechanic).  Inspections  are  made  to  determine  damage  or defects 
requiring  detailed  examination,  if necessary after the  ~leaning 
of  indiviual  components. 
2.3  Testing  (German:  'Untersuchung',  French:  'examen') 
Testing  shall  be  carried out  by  an  independent  expert  author-
ized  by  the  Mining  Authorities  to  perform  such  duties. 
Testing  comprises: 
2·.3.1  detailed  exmaination  of  components,  after  they  have  been  dis-
mantled  and  cleaned,  to  determine  damage  or  defects, 
2.3.2  where  necessary,  application  of  special  testing  or  measuring 
methods  permitting  detection of  damage  to  the  load-bearing  · 
components  e.g.  incipient  cracks. VII/2 
2.4  Suspension  gear 
Suspension  gear  (see  Figs  1-9)  is  taken  to  mean  the  connecting 
elements  between  winding  rope  and  winding  cage,  skip  or  counter-
weight  (herein after referred  to  as  'conveyance'). 
2.5  Balance  rope  suspension  gear 
Balance  rope  suspension  gear  (see  Figs  10-13)  is  taken  to 
'mean  the  connecting  elements  between  the  balance  rope  and 
conveyance. 
3.  Standard  safety regulations  for  winding  and  balance  rope  sus-
pension  gear. 
3.1  Mathematical  safety  factor  for  suspension  gear  - at least  10  x 
3.2  Test  loading  of  suspension  gear  - 2.5  x 
3.3  Mathematical  safety  factor  for  the  king  post 
in  the  area of  the  borehole  - at  least  10  x 
in  the  shaft of  the  king  post  - at least  15  x 
3.4  Edges  of  the  clamps  rounded  off  - yes 
3.5  Marking  of  the  load-bearing  components  of  the  suspension  gear 
(see  item  4.6)  - yes 
3.6  Weld  seams  only  on  non  load-bearing  components  other  than 
chains  (compression  and  shear  loads  permissible)  - yes 
3.7  Wedge-type  capels  and  wedge  clamps  for  conveyance  with arrest-
ing  devices  - with  the  exception  of  straight friction  wedge-
type  rope  capping  (type  reliance)  - not  acceptable. 
3.8  Items  3.1,  3.4,  3.5  and  3.6  apply  to  balance  rope  suspension 
gear  - yes 
3.9  In  situ examination  of  suspension  gear  (for  derogation  see 
item  4.7)  - every  working  day 
3.10  In  situ examination of balance  rope  suspension  gear  - at 
least weekly 
3.11  Dismantling  and  inspection  of  suspension  gear  (for derogation 
see  item  4.8)  - 6  months 
3.12  Dismantling  and  inspection  of balance  rope  suspension  gear 
(for  derogation  see  item  4.8)  - 6  months 
3.13  Testing  of  suspension  in  the  dismantled  condition  (for  dero-
gation  see  item  4.9)  - 12  months 
3.14  Testing  of balance  rope  suspension  gear  in  the  dismantled 
condition  (for  derogation  see  item  4.9)  - 12  months VII/3 
3.15  Sarvice  life of  winding  and  balance  rope  suspension  gear  (for 
derogation  see  item  4.10)  - 10  years 
3.16  Overall  life of winding  and  balance  rope  suspension  gear  in 
calendar  years  (for  derogation  see  item  4.10)  - 20  years 
4.  General 
Supplementary  provisions  applicable  to  the  standard safety 
requirements  for  winding  and  balance  rope  suspension gear 
4.1  Winding  and  balance  rope  suspension gear  must  be  manufactured 
from  non-aging  materials  (i.e;  materials  resistant to strain 
age  embrittlement)  or  from  materials  which  are  specifically 
permitted  under  national  regulations 
Tests  must  be  conducted  to  determine  the  mechanical  properties 
of  the  materials  of  which  suspension gear  is  made  - apart  from 
capel  wedges  or  thimbles  and  clamps. 
The  tests  must  be  carried out  on  surplus  lengths  having  the 
same  cross-section  and  having  undergone  the  same  heat treat-
ment  as  the  individual  ropes  in question or  on  test pieces 
from  the  same  batch,  the  shape  and  dimensions  to  be  agreed 
with  the  user.  These  test pieces  must  have  undergone  the  same 
heat  treatment  as  the  individual  components. 
4.2  The  requisite  mathematical  safety  factor  for  winding  rope 
suspension  gear  (item  3.1)  and  balance  rope  suspension  gear 
(item  3.8)  is  based  on  the  ex-works  condition  and  on  subse-
quent  replacement  of  bushes.  It shall be  determined  by  simple 
static  load  calculations based  solely  on  the  load,  the 
strength  of  the  material  and  dimensions,  taking  into  accou~t 
the  limits  of permitted wear  (Code  6f Practice).  (The  safety 
factors  have  been  selected so  that there  is  an  adequate 
safety margin  even  if complicated theoretical  strength cal-
culations  are  used).  The  lowest  tensile  strength guaranteed 
for  the  material  selected shall  be  used  for  the  calculat1on. 
4.3  In  the  calculation of  safety  factors  for all suspension  gear 
components  the  load shall  be  taken  as  the  net weight of  the 
conveyance,  the  weights  of  the  mine  cars,  the  payload  and  the 
balance  rope  suspension  gear  as  well  as  that of  the  balance 
rope  from  the  topmost  operating  condition of  the  conveyance 
down  to  the  loop  of  the  balance  rope  and  shall  cover at least 
the  proportionate  weights  of  the  winding  rope  suspension gear. 
The  payload  to  be  included  in  the  calculation is  that most 
frequently  encountered  in material  winding  under  normal 
conditions.  The  manwinding  weight  should be  used if this is 
greater  than  the  material winding  weight. VII/4 
4.4  In  calculating  the  safety  factors  for  the  balance  rope  sus-
pension  gear,  the  load  shall be  taken  as  the  weight  of  the 
balance  rope  suspension  gear  and  of  the  balance  rope  from  the 
topmost  operating position of  the  conveyance  down  to  the  loop 
of  the  balance  rope. 
4.5  Test  loading  of  the  suspension  gear  shall  be  carried out  at 
2.5  times  the  design  load. 
·Test  loading  of ordinary  thimbles  and  clamps  is  not  necessary. 
4.6  The  load-bearing  suspension  gear  components  must  be  marked  -
e.g.  by  stainless  steel plaques  attached with  adhesive  - so 
that the  surface  of  the  material  is  not  damaged,  unless 
national  standards  permit  this  at certain points  on  the 
components. 
4.7  Examination  of  suspension  gear  (item  3.9)  need  only. be  carried 
out  weekly  if manriding  and  material  winding  take  place  only 
occasionally  and  involve  not  more  than  thirty winding  oper-
ations  per  working  day. 
4.8  Dismantling of  the  winding  rope  suspension  gear  components 
(item  3.11)  and  of  the  balance  rope  suspension  gear  components 
(item  3.12)  need  only  be  carried out at intervals  of  12  months 
(maximum)  if winding  and  balance  rope  suspension  gear  is in-
spected  in situ at intervals  of  not  more  than  two  months. 
4.9  Except  in  the  case  of  winding  installations  subjected  to  heavy 
usage,  e.g.  over  500  winding  operations  per  working  day, 
testing  (items  3.13  and  3.14)  need  only  be  carried out  at 
intervals  of  up  to  two  years  if winding  and  balance  rope 
suspension  gear  components  subjected  to  tensile  and  bending 
stresses  are  tested  for  incipient  cracks  by  means  of  suitable 
non-destructive  methods. 
4.10  The  service  life of  winding  and  balance  rope  suspension  gear 
(see  item  3.15)  mqy  be  set at  a  maximum  of  15  years  and  the 
overall  life  (see  item  3.16)  at  a  maximum  of  30  years  provided 
the  Mining  Authorities  grant  exceptional  authorization. 
4.11  In  the  case  of  material  winding  installations  not  contained  in 
the  same  shaft  as  manriding  systems,  other  time  intervals  may 
be  laid  down  by  national  authorities  for  the  examination  and 
inspection  of  winding  and  balance  rope  suspension  gear  covered 













Zwischen,.eschirr mit  "Callsch~r Kette"  und  konischer llnlse  fOr  Verl!uRkoof 
Suspension  ~ear with  "Cha1'ne  Galle"  and  socket  for white  metal  canpin~ 




j_- _L__  .  _i_L 
deutsch 
HUlse  fUr  konischon  Ver~uQ­
kopf 
Verr.uBkopf 
Bolzen  mit Mutter und  Splint 
ICetten~lied 
KreuzgelenkstUck 
Bolzen  mit Spaltkeil 
englhh 
Socket  !or white  metal  cappin~ 
White  metal  capping 
Pin with  nut  and  cotter 
Flat  link 
Fork  link 
Pin  with  wed~e 
I 
Douille  conlque  pour 
culot  coul~ 
Culot  coul~ 
Axe  avec  ~crou et  ~oupille 
~lai llon 
Croisillon ou  chaoe  en 
croix  · 
Axe  avec  clavette deutsch 
A  Keil 
B  KreuzgelenkstOck 
c  Vorspann-Spindel 
0  Lasche 
E  Ans ch 1  uBb lech 
F  Bolzen mit Spaltkeil 
G  Sicherheitskle.abOgel 
H  Klemmgehluse 
J  Y.lemmhebel 
VII/8 
Zwlschengeschirr  "Pince  - C~le" 
Suspension  gear  "Pince  - Cible" 
Attelage  "Pince  - C~ble" 
en~lish 
Wed~e 
Fork  link 
wed~  clamping  screw 
Flat  link 
Reverse  spreader plate 
Pin  with wedge 
Safety clamp 
Capel  body 
Clamping  lever 
F 
F 
Fig.  Z 
Coin 
Croisillon  ou  chape  en 
croix  , 
Vis  de  pr,serrage 
Eclisse  ou  maillon 
Palonnier 
Axe  avec  clavette 
aride  de  s~curit' 
B~ti pour  coins  de  serraRe 
Bras  de  serrar.e deutsch 
A  Klemmring 
B  lreuzge  lenks  tUck 
c  Bolzen mit Mutter 
D  Verstecklasche 
E  Sicherheitsblock 
F  ICeil 
G  ICle-tdJrper 
D 
VI 1/9 
Zwischengeschirr mit  Kellen  und  KlemmrinP.en 
Su5pension  gear with  straight friction  capel 
Attela~e l  coins  ~ serrage par frettes 
enRlish 
Band  Frette 
fran~ais 
Fork  link  Croisillon ou  chJpe  en 
croix 
und  Splint  Pin  with  nut  and  cotter  Axe  avec lcrou et goupille 
















Zwischengeschirr  fQr  Trommelmaschine  (Einseil) 
Drum  winder suspension  ~ear  (sin~le line) 
Attelage  de  t~te pour machine  l  tambour  (monoc~le) 
--------A--------
_______  8 ________  _ 
______ c ____________  ~, 
_______________ o  __________ _ 
deutsch 








Klemmkorper  mit  Kellen  und 
Klemmringen 




Socket  for white  motal  capping 
Socket pin 
Fork  link 
Detaching hook 
Flat  link 
Connecting  link 
Adjusting  link 
straight friction  capel 
Connecting pin to  cage  or 
skip 
Fie.  4 
franfais 
Douille  conique  pour 
culot coul' 
Axe  de  doui lle 
Croisillon ou  chape  en 
croix 
Systeme  de  d'crochage 
Eclis~e ou  maillon 
ext, rieur 
Eclisse  ou  maillon 
indrieur 
Piece  de  r'p,lage 
Attache  1  coins  1  serrage 
par frettes 
Axe  de  liaison  avec  cage 
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Kettenzwischengeschirr  fOr  Trommelmaschine 
Drum  winder  ch~in suspension  gear 
Attela~e l  cha1nes  pour machine  1  tambour 
VerguB-
·---D-----

















Fh.  5 
fran~ais 
Socket  for white  metal  capping  Douille  conique  pour culot 
coul' 
Fork  link 
Detachin~ hook 
Bossed  link 
Connectin~ link 




Cage  han~te!r 
Croisillon ou  chape  en 
croix 
Syst~me de  d'crochaRe 
Eclisse  avec bossage 
Eclisse  ou  malllon 
int,rieur 














VI I/  12 
Zwischen~eschirr fOr  Ioepemaschine  (Ein- und Mehrseil) 
Friction winder suspension  cear  (sinP.le  or multi  rope) 
Attela~e de  tete pour machine  1 friction  (monoc~le ou  multic~le) 
•------------ E------------·• 
deutsch 






Ve rs teckk lotz 
KreuzkopfstUck 
Seitliche Aufhlngelasche 
Korb  oder Skip  AufhUngetrlger 
Fcststellplatte 
english 
Socket  for white  metal  cappinr. 
Socket pin 
Fork  link 
Pin 
Adjusting  link 
Adjusting block 
Cross  head 
Side  plate  link 
Cage  or skip suspension beaa 
Bottom  adaptor block 
I  .. 
I===~ 
Fig.  6 
Douille  conique pour culot 
coul' 
Axe  de  douille 
Croisillon ou  chape  en croix 
Axe 
Eclisse  de  r&glage 
Cale  de  r&qlal!e 
Pi~ce de  liaison en  croix 
Eclisse  lat~rale de  suspension 
Poutre  de  suspension  de  la 
ca'!e  ou  du  skip 
Plaque  de  fixation D 
deutsch 
A  Seilschwanzklemme 
B  Losb3re  Kontrollplatte 
c  Riegelschraube 
D  Kauschenherz 
E  KreuzgelenkstOck 
F  Bolzen mit Sicherung 
G  Klemmkauschengehluse 
H  JC!Snigstange 
VI I/13 
Zwischen~eschirr mit  llemmkausche 
Suspension  ~ear with  wed~e capel 
Attelage  l  cosse  autoserrante 









Clamp  for  rope  tail 
Rope  inspection plate 
Wed~e screw 
Capel  wedge 
Fork  link 
Fork  link pin 
Wedge  capel body 
King  post 
H 
Pince  de  brin libre 
Flasque  d~montable 
Vis  de  d~bloca~e 
Coeur  de  cosse  · 
Croisillon ou  chape  en croix 
Axe  avec  clavette 
B~ti pour cosse  autoserrante 






VI I/  14 
Zwischengeschirr mit lausche,  Seilklem~en und  Einfach-Xreuz~elenk· 
Suspension  gear with  thimble,  rope  clamps  and  fork  link 
Attela~e l  cosse,  brides et croisillon simple 
deutsch 
Kausche  fUr  RundseU 
Kauschenlasche 
KreuzgelenkstOck 
Bolzen mit  Kopf  und  Loch 






Thimble  for  round  winding  rope 
Bossed  link 
Fork  link 
Pin with  head  and hole  for 
cotter 
King  pos_t 
Rope  cla.mp 
F 
Fi~.  8 
f'ran~ais 
Co5se  pour  c9ble  rand 
Eclisse  avec  bossap:e 
Croisillon  ou  chape  en  croix 
Axe  avec  clavette 
The  ma'~tresse 





Mehrseil-Zwischengeschirr mit  Pa~stOck-Schnellversteckeinrichtun~ 
Hulti  rope  suspension  gear with hydraulic  adiustin~ link 





lreuz  aelenks tOck 
AnschluBblec:h 
., 
,...,]  ~----~------- ,........,_' -
Pia.  9 
english 
Wedge  capel  Attache  1 cosse  autoserrante 
Hydraulic adjustina  link  Dispositif de  r&glage  rapide 
Pork  link 
Reverse  spreader plate 














Aufblacunc  fUr Flachunterseil 
Suspension gear for flat balance rope 
Attelage pour cible d'  equilibre plat 
____  c 
-----D -----
english 
Balance  rope  suspension beam 
Pin 
Flat link 
Thimble  for  flat  rope 
Rope  cla11p 
Fig.  1  o 
frans:ais 
Traverse  de  suspension pour 
cSble  d'~quilibre 
Axe 
Eclisse  ou  maillon 
Cosse  pour  c4bl~ plat 












AuBen las  che 
Wirbel 
HQlsenbohen 
HQlse  fOr  konischen Verlul-
kopf 
VII/17 
Aufhlngung  fOr  Rundunterseil 
Suspension  gear  for  round balance  rope 
Attelage pour  ~ble d''quilibre  rond 
rrcp 
·--A  ---~~=:;j=;!::===~ 
Balance  rope  suspension bea• 
CoJUt.,ecting  link 
Pin 




Socket  for white ••tal capping 
Fig.  11 
Traverse  de  suspension pour 
c~ble d''quilibre 
Eclisse ou ••illon int,rieur 
Axe 
Eclisse ou •aillon ext4rieur 
Tourillon  ou '•erillon 
Axe  de  doui lle 






Unterseilaufblnf!unr  fOr  Rundunterseil 
Round  balance  rope  suspension  gear 







Balance  rope  suspension lUJZS 
Swivel 
Thimble  for  round  rope 
Shackle 
FiJZ.  12 
r6te  de  suspension pour 
cable  d'~quilibre 
Tourillon ou  'merillon 
Cosse  pour  ~le rond 
Manille deutsch 
A  Rundseilkausche 
B  Flachseilkausche 
c  Wirbe~ 
D  Lasthaken ai  t  Sperrklinke 
E  Schlkel 
VII/19 
Abteuf-ZwischenReschirr 
Kibble  suspension  gear 
Attelage  de  cuffat 
en~lish 
Thimble  for  round  rope 





Cosse  pour  c~ble rond 
Cosse  pour  c~le plat 
Tourillon ou '••rillon 
Mousqueton  ou crochet 
avec  linf!uet 
Manille 
c ANNEX  VIII 
INFORMATION  REPORT 
"New  aspects  of  the  testing  of  ropes  in  winding 
installations  subject  to  high  and  maximum  stress" 
By  Dr.  Ing.  H.  ARNOLD,  Seilprufstelle  der  West-
falischen  Berggewerksschaftskasse,  Bochum. VIII/1 
During  the  last  two  decades,  shaft winding  in  the  Ruhr  area  has 
been  concentrated  on  the  central  shafts  which  have  a  high  hoist-
ing  capacity.  This  continuing  trend  makes  new  ideas  of  safety 
control  necessary.  This  applies  particularly to  winding  ropes, 
suspension  gear,  braking  systems  and  speed  regulators  or  safety 
devices. 
Of  the  items  in  the  above  list,  winding  ropes  are  especially 
important;  they  cannot  be  designed  as  durable  parts  of  the 
installation because  of  their construction  and  the  geometrical 
and  dynamic  stresses  involved.  This  unfortunate  characteristic 
often  makes  it difficult to  determine  the  residual breaking 
strength  and  remaining  service  life of winding  ropes,  particularly 
in  installations  subject  to  high  and  maximum  stress.  Data  from 
investigations,  and  methods  for  testing  and  measuring,  which 
ensure  that  the  onset  of  failure  is  recognised  in  time,  are  out-
lined  below.  The  minimum  fatigue-strength  requirements  for  wire, 
strand  and  rope  for  winding  ropes  subject  to  high  and  maximum 
stress  are  also  indicated. 
1.  Fresh  data  allowing  more  accurate  determination  of  the  renewal 
schedule  for  winding  ropes  subject  to  high  and  maximum  stress. 
1.1  Relationship  between  rope  stress  and  wire  fractures. 
Fig.  1  gives  the  curves  for  the  loss  of  breaking  strength  under 
various  rope  loads.  The  tests  - with  the  geometric  facture  kept 
constant  - are  carried out  on  three-layer  flat strand ropes  with 
a  nominal  diameter  of  55  mm.  The  wire  fracture  figures  at 
renewal  time  were  established  for  four  different  rope  loads  in 
the  appropriate  test galleries. 
The  curves  showing  the  loss  of breaking  strength  in  the  rope 
tested  under  loads  of  33.3%,  20%;  10%  and  5%  of  the  established 
rope  breaking  strength  give  a  very  clear  indication of  the 
working  capacity  which  remains  at  rope  renewal  time.  The  curves 
for  the  loss  of  breaking  strength  in  ropes  subject  to  high  and 
maximum  stress  come  within  15  and  20%  of  the  loads  referred  to 
the  established  rope  breaking  strength .. 
In  the  small  inset  diagram  "Changes  in  length  as  a  function  of 
the  number  of  rolling operations",  the  area  representing  the 
onset of  failure  for  the  criterion  "change  in  length"  is  shaded. 
The  wire-fracture  figures  corresponding  to  the  curves  for  loss 
of  breaking  strength  demonstrate  the  increase  in wire  fracture 
with  decreasing  rope  load.  This  means  that  the  use  of  ~ire­
fracture  figures  as  a  criterion  for  the  renewal  schedule  for 
highly  stressed winding  installations  may  be  totally misleading 
because,  when  the  tensile  forces  in  the  rope  shortly before 
renewal  time  are  high,  only  a  few  wire  fractures  are  to  be  found 
despite  considerable  wire  fatigue,  whereas,  when  the  tensile 
forces  in  the  rope  are  lower,  there  may  well  be  many  wire  fract-
ures  as  a  result  of  the  large  number  of  rolling  operations.  In 
the  latter cases,  moreover,  there  can still be  considerable 
residual  rolling  up  to  the  rupture  point  of  the  rope. (Fig.  2  and  3). VI I I/2 
1.2  Information  acquired  from  operating  tests. 
So  far,  in  the  majority  of  cases  in  which  three-layer flat  strand 
ropes  have  failed,  considerable  residual  torsion  has  been  found, 
even  in  the  good  segment  of  the  rope.  Torsion  in  the  outer 
layer  causes  the  onset of  failure  through  the  constitution of 
the  two  inner  strand  layers.  The  investigations  also  showed 
that  the  direction of  lay  (right or  left)  caused  considerable 
variations  in  residual  torsion  in  both  winding  directions. 
1.3  Findings  relating  to  the  functional  relationship between  the 
change  in  rope  length  and  the  evolution  of  torsion  in  the  rope. 
Tests  were  first carried out  on  a  three-layer  flat strand  rope 
of  55  mm  diameter. 
The  first set of  results  is  from  the  fatigue  tests  carried out 
on  the.three-roller test  stand  (Fig.  4)  under  the  following  test 
conditions: 
Diameter  ration:  Driving  and  rope  pulleys  f6 
=  17,3 
Rope  diameter 
Rope  stresses:  o- =  0,33  (]".  o;  =  0,2  .dB  1  B' 
o;  =  0 1  1  ~;  q  =  0,05  -~ 
Here,  ~  is  the  established  ultimate  breaking  stress. 
In  the  diagram  (Fig.  5  and  Fig.  6)  for  rope  stresses 
a;  =  0 1 1  .  ~  and  a;  =  0 1 2  •  cfB  1 
the  changes  in  rope  length  and  rope  torsion  are  shown  as  a 
function  of  the  rolling.  The  working  range  of  the  winding  ropes 
comes  between  the  stress  values  shown  above.  The  diagrams  show 
clearly that the  changing  length  and  torsion  of  the  rope  subject 
to  less  stress  stabilize after  a  time.  The  onset  of  rope  failure 
is  then  shown  by  a  sharp  rise  in  each  curve.  In  a  highly-
stressed  rope,  the  transition  from  the  running-in  period  to  the 
failu~point is  so  indistinct that  the  rope  renewal  time  is 
difficult to  assess.  The  rope  tension  is  the  residual  momentum 
occurring  as  a  result  of  the  tension  of  the  two  inner  strand 
layers  and  the  counterrotation of  the  outer  strand.  Ideally, 
these  two  types  of  tension  should  be  more  or  less  counter-
balanced  so  that  the  twisting  action  of  the  rope  during  winding 
remains  as  low  as  possible.  The  greater  the  twisting  effect  of 
the  rope,  the  more  danger  there  is  of  constant constriction  and 
slackening  in  the  second  and  third  strand  layers  caused  by  the 
first  strand  layer. VIII/3 
The  tests  show  clearly  that  the  residual  tension  increases  to 
a  greater  or  lesser  extent  depending  on  the  work  the  rope  per-
forms,  which  in  turn  is  dependent  on  the  geometrical  and  static 
stresses.  The  rope  length  gradient  increases  at  the  same  time 
so  that daily  measurement  of  the  rope  length  allows  any  danger-
ous  increase  in  residual  tension  to  be  established  (Fig.  7). 
For  checking  purposes  it is  advisable  to  count  the  rope  revol-
utions  during  one  winding  cycle  by  means  of  a  'notch'  test  and 
to  compare  this with  previous  measurements.  This  simple  test 
method  provides  an  effective  additional  criterion  for  the  rec-
ognition  of  the  onset  of  failure  in highly-stressed winding  ropes. 
2.  Establishment  of  a  quantitative basis  of  the  dynamic  and  geo-
metric  effects  on  the  service  life of  the  rope. 
2.1  Rope-durability  diagram 
The  durability of three-layer  flat  strand  ropes  tested  under 
various  bending  loads  and  rope  stresses  is  illustrated in  the 
diagram  (Fig.  8).  The  set of  curves  give  a  clear picture  of  the 
relationship  between  rope  stress  and  rolling with  various  D/d 
ratios.  The  continuous  curve  represents  the  durability of  three-
layer flat  strand  ropes  of  55  mm  ¢and  a  D/d  ratio of  17.3.  The 
dotted  curve  shows  the  evolution  for  larger  D/d  ratios.  In 
order  to  keep  both  expenditure  on  test equipment  for  three-
roller tests  and  the  testing  time  within  reasonable  limits,  the 
D/d  ratios  are  between  about  15  and  30,  while  the  main  shaft 
winding  installations  have  D/d  ratios  of  about  100.  The  results 
for  the  various  parameters  obtained with  the  test equipment  are 
supplemented  by  statistical operating  values,  so  that  they  can 
be  related  to  users'  working  specifications  (Fig.  9). 
2.2  Coordination  of  important partial results  from  bench  tests  and 
in situ investigations  on  summary  sheets. 
By  means  of  a  comprehensive  representation  of  some  of  the  im-
portant  functional  relationships  for  the  determination of  the 
rope  renewal  schedule  and  a  comparison  of  the  state of wear  of 
the  strands  and  wires  after  a  varied  number  of  rolling operations, 
a  new  standard  for  the  evaluation  of highly-stressed qinding 
ropes  has  been  established  (Fig.  10). 
The  representation  shows  clearly that it is  essential  to  supple-
ment  sime  of  the  existing criteria for  the  renewal  schedule  in 
order  to  avoid  serious  mistakes. 
3.  Requirements  concerning  the  fatigue  strength  of wires  and 
reduced  fatigue  strength  (2,000  000  load  cycle)  of  strands  and 
ropes. VIII/4 
In  order  to  establish  the  fatigue  strength of  winding  rope 
wires,  a  large  number  of  stress-N  graphs  are  produced.  In  this 
method,  oscillations  are  gradually  reduced  in  amplitude  in  a 
series  of  individual  tests  until  the  amplitude  which  the  wire 
will  withstand  indefinitely  (i.e.  a  load  cycle  of  over 
3  000  000)  is  established  (Fig. 11) • 
The  fatigue-strength  coefficient of  a  wire,  for  a  particular 
amplitude  of oscillation  and  a  given  basic  stress,  then  gives  a 
pair  of points  on  the  Smith  fatigue-strength  graph  (Fig:12). 
The  same  method  is  applied  to  the  reduced  fatigue-strength 
ranges  of  strands  and  ropes  shown  in  the  Smith  diagram.  The 
stress-N  graphs  are  discontinued at  a  load  cycle  of  2  000  000 
in  the  determination  of  these  values. 
The  Smith  graph  for  wires,  strands  and  ropes  then  indicates  the 
minimum  wire,  strand  and  rope  requirements  in  relation  to  fatigue 
strength or  reduced  fatigue  strengt~ for  the  winding  rope  load 
range  (Fig.13). 
This  diagram  gives  the  miriimum  requirements  by  comparing  the 
test conditions  of  ~he testing machine  with  the  actual  stresses 
on  the  ropes  in  winding  installations  subject  to  high  and 
maximum  stress. 
4.  Studies  of  the  effects  of  the  variations  in wire  strength  in 
multi-strand  and  multi-rope  constructions. 
Precise  measurements  of  the  stresses  in  steel wires  of  differing 
strengths  often  reveal  considerable  variation  in  the  tensile 
behaviour  of  these  wires.  For  example,  some  wires  or  groups  of 
wires  in  one  and  the  same  rope  can  very  quickly  reach  the  plastic 
stage,  whilst others  are still withstanding  stress  in  their 
elastic range.  This  in  turn  leads  to  excess  length  in  the  wires 
with  the  result that  the  rope  construction is  affected  and  the 
load  on  the  wires  is  uneven  . 
In  this  way  ropes  composed  of  individual  wires  with  the  same 
tensile behaviour  can  as  a  result of stresses  causing  only 
slight plastic  deformation,  be  understressed  so  that the  limit 
of  elasticity  and  thus  the  fatigue  strength  improves.  In  ropes 
where  the  tensile behaviour  of  the  individual  wires  differ, 
however,  a  very  variable  and  uneven  distribution of  stress  can 
arise. 
Under  stress,  the  load  on  some  of  the  wires  disappears  as  a 
result of  permanent  deformation,  while  other  wires  continue  to 
stretch in  their elastic  range  and  are  therefore  subject  to  a 
higher  degree  of  strain.  In  this  respect  no  understressing 
effect  can  be  expected.  It is  far  more  likely that  the  fatigue 
strength of  individual  wires  will  be  exceeded.  This  fact  demon-
strates  the  need  to  use  wires  of  the  same  strength as  far  as 
possible,  so  that it is  fairly  certain that  the  tensile  behaviour 
of  winding  ropes  which  are  constantly  subject  to  alternating 
bending  while  running  over  pulleys  - i.e.  winding  ropes  in  the VIII/5 
broad  sense  - is  even. 
In  highly-stressed installations,  it is quite  possible  that 
the  stresses  induced  in  individual  wires  today  by  high  starting 
acceleration  and  quasi-static  undulating  loads  will  lie within 
the  range  of  the  proportional  limit,  causing  damage  to  winding 
roppes  composed  of  individual  wires  of  very  varying  tensile 
behaviour. 
5.  The  new  regulations  A  2.10  of  the  North  Rhine-Westphalia 
Mining  Authority  for  the  monitoring  of  winding  ropes  in  highly-
stressed winding  and  man-riding  installations. 
Because  of  various  cases  of  defective winding  ropes  in highly-
stressed  installations  and  the  increased difficulty  of  deter-
mining  renewal  schedules,  regulations  have  been  issued  govern-
ing  additional  monitoring  procedures.  These  regulations  are 
given  in  the  appendix. 
6.  This  document  attempts  to  set  out  in  concise  form  some  of  the 
discoveries  and  measures  which  might  help  in  the  difficult 
task  of  determining  the  renewal  schedule  for  highly-stressed 
widning  ropes.  The  tests  were  carried out  on  low-twist  winding 
installations which  are  used  in  West  Germany  particularly  for 
ropes  with  large  diameters.  Studies  of  winding  ropes  for 
highly-stressed  installations  of other  types  have  not yet  been 
completed. VIII/6 
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bad ANNEX  IX 
DECISION  OF  THE  MINES  SAFETY  AND  HEALTH 
COMMISSION  CONOERNING  USE  OF  LIGHT 
ALLOYS  FOR  THE  CONSTRUCTION  OF 
ELECTRICAL  APPARATUS  FOR  USE 
IN  MINES  FIREDAMP IX/1 
The  Nines  Safety and Health Commission at its meeting on 11th. July 1975, 
decided as follows  in reply  to a  question posed by CEHELEC  (  European 
Committee for Electroteohnioal Standardisation; 
Concerning the enclosures of electrical apparatus of equipment of the 
types  "Gro-up  I" (which is for mines  subject to firedamp),  and which are 
likely to be affected by the Draft  standard EN  50 014 - (  General  Regalations 
concerning electrical apparatus for use in potentially explosible atmospheres 
(para. 7.1.) 
The  alloys used in the construction of enclosures of electrical apparatus 
for use in mines  subject to firedamp  should contain by weight: 
a) not more  than 15 %  in total of al.umini'Wil,  ti  tatnDD.  and magnesiua; 
and 
b) not more  than 6 %  in total of magnesium  and titanUJD 
The  stand taken by the Mines  Safety and Health Commission will not prejudge 
in any w~  the advice which might be given concerning the general use of light 
alloys especially for certain apparatus where  a  reduction in weight may be an 
important factor affecting safety. 
Clearly the national authorities remain competant to anthorise the use of non 
specified materials. ANNEX  X 
A FIRST  REPORT  ON  FILTER  SELF-RESCUERS  FOR 
USE  IN  COAL  MINES  IN  THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITY  COUNTRIES 
'---,-------------~ 
PART  I  :  MINIMUM  DESIGN  R~UIREmiTS AND  'l'ESTING  PROCEDURES; 
----------- ------------------------·--------·-------
(Adopted by the Mines  Safety and  Health Commission  on 
6 ~  1976  and  submitted to the Governments  of Member  States 
as  a  proposal  following  ~icle 1  of its terms of Reference, 
and for implementation and  follow up in accordance with 
Article 4 of those terms of reference) FUREWORD 
1.  Part I  of the attached report deals only with the specification 
and testing of self resucers.  Part II will deal with the Mainte-
nance facilities. Neither Part argues the case for or  ~ainst the 
provision and  use of this type of apparatus in mines. 
2.  Fi.l ter self-rescuers are provided for use in the majority of coal 
mines  in member  states of the Community  of Europe.  The  design of 
the rescuers does not var,y greatly between states or coalfields, 
and it has generally proved to be satisfactory in service. 
3.  To  achieve improvement  in the design  and the economics  of production 
of such self-rescuers common  specifications and testing procedure 
are essential. 
4•  The  Committee  of Experts has included general  comments  in the 
Introduction to Part I. They briefly describe the historical 
development  of self rescuers,ana the possibilities and limits of 
their effectiveness. 
5·  For the successful  use of self _rescuers,  :f'tlrther provisions must  })e 
made  for routine maintenance and for the training of workmen  in 
their use.  These  provisions will be  covered in Part II of this 
report. 
6.  Such  provisions  m~  vary very considerably depending on  local 
circumstances.  Therefore only general recommendations  have been 
made  in Part II and the Committee  of Experts has decided to 
submit  only an  information report on  the different existing 
arrangements. 
7.  'Po ·expedite publication Part I  was  submitted to the Mines  Safety 
and  Health Commission  on  6 ~  1976  and Part II will follow later. 1. 
X/1 
FILTER  SELF-RESCUERS  IN  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITY 
PART  I:  MINIMUM  DESIGN  Rl!BUIREMENTS  AND  TESTING  PROCEDURES 
1.1. 
INTRODUCTION 
The  development  of self-rescuers began in the second half on  the 
1920's, utilising experience gained with gas masks  in the first 
world war.  They  were  first introduced on  a  large scale in German 
mines  in the 1950's  (following the 1946  disaster at Grimberg 
Colliery)  and made  compulsory in 1957  for all personnel underground. 
In Britain trials with self-rescuers were  started in 1953,  large 
seale introduction began in 1967  and the carrying or rescuers for 
all undergrotmd workers became  a  condition of employment  in 1968. 
Self-rescuers were  also introduced in Belgium in 1957• 
1.2.  It can be said that the general  introduction of filter self-
rescuers in the mines  was  delayed by the endeavours of early 
research workers  to provide the miner with an  escape apparatus 
that would  give protection in any  circumstances.  The  filter 
self-rescuer - as the name  implies - "filters" out the carbon 
monoxide  by converting it to carbon dioxide in a  catalyst layer. 
It is also effective against certain other toxic gases but it 
cannot prevent asphyxiation in oxygen  deficient surroundings. 
It must  always  be  remembered,  therefore,  that the self-rescuer is 
to serve as  an  escape apparatus only and  that it can only be effec-
tive when  there is enough  oxygen  to support life. 
Research into the fundamental  physico-chemical  characteristics 
of sui  table reagents,  carried out over the las 20  years,  indicates X/2 
that the limitations of the present self-rescuers are unlikely to 
be overcome.  In future only compa.rati  vely minor improvements  are 
likely to be achieved and this f'aot  must  be borne in mind when 
considering future developments. 
Research into  a  fully alternative self-contained breathing 
apparatus to replace the filter self-rescuer has not  so far proved 
wholly successful  (because of weight,  size and operational life) 
but should be  encouraged. 
1.3.  O:rldation of CO  to co2  is an  exothermic reaction and the heat 
produced raises the temperature of the inhaled air when  a  rescuer 
is in use.  The  temperature rise depends  on the concentration ot co. 
The  air paasing thro111gh  the resouer in 4ried a.nd it has been shown 
that men  can breathe dry air at fairly high temperatures without 
undue d.iscom:tort. 
The  heat-exchanger built into the current self-rescuer ensures 
that even at  CO  contents of up  to 1•5% by volume  in the ambient 
atmosphere the temperature of the inhaled air,  although uncomfor-
table,  oa:n  be tolerated. It is generally assumed that post-explo-
sion or fire gases with  CO  concentrations much  in excess of 1•5% 
are likely to be too deficient in oxygen to support life. 
1.4.  Investigations at the National  Coal  Board's Inati  tute of 
Occupational  Jled:icine in Edinburgh have  shown that - because of 
the intense respiratory drive produced by excess  co2 in inhaled 
air - many  men  find the rescuer unwearable in atmospheres with a 
high co2  content. It follows that the wearability of a  rescuer is 
also determined by  the co2  content in addi-tion to the limitations 
imposed by the o2  and co. 
The  filter self-rescuer is mainly intended for use in cases of 
mine fires when  there is sufficient oxygen,  some  carbon dioxide and 
a  dangerous level of carbon monoxide.  Similar conditions  can exist X/3 
after gas or dust  explosions,  especially in airw~ remote 
from  the seat of the blast. In such circumstances the protection 
afforded by a  self-rescuer is invaluable. 
1.5.  The  useful life on  a  self-rescuer cannot be defined by a  single 
figure.  It depends  on  the humidity of the surrounding atmosphere, 
the  CO  content  and the rate of breathing of the wearer,  which is 
in turn dictated by the effort involved in the escape. 
The  mention of the "life" of a  rescuer in official doc1liJlents 
refers to the Test  Life,  determined under specified test conditions 
in a  laboratory.  (See  2.2.1.) 
2.  DESIGN  AND  SPECIFICATION 
2 .1.  General 
All filter self-rescuer• are of the same  basic design and  consist 
of a  head-harness,  nose-clip and a  filter canister with a  mouth-
piece,  housed in a  metal or plastic case.  Tb  prevent ingress of 
moisture the case is hermetically sealed either mechanically at 
atmospheric pressure or under va.cu1liJl.  In a  vacuum-sealed case the 
container and its lid are held together by the ambient  overpress~e 
and fall  apart if the vacuum  is lost. The  tightness of a  case sealed 
at atmospheric pressure is checked by regular weighing or by another 
sui  table method to detect any pick-up of moisture. 
The  actual self-rescuer  itself is fitted with an  exhalation valve 
and may  also have  an inhalation valve.  The  :filter canister contains 
a  la;rer of a  drying agent  and hopcali  te catalyst.  Since the catalyst 
is deactivated by water vapour the  e~fective life of a  rescuer is 
determined by the saturation of the drier. It follows that in a 
given set of conditions the rescuer could be made  to function longer 
by increasing its moisture  absorption oapaci  ty.  In practice this 
means  using more  drying agent. i.e. making the rescuer bigger,  as X/4 
the efficiency of the existing reagent  cannot be improved 
significantly,  in spite of intensive research. 
From  the efficiency standpoint it would be highly desirable to 
develop a  catalyst not affected by moisture. 
2.2.  Physiological Requirements 
The  following minimwn  physiological requirements  should be met 
by filter self-rescuers: 
2.2.1.  Protection against Carbon  MOnoxide 
Using  a. test gas wi1ih  up to 1•5%  by volume  of CO  and with 20•7 
mg/1  ot water vapour the volume  of carbon monoxide  passing through 
the filter after 75  or 15o  minutes * should not  exceed 400  om3 
when  tested on  a  artificial lung set at 1•5 litres per inhalation 
and  20  inhalations per minute.  This requirement determines the 
time during which  a  self-rescuer - under standard conditions -
will provide protection against carbon monoxide 
("physiological test life"). 
Tests at other lung settings,  e.g. 35  1/min  (17•5 x  2•0)  may  be 
useful  as additional tests. 
2.2.2.  Temperature 
When  tested as in 2.2.1. with a  gas mixture containing 1•5 %  CO 
the temperature of the inhaled air shall not  exceed 95°C  (when 
measured by the method  in fig.  2). The  filter must  be so  construc-
ted that the user cannot  suffer burns from  parts that could get hot 
at high CO  concentration. 
-----·--
* Specified by individual  ool.Ultries  according to their national  codes or 
regulations,  which reflect the differences in mining conditions. X/5 
2.2.3.  Breathing Resistance 
2.2.3.1.  Inhalation Resistance 
The  inhalation resistance of the filter must  not  exceed 12•0 
mbar during the test at  a  constant air flow of 94.  1/min or at 
its equivalent under sinusoidal flow conditions with a  minute 
volume of 30 litres when  tested in accordance with 2.2.1. using 
a  test-gas with 0  25%  co.  *• 
2.2.3.2. Exhalation Resistance 
The  exhalation resistance when  tested as in par~aph 2.2.3.1. 
above,  must not exceed 3•0 mbar. 
2.3. Details of Construction 
The  outer case shall provide adequate protection for the rescuer 
and shall be constructed so  as to permit easy external cleaning. 
The  case should be fitted either with a  belt loop or a  shoulder 
strap. In both cases the attachment shall open or break when 
subjected to a  reasonably strong pull to prevent  a  man  being 
trapped by his aelf-rescuer. 
The  stand-off distance of the rescuer from the body when  worn 
on a  belt shall not  exceed 12•0 om,  with a  maximum  horizontal 
cross-section area of 100 om2• 
The  weight of the complete self-rescuer shall not  exceed 1300 g. 
* lfo"bea  !he  CEN  Working  Group  79  is studying the question of resistance of 
breathing apparatus;  lia.son will be maintained with this group to 
ensure uniformity of standards. 2.3.7· 
2.3.8. 
X/6 
The  weight of the respirator (without  nose-clip and head-harness) 
shall not exceed 750  g.  when  it is worn directly on the head of 
the user. 
All materials  used in the construction of the self-rescuer must 
be able to withstand the maximum  test temperatures without gene-
rating any harmtul,  evil-smelling or evil-tasting vapours.  They 
must  not deteriorate during prolonged storage.  The  outer case and 
the closure device must  be corrosion-resistant in underground con-
ditions. 
The  self-rescuers must  be easy to open and simple to put  on in an 
emergency.  In the event of difficulty of removing it from the 
bottom part of its case it shall remain usable in that state. 
The  mouth-piece  ,  provided with 2  "teeth bites", shall be 
designed so  as not to  cause undue discomfort when  worn for the 
rescuer's fUll  effective life. It shall be so made  that in use 
the air inlet cannot be closed. 
2.3.9.  The  head harness shall hold the rescuer securely to the wearer's 
face.  Its design must  permit  easy fit for different-sized heads. 
2.3.-10.  The  nose-clip must  seal the nose effectively. It shall be perma-
nently attached to the respirator and have large pressure pads, 
be  comf'ortable to wear  and easy to apply. 
2.3.11.  A chinguard shall be provided,  if necessary,  to protect the 
wearer's chin from the heat generated in the filter canister. 
2.3.12.  The  exhalation and inhalation  (where fitted) val  vee shall 
function irrespective of the position of the wearer,  be reliable 
and protected against  accidental loosening. X/7 
2.3.13.  A saliva duet shall be provided to  ensure that functioning 
of the filter and valves is not  affected by ingress of saliva. 
2.3.14.  The  self-rescuer shall be provided with filters to prevent 
the entry of dust  and  soot particles into the reagent layers. 
It must  be  ensured that reagent particles do  not  enter the 
mouthpiece. 
2.3.15.  Tb  protect the filter reagents from  moisture during carrying 
the rescuer must  be  sealed against water vapour to  ensure that 
there is no  impairment  of the function of the filter even after 
daily carrying of the rescuer in the pit over a  number  of years. 
2.3.16.  The  self-rescuer must  satisfy all the performance requirements 
even after subjection to  severe shocks  and vibration. 
2.3.17.  The  outer case shall be permanently marked with the serial 
number  and weight of the rescuer and the month  and year of 
manufacture.  Similar markings  m~  also be made  on  the filter 
canister. 




General  Testing Procedures 
Normal  laboratory methods  and  apparatus  shall be used where  no 
special techniques or instruments  are mentioned in the directions 
given below. 
Testing for Compliance  with the  P~ysiologioal Requirements 
Testing of Protection against  CO 
The  test determines whether the filter satisfies the requirements 
2.2.1.  The  test is carried out with  CO  mixture of 0•25%  and 1•5% 
by volume.  (0•25% is the concentration at which the test life of X/8 
a  self-rescuer ia shortest.  Concentration of 1•5%  CO  is 
assumed to be the limiting value above  which  there is unlikely 
to be sufficient oxygen in the atmosphere to support life). 
The  test-rig is depicted in fig.  1  and  consists basically of 
an artificial lung with valves controlled by the lung, 
humidifiers,  the teat-chamber,  the standar4 test connector 
(fig.  2),  flow-meters  for air and co,  the exhaust fan and test 
and  smpling points. 
The  test-rig operates on  the following principle: 
the filter "breathes" through the artificial lung.  The  filter 
is placed in a  box  (chamber)  30  em  long,  30  em  wide  and  26  em 
high.  The  air-flow past the filter must  be at least 100 1/min. 
The  admixture of CO  is by means  of a  regulating valve and  a 
flow-meter.  The  CO  concentration must  be  monitored either with 
a  continuous  analyser or by repeated check tests. In order to 
enrich the test gas with water vapour,  it is passed through  a 
humidifier.  Psychrometric measurements  are carried out to ensure 
that the prescribed water vapour content of the gas is maintained. 
The  temperature of the test gas  ( tt) should be approximately 
25-30  °C. 
The  filter is attached to the standard connector.  The  gas 
temperature is measured in the connector at the specified 
point,  with a  thermocouple. 
The  exhaled air should have  a  temperature of 25/30  °C  and be 
saturated with water vapour.  This temperature is measured before 
starting the test  (at the same  point in the connector as for the 
inhaled air temperature).  The  contact thermometer regulating this 
temperature is adjusted by separating the test-rig from  the 
artificial lung,  closing the inhalation path (e.g.  with a  bung) X/9 
and passing a  constant 30  1/min airstream through the exhaled 
air line. 
The  volume  of the test-rig- measured between the artificial 
lung connection and the mouthpiece of the self-reecuer - must 
not  exceed 2 litres. Wherever possible rigid tubing should be 
used to  connect together the different parts of the test rig 
The  setting of the artificial lung to the prescribed breathing volume 
is made  with a  gas meter  (volume  meter)  connected into the system 
in series with a  flow restrictor.  This restrictor mus  have  a  value 
of a. 0  mba:r  in a  constant  airstream of 94  1 /min. 
3.2.2.  Test of Protection against High Temperatures 
This test checks the  compliance with the requirements of para 
2.2.2.  The  measurement  of inhaled air temperature is made  as 
described in 3.2.1.  at  a  CO  content of the mixture of 1•5%  and 
a  moisture content of 20•7  mg/1.  The  thermocouple used for this 
purpose is as indicated in Figure 2. 
Tb  checkthat the rescuer does not  cause skin burns  a  test is 
carried out in the following w~: 
When  the self-rescuer reaches  a  constant temperature in the 
test 3. 2 .1. with 1 •  5%  CO  mixture it is removed  from  the teat 
rig and worn  immediately by one  of the testers.  This test must 
be repeated at least 4  times with different self-rescuers and 
different people.  It must  not  cause any skin burns. 
3.2.3.  Testing of the Breathing Resistance 
The  test checks the  compliance with para 2.2.3.  and is carried 
out  on the apparatus  shown  in fig.  3. X/10 
A steady air stream of 94  1/min is aspirated through the 
apparatus.  The  flow is set by means  of a  standard diaphragm 
to DIN  1952  and a  fine manometer. 
The  inhalation resistance is measured with a  manometer after 
attaching the mouthpiece of the rescuer  (with its exhalation 
valve sealed) to the apparatus via a  sui  table connector.  Any 
blank value  (arising from the shape of the connector)  must  be 
subtracted from the result.  The  inhalation resistance is determined 
immediately before the test and  not later than 30 seconds 
after the test carried out in accordance with 2.2.1. 
The  exhalation resistance is measured in a  similar manner 
on a  ready-for-use rescuer connected to the apparatus by means 
of a  sui  table connector.  The  resul.  t  mwt be  corrected for any 
zero  error arising from the shape of the connector. 
A continuous measurement  of breathing resistances during the 
test 3.2.1.  m~  also be used. 
3.3.  Pgysical  Tests 
General 
When  testing for compliance with the requirements set out in 
para.  2.3. the normal  laboratory practice shall be followed, 
as wll  as  any relevant  standard specifications of the country 
concerned. 
Individual  countries mey  wish to set  a  limit to the amount 
of re!gent fines introduced into the self-rescuer during the 
manufacturing stage.  At  the moment  such  a  requirement is applied 
only in Britain. X/11 
3.3.3. ·  The  adequacy of the resistance to  impact of the rescuers is 
tested in Germany  by submitting rescuers to  50,000 impacts in a 
vibrator and  then determining their teat lives on  the lung 
machine. 
In Britain self-rescuers are tumbled in a  cement  mixer to 
determine the amount  of reagent fines emitted.  A life-test 
normally follows. 
It is desirable to develop - on  a  European basis - a  teat 
that would more  closely simulate 1;he  oondi  tiona the rescuers 
are exposed to during their daily carrying underground. 
3.4.  Carrying Trials 
New  types of rescuers having passed the above tests will have 
to undergo  a  field acceptance trial to supplement  the laboratory 
results.  A minimum  of 20  rescuers should be available for this 
purpose.  They  will be carried underground for every working ~ 
for a  minimwn  of 150 shifts.  The  men  carrying these rescuers 
should be  chosen to represent a  cross-section of underground 
workers.  Their comments  and  views  shall be taken into account 
when  making  a  final  assessment of the praoticabili  ty of a  new 
self-rescuer for everyday use. 
3.5.  Routine  Acceptance  Testing 
In Bri1;ain the production testing of rescuers is carried out 
in Scotland on  a  national basis.  Apart  from  supervision of the 
manufacturing process by the National  Coal  Board's Factory 
Inspectors a  lo% sample of daily production is examined by 
Scientific Control,  with a  proportion of the sample subjected 
to the lung-similator test. X/12 
In the German  Federal  Republic the quality control is 
exercised by the Hauptstelle fUr  das Grubenrettungswesen in 
Easen.  In Belgium the responsible authority is the Institute 
National de  Industrie Extractive  (INIEX). 
Different industrial practices and conditions in the member 
countries make it impracticable at this stage to suggest  a 
common  routine acceptance testing programme.  It is, therefore, 
recommended  that some  form  of routine quality control of newly-
made  self-rescuers should be adopted,  but that it should be 
left to the individual member  states to specify how  this 















FIGURE  1 
Installation d'essai 
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Poumon  artificiel  1. 
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FIGURE  2 
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endroit  de  mesure  supplementaire  3. 
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chambre  d'essai en plastique) 
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Figure 2,2. 
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Figure  3 
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de  la resistance  respiratoire 
FIGURE  1 
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FIGURE  2 
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Figu.re  2.1. 
Connector 
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40%  Palladium/Gold 0,122  mn  dia) 
Fixing plate 
Figure  3 
Test-Rig for Breathing Resistance 
A.  Dispositif de  mesure  A.  General  Arrangement 
B.  Mesure  de  la resistance a  B.  l'~easuring system for resistance 
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4•  Precision manometer 
Measuring system for resistance 
to  exhalation 
5.  Filter 
6.  Connector containing tappings 
for the  precision manometer 
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1  Rohr  1" 
2  MeBstelle  ftir  die kontinuierliche 
Atemwiderstandsmessung 
3  Zusatzliche TemperaturmeBstelle 
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4  Testkammerwand 
5  Verbindungssttick 
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6  Gegensttick X/17 
Abbildung  2.1 
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2  Standardblende  gemaB  Dl~ 1952 
3  Differenzdruckmanometer 
4  Feindruckmanometer 
Abbildung  3 
Schema  der  MeBanlage 
ftir  den  Atemwiderstand 
C  Ausa temwidera tandsmes.;un;.: 
5  Filtergerat 
6  Verbindungssttick 
7  Dichtkappe  fur  das 
Ausatemventil ANNEX  XI 
BIBLIOGRAPHY  OF  THE  WORK  OF  THE  MINES 
SAFETY  AND  HEALTH  COMMISSION XI/2 
A.  MINE  RESCUE,  FIRES  AND  UNDERGROUND  COMBUSTION 
I.  - Mine  rescue 
1.  Organization  of  mine  rescue  arrangements 
- Report  on  tour  of central  rescue  stations  in  the  Community 
countries  and  Great  Britain  (First Report  on  the  organ-
ization of  mine  rescue  services  1958/59)  (2nd  Report  of 
the  Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission,  Annex  B,  June 
1961) i 
Second  Report  on  the  organization  of  mine  rescue  services, 
1960  (3rd  Report  of  the  MSHC,  Annex  V  a,  November  1966); 
- Third  Report  on  the  organization  of  mine  rescue  services, 
1961  (3rd  Report  of  the  MSHC,  Annex  VI  a,  November  1966); 
- Fourth  Report  on  the  organization  of  mine  rescue  services, 
196 2  .( 3 rd  Report  of  the  MSHC,  Annex  VI I  a,  November  196 6) ; 
Fifth Report  on  the  organization of  mine  rescue  services, 
1963  and  1964  (3rd  Report  of  the  MSHC,  Annex  VIII  a, 
November  1966); 
- Sixth  Report  on  the  organization of  mine  rescue  services, 
1965/66  (5th  Report  of  the  MSHC,  Annex  v,  October  1968); 
- Seventh  Report  on  the  organization  of  mine  rescue  services, 
1967/68,  •(7th  Report  of  the  MSHC,  Annex  IV,  September 
1970); 
Recommendatio~regarding the  provision  of  advice  from 
foreign  experts  in  the  case  of  major  accidents  (3rd  Report 
of  the  MSHC,  Annex  III,  November  1966); 
- Communication  links  between  the  rescue  base  and  the  rescue 
team  ( 3 rd  Report  of  the  MSHC  IV,  Annex  IV, . November  19 66) ; 
- List of  regulations  and  directives  concerning  the  organ-
ization  of  mine  rescue  services  in  the  countries  of  the 
Community  and  the  United  Kingdom  (Doc.  3845/1/70;  to  be 
published  in  the  9th  Report  of  the  MSHC). 
2.  Rescue  equipment 
- Interim  report  on  the  continued  development  of  the  co-
filter self-rescuer  (Doc.  1872/68/1,  10th  October  1968); 
- Results  of  the  research  carried out  with  financial  assis-
tance  from  the  Commission  of  the  European  Communities 
into  the  improvement  of  the  physiological  conditions  for 
the  wearing  of  breathing  apparatus  (8th  Report  of  the 
MSHC,  Annex  IV,  June  1971). 
- First report  on  filter  self-rescuers  for  use  in  coal 
mines  in  the  European  Community  countries  - Part  I 
minimum  design  requirements  and  testing  procedures  (13th 
Report  of  the  MSHC,  Annex  x,  1976). Xl/3 
A.  MINE  RESCUE,  FIRES  AND  UNDERGROUND  COMBUSTION  (cont'd) 
3.  Research  work  at high  temperatures 
- Final  report  on  research  into  the  establishment of  simple 
criteria for  the  selection of  rescue  team  personnel  for 
heavy  work  in high  temperatures  (3rd  Report  of  the  MSHC, 
Annex  IX  a,  November  1966). 
4.  Rescue  with  boreholes 
- List  of  specialists  for  borehole  rescue  work  and  equipment 
available  in  Community  countries  (8th  Report  of  the  MSHC, 
Annex  III,  June  1971,  revised  giving  position  as  at 
1.1.76.  (13th  Report  of  the  MSHC,  Annex  VI,  1976). 
II.  - Fires  and  underground  combustion 
1.  Shaft  fires  at great  depth 
- Recommendation  on  the  equipment  having  regard  to  the 
prevention of  open  fires  {1st  Report  of  the  MSHC,  April 
1959); 
- Fighting  of  fires  in  shafts  by  bringing  in  water  (2nd 
Report  of  the  MSHC,  page  24,  June  1961);  see  also 
modification  contained  in  10th  Report  of  MSHC,  Annex  VI, 
June  1972. 
- Final  report  on  experiments  with  shaft fires  carried out 
by  the  Experimental  Roadway  Association  in  Dortmund, 
with  the  financial  aid of  the  High  Authority,  at Dorst-
feld Colliery,  Dortmund  (3rd  Report  of  the  MSHC,  Annex 
III  a,  November  1966); 
- Explanatory  notes  and  views  of  the  Working  Parties  on 
Underground  Combustion  and  Fires  and  Mine  Rescue  Organ-
ization,  and  their expert  sub-committees,  concerning  the 
final  report  of  the  Experiment~! Roadway  Association, 
Dortmund,  on  the  shaft  fire  experiment at Dorstfeld 
Colliery.  (3rd  Report  of  the  MSHC,  Annex  III b,  November 
1966). 
2.  Fire  stoppings  (dams) 
- Sealing-off of  mine  fires  and  underground  combustion  by 
dams  (2nd  Report  of  the  MSHC,  page  51,  June  1961); 
- Report  on  trials with  explosion-proof  dams  carried out 
by  the  Experimental  Roadway  Association  in  Dortmund  at  the 
request  of  the  Safety  Commission  and  with  financial  aid 
of  the  High  Authority  - Statement  of  policy  regarding  the 
erection of  advance  dams  of plaster as  a  fire  fighting 
measure  (3rd  Report  of  the  MSHC,  Annex  I,  November  1966); XI/4 
A.  MINE  RESCUE,  FIRES  AND  UNDERGROUND  COMBUSTION  {cont'd) 
- Final  Report  on  trials with  explosion-proof  dams,  carried 
out  by  the  Experimental  Roadway  Association  in  Dortmund 
with  the  financial  aid  of  the  High  Authority  {3rd  Report 
of  the  MSHC,  Annex  I  a,  November  1966); 
- Instructions  for  the  construction  of plaster  stoppings  by 
the  method  developed  by  the  Essen-Kray  Main  Rescue  Station 
{3rd  Report  of  the  MSHC,  Annex  X  a,  November  1966); 
- Instructions  for  the  hydro-mechanical  method  of  construct-
ing  plaster stoppings  developed  from  the  Central  rescue 
station of  the  Saarbergwerke  AG  (8th  Report  of  the  MSHC, 
Annex  V,  June  1971). 
3.  Fire-resistant fluids 
- Report  on the  establishment of criteria for  fire-resistant 
fluids  for  power  transmission  (Hydraulic  fluids)  and  on 
the  tests  to  be  carried out  for  that  purpose  (2nd  Report 
of  the  MSHC,  Annex  A,  June  1971); 
- Second  Report  on  specifications  and  testing  conditions 
relating  to  fire-resistant  fluids  used  for  power  trans-
mission  (3rd  Report  of  the  MSHC,  Annex  IV  a,  November 
19 66) ; 
- Third  Report  on  specifications  and  testing  conditions 
relating  to  fire-resistant  fluids  for  power  transmission 
(pamphlet  10th  October,  1967); 
- Fourth  Report  on  specifications  and  testing  conditions 
relating  to  fire-resistant  fluids  for  power  transmission 
(pamphlet  26th  March  1971); 
- Fifth Report  on  specifications  and  testing conditions 
relating  to  fire-resistant  fluids  for  power  transmission 
(pamphlet  November  1974). 
4.  The  reopening  of  fire  areas 
- Report  on  the  opening  of  sealed-off  fire  areas  and  the 
rules  applicable  thereto  (3rd  Report  of  the  MSHC,  Annex 
II,  November  1966); 
- Study  on  the  reopening  of  sealed-off  fire  areas  by 
Bergassessor  a.D.G.  Lehmann  (3rd  Report  of  the  MSHC, 
Annex  II  a,  November  1966). 
5.  Use  of  urethane  foam  for  sealing 
Opinion  on  the  use  underground  of  polyurethane  foam  in  the 
coal_mining  industry  (7th  Report  of  the  MSHC,  Annex  VI, 
September  1970). XI/5 
A.  MINE  RESCUE,  FIRES  AND  UNDERGROUND  COMBUSTION(cont'd) 
6.  Conveyor  belts 
- First report  on  tests  and  criteria of  flammability  of 
conveyor  belts  with  fabric  cores  used  in  the  coal  mines 
of  the  European  Community  (12th  Report  of  the  MSHC,  Annex 
VI,  July  1975). Xl/6 
B.  WINDING  ENGINES,  WINCHES,  ROPES  AND  SHAFT  GUIDES 
Report  on  the  electro-magnetic  examination  of  winding 
ropes  {3rd  Report  of  the  MSHC,  Annex  VI,  November  1966); 
Final  report  on  electro-magnetic  tests  carried out with 
the  financial  aid  of  the  High  Authority  in  the  Bochum 
Rope-testing  Station  {3rd  Report  of  the  MSHC,  Annex  XI  a, 
November  1966); 
Report  on  the  use  of  accelerometers  for  testing winding 
installations  {3rd  Report  of  the  MSHC,  Annex  V,  November 
1966) ; 
Report  on  measurement  and  testing procedures  for  shaft-
and  roadway  winding  ropes  and  for  guides  for  shaft- and 
roadway  haulage  installations  (7th  Report  of  the  MSHC, 
Annex  VII,  September  1970); 
Report  of  the  Rope  Testing  Office  of  the  Westfalische 
Berggewerkschaftskasse  Bochum  on  rope  testing means  and 
procedures  for  improving  safety in  mine  shafts  and  road-
ways  employing  rope  haulage  (10th  Report  of  the  MSHC, 
Annex  v,  June  1973); 
Summary  of  current  techniques  in  shaft winding  and  rope 
haulage  with  special  reference  to  the  design  of  winding 
engines  (ARNOLD)  (printed  separately,  July  1975); 
The  safety  requirements  for  brakes  on  winding  engines  and 
winches  in  the  shaft  winding  plant  of  the  German  mining 
industry  (HAUSLER)  (printed  separately,  July  1975); 
Shaft winding  and  safety  (HOISCHEN)  (printed separately, 
July  1975); 
Minimum  safety  requirements  for  winding  and  balance  rope 
suspension  gear,  for  shaft winding  and  sinking  install-
ations  (13th  Report  of  the  MSHC,  Annex  VII,  1976); 
Information  report  "New  aspects  of  the  testing  of  ropes 
in  winding  installation subject to  high  and  maximum 
stress"  by  Dr  Ing.  ARNOLD,  Seilprftfstelle der  West-
falischen  Berggewerkschaftskasse,  Bochum  (13th  Report  of 
the  MSHC,  Annex  VII,  1976). XI/7 
C.  ELECTRICITY 
Decision  on  the  removal  of oil  from  resistors,  condensers, 
transformers,  switches  and  relays  used  underground  (1st 
Report  of  the  MSHC,  April  1959); 
The  use  of  non-flammable  materials  for  the  manufacture  of 
electric cables  and  leads  for  underground  use  (2nd  Report 
of  the  MSHC,  paqe  5,  June  1961); 
Requirements  which  must  be  met  by  electrical shotfirinq 
leads  (2nd  Report  of  the  MSHC,  page  8,  June  1961); 
Protection of  the  underground  electrical  network  against 
the  danger  of  electric  shocks  (2nd  Report  of  the  MSHC, 
page  11,  June  1961) ; 
Report  on  investigations  into  the  protection of  under-
ground  electrical network  against  dangers  arising  from 
fires  or  from  firedamp  explosions  (3rd  Report  MSHC,  Annex 
VII,  November  1966); 
Report  on  firedamp-proof  electrical  switchgear  for  nominal 
voltages  above  1100  volts  (3rd  Report  of  the  MSHC,  Annex 
VIII,  November  1966); 
Notes  on  the  problem  of  heat  transmission  in  an  insulated 
conductor  (3rd  Report  of  the  MSHC,  Annex  IX,  November 
1 96 6) ; 
Report  on  characteristic~  and  the  electrical protection 
of  power  feed  cables  for  mobile  machines  (cutters, 
loaders,  etc.)  used  underground  in  the  coal  mines  of  the 
countries  of  the  Community  (7th  Report  of  the  MSHC, 
Annex  v,  September  1970); 
Comments  and  recommendations  arising out  of  the  report 
adopted  by  the  Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission  on  20 
June  1969  on  the  characteristics  and  electrical protection 
of  cables  supplying  mobile  machines  (coal  cutters,  loading 
machines  etc.)  used  underground  in  coal  mines  in  the 
Community  countries  (8th  Report  of  the  MSHC,  Annex  IX, 
June  1971); 
Policy statement  on  the  deleterious  effects  of  dust-binding 
processes  using  saline  pastes  and  powders  upon  electrical 
plant  underground  (9th  Report  of  the  MSHC,  Annex  IX, 
July  1972); 
Comparison  of  safety provisions  concerning  electric trolley 
locomotives  underground  and  in particular,  possibilities 
of  reducing  the  incidence  of  trolley sparks  (9th  Re.port 
of  the  MSHC,  Annex  X,  July  1972); 
Report  and  conclusions  on  overvoltages  caused  by  l!ghtning 
(9th  Report  of  the  MSHC,  Annex  XI,  July  1972); XI/8 
C.  ELECTRICITY  (cont'd) 
Report  on  trends  in  the  use  of  explosion-proof electrical 
apparatus  for  nominal  voltages  above  1100  volts;  con-
clusions  and  recommendations  (10th  Report  of  the  MSHC, 
Annex  VIII,  June  1973); 
Report  and  conclusions  on  Haulage  powered  by  linear 
motors  (11th  Report  of  the  MSHC,  Annex  IX,  May  1974); 
Decisions  of  the  Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission 
concerning  materials  to  be  used,  and  specifications  for 
the  construction  of electrical apparatus  for  use  in  mines 
which  are  liable  to  be  affected  by  firedamp; 
- Surface  temperatures  of  caseings  (See  12th  Report, 
Annex.VIII,  July  1975) 
- Oil  immersed  contacts  in  switchgear  (See  12th  Report, 
Annex  VIII,  July  1975) 
- Provisions  for  locking  off  apparatus  in  the  open-
circuit condition  (See  12th  Report,  Annex  VIII,  July 
1975) 
- Use  of  Light Alloys  (See  13th  Report,  Annex  IX,  1976) 
which  will  be  taken  into  account  in  the  preparation  of  a 
European  Standard  by  the  CENELEC  committee  (European 
Committee  for  Electrotechnical  Standardization). 
D.  INFLAMMABLE  DUSTS 
Report  on  work  done  on  the  neutralization  of  combustible 
dusts  and  dust barriers  (7th  Report  of  the  MSHC,  Annex 
VIII,  September  1970); 
Memorandum  on  information  necessary  for  the  examination 
of  coaldust  explosions  or  ignitions  of  firedamp  in  mines 
(10th  Report  of  the  MSHC,  Annex  VII,  June  1973); 
Information  Report  on  'Dust  binding  by  means  of  salt 
pastes,  powders  and  flakes•  (11th  Report  of  the  MSHC, 
Annex~VI,  May  1974); 
Information  Report  on  •water  trough  barriers  for  protection 
against  underground  explosions  of  coal-dust  (11th  Report 
of  the  MSHC,  Annex  VII,  May  1974); 
Report  on  triggered barriers  and  recommendations  for  their 
use  underground  (11th  Report  of  the  MSHC,  Annex  VIII, 
May  1974). xi/9 
E.  MECHANIZATION 
Recommendations  concerning  the  equipment  of  locomotives 
(1st  Report  of  the  MSHC,  April  1959); 
Recommendations  concerning  the  neutralization of  exhaust 
gases  from  diesel  engines  (1st  Report  of  the  MSHC,  April 
1959). 
F.  HEALTH  PROTECTION  AND  ENVIRONMENTAL  FACTORS 
Explanatory  notes  to  the  recommendation  on  "Fixing  of 
climatic  limits" .(3rd  Report  of  the  MSHC,  Annex  X, 
November  1966); 
Recommendation  on  "Fixing  of climatic  limits"  (3rd  Report 
of  the  MSHC,  Annex  XI,  November  1966); 
Recommendation  embodying  directives  on  means  of  suppressing 
dust  concentrations  in  underground  workings  (8th  Report 
of  the  MSHC,  Annex  VI,  June  1971); 
Recommendation  on  the  organization of  special  services 
responsible  for  the  inspection of  dust  conditions  in 
underground  working  (8th  Report  of  the  MSHC,  Annex  VII, 
June  1971) ; 
Statement  on  the  need  to  reduce  the  dust  concentration 
resulting  from  the  use  of  coal-cuttings  and  getting 
machinery  and  roadway  drivage  (8th  Report  of  the  MSHC, 
Annex  VIII,  June  1971); 
Guidelines  concerning  the  Design  and  Use  of Coal  Getting 
and  Heading  Machines,  relating  to  the  reduction  of  air-
borne  dust  (11th  Report  of  the  MSHC,  Annex  XI,  May  1974); 
Examples  of  proven  and  effective  methods  of  installing  and 
operating  water  sprays  on  plough  faces  (Annex  to  the  guide 
lines  concerning  the  design  and  use  of  coal  getting  and 
heading  machines,  relating  to  the  reduction  of  airborne 
dust,  which  were  printed  as  Annex  XI  to  the  11th  Report) 
(12th  Report  of  the  MSHC,  Annex  VII,  July  1975). 
G.  HUMAN  FACTORS 
1.  Psychological  and  sociological  factors  in  mine  safety 
- Report  on  the  psychological  and  sociological  factors 
affecting  safety  (3rd  Report  of  the  MSHC,  .Annex  XII, 
November  1966); XI/10 
G.  HUMAN  FACTORS  (cont'd) 
- Recommendations  on  the  psychological  and  sociological 
factors  affecting  safety  (3rd  Report  of  the  MSHC, 
Annex  XIII,  November  1966); 
2.  Effects  of  remuneration  methods  on  safety 
- Report  on  the  implications  of  payment  at piece  rates  for 
mine  safety  (4th  Report  of  the  MSHC,  Annex  III,  December 
196  7) ; 
- Recommendations  as  to  principles  to  be  observed  in  view 
of  the  possible  influence  of  payment  at piece  rates  on 
safety in  coal  mines  (4th  Report  of  the  MSHC,  Annex  IV, 
December  1967). 
3.  Medical  Pxoblems 
- Report  on  pre-entry  and  routine  medical  examinations  and 
recommendations  (2nd  Report  of  the  MSHC,  page  74,  June 
1961) ; 
- Colliery  medical  services  in  the  countries  of  the  Community 
and  the  United  Kingdom  (2nd  Report  of  the  MSHC,  Annex  c, 
June  1961). 
H.  VENTILATION  AND  FIREDAMP 
- Study  of  the  Group  of  Experts  on  Ventilation Stabili-
zation  of  Ventilation  in Pit Fires  - investigation  in  the 
light of  Prof.  Budryk's  theory  (this  study  consists  of 
two  separate parts:  the  Report  itself and  Annex  III  to  the 
6th  Report  of  the  MSHC,  September  1966); 
- Practical  conclusions  of  the  application  of  the  theory  of 
stabilization of ventilation  (6th  Report  of  the  MSHC, 
Annex  III,  September  1969); 
- Circular  181  of  the  Belgian Ministry  of  Economic  Affairs 
relating  to  the  prevention of outbursts  of  Firedamp 
(11th  Report  of  the  MSHC,  Annex  X,  May  1974); 
- Conditions  under  which  exemption  might  be  granted  to  raise 
maximum  permitted  CH4  limits  in  Member  States  (Annex  V). XI/11 
J.  STRATA  CONTROL 
- Notes  concerning  the  statistical comparison  of  serious 
and  fatal  accidents  due  to  falls  of  ground  in  the 
bituminous  coal  mining  industry  of  the  European  Communities 
and  Great  Britain  (11th  Report  of  the  MSHC,  Annex  XII, 
May  1974); 
- Notes  on  operating statistics in  the  coal  mining  industry 
of  the  European  Community  countries  as  established  for 
1972  (11th  Report  of  the  MSHC,  Annex  XIII,  May  1974). OFFICE FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 
Boite postale  1003- Luxembourg  7492 